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SUMMARY 
The common law right of the accused to be protected against double jeopardy 
recently acquired constitutional status in South Africa. Although South African 
courts previously applied this rule in various procedural contexts, there has been 
very little critical discussion of the values on which the rule is based. Nor have all 
contexts in which the rule should be applied been recognised. In the light of the 
new constitutional dispensation, it has become necessary to identify and analyse 
the values which determine the application of the rule. 
This thesis addresses the treatment of various aspects of double jeopardy in other 
constitutionally·grounded jurisdictions. Double jeopardy jurisprudence in the 
jurisdictions of England, Canada, India, Germany and the federal system of the 
United States of America is considered on a comparative basis. The historical 
origin and development of the rule are considered first. This is followed by an 
assessment of the current application of the rule in the various jurisdictions. 
The study demonstrates that South African courts have relied largely on outdated 
principles derived from English common law, rather than applying the rule by 
focusing on the values that underlie the rule. This approach has become 
unacceptable in the new constitutional dispensation, inter alia, because a 
teleological, value·orientated interpretative approach has been adopted by the 
Constitutional Court. This thesis indicates which of the principles that developed 
in foreign constitutional double jeopardy jurisprudence may be of value in 
developing an appropriate body of South African constitutional double jeopardy 
principles. Proposals are made for future implementation of the rule in various 
procedural contexts. These suggestions include constitutional interpretation, 
legislative amendment and re·evaluation of various common law principles of 
criminal procedure. 
Key words: double jeopardy; res judicata; autrefois acquit; autrefois convict; issue 
estoppal; plea of former jeopardy; appeal; retrial; finality in criminal proceedings. 
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PART ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1 . 1 The double jeopardy rule - its origin and rationale 
The procedural right of the accused not to be tried more than once 
for the same matter is the most ancient of all procedural guarantees. 
The earliest known formulation of the rule is that by the Greek 
statesman and orator, Demosthenes. It is recorded that in the year 
355 BC Demosthenes stated that 1 
the laws forbid the same man to be tried twice on the same 
issue ... 
In Roman law, the rule evolved into a separate doctrine, known as 
the doctrine of res judicata. 2 This doctrine was also received into 
common law in England. However, the idea of a prohibition on 
relitigation of the same issue attained particular significance at that 
stage in English legal history when the state began to institute action 
against an individual at its own discretion. It was during this period 
(towards the thirteenth century) that the rule realised its most 
important function: the prevention of abuse by the state of the 
11 Demosthenes 589 (J Vince translation 4th ed 1970) cited by Mr 
Justice Rehnquist in the United States Supreme Court case of Whalen 
v us 445 us 684, 699 ( 1980). 
2See chapter two infra under 2. 1 for a discussion of the doctrine of res 
judicata as developed in Roman law. 
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criminal process. 3 By placing certain restraints on the prosecutor's 
powers to institute criminal proceedings, the rule gradually developed 
into a powerful instrument to protect the individual against the 
arbitrary exercise of state power. 
It is to be expected that a rule of such antiquity would by now have 
been thoroughly simplified and refined. On the contrary, the rule can 
be described as one of the most complex and least understood areas 
in the field of criminal procedure. In South African law, the rule 
(applied in a number of procedural contexts) has also given rise to a 
fair amount of confusion.4 This confusion can be ascribed to a failure 
of our courts to focus on the values which underlie the rule. 
The common law rule against double jeopardy recently acquired 
constitutional status in South Africa. Section 35(3)(m) of the 1996 
Constitution5 provides that 
[e]very accused person has a right to a fair trial, which 
includes the right not to be tried for an offence in respect 
of an act or omission for which that person has 
previously been either acquitted or convicted. 6 
3See chapter two infra under 2.3.1 for a discussion of the 
development of the rule in common law. 
4See for instance chapter four infra under 4.6. 7 for the different 
interpretations by our courts of the standard for determining the 
permissibility of multiple trials as proposed by the Appellate Division 
in S v Ndou 1971 (1) SA 668 (A). 
5Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 Act 108 of 1996. 
6The Afrikaans version reads as follows: "Elke beskuldigde persoon 
het die reg op 'n billike verhoor, waarby inbegrepe is die reg om nie 
verhoor te word weens 'n oortreding ten opsigte van 'n handeling of 
versuim ten opsigte waarvan daardie persoon voorheen vrygespreek 
of skuldig bevind is nie". 
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At the time of writing this thesis, the provision has not been 
interpreted by the Constitutional Court. Since the rule against double 
jeopardy is now an entrenched fundamental human right, it has 
become essential once again to give consideration to the values 
which underlie the rule as well as to the objectives it seeks to achieve. 
The purpose of this thesis is, inter alia, to identify. thav.alues which 
underlie the rule. This is done by tracing the historical development 
of the rule as well as considering contemporary applications of the rule 
in certain foreign jurisdictions. 
The systems of criminal justice considered on a comparative basis 
in this thesis are the English, Canadian, Indian and German systems as 
well as the American federal system. The treatment of double jeopardy 
issues in these jurisdictions is compared to the South African approach 
for the following reasons. Firstly, the South African law of criminal 
procedure is a hybrid system based on the common law and Roman-
Dutch law. All the systems considered in this thesis, except the 
German system, derive from the common law. The German system 
is essentially founded on principles of Roman law. The Roman law 
principles of res judicata were also received (via Roman-Dutch law) 
into the South African law of criminal procedure. Secondly, all the 
systems considered on a comparative basis in this thesis, except the 
English system, have written constitutions with Bills of Rights. 
Moreover, these constitutions are all based on the same values. In 
fact, the drafters of the Bill of Rights of the South African 
Constitution7 have drawn extensively on the provisions of the Bills of 
Rights of these various constitutions. 8 Thirdly, since the inception 
7Act 108 of 1996. 
8This is apparent from the reports of the Technical Committee 
entrusted with the task of drafting a Bill of Rights for the new South 
African order. See Overview of method of work prepared by Technical 
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of the interim Constitution9 in 1993, South African courts, in 
interpreting fundamental human rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights, 
have focused primarily on the interpretation of similar rights by courts 
in these particular jurisdictions. 10 
Section 39 of the South African Constitution 11 provides that in 
interpreting the Bill of Rights a court must consider international law 
and may consider foreign law. 12 In one of the first cases handed 
down by the Constitutional Court, the President of the court, Justice 
Chaskalson, recognised that in interpreting the provisions of the Bill 
of Rights the courts may draw on "[c]omparative 'bill of rights' 
jurisprudence ... particularly in the early stages of the transition when 
there is no developed indigenous jurisprudence in this branch of the 
law on which to draw" .13 However, he cautioned that although the 
Bill permits consideration of foreign law, the latter will not necessarily 
offer a safe guide to the interpretation of the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights. 14 
Committee of Theme Committee Four obtained from the Internet at 
http://www.constitution.org.za (hereinafter referred to as Report -
Theme Committee four). 
9Act 200 of 1993. 
10South African courts have also considered the interpretation of 
fundamental human rights entrenched in the Constitution of Namibia. 
The treatment of double jeopardy issues in the Namibian system is not 
considered in this study because, at the time of writing of this thesis, 
the double jeopardy provision of the Namibian Constitution has not as 
yet been interpreted. 
11Act 108 of 1996. 
12Section 39( 1 )(b and (c). 
13See S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) para 37. 
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The aspects of double jeopardy considered in this thesis have not as 
yet featured in international law. They have, however, featured 
prominently in the systems of criminal procedure considered on a 
comparative basis in this thesis. It is submitted that in order to 
consider the constitutionality of certain rules and practices of criminal 
procedure in South Africa which involve double jeopardy issues, the 
courts might benefit substantially from a knowledge ofthe treatment 
of these issues in the jurisdictions of England, Canada, India, Germany 
and America. 
In Park-Ross v Director: Office for Serious Economic Offences 15 
a division of the Supreme Court16 recognised the value of foreign 
jurisprudence. However, the court (per Tebbutt J) cautioned that 
regard to foreign jurisprudence should be exercised "with 
circumspection because of the different contexts within which other 
constitutions were drafted, the different social structures and milieu 
existing in those countries ... and the different historical backgrounds 
against which the various constitutions came into being" .17 The 
court added that18 
one must be wary of the danger of unnecessarily 
importing doctrines associated with those constitutions 
151995 (2) SA 148 (C) 160F-G. 
161n terms of section 166 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) a provincial or local division of the 
Supreme Court is now referred to as a High Court. The Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court is referred to as the Supreme Court of 
Appeal. The 1996 Constitution came into force at the beginning of 
1997. Therefore, where reference is made to South African cases 
decided at a stage before the Act came into force, the various courts 
will be referred to by their previous names. 
17 At 160G-H. 
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into an inappropriate South African setting. The South 
African Constitution must be interpreted within the 
context and historical background of the South African 
setting. 
In Berg v Prokureur-Generaal van Gauteng 19 Eloff JP criticised the 
applicant (and to a lesser degree the respondent) for relying on 
decisions of inter alia Canadian, American and English courts without 
also providing comprehensive information about the systems of 
criminal procedure which prevail in those jurisdictions. 20 The court 
pointed out that without this information, it could not be inferred 
solely from the wording of a particular provision of the Bill of Rights 
that a foreign case was in fact of comparable value. 21 
This thesis purports to indicate which of the principles developed in 
foreign constitutional double jeopardy jurisprudence may be of value 
in developing an appropriate body of South African constitutional 
double jeopardy principles. The different systems of criminal 
procedure followed in the various jurisdictions are investigated 
exhaustively and full information is given of the basic procedural 
approaches followed in the various systems. Their double jeopardy 
rules are contextualised. This is done in order to identify which 
foreign principles of double jeopardy may be regarded as valid also in 
the South African system of criminal procedure and which principles 
cannot be reconciled with our own system of criminal justice. This 
research is in accordance with the suggestions made by Eloff JP in the 
Berg case. 
191995(11) BCLR 1441 (T). 
20At 1445G-H. 
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A valuable consequence of this study is the following. 
Consideration of constitutional double jeopardy jurisprudence in foreign 
jurisdictions reveals that certain rules have effectively protected the 
accused against double jeopardy, while others have been less effective 
and even unworkable, once applied in a practical situation. 22 This 
study purports to highlight also the dangers and pitfalls of adopting 
certain foreign principles into South African law, even if these 
principles may be reconcilable with our own system of criminal justice. 
1.2 Field and general scheme of study 
In South Africa, as well as in other jurisdictions, the double jeopardy 
rule has featured in inter alia the following areas of criminal procedure 
(a) recharging of an accused in a second proceeding of the identical 
offence of which he has previously been acquitted or convicted 
(b) recharging of an accused in a second proceeding of a different 
offence to the one of which he has previously been acquitted 
or convicted, albeit for an offence arising from the same facts 
as those relating to the offence previously charged 
(c) relitigation of issues as opposed to actions (issue estoppel) 
(d) state appeals against acquittals on various grounds 
(e) state appeals against sentences imposed on convicted accused 
(f) the institution of new proceedings against accused whose 
convictions have been set aside by courts of appeal 
(g) imposition of a more severe sentence on appeal instituted by 
the accused, or on retrial 
22See for instance chapter four infra under 4.5. 7 for the difficulties 
encountered by the United States Supreme Court in applying the 
"same conduct" test as proposed in Grady v Corbin 495 US 508 
(, 990). 
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(h) substitution of a conviction for a conviction of a more serious 
offence on appeal instituted by the accused or on retrial 
(i) sentencing on multiple counts in a single trial 
(j) the jurisdictional relationship between courts of law and other 
tribunals, for instance military and prison disciplinary tribunals 
and 
(k) international aspects of double jeopardy, for instance 
convictions by foreign courts and extradition. 
This thesis focuses on the most important issues that have given 
rise to double jeopardy jurisprudence in certain domestic areas. These 
areas are set out in (a)-(h) above. The thesis is divided into six parts. 
Part I is the introduction. Parts II-IV deal with the treatment of double 
jeopardy issues in the Anglo-American systems of criminal procedure, 
namely the English, Canadian, Indian and federal American systems. 
Although not wholly part of the Anglo-American systems, South 
African law is also discussed in this part. Part V deals exclusively with 
the treatment of double jeopardy issues in German law. The German 
law is discussed separately because of the different (inquisitorial) 
nature of the German system of criminal procedure. Part VI sets out 
the conclusions of this study. In this final part of the thesis, the writer 
considers whether certain prevailing rules and practices of criminal 
procedure which involve double jeopardy issues can survive 
constitutional scrutiny. This is done by investigating whether the 
particular rules and practices serve the values which underlie the 
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, as well as the values 
which underlie the Constitution as a whole. In final analysis, this 
thesis considers whether prevailing rules and practices which have 
been identified as defeating these values, may nevertheless be viewed 
as justifiable and reasonable limitations of the accused's right against 
9 
double jeopardy in terms of the provisions of the limitation clause. 23 
The conclusions and recommendations of this study are drawn 
extensively from the guidelines laid down by the Constitutional Court 
(in interpreting other provisions of the Bill of Rights), as well as from 
the treatment of similar double jeopardy issues in the foreign 
jurisdictions under consideration in this thesis. 
23Section 36 of the 1996 Constitution. See chapter 10 infra under 
10.5 for a detailed discussion of the criteria laid down in this provision 
to determine the reasonableness and justification of limitation of a 
fundamental human right. 
PART TWO 
THE PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND 
SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTIONS 
CHAPTER TWO 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
2.1 ROMAN LAW 
The idea of a prohibition against trying a man more than once for 
the same offence was a fundamental principle of Roman jurisprudence. 
The principle found expression in the so-called doctrine of res 
judicata 1, and the relevant plea afforded the aggrieved party was 
known as the exceptio rei judicatae. 2 
Literally translated, res judicata means "matter adjudged". In 
essence, this is a policy which expounds that a matter, once put to an 
end, may not be re-opened or re-litigated. The Roman jurist 
Modestinus explained the principle as follows3 
1 See Bower GS The doctrine of res judicata 19 24 for a comprehensive 
study of this teaching (or tenet) as applied in civil and criminal law. 
2The doctrine of res judicata as applied in Roman law is treated at 
length in Books 42, 44, 47 and 48 of the Digest compiled by 
Justinian. The texts from the Digest referred to in these paragraphs 
are (unless indicated otherwise), taken from the translation by 
Mommsen T, Krueger P & Watson A The Digest of Justinian Vol IV 
1985. 
3042. 1 . 1 : Res iudicata dicitur, quae finem controversarium 
pronuntiatione iudicis accipit: quad vel condemnatione vel absolutione 
contingit). The translation advanced by Scott SP The Civil Law Vol 9 
1932 228 is: "By res judicata is meant the termination of a 
11 
An issue is said to be determined [res judicata dicitur] 
when an end is put to the dispute by the pronouncement 
of the judge which can be either a condemnation or an 
absolution. 
It follows that the remedy or defence available to the aggrieved party, 
the exceptio reijudicatae; is-based-on-tt:le.. ground. that.. the_ matter or 
question raised by one's adversary has already been adjudicated on in 
previous legal proceedings and can therefore not be raised once again. 
In Roman law, the exceptio rei judicatae could be raised in civil 
disputes as well as in criminal (or public) matters. The famous Roman 
jurist Paul observed as early as the third century after Christ that4 
controversy by the judgment of a court. This is accomplished either 
by an adverse decision, or by discharge from liability". 
4048.2.14. See also Justinian Codex 9.2.9 (translated by Scott SP 
The Civil Law Vol 14 1932 360). This text contains a constitutio 
issued by Emperors Diocletian and Maximian (issued 289 years after 
Christ) which provided that "[a]nyone who has been charged with a 
public crime, cannot again be accused of the same crime by another 
person". However, in the following text (Codex 9.2.9.1) this 
statement is qualified. It provides that "[i]f several offences arise from 
the same act, and complaint is only made of one of them, it is not 
forbidden for an accusation of another to be filed by some other 
individual". In Codex 9.2.9.2 it is furthermore stipulated that "[t]he 
judge will grant a hearing for both crimes, as he will not be permitted 
to pass sentence for one of them separately before a thorough 
examination of the other has taken place" (Scott's translation at 360). 
Cf also D48.2. 7.2 where Ulpian is cited as stating that "[t]he governor 
must not allow a man to be charged with the same offenses (sic) of 
which he has already been acquitted .... ". (However, he added that 
another person may, in exceptional circumstances, bring an 
accusation: if he pursued his own injury and he had not known that 
an accusation had previously been brought and, if there is good 
reason that he be allowed to bring the accusation). In D47.15.3.1 
Macer is cited as stating that "if a defendant in a public proceeding 
asserts to his accuser that he has been previously charged with the 
same offense (sic) by someone else and been acquitted, it is provided 
by the lex Julia that the present proceedings cannot go on ..... ". The 
only exception made by this jurist is if collusion by the previous 
12 
[t]he senate has ruled that a person cannot be charged 
on account of the same crime [idem crimen 1 under 
several statutes [pluribus /egibus 1. 
At a much later stage, the Roman-Dutch writer Voet asserted that 
the main reason for the introduction oLthe .exception in Roman law 
was to avoid the inextricable difficulties which could arise if different 
courts gave different (or perhaps) mutually contradictory decisions on 
the same topic. 5 However, Roman texts also reveal a concern that 
an end should be brought to matters or disputes; the underlying idea 
being that the community ought to be protected against what may be 
regarded as oppressive multiplication of suits namely, that the same 
thing be demanded twice. 6 
This brings us to the Roman understanding of the concepts 11 same 
thing", "same cause of action 11 or "same offence 11 • The basic rules 
emerging from the texts may be summarised as follows. The exceptio 
rei judicatae could be invoked if the subject matter of the res judicata 
and of the subsequent action dealt with the same issue or question 
accuser could be proved. 
5Voet J Commentarius ad Pandectas translated by Gane P The 
Selective Voet being the Commentary on the Pandects Vol 6 ( 1957) 
553. 
61n 050.17.57 Gaius is cited as stating that "[g]ood faith does not 
permit of the same thing being demanded twice" (Bona tides non 
patitur ut bis idem exigatur). Other texts which demonstrate a 
concern that matters be brought to an end are Codex 7. 1 (providing 
that "[a] judicial decision should be adhered to ... " and Codex 7.4 
stating that "[i]t is a bad precedent to revive a case which has been 
decided under the pretext of the discovery of new documents ... n 
Scott's translation Vol 9 195). D 50.17.207 expresses the inevitable 
consequence of this premise: "[a] matter once adjudged is accepted 
as the truth" (res judicata pro veritate accipitur). 
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(eadem questio). The Roman jurist Ulpian, for instance, made the 
following observation7 
And generally . . . the defence of res judicata avails 
whenever the same issue (eadem questio) is raised again 
between the same persons, albeit in a different kind of 
action. 
That the form of action as such did not determine the identity or 
sameness of the subject-matter also emerges from other texts. 8 
Paul, for instance, placed emphasis on the "same ground of complaint" 
(eadem causa petend'1. He is cited as stating that the criteria are9 
... the same ground for claiming (eadem causa petend1l 
and the same parties; unless all these exist together, it 
is a different issue. 
The jurist Ulpian is also cited as claiming that10 
7044.2.7.4 (my emphasis). 
8The same rule as appears in 044.2.7.4 is stated (in slightly different 
language) in 044.2.3 & 44.2.5. 
9044.2. 14. Bower 220 expresses the view that the relevant texts all 
indicate that the words eadem causa petendi refer to the "same 
ground of complaint", and not the "form of action or remedy". He 
refers to 044.2.5 where Ulpian gave the example of a person 
prohibited from bringing an action on mandate following an action of 
negotiorum gestorum (based on the same complaint). These Roman 
texts were interpreted on the same basis by Steyn CJ in African 
Farms & Townships v Cape Town Municipality 1963 (2) SA (A) 555, 
5628. See chapter four infra under 4.6.9, text at note 586 for a 
detailed discussion of the interpretation of Roman principles of res 
judicata in that case. 
10044.2.7. 
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[i]f a person should claim a part after he had claimed the 
whole, the defence of res judicata bars him; for the part 
is included in the whole, for it is considered to be the 
same issue even if a part is claimed of that which was 
claimed in its entirety. 
He illustrated this principle by giving examples from private law. 
However, as will become.clear:-from the.comparative study..of current 
law on the topic, this principle has also been widely recognised in the 
field of criminal law. 11 
These were the most important Roman texts which were built on in 
Roman-Dutch law. The interpretation and application of these 
principles in Roman-Dutch law will be analysed in the following 
paragraphs. 
2.2 ROMAN-DUTCH LAW 
The doctrine of res judicata as introduced and applied in Roman law 
was further refined by Roman-Dutch jurists. The most important 
contribution in this field of law was undoubtedly made by the .jurist 
Voet. 12 According to Voet, the exceptio rei judicatae lies when a 
dispute which has been brought to an end (!is terminata) is again set 
in motion between the same persons about the same thing and/or the 
11 Cf chapter four infra under 4.2.1 (text at note 17) and 4.5.5 (text at 
note 269) for references to the "lesser included offence" doctrine 
~pplied in the common law and the law of the United States. 
12Voet's treatment of the topic in his Commentarius ad Pandectas 
Book 42 is described by the translator (Sir Percival Gane) as one of his 
best titles. The exceptio rei judicatae is focused upon in Book 42. All 
subsequent references to texts by Voet are, unless indicated 
otherwise, taken from the translation by Gane. 
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same cause for claiming (ex eadam petendi causa). 13 It is available 
"to a defendant who has been absolved by judgment of a judge 
.... whether he has been absolved in a private or in a popular or in a 
public or criminal proceeding" .14 As pointed out above, Voet held 
the view that the doctrine was adopted to prevent inconsistent and 
contradictory decisions. 15 However, he also recognised the need for 
such a defence on the basis that principles of equity require-that an 
end be brought to legal proceedings. 16 
Voet' s understanding of the "same thing" can be explained as 
follows. A thing is the same "as often as what is sought before the 
earlier judge is sought before the later judge" . 17 However, the thing 
need not be precisely the same. The defence may also be raised 
where a part is claimed of something which has been claimed in 
whole, or the thing claimed has been increased or lessened. 18 For 
the purposes of criminal law, Voet's explanation of the "same cause 
of action" (causa petend11 is vital. He explained the concept in the 
13Voet 44.2.3. He added that the defence falls away if one of these 
three things is lacking. 
14Voet 44.2.1, relying upon 048.2. 7 .2 (discussed supra, note 4). 
15Voet 44.2.1. See supra, text at note 5. 
16See Voet 44.2.2: "Moreover, the pleading of this exception is 
needful because a decision given on behalf of a defendant does not 
ipso jure destroy the action for the plaintiff. Thus since that action 
can in strict law be raised over again, it had to be smashed by the fair 
means of an exception". Voet also recognised the consequences of 
this premise. He reiterates (44.2.1) that " .... the only question is 
whether there was a judgment, for the reason that a matter adjudged 
is considered the truth n • 
17Voet 44.2.3. 
18Voet 44.2.3. 
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following terms 19 
The cause for claiming is the same even though steps are 
not taken by the same class of action, but the same 
question is aired by another form of judicial proceeding, 
since it is not so much the action, as rather the source of 
the claim [origo petitiones] which makes a cause the 
same. 
The meaning of the "same cause of action" as advanced by Voet has 
been regarded as authoratitive in South African private as well as 
criminal law.20 
Other Roman-Dutch jurists who contributed in this particular field of 
law were Huber, 21 Vinnius, 22 Grotius23 and Van der Keessel. 24 
Van der Keessel made certain comments on some of the Roman texts 
which are worth discussing in some detail. 25 He stated that if a 
person has been charged by someone and placed on the roll of 
accused, he cannot be prosecuted by another unless the first 
19Voet 44.2.4. 
20See the African Farms Townships case discussed in chapter four 
infra under 4.6.9, text at note 586 and S v Vermeulen 1976 (1) SA 
623 (C) discussed in chapter four infra under 4.6.9, text at note 581. 
21 Huber U Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt 1742. Reference to this 
work is taken from the translation by Gane P under the title 
Jurisprudence of my Time 5th ed 1939. 
22Vinnius A lnstitutionum /mperialium Commentarius 1726. 
23Grotius H lnleiding tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid 1767. 
24Van der Keessel DG Praelectiones ad /us Criminale translated by 
Beinart B & Van Warmelo P Dionysius Godefridus Van der Keessel 
Lectures on Books 47 and 48 of the Digest Vols 1,2 & 5 1969, 1972, 
1978. 
25These particular texts are 048.2.11.2 and Codex 9.2.9. 
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prosecutor had discontinued or had procured a withdrawal of the 
case, 26 or, unless another offence is inherent in the same act. 27 He 
added that in the last-mentioned instance, "the judge ought to 
pronounce upon both matters simultaneously" .28 Van der Keessel 
also stated that an accused may be charged again if there has been 
some contravention of a matter which relates to the procedure, for 
instance, if the indictment has not been correctly drafted~ 29 A 
person "already acquitted by judgment of the court" would, however, 
in Van der Keessel's view, "much less be able to be prosecuted by 
another n. 30 
He also elaborates upon the Roman jurist Paul's statement that "[i)f 
one crime is punished under several statutes, the accused can be 
charged only under one of them". 31 He suggests that the rule only 
26For this statement, he relies upon 048.2.11.1 where Macer is cited 
as stating that "[s]omeone cannot accuse a person who has been 
accused by another but if that person is removed from the list of those 
charged, whether because of a public or private amnesty or because 
of the witdrawal of the accuser, another person is not forbidden to 
accuse him." 
27Beinart & Van Warmelo translation Vol 2 563. Van der Keessel relies 
upon Codex 9.2.9.1 for this statement. (See note 4 supra for the 
wording of this particular text). 
28/d (relying upon Codex 9.2.9.2. See note 4supra for the wording of 
this text). 
29Beinart & Van Warmelo translation Vol 1, 2019. He relied upon 
048.2.3.1 which provides as follows: " .... if the documents of 
indictment are not set out in legal form, the name of the one charged 
is deleted, and there shall be power to renew the charge all over 
again". 
30/d. He referred to 048.2. 7.2 (set out in note 4 supra), adding that 
Ulpian made room for certain exceptions to this rule. (See note 4 
supra for Ulpian's qualifications in this regard). 
31048.2.14. See text at note 4 supra. 
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forbade that a private as well as a public action (based on the same 
act) be instituted.32 He gives the following example. Violence is 
punishable as public violence and private violence under Julian law. 
In his view, if an act "falls foul of both statutes" (public and private 
violence), an accused may be prosecuted only for one. However, this 
rule did not prohibit (in his view) an accused being prosecuted by way 
of public actions for severar crimes under the same statute, or under 
different statutes. 33 
321d. See Joubert CP "Ne mo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa" 
Huldigingsbundel Paul Van Warmelo (red J Van der Westhuizen et al) 
1 10, 1 10-1 1 1 1984 for a brief exposition of common features of 
Roman public and private actions. The author (and honorable judge) 
points out that Roman private (delictual) actions (like, for instance, the 
actio furti and the actio iniuriam) also contained an element of 
punishment. Another common feature (of public and private actions) 
was that both could be instituted by any aggrieved private party. 
(Public actions were instituted for crimes, for instance, murder, 
kidnappng, bribery, adultery etc.) 
33Beinart & Van Warmelo 565. Van der Keessel's view seems to be 
that one act could give rise to several prosecutions by way of public 
actions but that prosecutions (based upon the same act) by way of 
private and public actions were prohibited. Joubert gives a different 
interpretation to these texts (048.2. 14 and Codex 9.2.9 & 9.2.9. 1. 
See note 4 supra for the contents of these texts). Although he also 
concludes that Roman law in fact allowed prosecutions for several 
crimes arising from the same act, he added that multiple prosecutions 
were only allowed if each crime charged violated a different legal 
interest. Joubert bases his conclusion upon comments made upon 
these texts by the medieval jurist Bartolus. In dealing with the 
meaning of the concept idem crimen in 048.2. 14, Bartolus 
distinguishes between crimes which are eiusdem generis and crimes 
which are diversi generis. Multiple prosecutions were (according to 
Bartolus) allowed for crimes which were diversi generis. In Joubert' s 
view, crimes which were diversi generis, were, in fact, crimes which 
violated different legal interests. (See Joubert 1 13-1 1 6). 
19 
The treatment of the topic by Huber, Vinnius and Grotius are the 
same as that advanced by Voet.34 A detailed discussion of the 
relevant texts by these writers is therefore not necessary. 
2.3 ENGLISH LAW 
2.3. 1 General35 
Unlike the position in Roman law, the existence of a double jeopardy 
prohibition cannot be demonstrated to be deeply rooted in English law. 
34Huber 5.38.4 reiterates that "to justify the exception, it is necessary 
that the persons should be the same, the things the same and the 
causes of action the same". He adds that if one of these things is 
different, then it is fair that a new action should be allowed, since 
then, "it cannot be said that the same question has been previously 
disposed of" (Gane's translation 338). Vinnius 4.13.5 also 
emphasised the identity of the question which is again raised. He 
stated: Haec autem exceptio non aliter agenti obstat quam si eadem 
questio inter easdem personas revocetur; itaque ita demun nocet si 
omnia sunt eadem, idem corpus, eadem quantitas, idem jus; eadem 
causa petendi, eademque conditio personarum. (Freely translated: But 
this plea does not stand in the way of the litigant otherwise than if the 
same complaint is lodged again between the same persons; thus in 
this manner it may only bring harm [to the litigant] if all things are the 
same, the same matter, the same quantity, the same right, the same 
cause of action, the same personal circumstances). Grotius 3.49 
merely makes the general statement that "[v]erzet van vonnisse ofte 
gewysde zake heeft plaets wanneer de zelve zake by de zelve, van de 
zelve, uyt de zelve oorzaken werd geeyscht, waer over vonnisse ist 
gestreken, ende gegaen in kragte van gewysde". He adds that "[d]e 
zelve zake werd ook verstaen te zyn, wanneer 't geheel eerst zynde 
geeyscht, daer na een dee/ werd geeyscht". 
35The following discussion of the early development of double 
jeopardy draws largely on Friedland ML Double Jeopardy 1969 5-16; 
Sigler JA Double Jeopardy - The development of a legal and social 
policy 10th ed 1969 1-21 (hereinafter referred to as Sigler Double 
Jeopardy); Sigler JA "A history of double jeopardy" The American 
Journal of Legal History vol 7 1963 283-298 (hereinafter referred to 
as Sigler History) and Hunter J "The development of the rule against 
double jeopardy" The Journal of Legal History Vol 5 1984 3-19. 
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Legal historians speculate that it initially found its way into English law 
through the Canon law introduced in England after the Norman 
Conquest or by the introduction of the Roman law principle of res 
judicata in civil and criminal law during the latter half of the twelfth 
century by teachers of Roman law at Oxford. 36 
In early church law, the principle arose that God does not punish 
twice for the same transgression. 37 During the latter half of the 
twelfth century, Archibishop Thomas a Becket opposed the judicial 
system introduced by Henry II that clerks convicted in ecclesiastical 
courts could also be punished for the same transgressions in the 
King's courts.38 After the murder of Becket in 1176, King Henry 
abolished these laws. Friedland suggests that this clash between the 
36See Friedland 5-6 and Sigler Double Jeopardy 3. The latter author 
observes that speculation on this point is difficult to resolve since 
"most of Western law derives from a common fund of shared judicial 
concepts". 
37Friedland 5 explains that this principle, well known in ecclesiastical 
law, stemmed from St Jerome's comment in AD 391 on the prophet 
Nahum: "For God judges not twice for the same offence". As a 
matter of interest, Sigler History (284 note 6) mentions that no 
reference to double jeopardy is to be found in the Babylonian Code of 
Hammurabi or in Talmudic law. According to his research, the 
concept is however briefly mentioned in the Hebrew law. The author 
concludes that the n alleged universality n of the double jeopardy 
principle is not apparent from a study of early law. 
38ln the Constitutions of Clarendon clause (iii) January 11 64, Henry II 
declared that a clerk suspected of committing a criminal offence would 
be arraigned and accused in the King's court to enable the accusation 
to be brought to the attention of the King's officials. Thereupon, he 
would be sent to the ecclesiastical court for trial and, if found guilty, 
stripped of his clerical status and returned to the King's court for 
punishment- death and forfeiture of all his property to the King. This 
allowed the church to punish its own members. However, once 
punished by the church, they could not lawfully be excluded from the 
King's jurisdiction. Therefore, these enactments allowed double 
punishment, not double trials. See Hunter 6. 
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state and the church and the subsequent concession by King Henry 
(following Becket's murder) that clerks convicted in ecclesiastical 
courts were exempt from further punishment in the King's courts, 
"probably was primarily responsible for bringing about the concept of 
double jeopardy in common law". 39 
Be that as it may, the abolition of these laws established the 
immunity from secular law enforcement known as the "benefit of 
clergy" which meant that the church could bring justice to its own 
members. An even more significant aspect of this occurrence in 
English legal history was that it prevented the establishment of dual 
sovereignty over a multitude of crimes- a situation which "would have 
retarded the development of the protection against double jeopardy for 
centuries". 40 
However, despite this important breakthrough and the fact that 
Roman law was introduced at Oxford at more or less the same time, 
no reference of the concept of double jeopardy appears in the Magna 
Carta, adopted in 1215. Hunter therefore expresses the alternative 
view that the protection against double jeopardy evolved during the 
Middle Ages as a statement of procedure, rather than as the product 
of post-Norman conquest immigration. 41 Hunter made a 
comprehensive study of the development of the rule against double 
jeopardy in medieval criminal procedure.42 From this study, she 
concludes that the rule against double, jeopardy never attained the 
39At 6. 
40See Hunter 5. 
42See supra note 35. Her research on medieval criminal procedure is 
far more extensive than that of Sigler or Friedland. 
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status of a fundamental legal right in post-Norman Conquest 
England. 43 Instead, she proposes that the rule gradually developed 
in English law during the Middle Ages to prevent abuses of the court's 
process. 44 The following discussion of the development of criminal 
procedure during the Middle Ages will demonstrate that Hunter's 
thesis is plausible. 
In the thirteenth century, the first signs of the idea of a former 
judgment barrier offering partial protection from reprosecution were 
apparent in English legal practice. 45 It was from this time on, and 
particularly during the late Middle Ages, that abuse of process became 
particularly acute in English law. In order to understand why, it is 
necessary to explain the nature of substantive criminal law and the 
state of criminal procedure before and after this period. 
As in Roman law, no clear distinction was drawn between civil and 
criminal cases in early Anglo-Saxon law; a distinct feature of Anglo-
Saxon criminal procedure was that suits were initiated by private 
persons. Since a true double jeopardy situation involves a limitation 
upon state power, viz the power of bringing a criminal suit, criminal 
procedure must, therefore, have developed to a point where the state 
has the power to conduct criminal action at its own discretion. The 
separation between the area of criminal law and civil law began to 
43Hunter 7. 
44/d note 26. The author cites Lord Pearce in the landmark decision of 
Conelly v DPP ( 1964) AC 1254, 1362 that "[i]t was no doubt, to meet 
these two abuses of criminal procedure [ie repetition of charges after 
an acquittal or after a conviction] that the court from its inherent 
power evolved the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict" . 
45See infra, text at note 49. 
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develop, albeit very slowly, from the end of the thirteenth century. 46 
The King independently began to institute action against an alleged 
transgressor of substantive criminal law, as substantive criminal law 
developed as a separate branch of the law. However, a private 
person could still institute action if he showed a special harm or 
grievance. 47 A suit by a private person usually yielded damages, 
while the King's suit could result in harsher punishment for those 
found guilty. Consequently, there developed a system of dual 
prosecutions. These were respectively known as the appeal of 
felony48 and the King's indictment. 
In the thirteenth century, the practice developed that a judgment of 
acquittal or conviction for a transgression brought by a private person 
by means of appeal of felony, barred a further suit by the private 
person, and a judgment in a suit brought on indictment by the King 
barred a further suit by the King. 49 For the protection to attach, the 
appeal must have been on the merits, that is in the case of trial by 
battle, victory to the appellant or duelling until the stars appeared, or 
in the case of inquest by a jury, a verdict of acquittal. 50 Since 
46See Sigler History 287. 
471d. 
48The meaning of the word appeal during this time denotes a 
prosecution brought by a private person. The mode of trial appeal by 
felony, created by the Normans, perpetuated the ancient concept of 
private prosecution. This mode of trial became obsolete during the 
sixteenth century. However, it was only abolished finally by the 
legislature in 1819. See Walker RJ The English Legal System 1985 
6th ed 15 hereinafter referred to Walker 1985 ed. 
49See Friedland 8. 
50See Hunter 9. The author relies on Bracton's description in 1250 of 
the appeal procedure as set out in Woodbine GE Bracton on the Laws 
and Customs of England 1968 Vol 2 400. 
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conviction for a felony carried a mandatory death penalty, the plea of 
autrefois convict was irrelevant during this period.51 If the appeal 
failed in the pleading stage, or the appellant retracted or defaulted on 
his appeal, the appellee (the defendant) could not plead a previous 
acquittal because the first appeal had not been determined on the 
merits. 52 However, the appellant himself could not bring the appeal 
a second time in these circumstances. &3 Nevertheless, the protection 
against double jeopardy was limited; any other individual who had 
detailed first hand knowledge of the case could still proceed with an 
appeal.54 
However, during this period (the thirteenth century) and also during 
the fourteenth century, a suit by an appellant (a private person) would 
not bar a suit by the King, and vice versa. 55 Despite this apparent 
denial of double jeopardy protection in the context of dual 
prosecutions during this time, Hunter explains that the practice did not 
prevail unqualified.56 According to her assessment of the law which 
prevailed at this stage, the King could only proceed to institute action 
when the appellee (the defendant) had avoided the appeal at committal 
stage or prior to trial; in other words, if the appellant's case failed 
51 See id note 37. 
53Hunter speculates that this was presumably prohibited because it 
would "leave the system open to vexatious and time-consuming 
litigation" (at 9). 
54Later the appeal was only available to the victim, or in the case of 
murder, to the heir or widow. 
55See Friedland 8-9. 
56At 11. 
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without a proper trial on the merits. 57 She expresses the view that 
the King would only step in if the allegation remained unanswered 
through lack of alternative prosecuting appellants. 58 
Nevertheless, it later became the practice that if no appellant 
(private person) had prosecuted the crime within a year and a day of 
its commission, the King could proceed by indictment Although the 
right of private prosecution was still considered an important 
fundamental right, the growth of the state administration and the 
obvious benefit to the state of controlling prosecution, conflicted with 
this medieval idea. Therefore, from 1350-1482, there arose a gradual 
acceptance of the King's premature indictment and a consequent 
rejection of the year and a day rule. As a result, the practice was 
established of allowing an acquittal on the indictment to establish a 
bar to a later appeal. 59 In fact, in the early fifteenth century, it 
was settled by statute that an acquittal on an indictment was a bar to 
a prosecution for the same offence by appeal and that an acquittal 
after a jury trial on charges initiated by appeal was a bar to a 
subsequent indictment. 60 
57The author relies on the writings of Bracton as set out by Woodbine 
402 and Britton's assessment of the law during this period as set out 
by Nichols FM Britton 1901 94 [ 1, 44b 5) and [ 1, 41 b]. See Hunter 
9 notes 36 and 37. 
58Hunter 11 . 
59See Hunter 12. 
60See Friedland 9 note 5. The author cites 14 Ed 3 (RS) 1 54 ( 61 ) 
(1340) and (in note 4) p 9 Hen 5, f 2, pl 7 (1421). 
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However, in 1482 the judiciary insisted on observation of the year 
and day rule in instances of homicide.61 Obviously, this step was 
disapproved of by the executive. Therefore, in order to balance the 
desire of the crown to take over the prime prosecuting role with the 
medieval right to private revenge in homicide cases, an Act was 
introduced in 1487 to allow the King to proceed in the case of 
homicide before an appeal had been brought without-thereby-affecting 
the right of the individual to bring an appeal if the defendant was 
acquitted. 62 In all other cases, the plea of previous acquittal would 
bar a second prosecution. 
During this period (the fifteenth century), jeopardy attached at the 
stage when the defendant had pleaded not guilty. 63 However, if a 
jury was discharged, the defendant could be tried again despite the 
fact that the jury was discharged after he had pleaded not guilty. 64 
During the sixteenth century there was very little development of 
double jeopardy principles in English legal practice. The only 
significant event was the decision of the King's Bench in Vaux's 
61 See Hunter 12 note 53. She cites ( 1482) 22 Ed 1 V Fitz Cor 44: 
"Note that all the judges of both benches said that it was their 
common opinion if one be indicted for the death of another, that he 
should not be arraigned within a year for the said felony at the King's 
suit, and they counselled all the lawyers to execute this point without 
variance so that the suit of the party might be saved". 
623 Hen VII, c 1 cited by Friedland 9 note 6. This statutory exception 
(which was only abolished by the legislature in 1819) became 
"totally anachronistic to eighteenth and nineteenth century criminal 
jurisprudence". See Hunter 1 2. 
63See Sigler History 294. 
64/d. A jury is discharged by the court if its members cannot agree on 
the verdict. 
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case.65 William Vaux, indicted for murder, answered that he had 
previously been indicted and acquitted for the same offence. 
However, the court held that because the first indictment had been 
defective in form (it did not aver that the deceased had received and 
had drunk the poison), Vaux was not entitled to a plea of autrefois 
acquit. 66 Th'e court argued as follows 
When the offender is discharged upon an insufficient 
indictment, there the law has not had its end; nor was 
the life of the party, in the judgment of the law, ever in 
jeopardy; and the wisdom of the law abhors that great 
offences should go unpunished ... 67 
The justification for a subsequent prosecution advanced in Vaux's 
case, namely that the offender was never in jeopardy of a conviction 
at the previous trial, was approved of and confirmed in the mid-
nineteenth century case of R v Drury. 68 In that case the accused 
was re-indicted for the same offence on reversal of his conviction by 
a Court of Error on the ground of a technical error in the original 
indictment. The court rejected his plea of autrefois acquit, proceeding 
on the principle suggested in Vaux's case that "in such a case 
[conviction upon a defective indictment] the prisoner has never been 
in jeopardy". 69 The court explained that 
[t]he true meaning therefore of "not having been in 
jeopardy" in this rule seems to be that, by reason of 
some defect in the record, either in the indictment, place 
654 Co Rep 44a, 76 Eng Rep 992 (KB) ( 1591). 
66At 993. 
67At 994. 
68(1849) 3 Car & K 193, 175 ER 516. 
69At 519. 
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of trial, process or the like, the prisoners were not 
lawfully liable to suffer judgment for the offence charged 
on that proceeding ... 
The introduction in the nineteenth century by the legislature of powers 
to amend indictments, to enable the courts to turn a defective 
indictment into a good one, either by correcting a defect apparent on 
the face of the indictment or by making the facts alleged in the 
indictment correspond with the proof, did not (as could have been 
expected) bring about any change in this approach. 70 In Regina v 
Green71 the court held that when the accused is acquitted because 
of some defect in the indictment (in casu the ownership of the goods 
stolen was laid in the wrong person), the accused can be tried again 
despite the fact that the indictment could have been amended. The 
court per Erle J argued that 
[ w]ith reference to the plea of autrefois acquit we must 
consider what the indictment was and not what it might 
have been made. The Judge was not bound to amend, he 
did not amend and the prisoner was acquitted upon an 
indictment upon which she was never in peril of a 
conviction. 
These decisions left their mark on present Anglo-American double 
jeopardy jurisprudence. The rule that a discharge on a defective 
indictment does not prohibit a subsequent prosecution for the same 
offence (even if the indictment could have been amended), still forms 
part of the law of criminal procedure of the majority of Anglo-American 
legal systems under consideration in this comparative study. 72 
70See Friedland 69. 
71 Dears and Bell 113, 169 ER ( 1856) 940. 
72See in general chapter three infra. 
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To return to significant events which occurred during the sixteenth 
century: another occurrence during that period which is worth 
mentioning, is that the first legal textbook which contained a detailed 
description of the pleas in bar was published. Using the Norman-
French labels, the author Staunford, in his work Les Plees Del 
Coron, 73 presented the pleas in bar of auterfoitz acquite (previous 
acquittal), auterfoitz convict (previous conviction) and auterfoitz 
attaint (previous attainder and punishment) as principles of law. 74 
Staunford did not mention the requirement that for the first jeopardy 
to attach, there need be an acquittal on the merits (as required by 
Bracton). 75 However, he averred that an acquittal based on an error 
of law does not found a plea of autrefoitz acquite. 76 Staunford also 
acknowledged that the offences must be the same, but made no 
analysis of the issue of identity of a crime. According to the author, 
the pleas could only be raised if a person's life was in jeopardy. 
Therefore, they were limited to felonies which carried the mandatory 
death sentence. 
During the 1 7th century, the concept of double jeopardy as set out 
in the different pleas of autrefois acquit, autrefois convict and 
autrefois attaint was described in detail by two prominent English 
73This work, published in 1557, was reproduced by London 
Professional Books 19 71 ed II. See Hunter 13-14 who gives a detailed 
account of the writer's exposition of the pleas in bar. 
74Hunter 13. 
75See supra, text at note 5 7. 
76Staunford 105a. This was probably the basis of Vaux's case 34 
years later. (See supra, text at note 65 for a discussion of Vaux's 
case). 
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writers of this century, Edward Coke77 and Matthew Hale.78 Unlike 
subsequent versions, the pleas as set out by Coke pertained to 
criminal matters only; a clear indication of recognition of the 
importance of protection of the individual against arbitrary exercise of 
state powers. Hale's treatment of the pleas was even more extensive 
than that of Coke. However, the pleas as set out by both these 
writers are not the same as understood in contemporary doctrine; the 
plea of autrefois acquit remained tied to the benefit of clergy and both 
autrefois attaint and the effect of the pardon ranked equally in 
importance with the plea of autrefois acquit. 
The rule that a previous acquittal barred a subsequent prosecution 
was applied frequently by the English courts during the seventeenth 
century. In 1660, the Court of King's Bench held that the crown 
prosecutor had no right to seek a new trial after an acquittal. 79 
Subsequent cases confirmed the principle that no new trial would be 
granted following an acquittal.8° For instance, in R v Jackson,81 the 
court denied a motion for a new trial following an acquittal for perjury. 
This case is an early example of application of double jeopardy 
principles in misdemeanour cases (cases for less serious offences). 
The court reporter explained simply that the new trial motion was 
77See Coke El The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 
(1644 ed) 212-214 (referred to as Coke 1644 ed). 
78See Hale M The History of the Pleas of the Crown 1736 ed reprinted 
1971 Vol II Chapters XXXI; XXXll; XXXlll and LV (first published in 
1 71 3 - 40 years after his death). 
79R v Read 1 Lev 9, 83 Eng Rep 271 KB (1660). The fact that the 
defendant assented to the new trial was not explained. 
80See R v Jackson 1 Lev 124, 83 Eng Rep 330 KB ( 1660); R v 
Fenwick & Holt 1 Keb 546, 83 Eng Rep 1104 ( 1663) and R v Davis 1 
Show 336, 89 Eng Rep 609 KB ( 1 691 ) . 
81Supra. 
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denied " ... it being in a criminal case, wherein the party being once 
acquitted, shall never be tried again". 82 
A hundred years after Coke published his Institutes, the important 
eighteenth century English writer Blackstone reiterated in some detail 
the pleas referred to by Coke.83 Blackstone explained the plea of 
autrefois acquit as follows 
First, the plea of autrefois acquit, or a former acquittal, is 
grounded on this universal maxim of the common law of 
England, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life, 
more than once, for the same offence. And hence it is allowed 
as a consequence, that when a man is once fairly found not 
guilty upon an indictment, or other prosecution, before any 
court having competent jurisdiction of the offence, he may 
plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for the 
same crime.84 
Likewise, Blackstone explained that a plea of autrefois convict or 
former conviction "for the same identical crime, ... is a good plea in 
bar .... And this depends upon the same principle as the former, that no 
man ought to be twice brought in danger of his life for one and the 
same crime" .85 
82At 330. 
83See Blackstone W Commentaries on the Laws of England Vol 1 V 
18th ed 1829 chapter XXVI (text based on the 1788 ed). 
84At 334. Blackstone notes (at 335) the exception that, in homicide 
cases, an acquittal following an indictment did not, in principle, bar a 
future prosecution by way of common law appeal. However, he 
states earlier (at 316 notes 20-21) that by his time, private appeals 
had "become nearly obsolete". 
85At 335-336. The author also refers (at 336-337) to the pleas of 
autrefois attaint and pardon as of equal importance during this time. 
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In eighteenth century England, it was settled that the pleas of 
autrefois acquit and autrefois convict could only be raised after an 
actual verdict of acquittal or conviction.86 In general, this rule still 
applies today. 87 A consequence of the retention of this rule is that 
the early English practice that a defendant can be recharged after a 
jury discharge still forms part of English law today. 88 
At the end of the nineteenth century, contemporary principles of 
double jeopardy were established in English law. A person charged 
with an offence could raise the pleas of autrefois acquit or autrefois 
convict if he had previously been convicted or acquitted of the same 
offence, irrespective of whether the conviction or acquittal was on 
indictment or summary (in other words the principle applied to serious 
as well as less serious offences), provided that it was on a valid 
indictment, before a court of competent jurisdiction and after a hearing 
on the merits.89 
2.3.2 The development of the concept "same offence" 
As the above discussion of English case law demonstrates, the main 
issue with which courts were confronted up to the eighteenth century 
86See Turner's case 89 Eng Rep 158 ( 1776). 
87See chapter three infra under 3.2. 1. 
88See chapter three infra under 3.2.2. 
89See Archbold JF Archbold's Pleading, Evidence and Practice in 
Criminal Cases 22nd ed 1900 155-163 (hereinafter referred to as 
Archbold 1900 ed.) As indicated above, the right of a private party to 
institute action for homicide was abolished in 1819 by the legislature. 
Furthermore, in the course of the nineteenth century, a successful 
reliance on the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict were no 
longer dependent on the so-called "benefit of clergy". The plea of 
autrefois attaint also became obsolete in the latter half of that century 
(see Archbold 1900 ed 162). 
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was whether a second prosecution for precisely the same offence was 
barred in terms of double jeopardy rules. The problematic issue which 
courts have to deal with in modern times, namely whether a 
prosecution for a separate legal offence arising from the same factual 
transaction as already adjudicated on in a previous trial for a different 
legal offence should be barred on double jeopardy grounds, did not 
arise before the eighteenth century. In order to understand why, it is 
necessary to describe once again certain features of English criminal 
procedure which prevailed before the eighteenth century. 
During the Middle Ages, the number of legal categories of criminal 
offences was relatively small and the scope of each offence was 
comparatively large.90 In view of the paucity of separate legal 
categories of criminal offences during this period, the entire criminal 
transaction was set forth in indictments. 91 Consequently, when the 
90For instance, at the end of the thirteenth century there were only 
nine felonies. All of these were punished severely - a judgment of "life 
or member". (See Pollock F and Maitland FW The History of English 
Law before the time of Edward I 2nd ed 1898 reprinted 1968 470). 
By Coke's time the number had increased to twenty seven, and in 
Blackstone's time there were one hundred and sixty. (See Stephen JF 
A History of the Criminal Law of England Vol II ( 1883) 219 hereinafter 
referred to as Stephen Criminal Law.) Most of these increases in the 
eighteenth century were in the field of larceny because many forms of 
theft which came to be recognised (for example embezzlement of an 
employer's goods), did not fall into any common law category. See in 
general Comment: "Statutory implementation of double jeopardy 
clauses: new life for a moribund constitutional guarantee" The Yale 
Law Journal Vol 65 1956 339, 342 (hereinafter referred to as 
"Comment: statutory implementation of double jeopardy clauses"). 
91 0ne fourteenth century indictment (taken from Putnam Proceedings 
before Justices of the Peace cxxxiii ( 1938)) alleges in six lines of Latin 
that the prisoner raped the prosecutor's wife and abducted her and 
carried off his goods and chattels. See "Comment: statutory 
implementation of double jeopardy clauses" 342 which refers to this 
example. 
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courts developed the rule barring a second prosecution for the "same 
offence", they did not distinguish between the legal theory of an 
offence and the underlying factual situation. 92 The law was 
concerned more with evidentiary facts than with definitions of 
"offence". Gradually, as the number of offences increased, 
indictments also increased in length, technicality and number of 
counts.93 However, the indictment stm described everything the 
accused had allegedly done. Therefore, when courts considered the 
validity of a plea of former jeopardy, the judges in practice compared 
prior and subsequent indictments and if the facts alleged in the second 
had been set forth in the first, the plea was sustained. For instance, 
in Rex v Segar and Potter94 the defendants were acquitted of 
burglary (breaking and entering followed by theft at night) on the 
ground that the breaking and entering took place in the day-time. On 
a subsequent attempt to indict them for larceny of the same articles 
during day-time, the court held that "they could not be indicted a-new 
(sic) for the same fact". 95 
During this period there was little incentive for prosecutors to 
subject an accused to two trials; the conviction rate was high, the 
conviction of a felony meant death or deportation and when a criminal 
transaction did give rise to more than one offence, the prosecutor was 
not forced by the court to elect on which count he was to proceed. 
Also, the courts were more inclined to permit a finding of a lesser 
92See "Comment: statutory implementation of double jeopardy 
clauses" 342. 
93See Stephen Criminal law Vol 1 280-282. 
94Comb 401, 90 Eng Rep 554 KB (1696). 
95At 554 (my emphasis). 
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offence when a felony was charged.96 However, these rules ceased 
to apply in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As the number 
of offences increased, it became customary to frame pleadings in 
terms of legal theories rather than factual transactions. In addition, 
rigid technicalities of pleading and proof were introduced in eighteenth 
century English criminal procedure. No provision was made for 
possible amendment of an indictment after trial commenced:- The 
result was that the slightest variance between what was alleged in the 
indictment and what was proved, often gave rise to acquittals which 
had nothing to do with the merits of a case. 97 
As it was felt that these strict rules of pleading and proof unduly 
advantaged the accused, the courts began to permit reprosecution on 
the same facts but under a different legal theory. This was first 
achieved by introduction of the "same evidence" test in the case of 
The King v Vandercomb & Abbot98 at the end of the eighteenth 
century. In that case, the defendants were charged with burglary 
(nocturnal breaking and entering followed by larceny). They were 
acquitted because there was no proof that any of the goods had been 
stolen during night-time (an element of the offence of burglary at that 
time). 99 In fact, it appeared from the evidence at trial that, although 
they had broken into the dwelling-house at night-time, the larceny had 
actually been committed on a prior day. A second indictment was then 
brought which charged the defendants with breaking and entering with 
96See in general Friedland 90-91 . 
97See Stephen Criminal Law Vol 1 283-284 & Kirchheimer 0 "The act, 
the offense (sic) and double jeopardy" The Yale Law Journal 1949 
Vol 58 513, 529. 
982 Leach 708, 720, 168 Eng Rep 455, (1796). 
99At 457 the court stated that "the form of the indictment decides the 
question". 
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intent to steal. On this charge there was no need to prove any actual 
larceny. The accused raised the plea of autrefois acquit. The court 
rejected this contention and convicted the accused of the crime 
charged in the latter indictment. In order to justify a second 
prosecution (and subsequent conviction) based upon the same factual 
transaction, Buller J formulated the "same evidence" test. He ruled 
that 
[u]nless the first indictment was such as the prisoner 
might have been convicted upon by proof of the facts 
contained in the second indictment, an acquittal on the 
first indictment can be no bar to the second. 100 
Therefore, since the accused could not be convicted on the first 
indictment (burglary) on proof of mere breaking and entering with the 
intent to steal (the proof required for a conviction on the second 
indictment), the subsequent prosecution for breaking and entering with 
intent to steal was allowed in terms of this test. 
The "same evidence" test as formulated by Buller J was neither 
clear nor accurate. 101 Friedland observes that the proposed test did 
not specify whether it referred only to the principal offence charged in 
the first indictment, or also to lesser offences of which the accused 
could be found guilty on the first indictment. 102 He explains that if 
the test could only be applied to the principal offence charged in the 
first indictment, it would lead to the unreasonable result that a person 
acquitted or convicted of rape, for instance, could be convicted of 
indecent assault on a second indictment - the evidence which is 
necessary to procure a conviction of indecent assault is obviously not 
100At 461. 
101 see Friedland 98-101 for a comprehensive analysis of the 
Vandercomb test. 
102/d. 
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sufficient to procure a conviction of rape. On the other hand, 
Friedland expresses the point of view that the test would offer too 
much protection if it applied to lesser included offences which could 
be found in the first indictment. 103 He explains that, whenever there 
is a common connecting offence between the two charges, a second 
indictment for such an offence would be prohibited. Since this is 
often "an accidental occurrence which can be brought about by the 
way in which the indictment is framed or by the peculiarities of 
legislation", 104 an expanded version of the test would, in Friedland's 
view, leave the issue of the permissibility of successive prosecutions 
to pure chance. He gives the example that if legislation should permit 
a finding of carrying a concealed weapon on charges of robbery as 
well as on charges of homicide, the accused could never be charged 
with one of these offences (robbery or homicide) after the other. 
Therefore, Friedland concludes that on either possible interpretation, 
the test would be arbitrary and ineffective: it would bar prosecutions 
where they should be permitted or permit them when they should be 
barred. 105 
As an exclusive criterion to determine identity of offences for double 
jeopardy purposes, the Vandercomb test is clearly inadequate. As 
indicated earlier, 106 the rule proposed in Vandercomb was intended 
to apply to variance cases; in other words, the rule was developed to 
compensate the prosecution for undue advantages given to the 
accused by the highly technical rules of pleading and proof which 
historically prevailed. Therefore, it may be argued that with the 
103/d. 
104At 98. 
105At 98. 
106see supra, text at note 98. 
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subsequent amelioration of these rules and the recognition in criminal 
procedure of powers to amend indictments after trial commences, the 
rule lost its reason for existence. 107 It was nevertheless sporadically 
applied by the courts during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. 108 Moreover, in 1964, the test was recognised by the 
House of Lords in the landmark double jeopardy decision of Conelly v 
OPP as one of several criteria which may be implemented by English 
courts to determine whether a successive prosecution ought to be 
stayed on double jeopardy grounds. 109 Ironically, the fact is that 
although the "same evidence" test as proposed in Vandercomb found 
favour in South African law110 and a variant of the rule came to be 
recognised as an exclusive criterion to determine identity of offences 
in American federal criminal jurisprudence, 111 the rule never acquired 
similar status in its country of origin. 112 
Soon after its introduction in Vandercomb, it became obvious that 
strict application of the same evidence test would, in the 
107The valid point is also raised that even if the variance problem had 
not disappeared, it would be difficult to justify application of the test 
in former conviction cases because variance would only be a harmful 
technicality when the defendant is acquitted. See Notes and 
Comments: " Twice in Jeopardy" The Yale Law Journal Vol 75 1965 
261, 274 (hereinafter referred to as "Comment: twice in jeopardy"). 
108See eg R v Bird ( 1851) 5 Cox CC 20 and R v Kupferberg ( 191 8) 1 3 
Cr App R 166. 
109( 1964) AC 1254. See chapter four infra under 4.2. 1 for a detailed 
discussion of this decision. 
110see chapter four infra under 4.6.2. 
111 See chapter four infra under 4. 5. 3. 
112The so-called "in peril" test came to be recognised as the basis of 
the special pleas in English law. See chapter four infra under 4.2.1 for 
a detailed discussion of the application of this test in English law. 
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overwhelming majority of cases, result in a denial of defence pleas of 
double jeopardy - often unjustifiably. This is because the same 
evidence test does not purport to ferret out any difference in the 
respective modes of criminal behaviour. Kirchheimer observes that it 
rather "compares the two indictments in order to determine whether 
the second indictment became necessary because the first judge failed 
to convict when he could have, if he had only explored all possibilities 
inherent in the first indictment" .113 Furthermore, it is irrelevant 
whether the same facts or same evidence are once again offered to 
prove the charge contained in the second indictment; instead, the 
crucial issue is whether "the facts are so combined and charged in the 
second indictment as to constitute the same offence". 114 
On the other hand, the Vandercomb test does not always favour 
the prosecution. Irrespective of whether a narrow or an expanded 
version of the test is applied, it would bar a subsequent prosecution 
for murder or manslaughter in the so-called "intervening death" cases. 
If the Vandercomb test applies, it means, for instance, that a person 
once convicted or acquitted of assault, cannot subsequently be 
charged of murder or culpable homicide in respect of the same victim, 
even if the victim died after the trial for assault was concluded. 115 
Therefore, in view of the inadequacies of the same evidence test, 
several other criteria were introduced by the courts during the 
113At 528. 
114See Kirchheimer 528. The author cites the nineteenth century 
American case of Commonwealth v Clair 89 Allen 525 (Mass 1863) 
in which the court pointed out the inadequacies of the test in these 
terms. 
1151f the Vandercomb test applies, then the evidence necessary to 
support the second indictment would have been sufficient to procure 
a legal conviction on the first. 
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nineteenth and early twentienth centuries to establish identity of 
offences. 116 Of these, the most important was the so-called "in 
peril" test. This test, which bars a prosecution for an offence if the 
accused has already been in peril of a conviction of that offence on a 
former indictment, was first applied in 1835 in the case of Dann. 117 
However, the test is mostly associated with the early twentieth 
century decision of R v Barron. 118 In that case the court held that 
the criterion proposed to establish whether a subsequent prosecution 
for an offence should be barred, namely whether the accused had on 
the first indictment, been in peril of a conviction of the offence 
charged in the second indictment, 
... applies not only to the offence actually charged in the 
first indictment, but to any offence of which he could 
have been properly convicted on the trial of the first 
indictment. 119 
At first glance, it seems as if the in peril test as formulated above 
supplements the Vandercomb test in an important respect: it prevents 
a second prosecution for a lesser included offence of which the 
accused could have been convicted on the first indictment. As 
pointed out above, this cannot be achieved in terms of the restricted 
version of the Vandercomb test. However, it can be achieved in terms 
116The most important of these was the so-called "in peril" test. This 
test or rule came to be recognised as the basis of the special pleas in 
English law and also found favour in South African law. See chapter 
four infra under 4.2.1 and 4.6.4 for a detailed discussion of the 
application of this test in English as well as South African law. 
117(1835) 1 Mood 424, 168 ER 1329. 
118[1914] 2 KB 570. South African courts have relied on Barron's case 
as authority for the application of this test in our law. See chapter 
four infra under 4.6.4. 
119At 574. 
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of the expanded version of the Vandercomb test. 120 Nevertheless, 
the in peril test is also susceptible to a broad or narrow interpretation. 
Friedland explains that, in terms of a narrow interpretation, the test 
refers only to whether the accused has been in peril for the principal 
offence charged in the second indictment. 121 According to this 
interpretation, the test will not prevent the crown from recharging an 
-
accused with a more serious offence, for instance, charges which 
include additional elements not contained in the first charge. A broad 
interpretation of the in peril test, namely that a subsequent charge is 
barred in terms of this test if the accused has been in peril of a lesser 
offence for which he is again in peril on the second indictment, would 
bar a subsequent prosecution for a greater offence. However, 
Friedland opposes the application of this expanded version of the in 
peril test on the same grounds as he opposes the application of an 
expanded version of the Vandercomb test: the barring of a charge 
would then be dependent on "accident" rather than "policy" .122 
Be that as it may, the restricted version of the in peril test became 
the basis of the special pleas in England at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. 123 Moreover, it was also the restricted version 
of the in peril test which was recognised by the House of Lords much 
later (in 1964) in the case of Conelly v DPP; Lord Devlin explicitly 
preferred the restricted version of the in peril test as one of several 
criteria which may be applied to establish whether a second 
120See supra text at note 102 for a discussion of the possible different 
interpretations of the rule in Vandercomb. 
121At 102. 
122See Friedland 102 and supra, text at note 104. 
123See Barron supra and Bannister v Clark ( 1920) 26 Cox CC 641. 
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prosecution should be barred. 124 The result of a limited application 
of the in peril test was that an accused convicted or acquitted of a 
minor offence could be charged again on the same facts with a greater 
offence, or a more aggravated form of the crime charged in the first 
indictment. 
To return to the Vandercomb test. Although the rule could in most 
cases be invoked to bar a subsequent prosecution for a more 
aggravated form of the crime previously charged, the courts also 
developed the rule that a person convicted or acquitted of a minor 
offence could not be charged again on the same facts with a more 
serious offence. This principle emerged in the important nineteenth 
century decision of The Queen v Elrington. 125 The facts of that case 
were as follows. Elrington was acquitted of assault and battery. 
Subsequently he was charged, on the same facts, of assault and 
battery as well as malicious cutting and wounding so as to cause 
grievous bodily harm. Although the court could ostensibly have 
applied the Vandercomb test in this case to bar a subsequent 
prosecution, it did not explicitly invoke this test. Instead, Cockburn 
CJ based his conclusion that Elrington could not be charged again with 
a more serious offence on the following dicta 
We must bear in mind the well established principle of 
our criminal law that a series of charges shall not be 
preferred, and, whether a party accused of a minor 
offence is acquitted or convicted, he shall not be charged 
on the same facts in a more aggravated form. 126 
124At 1339 his Lordship states: "For the doctrine of autrefois to apply, 
it is necessary that the accused should have been put in peril of 
conviction for the same offence as that with which he is then 
charged". (My emphasis.) 
125(1861) 121ER870. 
126At 873. Cf also R v Miles (1890) 24 QBD 423 where the court 
relied on Elrington's case to prevent a subsequent prosecution for 
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However, the courts consistently recognised the following 
exception to the principle set out above. If a person had been 
convicted of an assault or other offence of violence while the victim 
was still alive and the victim subsequently died, a plea of autrefois 
could not bar a subsequent prosecution for homicide based on the 
same facts. 127 Moreover, from a number of other decisions handed 
down during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it is evident 
aggravated assault after the accused had already been convicted of 
common assault in a previous trial. 
127 As pointed out above, these cases are known as the 11 intervening 
death 11 cases. See R v Morris ( 1867) LR 1 CCR 907 and R v Friel 
( 1890) 17 Cox CC 325. In both these cases, where the death of the 
victim only occurred after the respective accused had been convicted 
of assault, their summary convictions for assault did not prevent later 
proceedings for manslaughter. In R v Thomas [1950] I KB 26 the 
Court of Criminal Appeal held that where a person has been convicted 
of wounding with intent to murder and the person wounded 
subsequently dies, autrefois convict is not a good defence to a 
subsequent indictment for murder. Choo ALT Abuse of process and 
judicial stays of criminal proceedings 1993 22-24 observes that, 
from a purely logical perspective, the answer to the question whether 
a person may be charged with a more serious offence, should depend 
on whether the person had previously been convicted or acquitted of 
a lesser offence. He explains that an acquittal of common assault 
must logically bar a subsequent prosecution for aggravated assault: 
the common assault "core 11 of the aggravated assault offence has 
already not been proved. However, the same cannot be said of a 
prosecution for aggravated assault following a conviction of common 
assault: an acquittal of aggravated assault could still result if the 
aggravating circumstances are not proved. The author points out (at 
23) that the courts have nevertheless "followed the path of mercy 
rather than the path of logic 11 in these cases, and accordingly also 
prohibited a subsequent prosecution for a more aggravated form of the 
offence of which the accused has previously been convicted. 
However, Choo points out that the courts have recognised certain 
limits to the concession of mercy rather than logic; in the "intervening 
death" cases, the courts preferred to let strict logic prevail. 
Consequently, the courts have allowed a subsequent prosecution for 
murder or manslaughter after a conviction of a lesser offence in these 
exceptional cases, namely where the victim subsequently died. 
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that the English courts did not regard themselves bound to application 
of the Vandercomb or in peril tests only. In fact these cases 
demonstrate that the courts, in exercising criminal jurisdiction, 
retained a power to prevent a repetition of prosecution even when it 
did not fall within the exact limits of the pleas in bar. For instance, in 
the early case of Wemyss v Hopkins128 the court, in order to bar a 
subsequent prosecution, invoked the general principle of transit in rem 
judicatam; the offence has passed into a conviction and therefore, the 
offence has ceased to exist. 129 In this case, the defendant was 
convicted for a statutory offence, that as a driver of a carriage he had 
struck a horse ridden by the prosecutor, causing hurt and damage to 
the prosecutor. He was then summoned again for what was 
apparently a diferent offence; that he did unlawfully assault, strike 
and otherwise abuse the prosecutor. Both these prosecutions were 
based on one and the same incident. On a case stated (an appeal on 
a question of law), the second conviction was quashed. Blackburn J 
argued as follows 130 
The defence does not arise on a plea of autrefois convict, 
but on the well-established rule at common law, that 
128( 1875) LR 10 QB 378. 
129See the respective discussions of the Hopkins's decision by lord 
Pearce and Lord Devlin in Conelly's case (at 1362-1363 and 1365). 
See also supra under 2.1 and 2.2 for a discussion of the civil law 
doctrine of res judicata. 
130At 381. In R v Miles the court explained (at 433) that the real 
reason why the court invoked the larger doctrine of transit in rem 
judicatum in Hopkins, was to afford the same finality to decisions 
rendered by summary courts that the autrefois doctrine accords to 
decisions by superior courts. (Traditionally, the pleas of autrefois 
could only be raised in superior courts. Therefore, the court implied 
(in Miles) that Hopkins did not introduce a broader principle than the 
traditional autrefois pleas, but merely made the same principles 
available in summary trials, by invoking the doctrine of transit in rem 
judicatum.) 
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where a person has been convicted and punished for an 
offence by a court of competent jurisdiction, transit in 
rem judicatum, that is, the conviction shall be a bar to all 
further proceedings for the same offence, and he shall 
not be punished again for the same matter; otherwise 
there might be two different punishments for the same 
offence. 
In a few other cases, prosecutions were stayed on the basis that it 
was for an offence which was 11 practically the same" as an offence of 
which the accused had previously been convicted or acquitted. 131 
In R v King 132 for instance, the accused was charged with obtaining 
goods by fraud. After conviction of this offence, he was charged 
again of larceny of the same goods. On a case stated, the Court of 
Crown Cases Reserved quashed the conviction. Hawkins J stated that 
[t]he man had clearly been convicted of a misdemeanour 
in respect of obtaining credit for the same goods which 
were the subject of the charge of larceny; and it is 
against the very first principles of the criminal law that a 
man should be placed twice in jeopardy upon the same 
facts: the offences are practically the same, though not 
their legal operation. 133 
The court did not invoke the Vandercomb test in this case. In fact, 
from the words used by Hawkins J, namely that "the offences are 
practically the same, though not their legal operation", 134 it would 
131 See R v King [1897] 1QB214, 218. The words "substantially the 
same 11 were later used by the court in R v Kendrick and Smith ( 1931 ) 
All ER Rep 851, 855 and by Lord Morris in Conelly's case at 1306 
(see chapter four infra under 4.2.1, text at note 24). 
132Supra. 
133At 218. 
1341d. (My emphasis). 
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seem as if the Vandercomb test by itself would not have prevented a 
second trial. It seems therefore, as if a "same facts" approach was 
followed in King. However, in the subsequent case of Barron, 135 the 
court rejected the argument (advanced by counsel for the accused) 
that the test applied in King was the identity of facts rather than the 
identy of legal elements. In Barron Lord Reading CJ did not regard 
King's case as authority for the point of view that a man cannot be 
placed twice in jeopardy on the same facts even if the offences 
charged are different. 136 Instead, he stated that 
[i]t would appear that the decision of the court [in King] 
was given, either because in the exercise of his 
discretion the judge should not have permitted the trial 
for larceny, or because the verdict in the first trial was 
based upon a view of the facts which was inconsistent 
with that necessary to support the further 
indictment. 137 
R v Frederick Miles is another case which is worthy of 
mention. 138 In that case, the accused was first charged with 
larceny. The prosecution's case was that he was seen taking money 
from a sailor's pocket. He was acquitted of the crime of larceny but 
subsequently charged with a statutory offence, namely that he was 
found in a place with the intention of committing a felony. The 
evidence advanced by the prosecution was the same as on the 
previous charge. He was convicted and appealed on the basis of 
135Supra. As pointed out above (text at note 118) the in peril test was 
advanced in Barron to determine identity of offences. 
136At 575. 
137/d. 
138( 1909) 3 Cr App R 13. 
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former jeopardy. The court of appeal rejected his plea of former 
jeopardy. Although the court recognised that a judge has a discretion 
to stay proceedings " .... if, when a man has been acquitted, he [the 
judge] considers the acquittal should make an end of the whole case 
... '
1139
, the court of appeal rejected his plea of former jeopardy on 
the basis that the offences charged successively contained different 
legal elements (an intent to steal and actual theft as required for 
larceny, and presence and an intent to commit any felony as required 
for the statutory offence charged in the second indictment). 
The notion that a subsequent prosecution based on the same facts 
as already adjudicated upon in a previous trial for another offence 
should necessarily be barred in terms of the pleas of former jeopardy, 
was also rejected in the case of R v Kendrick and Smith. 140 In that 
case, the court did not apply either the Vandercomb or the in peril 
test, but merely compared the offences as to their legal elements and 
ruled that the plea of former jeopardy could not succeed because the 
offences were not in definitional terms substantially the same. The 
court argued that, although both offences arose out of the same act, 
they were nevertheless separate in law. 141 In giving the judgment 
of the court, Swift J remarked 
The fact that the evidence is the same, or that the facts 
139At 15. 
140( 1931) All ER Rep 851. 
141At 855. The accused were first charged and convicted of a 
contravention of the Larceny Act, namely threatening to publish 
photographic negatives with intent to extort money in violation of 
section 31 (2) of the Larceny Act 1916. In the same indictment they 
were also tried for uttering letters demanding money with menaces (in 
contravention of section 29 of the same Act). However, because the 
jury disagreed on this count, they were retried and convicted on this 
charge. 
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proved are the same, does not make the two offences 
identical. They are quite distinct and separate. 142 
Several other decisions dealt with the issue of identity of offences. 
However, the cases discussed above represent the basic criteria which 
were invoked by the courts to determine whether a plea of former 
jeopardy should be upheld. The principles developed in these cases 
can be summarised as follows 
(a) the same evidence test as proposed in Vandercomb 
(b) the restricted version of the in peril test as proposed in Barron 
(c) the rule set out in Elrington, namely that a person may not be 
charged with a more aggravated form of conduct, unless the 
aggravating circumstance occurred after the first trial had ended 
(Thomas) 
(d) legal identity of offences, namely whether offences can be 
regarded as the same in terms of their legal elements (Frederick 
Miles and Kendrick and Smith) 
(e) the broader principle of res judicata, namely that a matter once 
adjudged may not be re-opened (Hopkins) 
(f) inherent discretionary powers of a court to stay proceedings on 
the basis of similar facts and undue harassment of the accused 
(King). 
In the landmark double jeopardy decision of Conelly v OPP, 
(handed down by the Criminal Court of Appeal in 1964) the principles 
set out in (a) to (e) above were consolidated. Moreover, the notion 
that English criminal courts have inherent discretionary powers to 
prevent abuse of process by staying proceedings, also on double 
142At 855. 
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jeopardy grounds, (set out in (f) above), was finally recognised in 
Conelly. This decision is discussed in detail in chapter four, which 
deals with the definitional issue of "same offence" in current Anglo-
American law. Before proceeding with that issue, it is necessary to 
explain first of all what is understood in current Anglo-American 
systems under the concept "attachment of jeopardy". 
CHAPTER THREE 
SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTIONS FOR "THE IDENTICAL OFFENCE" - A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE "ATTACHMENT OF 
JEOPARDY" ISSUE 
3. 1 INTRODUCTION 
Any double jeopardy claim necessarily involves the question of 
whether criminal proceedings against an accused have reached a stage 
that it can be said that a person has been put in jeopardy or in peril 
of a conviction of the offence(s) allegedly committed. In the American 
federal legal system, this stage in a criminal proceeding is referred to 
as the "attachment" of jeopardy. In the legal systems considered on 
a comparative basis in this chapter, it is generally recognised that a 
person is put in jeopardy (or in peril) of a conviction at the 
commencement of the main proceedings, in other words, at the 
commencement of the criminal trial. It is argued, for instance, that it 
is at this stage that "the defendant's interest [in finality] reaches its 
highest plateau, because the opportunity for prosecutorial overreaching 
thereafter increases substantially, and . . . stress and possible 
harassment of the defendant from then on is sustained". 1 Courts 
have accordingly held that in a jury trial, jeopardy attaches at a stage 
when the jury is sworn and in a non-jury trial, at the stage when the 
accused pleads to the charge, or when the first witness begins to give 
evidence. 
1 See the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Crist 
v Bretz 437 US 28, 38 ( 1978) discussed in detail infra, text at note 
154. 
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From the position sketched above, it may be assumed that any 
termination of proceedings at a stage after the jury has been sworn, 
or (in a non-jury trial) after the accused has pleaded or the first 
witness has begun to give evidence, bars a second prosecution for the 
same offence. However, this is not always the case. In general, it 
may be said that in the absence of bad faith on the part of the 
prosecution or collusion, courts in the legal systems under 
consideration require nothing less than a termination of proceedings 
based on a finding as a matter of fact that a person charged is guilty 
or innocent before they prohibit a second prosecution for the same 
offence on double jeopardy grounds. 
There are, of course, exceptions to this approach. In some 
jurisdictions (for example South Africa, America and India), courts 
have ruled that a withdrawal of a case by the prosecution at a stage 
after jeopardy has attached, amounts to an acquittal which bars a 
second prosecution. However, where a discharge of the accused 
occurred on the basis of a so-called "technical" ground, courts have 
been less willing to abandon the requirement that the termination 
should be based on the factual merits of the case. The courts have 
justified this approach by arguing that an accused who has been 
discharged on a technical ground or defect in the proceedings, has 
never been in jeopardy of a conviction. 2 
However, the traditional understanding of a trial "upon the merits" 
(an adjudication of the factual guilt or innocence of the accused), has 
been subjected to scrutiny in Canadian constitutional jurisprudence. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has rejected the notion that only a 
2As pointed out in the historical overview, this rationale was first 
advanced in the fifteenth century, in Vaux's case. See chapter two 
supra under 2.3.1, text at note 65 for a discussion of this case. 
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finding as a matter of fact that the accused is either guilty or innocent 
of the offence charged, bars a second trial. 3 Instead, it has 
suggested that a second trial ought to be prohibited if jeopardy had 
attached in the temporal sense of the word (in other words if the trial 
had commenced), and if the court had the necessary jurisdiction to 
acquit or convict. This approach resulted in a rejection of the 
traditional theory advanced in the Engffsh case of Drury,4 namely that 
a discharge on a defective indictment cannot operate as an acquittal, 
which brings into effect protection against double jeopardy, even if the 
indictment could have been amended by the court at the first trial. 
Nevertheless, these and other developments in this particular field of 
double jeopardy jurisprudence are discussed and considered on a 
comparative basis in the paragraphs that follow. 
3.2 ENGLISH LAW 
3.2. 1 General 
During the twentienth century, English courts have not extended the 
traditional ambit of the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict. 
In general, the requirements for successful reliance on the pleas that 
prevailed during the nineteenth century, still apply today. 5 These 
requirements are that there should be 
a previous conviction or acquittal (which involves, in principle, 
3See infra under 3.3.2 for a discussion of the Canadian cases of R v 
Riddle ( 1980) 48 CCC (2d) 365 (SCC) & R v Moore ( 1988) 41 CCC 
(3d) 289 (SCC). 
4 See chapter two supra under 2.3.1, text at note 68 for a discussion 
of this case. 
5No distinction is drawn between acquittals or convictions on 
indictment and those following summary trial. 
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an adjudication on the guilt or innocence of the accused) 
for the same offence 
on a valid indictment 
by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
However, this does not mean that no developments occurred during 
contemporary times in this particular field of law. In the 1960's, the 
House of Lords suggested in the case of Conelly v Director of Public 
Prosecutions, 6 that double jeopardy protection is afforded not only by 
the pleas in bar, but also by the judicial discretion to stay proceedings 
as an abuse of process. 7 The existence of inherent powers vested 
in a court of law to stay proceedings in cases where the pleas cannot 
be relied on but the second prosecution (in the court's view) amounts 
to oppressive or improper conduct on the part of the prosecutor, was 
confirmed by the House of Lords in 1977 in the case of Director of 
Public Prosecutions v Humphrys. 8 In that case, Lord Salmon 
explained the scope of the "abuse of process discretion" in the 
following terms9 
6Supra. 
A judge has not and should not appear to have any 
responsibility for the institution of prosecutions; nor has 
he any power to refuse to allow a prosecution to proceed 
merely because he considers that, as a matter of policy, 
it ought not to have been brought. It is only if the 
prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the 
court and is oppressive and vexatious that the judge has 
7See the opinions of Lord Reid 1295-1296; Lord Devlin 1338-1361 
and Lord Pearce 1361-1368. The Conelly decision is discussed in 
detail in chapter four under 4.2.1. 
8( 1977] AC 1. The main issue in this case was whether the doctrine 
of issue estoppal forms part of English law. See chapter four infra 
under 4.2.3 for a detailed discussion of the Humphrys case. 
9At 46C-E. 
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the power to intervene. Fortunately, such prosecutions 
are hardly ever brought but the power of the court to 
prevent them is, in my view, of great constitutional 
importance and should be jealously preserved. For a man 
to be harassed and put to the expense of perhaps a long 
trial and then given an absolute discharge is hardly from 
any point of view an effective substitute for the exercise 
by the court of the power to which I have referred. 
Since the decision in Humphrys, English courts have stayed 
proceedings on double jeopardy grounds in a number of cases where 
the pleas of autrefois could not be relied on by the accused. Most of 
these cases dealt with a subsequent prosecution for a different 
offence, albeit on the same facts as previously adjudicated on. 10 In 
the field of attachment of jeopardy (addressed in this chapter), the 
discretion to stay proceedings has been exercised in favour of the 
accused in only one particular instance: a second preliminary hearing 
was found to be vexatious after a court of law had (in a previous 
preliminary hearing for the same offences) considered the merits and 
found that there was no case to answer. 11 
As indicated by the dicta of Lord Salmon cited above, 12 the 
discretion to stay proceedings is exercised on a case to case basis, 
depending on whether the particular facts of each case reveal an 
abuse of process. Recognition of such discretionary powers to stay 
proceedings has opened the door for constant re-evaluation of 
traditional premises in this particular field of law. Therefore, the 
possibility is not excluded that new principles may develop in the 
course of time which may be reconciled with contemporary practices 
10See chapter four infra under 4.2.2 for a discussion of these cases. 
11 See Regina v Horsham Justices, Ex parte Reeves ( 1981) 75 Cr App 
R 236 discussed in detail infra under 3.2.2, text at note 55. 
12See text at note 9 supra. 
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of criminal procedure. 
3.2.2 The attachment of jeopardy 
The principle advanced in the case law is that a person is "twice 
vexed" if he was in peril (or in jeopardy) of a valid conviction for the 
same offence at the first trial. 13 A person is put in peril of a 
conviction in a trial on indictment as soon as the jury is sworn, and, 
in a trial in a magistrate's court, as soon as he has pleaded to a 
charge. 14 However, this does not mean that all types of 
discontinuances of proceedings at a stage after jeopardy has attached, 
operate as a bar to a second prosecution for the same offence. The 
basic approach followed by the courts is that for double jeopardy 
principles to apply, there needs to be a discontinuance of proceedings 
based on a finding as a matter of fact that the accused is either guilty 
or innocent of the crime(s) charged. This becomes particularly 
apparent from the courts' unwillingness to depart from the ancient rule 
that a discharge of a jury from giving a verdict at a stage after 
jeopardy has attached amounts to a mere temporary discontinuance 
of proceedings, despite the possibilities for abuse of the rule. 15 
Moreover, the Appeal Court recently held that a plea of autrefois 
13See Director of Public Prosecutions v Porthouse ( 1989) 89 Cr App 
R QB 21, 24. See also Williams v Director of Public Prosecutions 
( 1991) 93 Cr App R QB 319, 327. 
14See Williams v Director of Public Prosecutions 327. 
15Friedland (23) criticises the fact that the discretion of the trial judge 
to discharge the jury is not reviewable by a higher court. He points 
out the following possibilities for abuse of the rule. The trial judge 
discharging the jury when the prosecutor has not made out a case; a 
discharge during the jury's deliberation when it is felt than an acquittal 
will be forthcoming, or a discharge caused by the deliberate 
introduction of inadmissible prejudicial evidence by a desperate 
prosecutor. 
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convict can only be sustained by evidence that the offence for which 
the accused is charged has already been the subject of complete 
adjudication against him; in other words, a decision establishing his 
guilt (whether it is a decision of the court or the jury or the entry of his 
own plea), and the final disposal of the case by passing sentence, or 
the making of some other order, for example, an absolute 
discharge. 16 
Other principles which emerge from a study of the case law are the 
following. In Regina v _Dorki'!Jl Justic..,es, ex parte Harrington 17 the 
'·" ,-·"/' ~-0 -----..,-~ , - .. ,,~. --~ """-_ __ " ___ , __________ ,,_, -·--' ,.,_~,.-~ ............... _,_,_...,.._,,,_ 
House of Lords laid down the principle that an accused is not, in the 
context of autrefois, in jeopardy merely because he is standing trial on 
a particular charge and, in a popular sense, in peril of a conviction. 
Jeopardy arises only after a lawful acquittal or conviction. 18 
Therefore, when a magistrate dismisses a case in circumstances where 
the process resulting in the adjudication was invalid (for example, 
where he failed to discharge his duty to listen to prosecution 
evidence), the decision is treated as a nullity. This means that the 
acquittal may be taken on review, and, on being quashed by a superior 
court, the prosecution may institute new proceedings against the 
accused for the same offence. An acquittal treated as a nullity is also 
referred to in the case law as an adjudication by a court acting 
"without jurisdiction" .19 The phrase "without jurisdiction" is used in 
16See Richards v The Queen (1993) AC 217. The court argued (at 
226) that the underlying rationale of autrefois convict is simply to 
prevent duplication of punishment and not (also) to prevent a second 
trial as such. 
17[1984] AC 743. See chapter six infra under 6.2.5, text at note 50 
for a discussion of this case. 
18At 753. 
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this context in the sense that when a court disregards a rule of 
criminal procedure in the process of adjudication, the decision which 
results from that invalid process of adjudication is one which the court 
has no jurisdiction to make. 20 
In R v Bryan Gwyn Green21 the court held that a finding of 
contempt of court which involved a finding of assault, did not provide 
the accused with an effective plea of autrefois convict against a 
subsequent prosecution in a criminal court for the very same 
assault. 22 The court in Gwyn Green argued that the contempt 
jurisdiction of the court is quite separate from the criminal jurisdiction 
of any other court. The court explained that power to punish for 
contempt is an inherent power which derives from a court's 
jurisdiction to enforce its orders. 
A discharge based on an insufficient or defective indictment23 (even 
201n the Harrington case (discussed in chapter six infra under 6.2.5, 
text at note 50) the magistrates' action by dismissing a case without 
hearing the prosecution amounted to a breach of the rules of natural 
justice. The court per Lord Roskill stated (at 735H) that "the test 
..... [is] whether the decision of the justices to dismiss an information 
is a decision which they had no jurisdiction to take, because they were 
declining to adjudicate on a matter on which it was their duty to 
adjudicate, and thus was a nullity". 
21 1993 Crim LR 46. 
22Contra the position in the law of the United States discussed in 
chapter four infra under 4.5.8. 
23Friedland (63) explains that an indictment may be defective in two 
ways: it may be defective on its face because it does not, for 
example, allege all the necessary elements of the offence, or because 
of a discrepancy between what is alleged in the indictment and what 
is proved at the trial. He points out that in the last instance, it is 
actually wrong to refer to a "defect" in the indictment because there 
is nothing wrong with the indictment itself. However, the word 
"defective" is commonly used in English law in both situations. 
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at a stage after jeopardy has attached) does not effect protection 
against double jeopardy. 24 Despite powers vested in courts to 
amend indictments, no exceptions have been made to this rule. 
Friedland severely criticises this position. 25 In his view, the principle 
laid down in the early case of Green, 26 (namely that with reference 
to the plea of autrefois acquit, it must be considered what .the 
indictment was and not what it might have been), can result in 
injustice to the accused in the case where he desires that an 
amendment be made so that there can be a determination on the 
merits of the case, but the court refuses such request and instead 
directs that the accused be acquitted. Friedland suggests that a fair 
and workable rule would be a proviso that the accused cannot be tried 
again if the court finds that the trial judge, in refusing the amendment 
and directing that the accused be acquitted, did not exercise his 
discretion properly. In other words, if the reviewing court finds that 
the trial judge ought to have amended the indictment, a second 
prosecution should be barred. Furthermore, he suggests that an 
accused should be estopped from saying that he was not in jeopardy 
at the first trial if in fact he had resisted the amendment. Unlike the 
position in Canadian law, English courts have not as yet reconsidered 
the rule laid down in Green from these suggested perspectives. 27 
24See Archbold 1995 ed 1 /487. The author points out that the rules 
laid down in R v Drury (supra) still apply. 
25At 70-71. 
26See supra chapter two under 2.3.1, text at note 71 for a discussion 
of this case. 
27See infra under 3.3.2 for a discussion of developments in this 
particular field in Canadian law. 
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In Williams.v Director of Public Prosecutions28 the court held that 
"-----· ./ .... - "' 
a dismissal of a summons before the accused had pleaded, does not 
amount to an acquittal for the purpose of double jeopardy protection. 
However, the court also considered in which circumstances a 
dismissal of a summons at a stage after the accused had pleaded 
operates as a bar to further proceedings. The facts were as follows. 
Williams was arrested for drunken driving as a result of a positive 
breath test. At the police station he also provided a specimen of 
blood. According to a provision of the Road Traffic Act, once the 
specimen of blood had been provided, no breath analysis could be 
used in proceedings against him. Nevertheless, he received a 
summons alleging that he had driven a vehicle with excess alcohol on 
his breath. However, the analyst certificate sent to him indicated 
excess alcohol in his blood. At the hearing, William's counsel 
objected to the charge before he entered a plea. The justices 
dismissed the summons and the prosecution issued a fresh summons, 
correctly relating the proportion of alcohol to the accused's blood, 
' 
accompanied by a new certificate of analysis of blood. On appeal by 
case stated (on a point of law), Williams contended that under the rule 
against double jeopardy, he could not be tried for an offence of which 
he had been acquitted. The court rejected this contention on the basis 
that Williams had never been in peril of a conviction at the first trial. 
The court explained that there are two possible situations in which 
a defendant may or may not be in jeopardy. The first is the 
"temporal" question, namely that the proceedings have reached such 
a stage that he was in peril of a conviction. 29 The second is 
"qualitative", namely whether the "imperfection" of the proceedings 
28Supra. 
29At 327. 
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which led to the original decision in the defendant's favour was of 
such a nature that the defendant would never have been in danger of 
conviction. 30 The court pointed out that these two issues are 
independent of each other. It continued by explaining that the 
temporal situation involves some formal stage at or after the start of 
the proceedings. In a trial on indictment, a trial starts, not on 
arraignment of the accused, but once the jury has been sworn and the 
defendant has been put in their charge. Therefore, this is the stage in 
a trial on indictment when jeopardy attaches. 31 On the other hand, 
in proceedings before justices in the magistrate's court, the "logical 
moment" at which a defendant begins to be in peril of a conviction is 
when his plea is taken. 32 The court expressed the view that when a 
preliminary point is taken before plea, it can be said that "battle has 
been joined". 33 However, the accused is not in peril of conviction of 
the charge he is called to answer as a result of the decision of the 
court on that particular point (either for or against him). This only 
occurs as soon as he has pleaded to the charge. 
As far as the qualitative question is concerned, the court concluded 
that the prosecution, having framed the charges incorrectly by 
referring to the breath analysis rather than blood, had put themselves 
out of court when it came to proving the charge of how much alcohol 
the accused had consumed. Therefore, it followed (in the court's 
view) that the accused was never in jeopardy of a comiiction.34 The 
31 /d. The court referred to the case of Tonner & Others 1985 80 Cr 
App R 170. 
33At 328. 
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court distinguished this decision from the early twentieth century 
decision of Haynes v Davis35 on the basis that the error which 
occurred in that case, which was a mere procedural irregularity, would 
not necessarily have prevented a conviction of the crime charged. The 
facts of the Haynes decision are as follows. The accused was 
charged with having sold adulterated milk and, in similarity to the 
Williams case, no certificate of analysis had been served in accordance 
with the appropriate section of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1899. 
The magistrate dismissed the summons without hearing any evidence 
as to the facts. A second summons was then taken out in respect of 
the same offence. The majority of the court of appeal held that the 
appellant had been in peril of being convicted on the first summons 
and was therefore entitled to plead autrefois acquit on the second. 
The report made no mention as to whether the defendant was ever 
asked to plead at his first appearance. Nevertheless, the court (per 
Ridley J) argued as follows36 
I think ... that we must treat the absence of the analyst's 
certificate in this case as a mere informality in procedure. 
If that is so, was this a case in which upon the first 
summons the appellant was in peril and in respect of 
which therefore he could plead autrefois acquit? I think 
he was in peril and therefore that he was entitled to 
plead autrefois acquit. The magistrate had jurisdiction 
unless objection was taken at the proper time to the 
informality, and unless that objection was taken there 
was a possibility, and indeed a probability, that the 
magistrate would proceed to a decision and convict the 
appellant. The appellant was thus in peril. It is not quite 
correct to say, although it is rather an attractive phrase, 
that there must have been an acquitttal upon the merits 
in order that there may be a good plea of autrefois 
acquit. In whatever way a person obtains an acquittal, 
whether it be by the verdict of a jury on the merits or by 
35[1915] 1 KB 332. 
36At 335. 
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some ruling on a point of law without the case going to 
the jury, he is entitled to protection from further 
proceedings. Once there is an acquittal he cannot be 
tried again for the same offence. 37 
The court in the Williams case did not find it necessary to comment on 
the correctness of the majority's dicta in the Haynes case. However, 
before reaching its conclusion, it did refer to the minority opinion of 
Lush J, (in the Haynes case) observing that this approach had been 
preferred by the Court of Appeal in the 1980' s in the civil case of 
Jelson (Estates) Ltd v Harvey. 38 The Jelson case concerned 
proceedings regarding alleged contempt of court. The original 
summons had been defective in that it failed to specify the aspects 
in regard to which it was alleged that the defendant had been in 
contempt, and it was accordingly dismissed by the judge. 
Subsequently, the plaintiffs issued a further summons, this time in the 
correct form with proper particulars. The defendant took the point 
that since proceedings for contempt of court were analogous to 
criminal proceedings, he was entitled to rely upon the doctrine of 
autrefois acquit. This contention was rejected by the court of appeal. 
In reaching a decision, the court considered the decision in Haynes, 
preferring the minority view of Lush J, to that of the majority opinion 
set out above. Lush J, expressed his views (in the Haynes case) in 
the following terms 
I quite agree that "acquittal on the merits" does not 
necessarily mean that the jury or the magistrate must 
find as a matter of fact that the person charged was 
innocent; it is just as much an acquittal upon the merits 
if the judge or the magistrate were to rule upon the 
construction of an Act of Parliament that the accused 
was in law entitled to be acquitted as in law he was not 
37My emphasis. 
38( 1984) 1 All ER 12 AC. 
63 
guilty, and to that extent the expression 'acquittal on the 
merits' must be qualified, but in my view the expression 
is used by way of antithesis to a dismissal of the charge 
upon some technical ground which had been a bar to the 
adjudication upon it. This is why this expression is 
important, however one may qualify it, and I think that 
the antithesis is between an adjudication of not guilty 
upon some matter of fact or law and a discharge of the 
person charged on the ground that there are reasons why 
the Court cannot proceed to find if he is guilty. 39 
The court in Williams concluded (on the qualitative question), that 
the facts in that case were comparable with that present in the Jelson 
case. It followed that the accused had never been in jeopardy of a 
conviction at his first trial. In this respect, the Williams decision can 
be viewed as an implied approval of the minority view expressed in the 
Haynes case. 
On the other hand, a dismissal of an information as a result of the 
accused pleading not guilty and the prosecution offering no evidence, 
brings protection into effect against a second prosecution for the same 
offence.40 However, there is an important qualification. In 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Porthouse41 the court held that if 
the first information was so faulty in form and content that the 
accused could never have been convicted on it, its dismissal as a 
result of the prosecution offering no evidence will not bar a second 
prosecution for the same offence.42 The court emphasised that a 
defendant is "twice-vexed" only if he was in peril of a valid conviction 
39My emphasis. 
40See Grays Justices ex parte Low ( 1990] 1 QB 54. 
41Supra. 
42At 26. 
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at his first trial. 43 
Where a court of appeal quashes an accused's conviction, the 
successful appellant is treated as if he has been acquitted by the jury 
that tried him. This means that he cannot be prosecuted again for the 
same offence, unless the court of appeal orders a retrial.44 
An accused may be re-indicted for the same offence 
notwithstanding that the Attorney-General has, at any stage after a bill 
of indictment against an accused has been signed and before 
judgment, entered a no/le prosequi which terminates a prosecution. 
Whether or not to enter a no/le prosequi is entirely within the Attorney-
General' s discretion and is not subject to control by the courts. 45 
Provided that the defendant has not yet pleaded, the prosecution 
may, with the court's leave, withdraw a summons in a summary 
trial. 46 In Grays Justices ex parte Low47 the court held that such 
a withdrawal of a summons is not equivalent to an acquittal. Nolan J, 
43At 24. 
44See section 7 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 as amended. See 
chapter eight infra under 8.2 for a detailed discussion of retrials upon 
appellate reversal of convictions in English law. 
45See Turner v Director of Public Prosecutions ( 1978) 68 Cr App R 
70, 76 & Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] AC 435, 487. 
However, Blackstone's Criminal Practice 1991 897 (hereinafter 
referred to as Blackstone 1991 ed) is of the opinion that in practice it 
is unlikely that a person will be re-indicted after the entering of a no/le 
prosequi. 
46Redbridge Justices, ex parte Sainty [ 1981] RTR 13. 
47Supra. 
observed48 
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it must now be regarded as settled law that . . . the 
withdrawal of a summons with the consent of the 
justices will not of itself operate as a bar to the issue of 
a further summons in respect of the same charge where 
there has been no adjudication upon the merits of the 
charge in the original summons, and the defendant has 
not been put in peril of conviction upon it. 
The Director of Public Prosecutions49 has certain statutory powers 
to withdraw proceedings in summary trials as well as in trials on 
indictment, albeit only during the preliminary stages of proceedings. 50 
In summary trials such notice of discontinuance may only be given 
before the prosecution start calling their evidence and in trials on 
indictment, before the accused is actually committed for trial. 51 A 
discontinuance by the Director does not bar fresh proceedings for the 
same offence at a later stage. However, the accused's interests are 
also served; he may insist (within 35 days of the discontinuance) 
that the prosecution against him goes ahead.52 This gives him the 
opportunity to obtain a formal acquittal which will later entitle him to 
a plea of autrefois acquit. 
Instances where the courts recognised their inherent powers to stay 
48At 59A-B. 
49The Director is responsible to the Attorney-General and his duty is to 
conduct all criminal proceedings initiated by the police. See Sprack J 
Emmins on Criminal Procedure 6th ed 1995 5. 
50See section 23 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985. 
51 See id. 
52Section 27(7) of the Act. 
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proceedings on the basis of abuse of process are the following. In 
Manchester v Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Snelson53 the court 
held that a discharge of the accused by examining judges after 
committal proceedings (preliminary hearings), does not amount to an 
acquittal. However, the court stated that it may exercise its 
discretionary power to ensure that the use of repeated committal 
proceedings is not allowed to become vexatious or an abuse of the 
process of the court. In the court's view, the facts of the case did not 
reveal such an abuse. At the first committal proceedings, the 
prosecution who expected that the examining judges would agree to 
an application for an adjournment had literally no evidence available at 
court on the day fixed for hearing. The case had accordingly not been 
considered on the merits. The institution of further committal 
proceedings, at which they were prepared to offer evidence, did not, 
in the court's view, amount to oppressive governmental action which 
justified a stay of proceedings. 54 
In ~_J(jj~~~J. u_~tices, ~x parte Re~ves55 on the other hand, the 
·-· , 
first committal proceedings, which lasted three days and involved full 
consideration of the prosecution evidence, ended in a discharge of the 
accused. The prosecution subsequently sought to bring fresh charges 
against the accused, based on the original charges. However, the 
court granted the accused an order of prohibition directed against a 
fresh bench of justices from continuing the second committal 
proceedings. The court reasoned that repeated committal proceedings 
could in this instance be categorised as an abuse of process on the 
following grounds. In the first committal proceedings, the 
53[1977] WLR 911. 
54At 913. 
55Supra. 
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prosecution's case had not been presented effectively because much 
confusing and irrelevant evidence had been put before the justices 
along with the cogent evidence. 56 The second committal 
proceedings were merely an attempt to repair the damage done by the 
prosecution's mistakes at the first proceedings. The prosecution was 
not entitled "to treat the first committal proceedings, for all practical 
purposes, as a dummy run, and, having concluded that they over-
complicated them, bring virtually the same proceedings but in a form 
in which they should have been brought if proper thought had been 
given by the prosecution to them, in the first place ... " .57 Such a 
course of action, in the courts view, amounts to oppressive and 
vexatious conduct, encouraging also "poor preparation [of cases] with 
resultant waste of time and money" .58 
In Brooks v Director of Public Prosecutions59 the Privy Council 
confirmed the principles laid down in the Reeves case, observing that 
"[t]here have to be exceptional circumstances to warrant prosecuting 
a defendant after it has been found in committal proceedings that 
there is no case to answer" .60 
3.2.3 Summary 
* The basic premise in English law is that an accused may only rely 
on the plea of former jeopardy if the termination of criminal 
proceedings at the first trial amounted to an adjudication on the facts 
56At 240. 
59[ 1994] WLR 381 . 
60At 390. 
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of his guilt or innocence of the crime(s) charged. Moreover, the 
accused may only rely on the plea if he has previously been lawfully 
acquitted or convicted. If the trial was contaminated by an error, it 
must be determined whether he was in jeopardy of a conviction at the 
first trial. This entails an investigation as to the nature of the error. If 
the error was of such a nature that it rendered the trial a nullity, the 
accused may be tried again because he was never in jeopardy of a 
conviction. A trial is also treated as a nullity if the court acted without 
jurisdiction. For instance, a court acted "without jurisdiction" if it 
committed a breach of the rules of natural justice by dismissing a case 
without hearing prosecution evidence. On the other hand, if the error 
did not render the trial a nullity, the accused may not be tried again. 
In other words, if the accused could have been convicted despite the 
error, he was in actual fact in jeopardy of a conviction and may 
therefore rely on the plea of former jeopardy. 
* An accused acquitted as a result of a defective indictment is 
regarded as never having been in jeopardy of a conviction and may 
therefore be tried again. In determining whether he was in jeopardy, 
it is not taken into consideration whether the indictment could have 
been amended. 
* In order to protect the accused against double jeopardy in deserving 
instances (where the pleas of former jeopardy cannot be raised), 
English courts have used their inherent discretionary powers to stay 
proceedings permanently as an abuse of process. The basic premise 
which emerges from the case law is that the courts regard attempts 
by the prosecution to treat preliminary hearings as a dummy run, in 
other words as mere preparation for subsequent preliminary hearings, 
as oppressive and vexatious conduct which justifies a permanent stay 
of proceedings on double jeopardy grounds. 
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* An accused tried on indictment may be re-indicted after entering of 
a no/le prosequi by the Attorney-General, even after he has pleaded. 
The only limitation is that it must be entered before judgment; the 
court has no control over the decision of the Attorney-General. In 
summary trials on the other hand, the prosecution may only withdraw 
a charge at a stage before plea. The Director of Public Prosecutions 
may withdraw in both summary trials and trials on indictment, albeit 
only during the preliminary stages of the proceedings (in other words, 
before plea). Of importance, however, is that the accused may insist 
that the state goes ahead with the second prosecution within 35 days. 
If this does not occur, the accused may raise the plea of former 
jeopardy. 
3.3 CANADIAN LAW 
3.3.1 General 
Section 11 {h) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
provides 
Any person charged with an offence has the right 
if finally acquitted of the offence, not to be tried for it 
again and, if finally found guilty and punished for the 
offence, not to be tried or punished for it again. 61 
Soon after the Charter's inception in 1982 the eminent Canadian 
lawyer, Martin Friedland, predicted that "[t]he language of the 
provision [being a very narrow expression of the principles of double 
61 Part 1 of the Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada 
Act 1982 (UK) 1982 C II. See Beaudoin GA & Ratushny E The 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 2nd ed 1989 538. 
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jeopardy] will not, without stretching the natural meaning of the 
words, cover the rule against multiple convictions, the rule against 
unreasonably splitting a case, issue estoppal, termination before a final 
verdict, or even prosecution for similar, although not identical 
offences". 62 He also pointed out that the word finally makes it clear 
that the state may not be prevented from appealing (in certain cases) 
against acquittals. Friedland envisaged however, that the "due 
process" clause of the Canadian Charter which provides that 
[e]veryone has a right to life, liberty and security of the 
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, 
may also be invoked on a subsidiary basis by an accused who alleges 
that his double jeopardy rights have been violated. 63 The extent to 
which the Canadian due process provision may assist the accused in 
this particular aspect, has, however, not as yet been delineated by the 
Canadian Supreme Court. 
Friedland' s predictions with regard to the interpretation of the double 
jeopardy provision have become true in most respects. The Supreme 
Court interpreted the provision as allowing for prosecution appeals, 
albeit on a point of law only. 64 In the field of successive 
prosecutions for the same offence, the Supreme Court's interpretation 
62See Friedland ML "Legal rights under the Charter" Criminal Law 
Quarterly Vol 24 1981-1982 430, 449 (hereinafter referred to as 
Friedland Legal rights. See also infra chapter four under 4. 3 for a 
discussion of these principles of double jeopardy as developed in the 
common law of Canada. 
631d. 
64See chapter six infra under 6.3 for a discussion of the recognition of 
the crown's right to appeal against an acquittal on a point of law in 
Canadian law. 
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of the double jeopardy clause has offered less protection to the 
accused than the principles evolved by the courts in the common law 
and those recognised in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 65 
However, in the field addressed in this chapter (namely at which 
stage in the proceedings jeopardy attaches), the court, in certain 
respects, has been more progressive. The traditional understanding of 
a previous trial on the merits has been rejected on the basis that an 
accused is considered in jeopardy on plea.66 The common law notion 
that an acquittal based on a defective indictment does not bring about 
protection against a subsequent prosecution for the same offence, 
even if the indictment could have been amended at the first trial, has 
been found to be inconsistent with contemporary rules of criminal 
procedure, namely those rules which vest extensive powers in the 
courts to allow an amendment of the charge. 67 However, the courts 
have been reluctant to interfere with the traditional rights of the 
Attorney-General to stay proceedings (the no/le prosequi rights at 
common law). These seem to have been retained on the basis that 
public policy requires that the Attorney-General's powers in this 
particular field remain unfettered.68 These different types of 
terminations of proceedings and their effect in terms of the rule 
against double jeopardy will be discussed in detail in the paragraphs 
below. 
65See chapter four infra under 4.3 for a detailed discussion of these 
principles. 
66Regina v Riddle ( 1980) 48 CCC (2d) 365 (SCC). 
67See R v Moore ( 1988) 41 CCC (3d) 289 (SCC). 
68See Regina v Tateham ( 1982) 70 CCC (2d) 565 (BCCA). 
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3.3.2 The attachment of jeopardy 
As indicated above, an accused may plead former jeopardy if 
charged with an offence of which he has previously been finally 
acquitted or finally convicted and punished. 69 The Supreme Court of 
Canada held that section 1 1 (h) is limited to criminal or quasi-criminal 
proceedings, or proceedings giving rise to penal consequences. The 
criterion seems to be that protection is only afforded for offences of 
a public nature, the punishment of which is deemed to promote public 
order and welfare.70 
A final conviction or acquittal in a jury trial does not present any 
difficulty. A final adjudication occurs when the jury returns its 
verdict. 71 The position is somewhat more complex in cases tried by 
a judge. As indicated above, the basic premise is that an accused 
must have been placed in jeopardy - that is, in peril of a conviction at 
the earlier proceeding. In Regina v Riddle72 the Supreme Court held 
that a person is in jeopardy as soon as he had been arraigned and 
pleaded to a charge before a court of competent jurisdiction. The 
facts in Riddle were the following. The accused was charged with 
common assault. He pleaded not guilty and the matter was adjourned 
for trial. On the trial date, the case was dismissed in the following 
circumstances. The informant failed to appear, the court refused to 
adjourn the matter and the crown subsequently called no evidence. 
A week later, the accused was once again charged with the same 
69See section 11 (h) of the Charter set out supra, text at note 61 . 
70See Regina v Wigglesworth ( 1988) 37 CCC (3d) 385 (SCC). In 
Regina v Shubley ( 1990) 52 CCC (3d) 481 (SCC) it was held that 
prison disciplinary proceedings do not satisfy this criterion. 
71 See Salhany RE Canadian Criminal Procedure 6th ed 1995 6-58. 
72Supra. 
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offence. He pleaded autrefois acquit to the charge which was upheld 
by the court. The state then appealed on a point of law, arguing that 
the dismissal was not tantamount to an acquittal because it did not 
amount to a disposition on the merits. 73 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. First of all, the court 
(per Dickson J), considered the historical meaning of the n unfortunate II 
phrase - 11 on the merits". 74 The court explained that in nineteenth 
century England, justices were given power to issue "certificates of 
dismissal" with respect to common assaults and batteries. In terms 
of a particular statute, these certificates served to "release the 
accused of all further proceedings (civil or criminal) for the same 
cause 11 • 75 In a number of cases, the prosecutor dropped a criminal 
proceeding in favour of a civil suit. However, in terms of the statute, 
the certificate barred a further suit. In order· to make provision for 
such cases, the legislature then amended the particular Act, adding 
that the termination of the criminal proceeding should be on the merits 
for the prohibition to operate. 76 
According to Justice Dickson, a particular case in which the court 
(at the time) considered the meaning of the concept 11 on the merits 11 , 
was Haynes v Davis.77 As indicated above,78 the accused in 
Haynes successfully raised the plea of autrefois acquit in the 
73At 376. 
74At 378. 
76At 378 of the Riddle decision, referring to Friedland supra 57-59 and 
a number of English cases on the point. 
77This case is discussed supra, text at note 35. 
78/d. 
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subsequent proceedings for the same offence, despite the fact that a 
previous summons was dismissed without considering the merits of 
the case. Justice Dickson referred to the following dicta of Ridley J, 
in the Haynes case79 
The appellant was thus in peril. It is not quite correct to 
say, although it is- rather an attractive phrase,. that there 
must have been an acquittal upon the merits in order that 
there may be a good plea of autrefois acquit. In 
whatever way a person obtains an acquittal, whether it 
be by the verdict of a jury on the merits or by some 
ruling on a point of law without the case going to the 
jury, he is entitled to protection from further proceedings. 
Justice Dickson also observed (in the Riddle case) that Avroy J (in a 
concurring opinion in the Haynes case) added the following remarks80 
and 
I prefer to rest my judgment upon the one ground that 
the plea of resjudicata or autrefois acquit depends for its 
validity upon this one question, whether the accused on 
the former occasion was in peril of being convicted of the 
same offence. If he was, the plea of autrefois is good. 
The question whether the one or the other is in peril is to 
be ascertained by enquiring whether the Magistrate had 
jurisdiction to deal with the offences. 
On the basis of these dicta, Justice Dickson concluded in the Canadian 
case of Riddle that an accused is in jeopardy from the moment he has 
79At 335, of the Haynes case. See 379 of the judgment of Dickson J, 
in the Riddle case. 
80At 337. 
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pleaded to a charge before a judge with jurisdiction.81 He added that 
the accused continues to be in jeopardy until final determination of 
the matter by the rendering of a verdict. In his view, "[t]he term on 
the merits does nothing to further the test for the application of the bis 
vexari maxim" .82 He concluded that the phrase merely serves to 
emphasise the general requirement that the previous dismissal must 
have been made by a court of competent jurisdictiorr whose 
proceedings were free from jurisdictional error and which rendered 
judgment on the charge.83 
The effect of Riddle is, inter alia, that no actual evidence need have 
been heard at the previous trial to sustain an otherwise valid plea of 
autrefois acquit. 84 In Petersen v The Queen85 the Supreme Court 
once again confirmed the Riddle principle, albeit in a different factual 
context. In that case, the trial judge dismissed the charge after a plea 
had been entered but before the hearing of any evidence. The basis 
of dismissal was that he had no jurisdiction to hear the matter because 
the accused had not previously consented to an adjournment of the 
case in excess of eight days as was required in terms of the Code. It 
appeared however, that the charge had been dismissed erroneously. 
The loss of jurisdiction could have been cured in terms of the Code 
81 At 379. Unlike the position taken in the English case of Williams 
(discussed supra, text at note 28), the court in Riddle did not 
distinguish the facts of Haynes on the basis that the summons was 
dismissed in that case because of a mere procedural error which would 
not necessarily have prevented a conviction of the accused at the first 
trial. 
82At 380. 
84See Ewaschuk EG Criminal pleadings and practice in Canada Vol 1 
2nd ed 1996 14-14. 
85( 1982) 69 CCC (2d) 385 (SCC). 
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and therefore dismissal was not necessary in the particular case. 
Nevertheless, instead of appealing the dismissal, the state proceeded 
on a new charge for the same offence. A plea of autrefois acquit was 
upheld by the trial court as well as the Supreme Court. 
Mcintyre J, who delivered the judgment of the Supreme Court, 
reasoned as follows. In terms of the Riddle· principle, a person may 
succeed with the plea of autrefois acquit if he can show that he had 
been placed in jeopardy on the same matter on an earlier occasion 
before a court of competent jurisdiction, and that there had been a 
disposition in his favour resulting in an acquittal or dismissal of the 
charges. 86 The court concluded that the fact that in reality the trial 
judge (in the case at hand) had been vested from the outset with 
jurisdiction and never lost it, meant that the court qualified as one with 
competent jurisdiction. 87 The court also found that the accused had 
been in jeopardy at the previous trial. In the court's view, this was not 
a case where the previous trial could be regarded as a nullity. The 
court explained that a jurisdictional error which renders a trial a nullity 
is "one which leads the court to exceed its jurisdiction by exercising, 
or purporting to exercise, a jurisdiction it does not possess". 88 In the 
case at hand, however, the judge, in deciding that he lacked 
jurisdiction, simply made an error in law in the disposition of the case 
which was properly before him and within his jurisdiction. 89 
Therefore, the crown should rather have appealed on a point of law 
86At 390. 
87 At 391 . The court pointed out that the crown should, rather than 
instituting new charges, have appealed against the dismissal on the 
basis of an error of law. However, when it instituted new charges, 
the court found that it had foregone its remedy. 
88At 392. 
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than proceed on new charges. The court pointed out that by following 
this approach (instituting new charges), the crown had foregone its 
remedy inasmuch as a plea of autrefois acquit could be raised 
successfully in such circumstances. 90 
Consistent with this approach, the Supreme Court laid down the 
principle in Regina v Moore91 that the quashing or dismissal of an 
indictment after arraignment and plea is tantamount to an acquittal 
which brings into effect protection against a successive prosecution 
for the same offence. 92 The facts were as follows. The trial judge 
dismissed a charge on the basis that it failed to allege an essential 
element of the offence. Subsequently, the accused was again charged 
with the same offence on a charge which set out all the essential 
elements of the offence. The accused then raised the plea of 
autrefois acquit. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether 
the dismissal of the charge amounted to an acquittal. The Supreme 
Court approached the problem on the principles of attachment of 
jeopardy and lack of jurisdiction to acquit or convict. The judgment of 
Lamer, J can be summarised in three principles 
(a) If a charge is merely voidable as opposed to void, it follows that 
the judge has the necessary jurisdiction to amend the 
charge. 93 The court explained that in the absence of absolute 
nullity, a court has wide powers in terms of the Code to amend 
a charge. 94 If a trial court could have amended a charge in 
90At 393. 
91 ( 1988) 41 CCC (3d) 289 (SCC). 
921n Regina v D ( 1990) 60 CCC (3d) 407 (Ont CA) the court held that 
this principle only applies where the indictment is quashed after a plea 
has been taken, and not before plea. 
93At 312. 
94These powers are set out in section 529 of the Code. 
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terms of the provisions of the Code, but instead (erroneously) 
dismissed the charge, the accused may, until that decision is 
reversed by a court of appeal, not be tried again for the same 
offence. The Supreme Court explained that if a charge could 
have been amended, it means that, in reality, the accused was 
in jeopardy of a conviction and the court had the necessary 
jurisdiction to deal with the case. 95 
(b) However, if no amendment could have been made because it 
would have prejudiced the accused "irreparably", the dismissal 
of the charge would then be tantamount to an acquittal which 
brings into effect double jeopardy. 96 
(c) If, on the other hand, the charge is an absolute nullity, the 
accused may be charged again in a new trial because he "never 
was in jeopardy and the disposition of the charge through 
quashing was for lack of jurisdiction" . 97 
Applying these principles to the case at hand, the court found that 
whereas the trial judge could in fact have amended the charge, the 
plea of autrefois acquit should have been upheld to prevent further 
proceedings. 
The decision in Moore can be described as a long-awaited departure 
from archaic principles which had become irreconcilable with modern 
practices of criminal procedure. Being consistent with present rules 
of criminal procedure which allow for extensive powers to amend 
indictments, the decision can be viewed as an important breakthrough 
95At311-312. 
96At 312. The term "irreparable prejudice" is advanced in the case law 
as the criterion to determine whether a defective charge should be 
dismissed. This means that the amendment cannot be cured by an 
adjournment of the proceedings, or in any other way. (Id). 
97 At 311. 
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in the law of double jeopardy. 98 
However, as indicated above, Canadian courts have not adopted 
the same approach in the field of prosecutorial discretion to withdraw 
charges. In fact, the courts have been reluctant to interfere on the 
grounds of double jeopardy with the prosecutor's discretion to institute 
new proceedings after withdrawal of charges. At present there are 
three ways for the crown to terminate proceedings 
(a) The prosecutor may withdraw the charges. This is not provided 
for in the Code but the (traditional) practice continues 
nevertheless. 99 
(b) The Attorney-General or "counsel instructed by him for that 
purpose" may stay proceedings in terms of the Code. 100 
(c) The prosecutor may offer no evidence with respect to the 
charge which, in terms of the Riddle principle, leads to an 
acquittal. 101 
As regards the withdrawal of a charge in terms of the common law, 
the following principles prevail. A withdrawal before plea does not 
bring into effect double jeopardy protection. After a plea has been 
entered, a charge may only be withdrawn with the consent of the 
98Bolton PM Criminal Procedure in Canada 10th ed 1991 11 2 remarks 
that the decision also has the effect of forcing the crown to amend an 
indictment or information when it is appropriate rather than bringing 
a new indictment. 
99See in general Law Reform Commission of Canada: Working Paper 
62 1990 Controlling criminal prosecutions: the Attorney-General and 
the Crown Prosecutor 99 (hereinafter referred to as Working Paper 
62). 
1~his is done in terms of section 579 of the Code. 
101 See supra, text at note 72 for a discussion of the Riddle case. 
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judge. 102 The legal effect of such a withdrawal, however, is not 
perfectly clear. in Regina v Selhi103 the court held that a withdrawal 
after plea, but before evidence is heard, does not justify a subsequent 
plea of autrefois acquit. The court was influenced in its decision by 
the fact that the withdrawal was based on technical aspects at the 
very beginning of the trial before evidence was led. 104 However, the 
Supreme Court has not as yet specifically ruled on the issue of 
whether a withdrawal subsequent to the hearing of evidence may be 
allowed in terms of double jeopardy principles. 
A stay of proceedings by the Attorney-General as provided for in the 
Act does not require the consent of the court and may be entered at 
any stage before judgment is delivered. It was held in R v 
Tateham 105 that a stay of proceedings by the Attorney-General does 
not operate as an acquittal but merely suspends proceedings. In 
Tateham, a plea of autrefois acquit was rejected in the following 
circumstances. The crown entered a stay of proceedings in the middle 
of the trial after the trial judge refused to allow the prosecution to read 
in a particular piece of evidence delivered by a witness at the 
preliminary hearing. The crown was allegedly unable to present oral 
evidence because the witness was, at the time, absent from Canada. 
Subsequent proceedings for the same offence were allowed, despite 
reliance by the defence on the Riddle principle. 106 However, the 
court refused to interfere with the power of the Attorney-General and 
allowed the subsequent prosecution, apparently on the basis that the 
102See Working Paper 62, 99-100. 
103( 1990) 53 CCC (3d) 576 (SCC). 
104At 576. 
105 ( 1982) 70 CCC (2d) 565 (BCCA). 
106At 568. 
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Attorney-General is not answerable to the court for the exercise of his 
powers to stay proceedings. 107 
The Law Commission of Canada also recently expressed itself in 
favour of the retention of the principle that the Attorney-General may, 
at his discretion, discontinue proceedings temporarily. 108 However, 
certain limits to this power are suggested. These are, inter alia, that 
there should be some judicial control over the stage in the proceedings 
at which a stay may be entered, as is the case with withdrawals. The 
Commission expressed the view that since there are many legitimate 
reasons for which the crown may want to delay proceedings, the 
crown should retain the right to discontinue proceedings temporarily, 
as long as it takes into account the accused's right to an expeditious 
trial. 109 The Commission consequently suggested that certain time 
limits should be attached to a temporary discontinuance, and that the 
accused should be informed from the outset whether a discontinuance 
will be of a permanent or merely temporary nature. 110 
Other "premature" terminations or proceedings which do not bring 
into effect protection against double jeopardy, are 
where the trial has been declared a nullity, for 
107See in general Gauthier A "The power of the Crown to reinstitute 
proceedings after the withdrawal or dismissal of charges" Criminal 
Law Quarterly Vol 22 1979-1980 463-483 and Cohen S Due process 
of law - The Canadian system of justice 1977 150-160 for criticisms 
of the unfettered powers of the Attorney-General to stay proceedings. 
The basic concern raised by both these writers is the potential for 
abuse of power and consequential harrassment of the accused. 
108See supra note 99. 
109working Paper 62, 110-111 . 
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example where no plea was taken 111 
where a jury is unable to agree on a verdict (a so-
called "hung-jury") 112 
a discharge at a preliminary enquiry 
where an appeal has been taken and a new trial 
ordered. 113 
However, a stay of proceedings by the court in terms of its inherent 
discretionary powers to prevent an abuse of the process is regarded 
as an acquittal which brings into effect protection against double 
jeopardy. This was recognised in the landmark decision of Regina v 
Jewitt which held that a trial judge may stay proceedings in terms of 
these powers on the basis that the accused was unlawfully 
entrapped. 114 In Conway v the Queen 115 the Supreme Court held 
that a trial judge has a discretion to stay proceedings in order to 
remedy an abuse of the court's process where unfair or oppressive 
treatment of an accused disentitles the crown to carry on with the 
prosecution of the charge. The court held that abuse of process is not 
limited to cases where there is evidence of prosecutorial misconduct. 
Instead, the court laid down the guideline that "where the affront to 
fair play and decency is disproportionate to the societal interest in the 
effective prosecution of criminal cases, then the administration of 
111 See R v Pal/en (1960) 127 CCC 272 (BCSC). Cf supra, text at 
notes 93-97 for a discussion of the difference between a void and a 
voidable charge. 
112Regina v Misra ( 1985) 44 CR (3d) 179 (Sask QB). 
113Regina v Purcell (1933) 61 CCC 261 (NSSC). 
114( 1985) 21 CCC (3d) 7 (SCC). See also Regina v Mack ( 1988) 44 
CCC (3d) 513 (SCC). 
115( 1989) 49 CCC (3d) 289 (SCC). 
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justice is best served by staying the proceedings" .116 Instances 
where a stay had been granted are the following 
where the accused was arbitrarily detained in contravention of 
section 9 of the Charter 117 
where the accused's right to a speedy trial was violated. 118 
However, a judicial stay of proceedings, so far, has not been granted 
where the crown exercised its right in terms of the Code to enter a 
stay of proceedings after it was refused an adjournment, on the basis 
that the Attorney-General is not ordinarily answerable to the courts for 
the exercise of his powers to stay proceedings. 119 
3.3.3 Summary 
* Regarding a successful double jeopardy plea, the Supreme Court of 
Canada rejected the notion that an acquittal be "on the merits"; in 
other words, a termination of proceedings in favour of the accused 
need not be based on a finding of fact that the accused is innocent 
before a plea of former jeopardy may be raised successfully. Instead, 
the court suggested that it should be investigated whether a previous 
dismissal was made by a court of competent jurisdiction whose 
proceedings were free from jurisdictional error and which rendered 
judgment on the charge. The consequences of this approach {as 
opposed to the traditional approach followed in English law) are the 
116At 302. 
117Regina v Pithart (1987) 34 CCC {3d) 150 {BC Co Ct). 
118Regina v Askov ( 1991) 59 CCC {3d) 449 {SCC). 
119Regina v Bjorklund (1977) 37 CCC {2d) 5 (BCSC). 
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following 
(a) If a court dismissed a charge because it was under the 
erroneous belief that it lacked jurisdiction, the accused may at 
a subsequenttrial raise the plea of former jeopardy. The reason 
is that the court (vested from the outset with jurisdiction) 
qualified as one with competent jurisdiction. Therefore, the 
accused was, in reality, in jeopardy of a conviction. In such 
instances the crown should rather appeal on a point of law than 
proceed on new charges. 
(b) If an accused is charged on the basis of a defective indictment, 
he may not be charged again if the indictment could have been 
amended. The accused was in jeopardy of a conviction 
because the court had the necessary jurisdiction to deal with 
the matter. However, if no amendment could have been made 
because it would have prejudiced the accused, a second trial is 
also prohibited. In such cases, a discharge of the accused is 
regarded as tantamount to an acquittal. If, on the other hand, 
the charge was an absolute nullity, the accused may be charged 
again because he never was in jeopardy and the quashing of the 
charge was a result of lack of jurisdiction. 
(c) A stay of proceedings by the court in terms of inherent 
discretionary powers to prevent an abuse of process, is 
regarded as an acquittal which brings into effect protection 
against double jeopardy. 
* Canadian courts are not inclined to interfere with the prosecutor's 
discretion to withdraw charges. In terms of the common law, a case 
may be withdrawn after plea with the consent of the court, but before 
evidence is heard. It is an open question whether a case may be 
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withdrawn after this stage. However, in terms of statutory law, the 
Attorney-General may withdraw charges at any stage before judgment 
is delivered. Moreover, there is no judicial control over the stage in 
the proceedings at which a stay may be entered. The Law 
Commission of Canada expressed certain reservations in this regard. 
The Commission suggested certain limitations to these powers. It is 
suggested, inter alia, that the accused be informed from the outset 
whether a discontinuance will be of a mere temporary nature. Jurists 
point out that the wide powers of the Attorney-General in this regard 
create the possibility of abuse of power and consequential harassment 
of the accused. 
3.4 INDIAN LAW 
3.4. 1 General 
The common law principle of res judicata formed part of Indian 
jurisprudence from as early as 1793. 120 Judges in British India 
applied the common law rule that a court cannot entertain any cause 
in civil as well as in criminal matters which has previously been heard 
and determined by a judge. 121 
In 1861 , the principle found recognition in the first Code of Criminal 
Procedure enacted in lndia. 122 Section 55 of that Code provided 
120See Singh RP Double Jeopardy - constitutional and statutory 
protection 1 991 24. This author suggests that the idea of a 
prohibition against double jeopardy can be traced back as far as 
ancient Hindu law (at 8-18). 
121 See Singh 24. 
122Act 25 of 1861. 
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that 
[a] person who has once been tried of an offence and 
convicted or acquitted of such offence, shall not be liable 
to be tried again for the same offence. 123 
At present, the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict are 
contained in section 300 of the current Code of Criminal 
Procedure. 124 This is an exhausitive provision which will be 
discussed in detail in chapter four. 
With the adoption of the Constitution of India in 1949, the common 
law rule against double jeopardy also acquired the status of a 
fundamental right in that country. Article 20(2) of the Constitution 
of India provides that 
[no] person shall be prosecuted and punished for the 
same offence more than once. 
Soon after its inception, the Supreme Court of India had an 
opportunity to interpret the words "prosecuted and punished" as they 
appear in the provision. The court held in Venkataram v Union of 
India 125 that both these factors must exist before the clause may be 
invoked. Therefore, protection in terms of the constitutional 
prohibition would only be available if the previous prosecution ended 
123This provision was re-enacted (in more detail) in its successor, 
section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. 
124Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1974). 
125AIR 1954 SC 375, 377. 
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in a conviction, and not if it ended merely in an acquittal. 126 
The principle of autrefois acquit has however been retained in the 
ordinary law of the land. 127 Discussion of the ordinary law as well 
as the constitutional law on the topic addressed in this chapter is 
consequently essential. 
3.4.2 The attachment of jeopardy 
The Indian Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a person, once 
tried and convicted or acquitted of an offence, may not be tried again 
for the same offence. 128 A person may only rely on the defences of 
previous jeopardy if previously convicted or acquitted by a court of 
law which had the necessary jurisdiction to try him for the 
offence. 129 For jurisdiction to be present, it is also required that the 
126See Singh 98-104 for a discussion of the history of the enactment 
of this provision. He explains that the first drafts of this provision 
(submitted by the sub-committee on fundamental rights), were based 
on the American model, and provided that no person should be "tried" 
more than once for the same offence. However, for no apparent 
reason the Constitutional advisor substituted the word "punished" for 
the word "tried". This modified version was eventually adopted by the 
Constitutional Assembly without much debate, despite the fact that 
there is a marked difference between the words "punished" and 
"tried". 
127Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (Act No 2 of 
1 9 7 4) contains both the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois 
convict. 
128Section 300( 1 ) . 
129See Maqbool Hussain v State of Bombay AIR 1953 SC 325. The 
necessary jurisdiction would be absent if certain conditions for the 
exercise of jurisdiction had not been complied with, for example where 
previous sanction for the prosecution of particular offences (as 
required in terms of the Code) had not been obtained from the 
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court believed that it had such jurisdiction. If it believed, erroneously, 
that it had no such jurisdiction, the trial is regarded as a nullity and the 
pleas of former jeopardy cannot be raised successfully. 130 
A distinction is maintained in the Act between a discharge and an 
acquittal; only an acquittal brings into effect double jeopardy 
protection. The classic example of an acquittal in Indian law is the 
following. The judge, after taking the evidence for the prosecution, 
and hearing the defence on the case, concludes that there is not 
sufficient evidence to find the accused guilty of the crime charged and 
accordingly enters an acquittal. 131 However, an acquittal on the 
merits of the case at the conclusion of the trial is not necessarily 
required. An acquittal may also be entered at a stage before a verdict 
is delivered on the factual merits of a case. This occurs in the 
following instances 
(a) where the proceedings have been instituted upon a complaint 
and the complainant is absent on the day fixed for the hearing 132 
Government. (See infra note 140 for an explanation of this feature of 
the criminal prosecution in India). 
130See Mohammad Safi v State of West Bengal 1966 1 Cri LJ 75. 
Contra the position taken in Canadian law in the case of Petersen 
(discussed infra under 3.3.2, text at note 85). 
131 Section 232 of the Act. 
132Section 249 of the Act. A private citizen intending to initiate 
criminal proceedings in respect of an offence has two courses open to 
him. He may lodge a first information report before the police if the 
offence is a cognizable one (that is one for which the police may arrest 
without a warrant), or he may lodge a complaint before a competent 
judicial magistrate irrespective of whether the offence is cognizable or 
non-cognizable. (Non-cognizable offences are offences for which the 
police have no authority to arrest without warrant). See Kelkar RV 
Outlines of Criminal Procedure 1977 105 & 159. The author points 
out that the object of the Indian Code is to ensure the freedom and the 
safety of the subject in that it gives him the right to come to court if 
89 
· (b) where a complaint is withdrawn at any time before a final order 
is passed 133 
(c) where the case is withdrawn by the public prosecutor at a stage 
after the charge has been framed 134 
(d) the termination of proceedings by the magistrate in summons 
cases 135 instituted otherwise than on a complaint, before 
pronouncement of judgment if such stoppage is made at a stage 
he considers that a wrong has been done to him or to the Republic, 
and to be a check upon police vagaries. Where a complaint is filed 
before a magistrate, he may then order an investigation by the police. 
133Section 257 of the Code. The magistrate permits the withdrawal if 
he is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for withdrawing the 
complaint. The Supreme Court of India held in Cricket Association of 
Bengal v State of West Bengal Al R 19 71 SC 19 25, 1930 that once the 
magistrate permits the complaint to be withdrawn, he must acquit the 
accused. 
134Section 321 of the Code. The court must grant permission for 
withdrawal on the guiding consideration of the interest of the 
administration of justice (State of Punjab v Union of India 1987 Cri LJ 
SC 151, 152). A prosecution of a case may be withdrawn not merely 
on the ground of paucity of evidence, but also to further the broad 
ends of public justice which may include appropriate social, economic 
and political purposes. (See State of Punjab v Union of India 152). 
135The Code has adopted four distinct modes of trial. These are: (i) 
trial before a court of sessions; (ii) trial of warrant cases; (iii) trial of 
summons cases and (iv) summary trials. For the purpose of 
determining the mode of trial, all criminal cases are divided into two 
categories: offences punishable with death, imprisonment for life or 
imprisonment for a term exceeding two years form one category and 
are called "warrant cases". The first two trial modes are adopted in 
such cases. The other criminal cases (relatively of a less serious 
nature) form the second category and are termed "summons cases". 
The last two modes of trials are applicable to such cases. Less 
elaborate procedures are employed in these particular modes of trial. 
(See Kelkar 280). 
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after the evidence of the principal witnesses has been 
recorded. 136 
The following terminations of criminal proceedings have, however, not 
been regarded as acquittals 
(a) the stopping of proceedings before evidence is given 137 
(b) withdrawal by a public prosecutor before a charge has been 
framed 138 
(c) dismissal of a complaint139 
136Section 258 of the Code. These are cases where there exist, in the 
court's view, no prima facie evidence against the accused 
(Mangalprasad Jethalal Upadhyay v Thakkar Ananji Rachhoddas 1983 
Cri LJ 309, 314 (Guj)). 
137Section 258 of the Code. This is regarded as a mere discharge 
which does not bring into effect protection against double jeopardy. 
138Section 321 of the Code. 
1391n terms of section 203 of the Act a magistrate may, after 
considering the statement of the complainant and witnesses and the 
result of the police investigation (if any), dismiss the complaint if he 
is of the opinion that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding with 
the case. In Chandra Deo Singh v Prokash Chandra Bose 1963 2 Cri 
LJ 397, 400 the court held that the test is whether a prima facie case 
is made out, and not whether there is insufficient ground for 
conviction. A dismissal of a complaint occurs at a very preliminary 
stage in the proceedings; in fact, it can be compared with the 
preliminary inquiry stage of proceedings in our own law. Although 
the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict may not be raised 
on the mere ground of a dismissal of a complaint, it is pointed out that 
the possibility of a successive prosecution is unlikely in such 
instances. (See Kelkar 191). The author expresses the view that only 
exceptional circumstances may warrant a new proceeding. These are: 
(i) where the previous order of dismissal was passed on a incomplete 
record; (ii) where the dismissal was based on a misunderstanding, or 
could be regarded as manifestly unjust or absurd, or (iii) where new 
facts were adduced in the second complaint which could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have been brought on the record in the previous 
91 
(d) an order of acquittal by a magistrate on the ground that he had 
no jurisdiction to hear the case for want of valid sanction 140 
(e) dismissal of a defective indictment. 141 
proceeding. The author concludes that it would depend on the facts 
of each case whether entertaining a second complaint on the same 
facts after the dismissal of the first ought to be regarded as an abuse 
of the process of the court, or a step in futherance of justice. (Id). 
See chapter four infra under 4.4.5 for a discussion of the exercise of 
discretionary powers by Indian courts to prevent an abuse of process 
in the field of double jeopardy. 
140Noorbhoy v The King AIR 1949 PC 264. For prosecution of certain 
offences against the state, sanction or permission must be obtained 
from the government (state or central government). Kelkar explains 
(at 1 70) that the object of the section is to ensure that unauthorised 
persons do not interfere in state matters. He also points out that 
absence in sanction is regarded by Indian courts as a basic defect in 
jurisdiction and therefore not curable. (Cf also Abdul Mian v The King 
AIR 1951 Pat 513). Jain MP Indian Constitutional Law 4th ed repr 
1993 points out (at 566) that when a trial has for some reason 
become abortive either because of some inherent defect or illegality 
affecting the validity of the trial itself, a second trial is not barred by 
section 20(2) (Mohd Sati v West Bengal AIR 1960 Born 225). 
141 1n terms of the Code, wide powers are conferred on Indian courts 
to amend or alter a charge at any time before judgment is pronounced. 
(See section 216(a)). The basic premise is that no errors in stating 
either the offence or the particulars required to be stated in the charge 
should be regarded (at any stage) as being material, unless the 
accused has in fact been misled by such an error and it has 
occasioned a failure of justice. (See section 215 of the Code). The 
practice adopted in India is the following. In the event of prejudice to 
the accused, the court may either adjourn the trial for such period as 
may be necessary, or, direct a new trial. (This is provided for in 
section 216(4)). The result of these wide powers, namely that the 
court may adjourn the trial or direct a new trial at any stage of the 
proceedings, is that an acquittal based on a defective indictment 
almost never occurs. In fact, no such reported case could be traced. 
(See in general Kelkar 276-279). Cf however the decision in Bishan 
Singh v State of Rajasthan 1973 Cri LJ 1079 (discussed in chapter 
eight infra under 8.4.2, text at note 147) where a conviction on a 
defective indictment was set aside on appeal and the question of the 
permissiblity of a new trial considered on the basis of double jeopardy 
principles. 
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3.4. 3 Summary 
* The Supreme Court of India held that an accused may only rely on 
the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy if he has 
previously been convicted and punished for an offence. This means 
that the plea of autrefois acquit did not attain constitutional status in 
India. However, the plea of former acquittal may be raised in the 
ordinary law of the land. It follows that greater protection against 
double jeopardy is afforded the accused in terms of the ordinary law 
of the land than in terms of the Constitution. 
* A distinction is maintained in Indian law of criminal procedure 
between an acquittal on the one hand, and a discharge on the other 
hand. Only an acquittal effects protection against double jeopardy. 
An acquittal does not necessarily mean a termination of proceedings 
at the conclusion of the case based on a finding of fact that the 
accused is innocent. Terminations of proceedings on other grounds 
may also qualify as an "acquittal". These grounds are 
a) Absence of a complainant in proceedings instituted on 
complaint. These are proceedings initiated by the 
complainant himself instead of the state before a 
competent judicial magistrate. 
(b) The withdrawal of a complaint. 
(c) The withdrawal by a public prosecutor after a charge has 
been framed. 
(d) The termination of a case by the magistrate in summons 
cases (proceedings for less serious offences) at a stage 
after the evidence has been given. 
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Dismissal of a complaint in proceedings described in (a) above does 
not per se offer the accused protection against double jeopardy. The 
reason advanced is that proceedings on complaint amount merely to 
preliminary proceedings; a second prosecution is therefore justified. 
However, this will only be allowed in exceptional circumstances, for 
instance where the dismissal was based on a misunderstanding, or is 
manifestly unjust or absurd. Similar to the position· in English· law 
regarding the effect of a finding of no case to answer at a preliminary 
enquiry, a second prosecution on dismissal of a complaint may be 
prohibited if it amounts to an abuse of process. 
* Unlike the position in Canadian law, the common law principle still 
applies in Indian law that a dismissal based on a defective indictment 
does not bar a second trial. However, a dismissal on this basis is very 
rare. An indictment is only regarded as being defective if the accused 
was in fact misled by the error and it has resulted in a failure of 
justice. Moreover, Indian courts have wide powers to adjourn matters 
in order to avoid prejudice to the accused (in allowing amendment of 
an indictment). 
* Finally, a trial is regarded as a nullity and a second trial allowed for 
the same offence if the court discharged the accused in the erroneous 
belief that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter. 
3.5 THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
3.5.1 General 
The first Congress of the Federal Government of the United States 
adopted the common law guarantee against double jeopardy as part 
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of the Bill of Rights in 1789. 142 The prohibition was included as part 
of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 143 This 
provision provides, inter a/ia, that 
[No] person [shall] be subject for the same offense [sic] 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. 144 
In an early decision, 145 the Supreme Court emphasised that the 
double jeopardy clause in the Fifth Amendment is to be read broadly 
and applied "to all cases where a second punishment is attempted to 
be inflicted for the same offense [sic] by a judicial sentence". 146 
Almost a hundred years later the court made clear, however, that the 
clause was a bar not only against successive punishments for the 
same offence, but also against being twice put in jeopardy. The court 
stated in Price v Georgia 147 that 
[t]he "twice put in jeopardy" language of the Constitution 
thus relates to a potential, i.e., the risk that an accused 
142 Recognition of the concept of double jeopardy originated in the new 
nation in the colony of Massachusetts. Sigler Double Jeopardy 22-23 
expresses the view that the significance of double jeopardy in 
Massachusetts law explains why the doctrine was elevated to 
constitutional dignity (as early as the eighteenth century), instead of 
being treated as just another common law concept. See in general 
Sigler Double . Jeopardy 21-34 and Singer S and Hartman MJ 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure handbook 1986 540 for a discussion 
of the adoption process of the rule in American law. 
143The Bill of Rights was introduced by James Madison in 1789 as the 
first ten amendments to the United States Constitution. 
144US Const amend V. 
145 Ex parte Lange 85 US ( 18 Wall) 163 ( 1873). 
146At 173. 
147398 us 323, 326 ( 1970). 
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for a second time will be convicted of the "same 
offense" (sic) for which he was initially tried. 
The Court recognised that the clause offers the defendant in a 
criminal trial three distinct constitutional protections. 148 Protection 
against a second prosecution for the same offence after acquittal; 
protection against a second prosecution for the same offence after 
conviction and, protection against multiple punishment for the same 
offence. 
However, the double jeopardy clause was not obligatory in the 
states until 1969. In that year, the United States Supreme Court 
made federal double jeopardy standards applicable to the states by 
incorporation of the guarantee through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 149 
The rationale of the constitutional safeguard was articulated by the 
148North Carolina v Pearce 395 US 711, 717 ( 1969). It has also long 
been recognised that the protection is applicable to both felonies and 
misdemeanours (Ex parte Lange supra). 
149See Benton v Maryland 395 US 784 (1969). Prior to Benton, the 
Court held that the clause operated as a limitation on the federal 
government only. (See Palko v Connecticut 302 US 319 ( 1937). The 
double jeopardy jurisprudence of the different states of America will 
not be fully canvassed in this thesis. Suffice it to say (at this stage) 
that most of the states provide for greater protection against double 
jeopardy than that provided by the federal constitutional provision (as 
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court). All states, except 
Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina and Vermont 
also provide for double jeopardy protection in their own constitutions. 
The five states that do not, consider double jeopardy as part of their 
common law. See Singer & Hartman 540-541 and Notes and 
Comments: "Twice in Jeopardy" Yale Law Journal Vol 75 1965 262, 
262-263 (hereinafter referred to as "Comment: twice in jeopardy"). 
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United States Supreme Court in Green v US150 
The constitutional prohibition against "double jeopardy" 
was designed to protect an individual from being 
subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction 
more than once for an alleged offfense [sic] .... The 
underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least 
the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the 
State with all its resources and power should not be 
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an 
individual for an alleged offense, [sic] thereby subjecting 
him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and 
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety 
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that 
even though innocent he may be found quilty. 
The Supreme Court repeated these values (set out in Green) in 
almost every single case dealing with double jeopardy issues. 
However, confirmation of these values has not prevented the court 
from moving towards a less defendant-oriented philosophy in recent 
decisions. Although the court laid down the rule that jeopardy 
attaches at the commencement of the trial (in a jury trial, when the 
jury is sworn, and in a bench trial, when the first witness is 
called), 151 it interpreted the double jeopardy provision of the 
Constitution on the basis that it operates primarily to protect the 
sanctity of acquittals on the merits, rather than to protect the 
individual from repeated attempts by the state to secure a 
conviction. 152 The court's decisions reflecting this trend involve 
cases which attempt to determine whether the double jeopardy clause 
should prohibit retrials after mistrials, dismissals, appeals by the 
150355 us 184, 187-188 ( 1957). 
151 See Crist v Bretz 437 US 28 ( 1978). 
152See in particular the approach adopted in US v Scott 437 US 82 
( 1978) discussed in detail in chapter six infra under 6.5.5, text at note 
193. 
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defendant and appeals by the state. The principles laid down by the 
Supreme Court in these different procedural contexts will be 
considered on a separate basis in the following paragraphs. 
3.5.2 The attachment of jeopardy 
The United States Supreme Court held that jeopardy attaches in a 
bench trial (a non-jury trial) when the court begins to hear evidence, 
and this standard now applies in state as well as federal 
prosecutions. 153 In the 1978 Term, however, the Supreme Court in 
Crist v Bretz154 laid down as a constitutional principle the rule that 
jeopardy attaches in a jury trial at the impanelling and swearing in of 
the jury. In Crist, the Supreme Court focused on the values which 
underlie the prohibition against double jeopardy. It is therefore 
essential to give a detailed discussion of that case. The facts were the 
following. The defendants objected to errors in the criminal charge 
against them (relating to a count of obtaining money and property by 
false pretences), at a stage immediately after the jury was impanelled 
and sworn, but before the state's first witness was sworn. The trial 
judge, rejecting a motion by the prosecution to amend the charge, 
dismissed the entire charge against the defendants. However, it 
allowed the state to proceed with the case in a new trial on a new 
charge. After a second jury had been selected and sworn, the 
defendants moved to dismiss the new charge, claiming that the double 
jeopardy clause of the United States as well as the double jeopardy 
clause of the state of Montana Constitution barred a second 
prosecution. Since the state law fixed attachment of jeopardy at the 
153See Lee v US 432 US 23 ( 1977) & Serfass v US 420 US 377 
(1974). 
154Supra. 
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swearing of the first witness, the motion was denied. 155 However, 
the Supreme Court ruled that the subsequent convictions based on the 
charges in the second proceeding had to be reversed because, as a 
matter of constitutional law, jeopardy had attached when the first jury 
was impanelled and sworn. The court held that, through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, this rule also applied to the state of 
Montana. 156 
Mr Justice Stewart stated that "the relatively simple rule" laid 
down in English common law, namely that a defendant is regarded as 
having been in jeopardy only when there has been a conviction or 
acquittal after a complete trial, also formed part of early American 
constitutional law. 157 However, he pointed out that unlike the 
position in English law, this rule did not survive constitutional scrutiny 
in the United States of America. From the end of the nineteenth 
century, it became firmly established that a defendant could be put in 
jeopardy even in a prosecution that did not culminate in a conviction 
or an acquittal. 158 
The court explained that although it has long been established that 
jeopardy may attach in a criminal trial that ends inconclusively, the 
precise point at which jeopardy does attach in a jury trial was, until 
155Until the decision in Crist, the federal rule of attachment of jeopardy 
(in jury trials) was not considered a constitutionally essential element 
of state procedure. 
156At 32. 
157 At 33. 
158At 33. The court referred to a number of cases which dealt with 
the issue whether a subsequent prosecution may follow on a 
declaration of a so-called mistrial. The mistrial cases are discussed in 
detail under the following sub-heading. 
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the court's decision in 1963 in Downum v US, 159 open to argument. 
It was only in that case that the Supreme Court pinpointed the stage 
in a jury trial when jeopardy attaches, namely when the jury is 
impanelled and sworn. Mr Justice Stewart explained that Downum 
and other decisions of the Supreme Court indicate that the reason for 
holding that jeopardy atttaches when the jury is impanelled and sworn, 
is that the defendant "[has a] valued right to have his trial completed 
by a particular tribunal" .160 In other words, the attachment rule 
protects the interest of an accused in retaining a chosen jury. 161 
The court emphasised that the right of the accused to have his trial 
completed by the first tribunal he encounters, "lies at the foundation 
of the federal rule that jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled 
[sic] and sworn". 162 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun chose not to rest his 
conclusion (namely that jeopardy attaches at the time when the jury 
is impanelled and sworn), solely on the above grounds. He pointed 
out that the argument that jeopardy attaches at that particular stage 
of the proceedings for the sole reason that the accused has a valued 
right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal, would also 
support a conclusion that jeopardy attaches at the very beginning of 
the jury selection process. 163 In his view, other interests are also 
involved: repetitive stress upon the defendant; continuing 
159372 US 734 ( 1963). See infra text at note 179 for a discussion of 
that decision. 
160At 36, relying on the court's previous holding in Wade v Hunter 336 
US 684 689 ( 1949). The court also referred to the dicta in Green 
cited supra, text at note 150. 
161At 35. 
162At 36. 
163At 38. 
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embarrassment for him; and the possiblity of prosecutorial 
overreaching in the opening statement. 164 In Justice Blacmun's 
view, although each of these interests could also be used to support 
an argument that jeopardy attaches at some point before the jury is 
sworn, they become particulary acute at the commencement of trial 
(in other words, when the jury is sworn). The judge explained that it 
is then that the accused begins to run the risk- of conviction ·and, the 
greatest opportunity exists for prosecutorial overreaching. 165 
However, the important interests of the accused highlighted in the 
Crist case did not result in a permanent discontinuance of criminal 
proceedings for the same offence in all circumstances where the 
discontinuance occurred at a stage after jeopardy had attached. In 
deciding whether the double jeopardy ban applies after jeopardy has 
attached, the court balanced these interests of the accused against the 
public's interest to bring an offender to justice. This balancing of 
interests becomes particularly apparent from decisions of the Supreme 
Court handed down in the so-called "mistrial" cases. It is therefore 
expedient to discuss these cases first. 
3.5.2.1 Mistrials 
In the federal law of the United States a trial may be terminated by a 
trial court at a stage after jeopardy had attached but before a final 
verdict is rendered by declaring the trial a so-called "mistrial". The 
declaration of the trial court of a mistrial means that a trial is 
165The judge stated (at 38) that "it is then and there that the 
defendant's interest in the jury reaches its highest plateau, because 
the opportunity for prosecutorial overreaching thereafter increases 
substantially, and ... stress and possible harassment for the defendant 
from then on is sustained". 
L 
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discontinued on the basis that it has become inappropriate or 
impossible to continue with the trial. 166 Improper conduct by 
counsel, the presiding judge, members of the jury or witnesses, inter 
alia, constitutes grounds for a mistrial and a motion on these grounds 
may be made by either the prosecution or the defence prior to jury 
deliberations. Mistrials may also be declared suo sponte by a judge 
either at a stage prior to jury deliberations or, at a stage after jury 
deliberations if the jury failed to reach a verdict. The last-mentioned 
instance is known as a "hung-jury" mistrial. 167 The judge who 
orders a mistrial usually assumes that a reprosecution can be brought. 
However, as the following discussion of Supreme Court decisions on 
the issue demonstrates, this is not always the case. 
In dealing with the question whether reprosecution of an accused 
on declaration of a mistrial is constitutionally permissible, the Supreme 
Court has demonstrated two primary concerns. Protection of the 
accused from prosecutorial overreaching or harassment and 
preservation of the accused's interest in finality. 168 The accused's 
interest in finality has been more clearly defined by the court in mistrial 
cases as a "valued right to have his trial completed before the first 
tribunal he confronts" .169 An accused has a valued right to have his 
166See Israel JH Kamisar Y and LaFave WR Criminal Procedure and the 
Constitution 1989 673-67 4. 
167See Del Carmen R Criminal Procedure - Law and Practice 2nd ed 
1991 43. 
168See Comments "Double jeopardy and reprosecution after mistrial: 
Is the Manifest Necessity Test manifestly necessary?" Northwestern 
University Law Review Vol 69 1975 887, 888 (hereinafter referred to 
as "Comment: manifest necessity test"). 
169US vJorn 400 US 470, 486 (1971). An accused's valued right to 
have his trial completed by a particular tribunal was first formulated in 
these terms by Justice Black in Wade v Hunter supra at 689. Mr 
Justice Black recognised in Hunter that the protection of an accused's 
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trial completed by a particular tribunal because he has an interest in 
being able "to conclude his confrontation with society" once it has 
begun. 170 It follows that he has an interest in continuing with the 
first jury impanelled, because changing the jury means interrupting the 
trial. Therefore, the defendant's interest in retaining the particular 
tribunal with which he began is viewed as " merely an incident of his 
primary interest in being able to complete the trial itself". 171 In 
other words, this "valued" interest of the accused is merely part of the 
accused's larger interest in finality. 
However, the United States Supreme Court was faced with a 
dillemma in the mistrial cases. If the accused's right to obtain a 
verdict from the first tribunal he confronts was to be regarded as 
absolute, a declaration of a mistrial after jeopardy attached but before 
a final verdict is rendered would bar a retrial and subsequently result 
in the release of the accused where no true adjudication of the factual 
issues occurred. As this result was regarded as a violation of 
concepts of justice, the court recognised that reprosecution 
subsequent to a trial terminated prior to verdict involves "the 
competing equities of bringing the guilty to justice while securing to 
the defendant his first jury right and protecting him from harassment 
interest in a particular forum is a necessary result of the attachment 
of double jeopardy protection at a stage before a final verdict; a 
distinctive feature of the American justice system that "displays a 
much greater sensitivity for the individual rights of the criminal 
defendant" (at 689). 
170See US v Jorn 486. 
171 See Westen P and Drube! R "Toward a general theory of double 
jeopardy" 1978 Supreme Court Review 81, 90 (hereinafter referred 
to as Westen General theory). 
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and anxiety" .172 
In order to reach a decision which balances these competing 
interests, the Supreme Court introduced early in the previous century 
the "manifest necessity" test in US v Perez. 173 In Perez the jury, 
unable to agree upon a verdict (a so-called hung-jury), was-discharged 
by the judge without the consent of the accused. The accused was 
thereupon reprosecuted over his objection and appealed against his 
subsequent conviction on grounds of former jeopardy. The Supreme 
Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy provision does 
not bar retrial when a mistrial had been declared due to the inability of 
the jury to agree upon a verdict. Mr Justice Story stated that courts 
have 
authority to discharge a jury from giving a verdict, 
whenever in their opinion, taking all the circumstances 
into consideration, there is manifest necessity for the act, 
or the ends of public justice would otherwise be 
defeated". 174 
However, the opinion of the court in Perez contained neither reasoning 
nor explanation to indicate how the stated standard was applied to the 
172See "Comment: manifest necessity test" 889. In Wade v Hunter 
the court stated (at 978) that "[A] defendant's valued right to have 
his trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some circumstances 
be subordinated to the public interest in fair trials designed to end in 
just judgments". 
17322 US 9 (Wheat) 579 ( 1824). 
174At 580. The approach adopted in US v Perez namely that when 
there is a hung-jury and the accused is neither convicted or acquitted, 
the double jeopardy clause does not prohibit reprosecution, was 
confirmed by the Supreme Court in Richardson v US 468 US 31 7 
( 1984). This case is discussed infra, text at note 198. 
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facts in the case and how the test justified the conclusion reached. 
Moreover, subsequent cases of the Supreme Court on the issue of 
reprosecution on declaration of a mistrial for reasons other than a 
hung-jury (for instance, where prosecutorial error contaminated the 
trial), were inconsistent inasmuch as some required a "scrupulous 
exercise of judicial discretion" 175 before depriving an accused of his 
first jury right, and others ruled· that; because the tria~ judge has a 
broad discretion to declare a mistrial in terms of the manifest necessity 
test, "no mechanical formula could be applied in reviewing the 
propriety of a mistrial declaration". 176 
However, during the 1977 Term, the Supreme Court considered the 
scope of a trial judge's discretion in declaring mistrials in the landmark 
decision of Arizona v Washington. 177 The court ruled that, 
although mistrials based on the factfinder's inability to reach a verdict 
(so-called hung-jury mistrials), deserved minimal scrutiny by a 
175See US v Jorn 485. In that case, the court barred reprosecution 
when, over the accused's objection, a trial judge suo sponte declared 
a mistrial because he was persuaded that several prosecution 
witnesses had not been warned of their constitutional rights. 
Although there had been no question of prosecutorial overreach in that 
case, the court nevertheless attached paramount importance to the 
accused's first jury right. The court stated (at 487) that there was no 
"manifest necessity" to declare a mistrial since the trial judge had 
failed to consider less drastic measures (for instance, the granting of 
a continuance). 
176See Illinois v Somerville 410 US 458, 462 ( 1973). See also Klarman 
MJ "Mistrials arising from prosecutorial error: Double jeopardy 
protection" Stanford Law Review Vol 34 1982 1061-1069. 
177343 US 497 ( 1978). In that case, a mistrial was declared on a 
prosecution motion as a result of improper behaviour of the defence. 
The court concluded that, in those circumstances, the accused may 
be tried again in a new trial because the public interest in fair trials 
must prevail over the defendant's right to have his trial concluded 
before the first jury impanelled. 
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reviewing court, 
the strictest scrutiny is appropriate when the basis for 
the mistrial is the unavailability of critical prosecution 
evidence, or where there is reason to believe that the 
prosecutor is using superior resources of the state to 
harass or to achieve a tactical advantange over the 
accused. 178 
Although decided long before Washington, the Supreme Court's 
decision in Downum v US179 is a good illustration of the application 
of this standard by the court. In that case, the court ruled that where 
a mistrial had been granted at the prosecution's request because one 
of the prosecution's key witnesses failed to appear for trial, a retrial 
of the accused would be barred in terms of the double jeopardy 
clause. The court expressed the view that once a proceeding had 
begun, and once the defendant had an interest in "having his trial 
completed by the particular tribunal summoned to sit in judgment of 
him", the state could not abort the proceedings simply by showing 
that it had a legitimate prosecutorial interest in starting over. 180 
On the strength of the court's decision in, inter alia, Downum and 
Washington, the legal commentators Westen and Drube I submit that 
a combination of the accused's interest in finalising proceedings 
before the first tribunal he confronts and his interest in being protected 
from manipulation explains why he cannot be reprosecuted on 
declaration of a mistrial. 181 
178At 509. 
179Supra. 
180At 736. 
181At91. 
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Although this explanation is valid in cases where a mistrial is 
declared without the consent of the accused, different considerations 
come into play in cases where the accused moves for a mistrial. One 
legal commentator points out that where the accused's motion is 
made as a result of prosecutorial misconduct or judicial error, the 
interest of the accused in proceeding before the first forum is in 
potential conflict with his interest in·· ·avoiding . governmental 
harassment. 182 Thus, continuing in the first forum does not protect 
the defendant from governmental harassment in such cases. 
In US v Dinitz183 the court explored the potential conflict between 
these considerations. The court held that when a defendant, faced 
with prejudicial error, moves for a mistrial, it may be in his own 
interest to choose an immediate retrial following the mistrial instead of 
proceeding to a tainted conviction followed by an appeal, reversal and 
eventual retrial. 184 The court explained that 
[i]n such circumstances, a defendant's mistrial request 
has objectives not unlike the interests served by the 
Double Jeopardy Clause - the avoidance of anxiety, 
expense and delay occasioned by multiple 
prosecutions. 185 
182See Ponsoldt JF "When guilt should be irrelevant: Government 
overreaching as a bar to reprosecution under the double jeopardy 
clause after Oregon v Kennedy" Cornell Law Review Vol 69 1983, 76, 
87. The commentator explains that often, where the accused's 
motion for a mistrial is made in the face of prejudicial prosecutorial 
conduct or judicial error, the prosecution does not seek to provoke a 
mistrial, but rather prefers the opportunity to prevail in the first forum 
based on its prejudicial activities. 
183424 us 600 ( 1976). 
184At 610. 
185At 608. 
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Given these possible objectives, the court expressed the view that the 
important consideration for purposes of the double jeopardy clause is 
that 
... the defendant retains primary control over the course 
to be followed in the event of [prosecutorial or judicial] 
error. 186 
However, as regards the above premise, the court added an important 
qualification. It emphasised that 
[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause does protect a defendant 
against governmental action intended to provoke mistrial 
requests and thereby to subject defendants to the 
substantial burdens imposed by multiple prosecutions. It 
bars retrials where "bad-faith conduct by judge or 
prosecutor", threatens the "[h]arassment of an accused 
by several successive prosecutions or declaration of a 
mistrial so as to afford the prosecution a more favourable 
opportunity to convict" the defendant. 187 
The court emphasised that regardless of an accused's choice, some 
level of prosecutorial or judicial misconduct should always bar retrial 
following a mistrial. In Arizona v Washington 188 the Supreme Court 
endorsed the approach adopted in Dinitz. It stated that retrial would 
be barred "where there is reason to believe that the prosecutor is 
using superior resources of the State to harass or to achieve a tactical 
advantage over the accused". 189 Therefore the Supreme Court's 
186At 609. 
187 At 611 quoting Jorn 470 and 485. 
188Supra. 
189At 508. (My emphasis). 
108 
decision in both Dinitz and Washington manifested a concern to 
protect citizens against governmental abuse of power; the 
fundamental idea that underlies the accused's constitutional right 
against double jeopardy. 
However, the court subsequently retreated from the principle it laid 
down in Dinitz in the case of Oregon v Kennedy. 190 In that case, Mr 
Justice Rehnquist rephrased the test to be applied in order to 
determine whether a retrial is barred in terms of the double jeopardy 
clause on a declaration of a mistrial granted on defence request as a 
result of prosecutorial misconduct. 191 In what has been described 
as an 11 Animal Farm-like opinion 11 , 192 the court stated that 
[p]rosecutorial conduct that might be viewed as 
harassment or overreaching, even if sufficient to justify 
a mistrial on defendant's motion, therefore, does not bar 
retrial absent intent on the part of the prosecutor to 
subvert the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause ... Only where the governmental conduct in 
question is intended to "goad" the defendant into moving 
for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double 
jeopardy. 193 
The decision has been criticised severely by legal commentators in that 
it would be almost impossible for a defendant to show that the 
prosecution "intended to goad" the defendant into moving for a 
190456 us 667 (1982). 
191 /n casu, the prosecution asked a question of a witness which was 
a direct personal attack on the general character of the accused and 
which clearly prejudiced the accused's case. 
192See Singer and Hartman 556. 
193At 675-676. (My emphasis). 
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mistrial. 194 It is suggested that the criterion should rather be whether 
the misconduct or government error was engaged in with the purpose 
of improperly seeking a conviction rather than a mistrial. 195 The 
view is expressed that defendants should not lose their double 
jeopardy protection simply because a prosecutor intends to seek a 
conviction rather than provoke a mistrial through conduct that could 
accomplish either result. 196 Despite these valid criticisms of the 
restrictive approach adopted in Oregon, the decision has as yet not 
been overruled. 
At the beginning of this discussion it was pointed out that the 
Supreme Court held in US v Perez197 that an accused may be tried 
again on declaration of a "hung-jury" mistrial. In 1984, in the case of 
Richardson v US, 198 the Supreme Court affirmed the Perez rule. 
Counsel for the defence in Richardson argued that if the prosecutor 
failed to introduce sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the accused 
beyond reasonable doubt, he could not be tried again following the 
declaration of a mistrial based on a "hung-jury" .199 The majority of 
194Singer and Hartman 556. 
195See Ponsoldt 78. 
196See Ponsoldt 100. 
197Discussed supra, text at note 173. 
198468 us 317 ( 1984). 
199Defence counsel relied upon a previous decision of the Supreme 
Court, Burks v US 437 US 1 (1978). In that case, (discussed in detail 
in chapter eight infra under 8.5.2, text at note 181) the Supreme 
Court held that a reversal of a conviction on appeal due to 
insufficiency of evidence as opposed to a reversal due to procedural 
error, brings into effect protection against double jeopardy. In other 
words, an accused whose conviction is set aside on appeal on the 
basis of insufficiency of evidence, may not be tried again in a new 
trial. 
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the court (per Mr Justice Rehnquist) rejected this argument, ruling that 
if neither the appellate court nor the trial court had actually declared 
that the state's evidence was insufficient to convict, retrial was not 
barred by the prohibition against double jeopardy. 200 The court also 
invoked the "continuous jeopardy" theory in order to justify its 
conclusion. 201 It stated that retrial does not involve the double 
jeopardy clause unless the accused's initial jeopardy has terminated; 
so long as the accused's original jeopardy continues he is only once 
in jeopardy. 202 The conclusion of the court was that the declaration 
of a "hung-jury" mistrial is not an event which terminates jeopardy. 
The court's reasoning in this case has been described as "sparse 
and reduce[d] ultimately to a statement of historical fact". 203 This 
comment was aimed more particularly at the attempt by the court to 
justify its decision by arguing that " ... for 160 years, .... a failure of the 
jury to agree on a verdict [has posed no bar to retrial]". 204 The 
court's argument in Richardson is also questioned on the basis that it 
200At 324. 
201 At 325-326. See chapter six infra under 6.5.2, text at note 144 
and chapter eight under 8.5.2, text at note 177 for a discussion of the 
"continuous jeopardy" theory. 
202At 325. The court based this reasoning upon a previous holding, 
Justices of Boston Municipal Court v Lydon 466 US 294 ( 1984). 
However, that case dealt with a completely different issue: Whether 
a two-tiered trial system (applied in the state of Massachusetts) which 
provided for a right of the accused to a de novo trial before a jury in 
the event of conviction before a judge in a bench trial, could be 
challenged in terms of the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution. 
The Court (in the Lydon case) answered this question in the negative 
on the basis that it amounted merely to a single continuous process. 
203See Wang SO "Insufficient attention to insufficient evidence: Some 
double jeopardy implications" Virginia law Review Vol 79 1993 
1381, 1390. 
204 At 323-324. 
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does not necessarily rest upon "airtight logic" :205 When the jury 
fails to agree on a verdict the accused may be retried, even if the vote 
was 11-1 for acquittal. 206 Johnson argues that if the prosecution 
cannot convince 1 2 jurors beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant is guilty, then why should it have a second chance with 
another twelve ?207 Despite these valid criticisms, the rule that a 
"hung-jury" mistrial declaration does not bar a second trialstiU prevails 
in American law. 
3.5.2.2 Dismissals 
The double jeopardy clause clearly bars retrial after a verdict of 
acquittal by the trial court (either by a judge or by a jury). 208 
Likewise, a directed verdict of acquittal by a judge in a jury trial 
amounts to a termination of proceedings which brings into effect 
double jeopardy. 209 According to the Supreme Court in the case of 
United States v Martin Linen Supply Co, 210 the double jeopardy 
205See Johnson PE Criminal Procedure 2nd ed 1994 937. 
2061n federal and most state trials, the jury vote for conviction or 
acquittal must be unanimous. See Del Carmen 43. 
207See Johnson 937. 
208See Fong Foo v United States 369 US 14 1 ( 1962) discussed in 
detail in chapter six infra under 6.5.3, text at note 151. 
209 A directed verdict of acquittal by a judge follows on a request by 
defence counsel that the trial judge render a verdict of not guilty 
without the case going to the jury. Counsel is alleging that even if all 
the evidence presented by the prosecution is true, it is still not 
sufficient to sustain a conviction. See Schiffman JD Fundamentals of 
the Criminal Justice Process 1986 196. 
210430 US 564 97 ( 1977). This case, dealt with the issue of whether 
an acquittal, entered by a trial judge in terms of a rule which provided 
that a court could enter an acquittal after a deadlocked jury had been 
discharged by the court was appeallable by the prosecution. The 
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clause may also prohibit retrial after a dismissal that is not an outright 
acquittal, if that dismissal can be regarded as the equivalent of an 
acquittal. 211 
Before explaining what is meant by the concept "equivalent of an 
acquittal", it is necessary first of all to explain the difference between 
a mistrial type termination of proceedings and a termination of 
proceedings labelled a dismissal. As indicated above, a mistrial is 
declared if the court finds that it would be inappropriate or impossible 
to continue with the present trial. The trial is terminated on the 
assumption that the prosecution will proceed in a new trial. In 
contrast to mistrial declarations (which. order a termination of the 
present trial without ending the prosecution), a dismissal is based on 
a flaw in the prosecution's case that presents a bar to conviction of 
the offence charged. 212 Reprosecution cannot follow on a dismissal 
type of termination unless the prosecution is allowed to appeal the 
dismissal, and it is set aside by a higher tribunal. 213 
In the Martin linen case, the court held that a dismissal ("whatever 
its label"),214 amounts to the equivalent of an acquittal, "[if it] 
actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the 
case is discussed in detail in the chapter six infra under 6.5.5, text at 
note 174. 
211 At 579. 
212See Israel, Kamisar & La Fave 673-674. 
213The circumstances in which the prosecution may appeal against a 
dismissal is discussed in detail in chapter six infra under 6.5.5. 
214At 571. 
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factual elements of the offense [sic] charged" .215 In other words, 
a dismissal amounts to an acquittal which brings into effect protection 
against double jeopardy if it amounts to an adjudication on the factual 
merits of the case. The approach adopted in the Martin Linen case 
was confirmed by the Supreme Court three years later in United States 
v Scott. 216 In Scott, the defendant moved successfuly for a mid-
trial dismissal of two counts in his indictment, on the grounds of 
prejudicial delay. The jury acquitted the defendant on the third count. 
The Supreme Court permitted retrial on the first two counts, because 
the defendant himself sought dismissal on grounds "unrelated to [his] 
factual guilt or innocence" .217 The Court in Scott could find no 
functional distinction between a dismissal not on the merits and a 
2151d. The court found that that the dismissal granted by the court of 
first instance in fact amounted to an acquittal (for double jeopardy 
purposes), because that court recorded that the state had failed to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the material allegations necessary for 
a conviction of the crime. The defendant therefore had to be found 
not guilty of the offence charged. It is necessary to explain the 
difference between the Martin Linen case and that of Richardson 
(discussed supra, text at note 198). In both these cases the jury was 
deadlocked (a "hung-jury"). However, in the Martin Linen case, the 
defendants filed a motion for judgment of acquittal in terms of a 
federal rule of criminal procedure which allows the district court to 
enter such a judgment of acquittal where the jury is discharged 
without reaching a verdict. The court granted this motion, stating that 
the accused should be acquitted because the prosecution had failed to 
state its case beyond reasonable doubt. Under these circumstances, 
the Supreme Court held that the prohibition against double jeopardy 
barred an appeal by the state from a judgment of acquittal. In the 
Richardson case no such statement was made by the court. See 
chapter six infra under 6.5.5, text at note 174 for a detailed 
discussion of the Martin Linen case. 
216437 US 82 ( 1978). See infra chapter six under 6.5.5, text at note 
193 for a detailed discussion of this case. 
217At 87. 
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mistrial and therefore found the mistrial analysis applicable.218 The 
court argued that by obtaining a premature dismissal on grounds 
unrelated to his factual guilt or innocence, the defendant had not 
permitted the state "one complete opportunity to convict those who 
have violated its laws". 219 
The mistrial analysis (or standards) were also applied in Lee v United 
States. 220 In that case, the Supreme Court held that the dismissal 
of a defective indictment (it did not allege the necessary specific intent 
required for theft), at a stage during trial after jeopardy had attached, 
did not prevent a subsequent prosecution on a new (corrected) 
indictment. The court allowed the second prosecution on the basis of 
standards applied in mistrial cases. 221 It held that there was no 
prosecutorial bad faith, only negligence. 222 Secondly, that the 
proceedings were terminated at the defendant's request and with his 
consent. 223 A subsequent trial could accordingly not be viewed as 
2181n two previous decisions, United States v Wilson 420 US 332 
( 1975) & United States v Jenkins 420 US 358 ( 1975) the Supreme 
Court made no distinction between dismissals on the merits and those 
on procedural grounds. According to these cases, the double jeopardy 
clauses would automatically apply to any dismissal if a reversal of 
such a dismissal would require additional proceedings (in a new trial) 
to resolve the case. Therefore the court distinguished in these cases 
between mistrials (which amounts merely to a ruling by the trial court 
that the present trial cannot proceed and that a new one must be 
held), and dismissals (which, like an acquittal, involve a finding 
favouring the defendant). See chapter six infra under 6.5.4 for a 
detailed discussion of the approach adopted in these cases. 
219At 100. 
220432 us 23 ( 1977). 
221 The court viewed the dismissal as "functionally indistinguishable 
from a declaration of a mistrial" (at 31). 
222At 34. 
223At 33. 
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a violation of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. 
To summarise. A dismissal as opposed to an acquittal does not bring 
into effect protection against double jeopardy, except if it can be 
regarded as the equivalent of an acquittal. The equivalent of an 
acquittal is a factual determination of the guilt or innocence of the 
accused. The defendant who successfully·· seeks· to halt the 
prosecution against him without demanding a factual determination of 
his guilt or innocence, and, without being able to prove prosecutorial 
or judicial bad faith (as opposed to mere negligence), may be tried 
again, even though as a theoretical matter, jeopardy has already 
attached. 
3.5.2.3 Reprosecution following an appeal by the accused 
Generally, the state is not barred from reprosecuting the defendant 
who had his conviction set aside on appeal. The early decision of the 
Supreme Court in Ball v United States224 set the standard that retrial 
on appellate reversal does not amount to a violation of the double 
jeopardy clause. The court has reasoned in subsequent decisions that 
when an appeal is successful, the appellant has either "waived" his 
plea of former jeopardy, or that the original jeopardy is "continued" 
since the first conviction is not final. 225 
However, in the 1978 term, the Supreme Court recognised an 
224163 US 662 ( 1896). This case is discussed in detail in chapter six 
infra under 6.5.2, text at note 131. 
225See Trono v US 199 US 521 ( 1905) discussed in chapter eight infra 
under 8.5.2, text at note 169 and Green v US discussed in chapter six 
infra under 6.5.3, text at note 147. 
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important exception to this approach in the case of Burks v US. 226 
In that case, the court distinguished between reversals due to 
insufficiency of evidence and reversal due to procedural errors at trial. 
In the court's view, reversals due to insufficiency of evidence brings 
into effect protection against double jeopardy. It argued that a 
reversal based on insufficiency amounts to an acquittal on the factual 
merits of the case.227 The court argued that when a defendant's 
conviction has been overturned due to a failure of proof at trial, the 
prosecution cannot complain, "for it has been given one fair 
opportunity to offer whatever proof it could assemble" .228 In such 
circumstances, a second trial would violate the prohibition against 
double jeopardy because, the prosecution is afforded "another 
opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first 
proceedings". 229 
A second exception to the general rule that retrial upon appellate 
226Supra. 
221 At 15. 
229At 11. See chapter eight infra under 8.5.2, text at note 181 for a 
detailed discussion of this case. In two subsequent decisions Tibbs 
v Florida 457 US 31 (1982) and Lockhart v Nelson 109 SC 285 
( 1988) the Supreme Court limited the scope of the exception 
recognised in Burks. In Tibbs the Supreme Court ruled that a reversal 
of a conviction by an appellate court based on the weight of the 
evidence as opposed to its sufficiency, does not invoke double 
jeopardy protection. In Lockhart, the Supreme Court held that a 
reversal of an accused's conviction based upon erroneous admission 
of evidence against him amounts to a reversal based upon trial error, 
even if the court of appeal concluded that without such evidence, the 
remaining evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction. These 
cases are discussed in detail in chapter eight infra under 8.5.2, text at 
notes 196 and 197. 
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reversal of a conviction does not implicate double jeopardy principles, 
is the following. Where the original trial is for a given offence, but 
results in conviction of the defendant for only one of its lesser 
included offences, the defendant is implicitly acquitted of the greater 
crime. In Green v US230 the defendant was charged of first-degree 
murder but convicted of the lesser included offence of second-degree 
murder. After his successful appeal, retrial on the greater charge was 
held to violate the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution on the 
ground that jeopardy continues only for the lesser included offence. 
3.5.2.4 Appeals by the prosecution 
The right of the state to appeal against a termination of proceedings 
favourable to the accused is discussed in detail in chapter six. 
However, for the sake of clarity it is essential to discuss a few basic 
principles relevant to the issue of attachment of jeopardy. As 
indicated above, the double jeopardy clause has been interpreted by 
the Supreme Court as prohibiting a state appeal against an acquittal, 
or a dismissal which is the equivalent of an acquittal. 231 Therefore, 
any dismissal of a case at a stage after jeopardy has attached which 
is not the equivalent of an acquittal, may be appealed against by the 
state. 232 
Generally, appeals by the state against pre-trial rulings in favour of 
the accused (for example a pre-trial ruling to suppress evidence), are 
permitted because jeopardy has not yet attached. Therefore, if such 
230Supra. 
231 See supra, text at notes 215 and 216. 
232See again the decision of the Supreme Court in US v Scott 
discussed briefly supra, text at note 21 6 and in detail in chapter six 
infra under 6.5.5, text at note 193. 
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an appeal is successful and results in new proceedings, the accused 
cannot rely on the rule against double jeopardy to prevent a 
subsequent trial. There is, however, an exception to this rule. In US 
v Brewster233 the Supreme Court held that if a preliminary dismissal 
in favour of the accused involves findings which "would constitute a 
defense [sic] on the merits at trial", jeopardy is said to attach 
constructively. 234 This is merely an application of the rule that an 
acquittal (or the equivalent thereof) brings into effect double jeopardy, 
albeit in the context of preliminary proceedings. In other words, if an 
adjudication occurs which deals with the factual merits of the case at 
a stage before jeopardy is said to attach formally, it may also effect 
protection against double jeopardy. 
3.5.2.5 Discontinuance of prosecution by Attorney-General 
Although the Attorney-General is accorded a broad discretion to decide 
whether to institute a prosecution, 235 his decision to terminate a 
prosecution is (in terms of the Federal Law) subject to judicial review. 
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require consent of the court 
233408 us 501, 506 (1972). 
234An example of application of this principle is the following. In a 
prosecution for depositing obscene matter in the mail, jeopardy 
attached when the trial judge, after arraignment and entry of not guilty 
pleas "heard" written evidence at a pretrial hearing and determined 
that the materials forming the basis of the indictment were not 
obscene as a matter of law. See US v Hill (CA9) 473 F2d 759, 
referred to in American Jurisprudence: A modern comprehensive text 
statement of American law, State and Federal 2nd ed 1981 Vol 21 
456 (hereinafter referred to as American Jurisprudence). 
235The basic premise is that under constitutional separation of powers, 
the judicial branch is precluded from unwarranted interference with the 
prosecutor's discretionary power over the control of criminal 
prosecutions. Thus the prosecutor remains free to exercise his 
judgment in determining what prosecutions will best serve the public 
interest. SeeAmerican Jurisprudence 862 note 53. 
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to withdraw a criminal prosecution, 236 and vest in the courts the 
power to exercise their judicial discretion to determine whether a 
motion should be granted. 237 Rule 48(a) provides 
The Attorney General of the United States may by leave 
of court file a dismissal of an indictment, information or 
complaint and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate. 
Such a dismissal may not be filed during the trral without 
the consent of the defendant. 
The rules itself do not provide guidelines of how the courts should 
exercise their discretion. The basic approach seems to be that the 
courts should exercise their judicial discretion to grant a 
discontinuance in such a manner as to assure that the public interest 
is protected and that the interests of justice are served.238 In 
Rinaldi v US239 the Supreme Court stated that 
(t]he principal object of the "leave of court" requirement 
is apparently to protect a defendant against prosecutorial 
harassment, e.g., charging, dismissing and re-charging, 
when the government moves to dismiss an indictment 
over the defendants objection. 
Accordingly, the courts have exercised their discretion to allow a 
discontinuance of proceedings by the prosecutor in terms of these 
guidelines. 240 
2361964 18 USC, Rule 48. 
237 Rinaldi v US 434 US 22 ( 19 77). 
238See American Jurisprudence 863. 
239At 29 note 15. 
240Many federal courts have required that the prosecutor reveals the 
basis which supports the motion to dismiss. In other words, that the 
prosecutor gives reasons for his motion to discontinue the 
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However, a withdrawal of charges by the prosecution at a stage 
before jeopardy attaches does not operate as an acquittal or prevent 
further prosecution for the same offence. 241 The entry of a no/le 
prosequi after jeopardy has attached on the other hand, requires the 
consent of the accused.242 If the no/le prosequi is entered without 
the accused's consent, it operates as an acquittal and· precludes 
further prosecution for the same offence. 243 A no/le prosequi with 
the defendant's consent, however, even if it is entered after evidence 
is led, apparently does not bar a subsequent prosecution for the same 
offence. 244 
3.5.2.6 Jurisdiction 
It cannot be said that a person was in jeopardy unless the court in 
which he was acquitted or convicted had jurisdiction to try him for the 
offence charged. 245 The double jeopardy clause has been held to 
apply to criminal proceedings only; prison disciplinary measures or 
administrative sanctions imposed upon a prisoner for violation of a 
prison rule of conduct do not raise the bar of double jeopardy to his 
proceedings. See in general American Jurisprudence 862-864 for 
further examples of exercise of discretionary powers by the courts in 
this particular context. 
2418assing v Cady 208 US 386 ( 1907). 
242See Rule 48(a) supra and American Jurisprudence 462-463. 
243American Jurisprudence 463, referring to a number of decisions by 
federal courts holding that a dismissal at that stage of the proceedings 
without the consent of the defendant amounts to an acquittal and bars 
further prosecution for the same crime. 
244See American Jurisprudence 463. 
245 See Serfass v US (supra). 
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prosecution for a statutory offence arising from the same act that was 
the basis of the prison discipline.246 
A related issue adressed in American law is the following. Can an 
accused, convicted or acquitted of a lesser crime by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, be charged subsequently for a greater crime 
(arising from the same facts) in another-court (competent-to hear that 
charge) if the first court lacked jurisdiction to determine c_ulpability of 
the greater offence? The basic approach seems to be that despite the 
difference in jurisdiction (and the fact that the accused was never in 
jeopardy of conviction of the greater offence in the first trial), a 
prosecution of the greater offence will be barred. 247 The rationale 
which apparently underlies this rule is that the double jeopardy 
prohibition requires that the state should proceed first on the greater 
offence; a trial for the lesser offence first may be regarded as a 
"dummy run" in order to obtain a conviction for the greater offence. 
This gives an unfair advantage to the state and enhances the potential 
for state abuse of power. 
3.5.2. 7 Collusive conviction or acquittal 
It is generally recognised that a plea of former jeopardy is not 
supported by a conviction (for a minor offence, for instance to avoid 
an anticipated prosecution on a more serious charge based on the 
same facts) or an acquittal obtained by collusive or fraudulent 
activities. 248 
246See American Jurisprudence 444. 
247See American Jurisprudence 450. 
248See American Jurisprudence 452-453. A number of decisions is 
cited in support of this rule. 
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3.5.3 Summary 
Mistrials 
* The law which prevails today is that the prohibition against double 
jeopardy will bar retrial after a mistrial has been declared unless there 
was a manifest necessity to declare the mistrial in the first place. 
* If the defence makes the motion for mistrial, retrial will not be 
barred unless the prosecution "intended to goad" the accused into 
moving for a mistrial. 249 
* If the prosecution moves for a mistrial on the ground of improper 
defence behaviour, retrial will be permitted unless the trial judge has 
clearly abused his discretion in granting the mistrial. 250 However, 
if a mistrial is declared sua sponte in bad faith by the judge, or, on a 
prosecution motion which can be viewed as prosecutorial overreach 
or an attempt to manipulate the trial, retrial will be barred. 251 
* A hung-jury mistrial declaration is not regarded as a termination of 
proceedings which invokes protection against double jeopardy. 252 
Dismissals 
* A dismissal as opposed to an acquittal does not trigger protection 
249See Oregon v Kennedy discussed supra text at note 190. 
250See Arizona v Washington discussed supra text at note 188. 
251 See Downum v US discussed supra text at note 179 and Arizona 
v Washington discussed supra under 3.5.3, text at note 177. 
252See Richardson discussed supra, text at note 198. 
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against double jeopardy, except if it can be regarded as the equivalent 
of an acquittal. The equivalent of an acquittal is a factual 
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 
* The defendant who successfully seeks to halt the prosecution 
against him without demanding a factual determination of his guilt or 
innocence, and, without being able to prove prosecutoriat-or judicial 
bad faith (as opposed to mere negligence), may be tried again, even 
though as a theoretical matter, jeopardy has already attached. 
Reprosecution following an appeal by the accused 
* Reversal of a conviction based on insufficiency of evidence brings 
into effect protection against double jeopardy. The rationale 
underlying this rule is the following. The state, having already had one 
opportunity in an error-free trial to offer whatever proof it could 
assemble, may not get another opportunity to supply evidence which 
it failed to muster in the first proceedings. Reversal of a conviction on 
trial error, on the other hand, does not operate as a bar to a second 
trial. 
* A conviction of a lesser offence operates as an acquittal of the 
greater offence of which the accused could have been convicted at 
trial. Thus on reversal of conviction of the lesser offence, the accused 
may not be tried again in a new trial for the greater offence. This is 
referred to as the "implied acquittal" doctrine. 
Discontinuance of prosecution by Attorney--General 
* The federal rules of criminal procedure provide for judicial review 
of the Attorney-General's decision to withdraw a charge at a stage 
after jeopardy has attached. In deciding whether a withdrawal may 
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occur, the courts take into account the public interest, as well as the 
broader interests of justice; for instance, protection of a defendant 
against prosecutorial harassment by charging, dismissing and re-
charging for the same offence. 
* If a discontinuance of proceedings entered after jeopardy had 
attached is allowed by the court, the accused may·be tried·againif he 
also consented to the discontinuance. If the accused did not consent, 
it operates as an acquittal and precludes further prosecution for the 
same offence. 
3. 6 SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
3.6.1 General 
The special pleas of former jeopardy were first introduced in colonial 
courts towards the end of the nineteenth century. 253 In dealing with 
these pleas (raised in the courts under their Norman-French labels of 
autrefois acquit and autrefois convict), the courts relied exclusively on 
English common law. 254 This was the position even though Roman-
Dutch law still formed the basis of criminal procedure during this 
period, and until the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 
1910. 255 It was only in 1933, in the decision of R v 
253The pleas were raised in inter alia, the following early cases: R v 
Stuurmans (1863) 1R83; Regina v Umbambeni (1895) 16 NLR 61; 
R v Nkani ( 1903) 24 NLR 255; R v Twalatunga ( 1903) 20 SC 425; R 
v Samoosing ( 1905) 26 NLR 145; Kerr v Rex 1907 EDL 324. 
254This is clear from a consideration of the cases cited in note 253. 
255Roman-Dutch law was introduced at tne Cape during the 
Occupation of the Dutch East India Company (1652-1795). This 
system of criminal procedure survived the first British Occupation and 
was also applied during the subsequent reign of the Batavian Republic 
(1803-1806). See Dugard J South African Criminal Law and 
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Manasewitz, 256 that the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court 
explained the basis and ambit of the pleas in terms of Roman and 
Roman-Dutch principles, namely the doctrine of res judicata. In 
Manasewitz, the court emphasised that considerations of 
reasonableness and fairness underlie the rule against double 
jeopardy. 257 
At present, the pleas of former jeopardy are recognised in the 
Criminal Procedure Act. 258 Section 106(1) provides (inter a/ia), as 
follows 
When an accused pleads to a charge he may plead -
(c) that he has already been convicted of the offence 
with which he is charged; or 
(d) that he has already been acquitted of the offence 
with which he is charged[.] 
The common law right of the accused against double jeopardy also 
recently acquired the status of a fundamental human right in South 
African law. Section 35(3)(m) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Procedure Vol IV 1977 18. 
256 1933 AD 165. This case is discussed in detail in chapter four supra 
under 4.6.3, text at note 437. 
257See the judgment of Beyers JA discussed in detail in chapter four 
infra under 4.6.3, text at note 448. This rationale of the rule has been 
reiterated in a number of subsequent decisions. See for instance S v 
Vermeulen supra discussed in chapter four infra under 4.6.9, text at 
note 581. 
258Act 51 of 1977. 
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South Africa259 provides that every accused person has the right to 
a fair trial, which includes the right 
not to be tried for an offence in respect of an act or 
omission for which that person has previously been either 
acquitted or convicted. 
At the time of writing of this thesis, the Constitutional Court has not 
as yet considered the ambit of this particular fundamental human right. 
In the ordinary law of the land the rule has been considered in a 
number of procedural contexts. The most important development that 
occurred during this century is the expansion by the courts of 
protection against double jeopardy in the field of successive 
prosecutions for offences arising from the same facts. 260 However, 
in the field of attachment of jeopardy, the courts have been less 
inclined to re-evaluate common law principles in the light of modern 
developments. This is discussed in more detail below. 
3.6.2 The attachment of jeopardy 
It is generally recognised that an accused is in jeopardy from the 
moment that he pleads to a charge before a court competent to try 
him for the offence(s) set out in the charge. 261 Therefore, it may be 
said that jeopardy attaches at this particular stage of criminal 
259 Act 108 of 1996. 
260These developments are discussed in detail in chapter four. 
261 Section 106(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides: An accused 
who pleads to a charge other than a plea that the court has no 
jurisdiction to try the offence, or an accused on behalf of whom a plea 
of not guilty is entered by the court, shall, save as is otherwise 
expressly provided by this Act or any other law, be entitled to demand 
that he be acquitted or be convicted. 
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proceedings. However, South African courts have also required (in 
most cases) that an accused be acquitted or convicted on a valid 
indictment after a trial "on the merits" before he may succeed with a 
plea of former jeopardy. 
In an early reported case, R v Twalatunga, 262 the Supreme Court 
of the Cape Colony was confronted with the question-·whether an 
accused, convicted on an indictment in which it was set out that he 
had stolen certain articles, the property of A, could be tried again in a 
new trial after appellate reversal of his conviction on the ground that 
the articles were the property of B. 263 The court answered this 
question in the affirmative. It relied upon the common law decision of 
Green, 264 and held that an accused convicted or acquitted on a 
defective indictment may, absent amendment of the indictment at the 
first trial, be tried again in a new trial upon a corrected 
indictment. 265 The court justified its ruling by reference266 to the 
dicta in the mid-nineteenth century English case of Drury261 where 
Coleridge J is quoted as saying that 
262Supra. 
[i]t would be shocking to both justice and commonsense 
that individuals, who object only that they have been 
263The permissibility of retrials on appellate reversals of convictions are 
considered in detail in chapter eight infra. This chapter focuses 
instead on the permissibility of new trials after a discharge (or 
acquittal) of the accused. 
264This case is discussed in chapter two supra under 2.3.1, text at 
note 71. 
265At 428-429. 
266At 429. 
267See chapter two supra under 2.3.1, text at note 68 for a discussion 
of this case. 
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regularly found guilty of an offence on a lawful trial, but 
that there has been a mistake in the judgment 
pronounced, which judgment has on that ground been 
reversed, and can never be carried into effect, should 
therefore remain exempt from all punishment. 
In a subsequent decision, R v Koege/enberg, 268 the Transvaal 
Provincial Division followed the principlalaid down in Twalatunga. In 
that case, the accused was acquitted on a charge of attempting to 
supply intoxicating liquor to a person S. At the trial, the magistrate 
refused to allow an amendment of the charge to the effect that a 
person J had been supplied with intoxicating liquor instead of person 
S. The accused was subsequently brought to trial on a charge of 
attempting to supply the same liquor on the same occasion to J. The 
court concluded that a plea of autrefois acquit could not be sustained 
on the ground that the accused had not been in jeopardy of a 
conviction at the first trial. The court argued as follows269 
The fact that the magistrate upheld the objection of the 
defence and refused to allow the amendment does not 
seem to me to alter the position. Even assuming that he 
might well have allowed the amendment, the fact that he 
did not allow the amendment left the charge as it was 
..... Under the circumstances, I do not think the plea of 
autrefois acquit can be sustained .... 
In R v Bekker270 the court allowed a second trial even though it 
found that the magistrate (in the first trial) should have amended the 
charge instead of discharging the accused. In that case, the accused 
was charged with selling liquor contrary to the conditions of his 
268 19 24 TPD 594. 
269At 597. 
2701926 CPD 410. 
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licence. The licence provided that no liquor should be sold after six 
o'clock in the evening. However, it was not averred in the charge that 
the accused sold the liquor after six o'clock. The accused pleaded not 
guilty and the court discharged him on the basis that the charge 
disclosed no offence. On the very same day he was arraigned on a 
new charge in which it was averred that the sale took place after six 
o'clock. The accused's plea of autrefois acquit was rejected by the 
magistrate. On appeal Gardiner JP stated that according to the English 
author Russell, an accused may rely on the plea of autrefois acquit if 
he can show that he was previously in jeopardy of conviction of the 
same offence. 271 He continued by stating that Russell regards a 
person as being formerly in jeopardy of a conviction in the following 
circumstances272 
(a) if the court was competent to try him for the 
offence 
(b) the trial was upon a good indictment on which a 
valid conviction could be entered and 
(c) the acquittal was on the merits. 
The court stated that in the case at hand, the first and the second 
requirements were complied with. Gardiner JP argued that although 
an indictment may have a defect "it may not be fatal to its 
validity". 273 In his view, the original indictment did in fact disclose 
an offence. Therefore the magistrate should not have discharged the 
accused but, instead, have amended the indictment. In the court's 
view even "if the case had been tried upon the indictment without 
271 The court referred to Russell on Crimes 7th ed at 1982. 
272/d. 
273At 413. 
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amendment, .... the Court would [not] have quashed the proceedings 
on appeal or review on the ground that the indictment disclosed no 
offence". 274 In other words, the court found that the defect in the 
first indictment was not of such a nature or magnitude that it 
invalidated the proceedings. The court then considered whether the 
first trial complied with the third requirement, namely that the trial be 
concluded on the merits. However, it pointed otJt--that this 
requirement was not insisted on by the English legal commentator 
Archbold, and, that it was criticised by Ridley J in the Haynes 
decision. 275 In the court's view, the need for this requirement can 
only be ascertained by considering the basis for the plea of 
autrefois. 276 
The court explained that the principle underlying the plea is 
expressed in the maxim Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem 
causa. It must therefore be ascertained when, and in what 
circumstances a person can be said to be twice vexed (bis vexan1. 
The court then explained its understanding of the concept "vexed" in 
the following terms277 
Vexari in this maxim cannot mean simply "to be 
annoyed". Autrefois acquit is of no avail when the first 
indictment was bad, and yet the accused is twice 
arraigned, he has had to attend Court twice, and to 
answer twice to an indictment. And I do not think that 
it can be said that a man was vexed, because he was in 
danger of being punished under the first indictment. A 
man is in this danger even when the indictment is bad; 
274At 414. (My emphasis). 
275 At 414. See supra under 3. 2. 2, text at note 35 for a discussion of 
the judgment of Ridley Jin the Haynes case. 
276At 415. 
277 At 415-416. 
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he may, without taking any exception, plead guilty to it, 
the matter may never come up on review or appeal, and 
he may suffer his punishment. In a sense every person 
who pleads generally to an indictment is in a position of 
danger, for he may plead guilty. 
The court referred to an English decision as illustration for the above 
contention, and then continued as follows278 
It seems to me therefore that it is not merely the 
objection to annoying twice the person accused, nor the 
fact that he has previously been in danger, which is the 
whole basis of the plea of autrefois acquit. We need not 
treat the maxim nemo debet bis vexari as an original 
principle. It is really a branch of a wider principle -
Interest republicae ut sit finis litium, which has as its 
corollary res iudicata pro veritate accipitur. Where the 
proper tribunal has given a final decision, that decision, 
unless reversed on appeal, is binding as to the matter 
actually decided. If it be a decision that the facts 
adduced do not establish the prisoner's guilt, then he 
cannot be tried again. In the same way, if the Court 
decides that upon the law he cannot be found guilty, 
then no fresh trial can take place. It seems to me that 
the test is whether the Court has given what it intends to 
be a final decision as to the prisoner's guilt. 
The court applied these considerations to the case at hand and 
concluded that since the magistrate in the first trial never intended to 
give a final decision on the merits (because he was under the wrong 
impression that the charge disclosed no offence), the accused could 
not rely on the plea of autrefois acquit. 279 
The decision in Bekker was relied on in a number of subsequent 
278At 416. (My emphasis}. 
279 At 419. Contra the position in Canadian law discussed supra under 
3.3.2, text at note 82. 
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decisions. In R v Kaplan280 the court justified the acceptance of the 
rule that the trial be on the merits on the basis that it was also 
recognised by Roman-Dutch writers. It observed that281 
[t]he same requirement is insisted upon by Carpzovius in 
a passage (Prac. Rerum Crim., 3, 104, 60) which seems 
singularly apposite to modern criminal procedure and is 
referred to in a reporter's note in the report of the case 
of The Queen v. Myers ([ 1 883) 2 S. C. 219). Carpzovius 
says that the accused must have been "definitely 
absolved from the crime" (definitive a delicto absolutus) 
or "declared not guilty" (pro innocenti habitus), and not 
merely "discharged from the purview of the prosecution" 
by reason of some technical defect therein, such as "a 
faulty framing of the charge-sheet or want of capacity on 
the part of the prosecutor" (ab observatione iudicii 
absolutus, puta forsan ob libelli ineptitudinem, aut 
accusatoris inhabilitatem). 
In Manasewitz, Chief Justice Wessels reiterated the requirements for 
a successful plea of former jeopardy as set out in Bekker, inter alia, 
the requirement that the trial be on the merits. 282 Twenty two 
years later, in R v Long, 283 the Appellate Division confirmed the 
principle advanced first in the English case of Green and applied in 
early South African decisions namely, that the fact that an indictment 
could have been amended is irrelevant as regards the question of 
whether a person was in jeopardy at a previous trial. 
280 1927 EDL 178. 
281 At 181. 
282At 168. This case is discussed in detail in chapter four supra under 
4.6.3, text at note 437. 
283 1958 (I) SA (A) 115. 
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Schreiner JA made the following comment in this regard284 
[l]t is contended . . . that the charge might have been 
amended ... and in that event the appellant might have 
been convicted of theft of the cheque or the money [the 
offence charged in the second trial]. That is true, but, 
not I think, relevant, for it is the offence with which she 
was actually charged that must be looked at, not any 
offence with which she might have been charged in an 
amended indictment. 
A subsequent decision which deserves consideration is S v 
Vorster, 285 a decision of a provincial division of the Supreme Court. 
The facts were as follows. X was charged with drunken driving. In 
the charge sheet it was alleged that he had driven a vehicle with the 
registration number OP 181 on a public road, on a particular day, 
under the influence of liquor. At the trial it appeared that he had 
driven a vehicle with a different registration number on that particular 
day. The prosecution applied for an amendment of the charge, which 
was rejected by the court. The prosecution then requested a 
postponement of the case which was also rejected by the court. The 
prosecution then withdrew their case. The accused was 
subsequently found not guilty and discharged. He was then charged 
for the same offence in a new trial. This time the prosecution made 
sure that they inserted the correct registration number in the charge 
sheet. The question before the court was whether the accused could 
have raised the plea of autrefois acquit. Eksteen AJ answered this 
question in the affirmative. He based his decision on the following 
arguments. The issue is whether the accused was in jeopardy of a 
conviction at the first trial. The mere fact that the charge could have 
been amended at the first trial does not mean that the accused was in 
284At 118. 
285 1961 (4) SA 863 (0). 
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jeopardy. 286 However, the registration number of the car was not 
an essential element of the offence charged. It follows that the 
accused could have been convicted at the first trial despite this error 
in the indictment. He was therefore in jeopardy of a conviction which 
afforded him a plea of autrefois acquit. 
Of importance is that the court did ·not base its conclusion (that the 
accused may rely on the plea of autrefois acquit) on the ground that 
the state had withdrawn its case at a stage after plea. The court 
based its decision purely on the ground that the accused could have 
been convicted on the charge in the first trial. Unlike the approach 
adopted in Bekker, the court in Vorster sustained the plea despite the 
fact that there was no real factual adjudication of the guilt or 
innocence of the accused in this case. In other words, the court did 
not investigate also whether there had been an acquittal on the merits. 
In fact, the approach adopted in Vorster is similar to that adopted by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of Moore. 287 
In S v Mthetwa 288 the court held that a failure of the prosecution 
to present evidence, as opposed to a procedural irregularity or a 
defective charge sheet, could be regarded as an acquittal upon the 
merits. The court equated the situation where the prosecution offered 
insufficient evidence with a situation where it offered no evidence at 
all. 299 
286At 8680-E. The court referred to the dicta of Schreiner JA in the 
Long case. 
287See supra under 3.3.2, text at note 91 for a discussion of this case. 
288 1970 (2) SA 310 (N). 
289See 3150-F. The court relied on the case of R v Sikupela 1935 
CPD 266 in which Gardiner JP explained the thesis on the basis that 
a failure of the prosecution to offer evidence amounts to an acquittal 
\ 
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At this stage, it is important to point out that the common law rule 
adopted in early cases such as Twalatunga and Bekker namely, that 
an acquittal on a defective indictment does not bar a second trial, has 
largely become irrelevant in South African law. For the last few 
decades, South African courts have been vested with extensive 
powers to allow amendments of defective charge sheets. In terms of 
the present Criminal Procedure Act, courts are empowered to remedy 
any defect imaginable. For instance, a charge may be remedied if it 
fails to set out an essential element of the offence(s) charged, or 
where there appears to be variance between what is alleged in the 
charge and the evidence adduced in proof of such averment. 
Moreover, it may be remedied "where there is any other error in the 
charge . . . whether it discloses an offence or not". 290 Even if a 
charge is not amended, it may be cured by evidence presented at the 
trial. 291 The only restriction is that a charge may not be amended 
or cured by evidence rendered at the trial if it will cause prejudice to 
the accused in his defence. 292 Because South African courts have 
such extensive powers to allow amendments of indictments, it has in 
on the merits. 
290See the provisions of section 86( 1) of Act 51 of 19 77. However, 
In S v Barkett's Transport (Edms) Bpk 1988 ( 1) SA 157 (A) the court 
held that the section does not authorise the substitution of one charge 
by another. The concept "amendment" implies some degree of 
retention of that which is to be amended. In other words, if a 
proposed amendment is in no way identifiable with the original charge, 
then there can be no suggestion of an amendment but rather a 
substitution. See Du Toit E et al Commentary on the Criminal 
Procedure Act 14-24 Service 13, 1994. 
291 See the provisions of sections 86(4) and 88 of Act 51 of 19 77. 
292See section 86( 1 ) which provides that the court may refuse an 
amendment if it considers that it will prejudice the accused in his 
defence. This is also a condition for the validation of the proceedings 
by evidence in terms of section 86(4). (See S v Coetzer 1976 (2) SA 
769 (A)). 
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actual fact become highly unlikely for an accused to be discharged on 
the basis that the charge was an absolute nullity. In other words, that 
it was so defective that it could not be amended. 
The effect of current rules of criminal procedure on amendment of 
charges is that an accused will only be acquitted on a defective 
indictment if the court refused to remedy the charge because it would 
prejudice the accused in his defence. As indicated in the discussion 
of Canadian law, the Supreme Court of Canada held in Moore that a 
discharge on this basis is tantamount to an acquittal which bars a 
second trial for the same offence. This is not the position in South 
African law. Because it is still required that an acquittal be on the 
merits, an accused can ostensibly be tried again in these 
circumstances. 
It remains to consider whether the plea of autrefois acquit may be 
raised on the ground that the Attorney-General discontinued 
proceedings. The rule which applies in South African law is that an 
acquittal or a discharge which follows on the stopping of a prosecution 
by the Attorney-General at any stage after the accused had pleaded 
is regarded as a discontinuance which bars a second trial. 293 A 
293See S v Ndou 1971 ( 1) SA 668 (A) 671 H. This principle was 
subsequently applied in S v Teele 1979 (4) (BSC) 610. In S v lubbe 
1989 (3) SA 245 (T) the court held that this rule does not apply to 
proceedings in terms of sections 119-122 of of the Criminal 
Procedure Act. In these sections, provision is made for a shortened 
form of preparatory examination according to which the accused 
pleads in a lower court to a charge justiciable in a superior court. The 
court ruled that only a termination of a prosecution at a stage after the 
accused had pleaded in a court which is to try him on that particular 
charge brings into effect protection against double jeopardy. This 
means that an accused who has already pleaded in the court holding 
the preparatory examination, must again plead in the court competent 
to try his case before he can rely upon the pleas of former jeopardy. 
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withdrawal of a charge at a stage before plea does not bring into 
effect protection against double jeopardy. However, there is one 
exception to this rule. If the Attorney-General declines to prosecute 
after the completion of a preparatory examination (preliminary 
proceedings), the accused may rely on the plea of former 
jeopardy. 294 
3. 6. 3 Summary 
* The South African rules of attachment of jeopardy are basically the 
same as those that prevail in English law. Although it is said that 
jeopardy attaches on plea, the basic premise is that a plea of former 
jeopardy may only be raised if the accused had previously been 
convicted or acquitted (a) by a competent court (b) on a valid 
indictment (c) after a trial on the merits. A trial on the merits denotes 
a decision by the court which it (the court) intends to be a final 
decision as to the accused's guilt. (Bekker). 
* The common law rule that an accused person may only rely on the 
plea of former jeopardy if he has previously been acquitted on a valid 
indictment, has largely became irrelevant in South African law. This 
is because South African courts have wide powers to amend 
indictments. The only restriction on the courts is that an amendment 
may not prejudice the accused. However (unlike the position in 
Canadian law), an accused acquitted on the basis that the amendment 
of a defective indictment would have been prejudicial to him, cannot 
raise the plea of former jeopardy; the trial was not concluded on the 
merits. 
* Similar to English law, the "in jeopardy" investigation does not 
294This is specifically provided for in section 142 of the Act. 
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involve the question whether an indictment could have been amended 
at trial (long). 
* The failure of the prosecution to present evidence amounts to an 
acquittal on the merits; a situation where the prosecution offers 
insufficient evidence is equated with a situation where it offers no 
evidence. 
* There is an exception to the rule that a termination of proceedings 
in favour of the accused needs to be one on the merits: a discharge 
of an accused which follows upon a discontinuance of proceedings by 
the Attorney-General at a stage after the accused has pleaded, 
operates as a bar to a new trial. 
* In one situation jeopardy may even attach at a stage before the 
accused has pleaded. If the Attorney-General declines to prosecute 
after the completion of a preparatory examination, the accused may 
raise the plea of autrefois acquit. The rationale which apparently 
underlies this rule is that a discharge after a preparatory examination 
is equated to an acquittal on the merits; because the state failed to 
offer sufficient evidence to prove its case against the accused, it is 
prohibited from re-trying the accused for the same subject-matter. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTIONS FOR OFFENCES ARISING FROM THE 
SAME FACTS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE 
DEFINITIONAL ISSUE OF "SAME OFFENCE" 
4. 1 INTRODUCTION 
It is a universal principle that the rule against double jeopardy 
prohibits multiple prosecutions for the "same offence". The 
boundaries of the concept "same offence" can, however, be described 
as one of the most complicated issues encountered by courts in 
modern times. As demonstrated in the historical overview, the 
concept "same offence" presented very little (if any) difficulty in 
medieval law of criminal procedure. Because there were only a small 
number of legal categories of offences during this time, and the scope 
of each offence was comparatively large, a subsequent prosecution for 
the "same offence" meant a subsequent prosecution for the entire 
criminal transaction (or factual situation). 1 Therefore, "same offence" 
merely denoted "same facts" during this period. 
The problem that presents itself in present times is that a single act 
or a single factual situation may give rise to a number of substantive 
legal offences. Consider the following examples: X, a 21 year old 
male person, has one encounter of sexual intercourse with his sister 
without her consent. In terms of South African law, he may be 
charged with at least three offences: Rape, indecent assault and 
incest. One act may also comply with the definition of one 
substantive offence more than once. The following is an example. X 
1See supra chapter two under 2.3.2 for a discussion of the concept 
"same offence" in medieval law. 
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fires a single shot and injures two victims. X may be charged with 
assault with the intent to do grievous bodily harm and attempted 
murder in respect of both these victims. A single factual situation may 
also result in the following scenario. X breaks into a house, holds the 
inhabitants at gunpoint, rapes a woman and robs the other inhabitants 
of the house. In this example, X commits at least four substantive 
offences; Housebreaking with the intent to commit a crime, rape, 
robbery and assault. 
It is recognised in all the legal systems considered in this 
comparative study that X may be charged with all of the offences 
relating to each set of facts in one single trial; injustices which might 
arise from manipulation of a single act or transactional situtation in 
order to obtain several convictions based on separate substantive 
offences may be remedied during the sentencing stage of 
proceedings. 2 However, the issue addressed in this chapter is 
whether X may be charged of the offences relevant to each set of 
facts in successive prosecutions. In other words, can the prosecution 
in the first example initially charge X with assault and then in a 
subsequent prosecution with incest and rape or vice versa? In the 
second example, can X be prosecuted first for attempted murder of 
one victim and in a subsequent prosecution for attempted murder of 
the other victim? In the third example, can X initially be prosecuted 
for housebreaking, subsequently for rape and in a third trial for 
robbery? 
The question (posed differently) is whether the principles which 
2The judge may, for instance, prevent the imposition of excessive 
punishment for the same conduct or transaction by ordering that 
respective sentences of imprisonment run concurrently. However, it 
must be pointed out that there remains the injustice of a criminal 
record which contains two offences instead of one. 
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underlie the rule against double jeopardy require that the prosecutor be 
prohibited from charging an accused for offences in successive 
prosecutions if all of those offences could have been charged in one 
single trial. 
In general, courts in Anglo-American legal systems have not 
determined the permissiblity of successive prosecutions in terms of the 
question posed above. 3 Instead, the courts attempted to give 
definitional content to the concept "same offence". Several criteria 
have been advanced to determine the sameness of offences. Some 
of these criteria amount to a mere repetition of old formulas developed 
at a time when different historical considerations prevailed. An 
example of such a formula or theory is the same evidence or 
Vandercomb test which focuses on the identity of the legal elements 
of different substantive offences. 
As indicated in the historical overview, the same evidence test was 
devised initially, not to protect the accused against double jeopardy, 
but to compensate the prosecution for undue advantages given to the 
accused by highly technical rules of pleading and proof which 
3See however the judgment of Lord Devlin in the English case of 
Conelly (discussed infra under 4.2.1 ). His Lordship expressed the 
view that it is in the inherent power of the courts to declare that the 
prosecution must as a general rule join in the same indictment charges 
that are founded on the same facts, or which form or are part of a 
series of offences of the same or a similar character. He added that 
a court may stay proceedings (in other words, order the 
discontinuance of proceedings on a permanent basis) if it is satisfied 
that the subject matter of the second indictment ought to have been 
included in the first indictment. Also, in the Canadian decision of 
Regina v B ( 1986) 29 CCC (3d) 365, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
recognised that the splitting of a case may amount to an abuse of 
process which would justify a stay of proceedings, albeit only in 
certain defined circumstances. This case is discussed infra under 
4.3.4. See also (in the same vein) the recent South African decision 
of S v Khoza 1989 (3) SA 60 (T) discussed infra under 4.6.8. 
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prevailed during the eighteenth century. Despite the inadequacies of 
the test as a tool to protect the accused against double jeopardy, it 
has nevertheless been approved and applied in current English and 
South African law. Furthermore, a modified version of the test, which 
has been accepted in American law and elevated to a constitutional 
principle and which had subsequently been rejected, has recently been 
reinstituted by the Supreme Court of the United· States as an 
exclusive criterion to determine the sameness of offences. 4 
Other theories or tests proposed to give meaning to the concept 
"same offence" can be described as laudable attempts by the courts 
to give effect to equitable considerations underlying the rule against 
double jeopardy. Examples of these are the traditional in peril test, 
and the recently proposed same conduct and same transaction tests. 5 
Although the application of the in peril test6 has not presented major 
difficulties in the majority of legal systems under consideration, 7 the 
same conduct and same transaction tests have been less easy to apply 
in practice. In fact, the application of these tests has given rise to a 
considerable amount of confusion in the law of double jeopardy, 
particulary in the United States of America. 
4See infra under 4.5.8. 
5 A same conduct test has been introduced in the law of the United 
States and South African law. See infra under 4.5.6 and 4.6.6 for a 
discussion of the respective decisions in which a same conduct test 
was applied. 
6This test is referred to in constitutional jurisprudence of the United 
States and Canada as the "lesser included offence" doctrine. 
7Except in the constitutional jurisprudence of the United States of 
America. The "lesser included offence" doctrine advanced by Justice 
Scalia in the recent United States Supreme Court case of US v Dixon 
113 S Ct 2849 ( 1993) has been utterly confusing. See infra under 
4.5.8 for a detailed discussion of this case. 
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In the last few decades, courts in the Indian, Canadian and English 
legal systems have exercised inherent discretionary powers to stay 
proceedings as an abuse of process on double jeopardy grounds. The 
exercise of the courts' discretion in this particular field of law 
expanded protection against double jeopardy in the field of successive 
prosecutions. As will become clear from a discussion of the case 
law, the exercise of discretionary powers to stay proceedings on this 
basis, has been more effective in achieving the objectives of the 
double jeopardy rule than the tests proposed to give meaning to the 
concept "same offence". Moreover, in exercising a discretion in this 
particular field of law, the courts have laid down guidelines for 
prosecutors as to what amounts to oppressive and vexatious 
prosecutorial conduct in this particular field of law. 
Finally, in the majority of legal systems under consideration, courts 
have given a broad interpretation to the concept "same offence" so as 
to include the broader principle of res judicata which prevents the 
prosecution from re-opening a particular issue of fact which has been 
decided in favour of the accused at an earlier trial ending in an 
acquittal. This is known as the doctrine of issue estoppal and is 
recognised and applied in Canadian, Indian and American 
constitutional double jeopardy jurisprudence. 
Although the topic addressed in this chapter is referred to in the 
heading as "the definitional issue of same offence", it is clear that it 
in fact covers a much wider field. The recognition of a residual 
discretionary power to stay proceedings as an abuse of process, and 
the broader doctrine of res judicata (prohibiting inter alia the relitigation 
of issues) is not strictly part of the definitional issue of same offence. 
The exercise of discretionary powers, for instance, rather implies a 
departure from the notion that unless it appears that the second 
prosecution is technically for the same offence, the accused may be 
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tried anew. In fact, it offers protection against a subsequent 
prosecution precisely when the criteria for same offence have not been 
satisfied. Likewise, the doctrine of issue estoppal offers protection 
against relitigation of issues as opposed to actions. 
4.2 ENGLISH LAW 
4.2.1 The Conelly decision 
As indicated above,8 a majority of the House of Lords suggested in 
Conelly v opp9 that double jeopardy protection is afforded not only 
by the pleas in bar (autrefois acquit and autrefois convict), but also by 
the judicial discretion to stay proceedings on the basis of an abuse of 
process. 10 However, a further possible protection considered 
favourably in Conelly, the doctrine of issue estoppal, was in 1976 held 
to be unavailable in English criminal law by the House of Lords. 11 
The facts of Conelly were as follows. The accused participated in 
an armed robbery in the course of which a man was shot and killed. 
Together with three others, he was indicted for murder. In this 
indictment, he was not also charged with robbery; at the time a rule 
prevailed that a second charge could not be combined in one 
indictment in which the crime of murder was charged. 12 Conelly and 
8See chapter three supra under 3.2.1. 
9Supra. 
10See the opinions of Lord Reid 1295-1 296; Lord Devlin 1338-1361 
and Lord Pearce 1361-1368. 
11 See OPP v Humphrys [1977] AC 1. 
12Although rule 3 in Schedule 1 of the Indictments Act 1915 provided 
that "[c]harges for any offence, whether felonies or misdemeanours, 
may be joined in the same indictment if those charges are founded on 
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his co-accused were convicted of murder. Conelly appealed against 
his conviction which was quashed and an acquittal entered on the 
ground that errors had occurred resulting from the manner in which 
the trial was conducted. 13 Conelly could not be tried again for the 
crime of murder. 14 The prosecution accordingly indicted him for 
robbery. On this charge Conelly pleaded autrefois acquit on the 
grounds that 
(a) he was, in law, entitled to the plea of autrefois acquit 
(b) the doctrine of issue estoppal operated in his favour 
(c) the judge has a discretion to stop the trial on the second 
indictment if he held that the further process would be unjust 
or oppressive 
(d) it was not permissible for the the crown in the second trial to 
adduce evidence (for the purpose of establishing robbery) of 
admissions (for example verbal statements admitting "going 
thieving" but denying having a gun or planning a murder) which 
were alleged to have been made by the appellant and which had 
been relied on at the first trial for the purpose of establishing 
murder. 
the same facts or form or are a part of a series of offences of the 
same or a similar character", the judiciary held in R v Jones [ 1918] 1 
KB 416 that the rule did not apply in a case of murder. The court 
justified this exception by stating that "(t]he charge of murder is too 
serious a matter to be complicated by having alternative counts 
inserted in the indictment" (at 417). This rule was later abolished but 
still prevailed at the time Conelly was decided. 
131n the trial court, Conelly relied on two defences: lack of intent and 
alibi. The Court of Appeal quashed his conviction on the ground that 
the judge, in his summing-up, did not direct the jury properly on the 
plea of alibi. 
14See chapter seven infra under 7.3 for a discussion of the rules 
regarding the permissibility of new trials on reversals of convictions 
which prevailed at that time. 
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The trial court rejected these contentions and convicted Conelly of 
robbery. Conelly, once again, appealed to the Court of Criminal 
Appeal. Having considered all these grounds, that court dismissed the 
appeal, as subsequently did the House of Lords. 
As regards the scope of the traditional plea of autrefois, the opinion 
of Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest is generally treated as the foundation 
of modern English law on this topic. 15 His Lordship summarised the 
"governing principles" of the doctrine of autrefois as borne out in 
English case law in a number of propositions. For the sake of clarity, 
these propositions will be set out and discussed on a separate basis 
in the text that follows. 16 
Proposition 1 : A person cannot be tried for a crime in respect of 
which he has previously been convicted or acquitted. This is the 
straightforward application of the pleas of autrefois. If the accused is 
charged with an offence which is identical in law and on the facts to 
one which he has already been acquitted of, or, convicted of, the plea 
will bar any further proceedings for that offence. 
Proposition 2: A person cannot be tried for a crime in respect of 
which he could have been convicted on some previous indictment. It 
is obvious that this proposition sets out the common law in peril 
test. 17 Blackstone explains that this is the corollary of the power of 
a jury to return a verdict of not guilty as charged, but guilty of a lesser 
15See Blackstone ( 1991 ed) 1127. The exhaustive opinion of Lord 
Morris appears at 1 296-1330 of the judgment of the House of Lords. 
16These propositions appear at 1305-1306 of his Lordship's opinion. 
17See chapter two supra under 2.3.2, text at note 118 for a discussion 
of this test. 
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offence. 18 Also, where the jury, on a certain count could find the 
accused guilty of a lesser offence, but chose simply to find the 
accused not guilty, the author explains that such a verdict amounts to 
an implied acquittal of both the principal and any lesser offences. 19 
Previously, an accused could not successfully rely on the in peril test 
if the lesser offence charged in the second indictment was not 
properly placed before the jury for consideration in the first trial. 20 
However, in view of legislation enacted in 1967, 21 it is suggested 
that an accused may now rely on this test to prevent subsequent 
proceedings for a lesser offence as long as a verdict on that offence 
was open to the jury as a matter of law, even if the judge did not draw 
their attention to it. 22 
Although Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest did not eludicate the issue 
whether the in peril test should be confined to cases where the 
accused was in jeopardy of a previous conviction for the principal 
offence charged in the second indictment, Lord Devlin preferred the 
18At1127. 
19/d. See also infra chapters six and eight for a detailed discussion of 
the "implied acquittal" doctrine. 
20See the early twentieth century decision of R v Barron discussed in 
chapter two supra under 2.3.2. 
21 Section 6(3) of the Criminal Law Act 1967. 
22See Blackstone ( 1991 ed) 1127-1128. Section 6(3) of the Criminal 
Law Act 1967 enables a court to convict a person for a lesser offence 
on a charge for a more serious offence if the defendant is not found 
guilty of the more serious offence. It provides: "Where, on a person's 
trial on indictment for any offence except treason or murder, the jury 
find him not guilty of the offence specifically charged in the 
indictment, but the allegations in the indictment amount to or include 
(expressly or by implication) an allegation of another offence falling 
within the jurisdiction of the court of trial, the jury may find him guilty 
of that other offence or of an offence of which he could be found 
guilty on an indictment specifically charging that other offence." 
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narrow interpretation of the test. He stated 
For the doctrine of autrefois to apply, it is necessary that 
the accused should have been put in peril of conviction 
for the same offence of that with which he is then 
charged. 23 
Proposition 3: A person cannot be tried for a crime which is in effect 
the same, or is substantially the same as a crime of which he has 
previously been acquitted or convicted (or could have been convicted 
by way of an alternative verdict). As discussed in the historical 
overview, this vague criterion was applied in cases like R v King and 
R v Kendrick and Smith. 24 However, these cases were inconsistent 
in respect of establishing the degree of similarity required before it 
could be said that a subsequent charge was "substantially" the same 
as an earlier charge. 
As indicated earlier, King focused on the same facts and seems to 
have introduced a broader principle beyond the traditional ambit of the 
autrefois plea. Moreover, King manifested a concern to prevent 
vexatious proceedings for different offences arising from the same 
facts. Kendrick and Smith on the other hand, focused purely on the 
similarity of the legal elements of the two offences in order to 
determine whether they were "substantially" the same. In Conelly, 
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest submitted that the Vandercomb test 
should be invoked to determine whether crimes are substantially the 
23At 1339 of his Lordship's opinion (my emphasis). 
24See chapter two supra under 2.3.2, text at notes 132 and 140 for 
a discussion of these cases. 
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same. 25 Consequently, his Lordship was not prepared to broaden 
protection against double jeopardy under this criterion on the strength 
of authority like King. 26 
Propositions 4 and 5: One test of whether autrefois applies is whether 
the evidence which is necessary to support the second indictment, or 
whether the facts which constitute the second offence, would have 
been sufficient to procure a legal conviction on the first indictment 
either in respect of the offence charged or in respect of an offence of 
which the jury could have convicted (proposition 4). However, this 
test must be subjected to the provision that the offence charged in the 
second indictment had in fact been committed at the time of the first 
charge (proposition 5). Lord Morris clearly adopted a broad version of 
the Vandercomb test in proposition 4. 27 Proposition 5 deals with 
the "intervening death" cases. This exception to the general principle 
contained in the Vandercomb test was discussed above and needs no 
further explanation. 28 
251n the series of propositions (at 1305-1306), Lord Morris merely 
described the Vandercomb test as a criterion to establish whether 
crimes are substantially the same. However, at 1310-1311, it appears 
as if his Lordship regarded the Vandercomb test as the exclusive 
criterion which should be applied to determine whether offences 
charged successively are substantially, or in effect the same. 
26See supra under 2.3.2, text at note 132 for a discussion of King's 
case. 
27 As a matter of interest, Friedland points out (at 103), that a 
restricted version of the "in peril" test and an expanded version of the 
Vandercomb test have the same effect; the (restricted) in peril test 
becomes unnecessary if the expanded version of the Vandercomb test 
is applied. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest probably did not perceive the 
inverse relationship between the two - he held that both these tests 
should be applied to establish identity of offences. 
28See chapter two supra under 2.3.2, text at note 115. 
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Lord Morris did not regard Elrington's case29 (which recognised the 
principle that a party convicted or acquitted of a minor offence should 
not be charged on the same facts in a more aggravated form), as 
authority which suggested broader protection against double jeopardy 
than that afforded by the Vandercomb test. 30 He expressed the view 
that reprosecution for a more aggravated form of conduct would only 
be prevented where the more serious offence charged in the second 
indictment included some legal elements of the offence charged in the 
first indictment, and not where there was simply factual similarity. As 
regards the dicta of Cockburn CJ in Elrington, 31 Lord Morris 
commented 
The chief justice must have been referring to the 
established principle of autrefois acquit - and equally the 
established principle of autrefois convict. He must have 
been referring to the well recognised test, that is, 
whether the evidence necessary to support the second 
indictment would have been sufficient to procure a legal 
conviction upon the first. 32 
Proposition 6: Apart from circumstances under which there may be 
a plea of autrefois acquit, a person may be able to show that a matter 
has been decided by a court competent to decide it, and that 
consequently the principle of res judicata applies. In this proposition, 
Lord Morris expressed himself in favour of the application of the (civil 
law) doctrine of issue estoppel in criminal law. Lord Hodson and Lord 
29This case is discussed in detail in chapter two supra under 2.3.2, 
text at note 1 25. 
30At 1315. 
31 See chapter two supra under 2.3.2, text at note 126. 
32At 1315. 
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Pearce also endorsed the application of this doctrine in criminal 
cases. 33 As pointed out above, the House of Lords subsequently 
rejected the application of this doctrine in criminal cases, in OPP v 
Humphrys. 34 A detailed discussion of that case, and of the merits of 
the application of this doctrine in criminal cases, are undertaken at a 
later stage in this thesis. 35 
Propositions 7 and 8: On a plea of autrefois acquit or autrefois 
convict a person is not restricted to a comparison between the earlier 
and some previous indictment or to the record of the court, but may 
prove by evidence all such questions as to the identity of persons, 
dates and facts which are necessary to enable him to show that he is 
being charged with an offence which is either the same or 
substantially the same as one in respect of which he had been 
convicted or acquitted or, as the one in respect of which he could 
have been convicted, and (proposition 8) it is immaterial that the facts 
under examination or the witnesses being called in the later 
proceedings are the same as those in earlier proceedings. 
Proposition 7 is clear and needs no further explanation. With regard 
to proposition 8, Lord Morris interpreted the English common law on 
the basis that there never had been a rule that the same facts might 
not form the basis of successive prosecutions.36 In the same vein, 
he denied the existence of a residual judicial discretion to stay 
proceedings on grounds outside the ambit of the different propositions 
33At 1334 of Lord Hodson's opinion, and, at 1364, 1366 and 1368 of 
the opinion of Lord Pearce. 
34See chapter three supra note 7. 
35See infra under 4.2.3 note 89. 
36At 1301. 
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advanced above. Moreover, he rejected the argument advanced by 
defence counsel that the courts have an inherent power to stay 
proceedings in cases where evidence given in reference to one charge 
has been repeated in reference to another, different charge. 37 Lord 
Morris concluded that Conelly could not rely on the plea of autrefois 
acquit because the essential elements of the robbery charge would not 
suffice to prove a charge of murder or manslaughter. 
In a separate opinion, Lord Hodson agreed with Lord Morris that 
there was no residual judicial discretion to stay proceedings on the 
basis of abuse of process in cases where the pleas in bar cannot be 
applied.38 However, his judgment supplemented that of Lord Morris 
in one important respect: Lord Hodson gave a detailed discussion of 
Elrington's case, describing the principle introduced in that case, 
namely that a person could not be charged with a more aggravated 
form of an offence of which he had previously been convicted or 
acquitted, as the "ascending scale" principle. 39 The exception to 
this principle, the so-called "intervening death" cases, is explained by 
Lord Hodson on the basis that it presents "a new fact which 
necessitates a trial in the interests of justice". 40 Lord Hodson 
expressed the view that Elrington introduced "an extension of the 
37 At 1302. At 1330 his Lordship reiterated this point of view, 
observing that there was no authority to support such a submission 
and, furthermore, that "principles of fairness or requirements of justice 
does not compel its acceptance n. 
38 At 1335 and 1338. 
39At 1332. Choo also refers to this principle in these terms (at 22-23). 
He also advances a logical explanation of the "ascending scale " 
principle. See chapter two supra under 2.3.2 note 127. 
40At 1332. 
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narrow principle of autrefois" 41 and implied that it did not merely 
amount to an application of the Vandercomb test (as submitted by 
Lord Morris). However, Lord Hodson was not prepared to regard 
Elrington as authority for the proposition that a court has inherent 
judicial powers to stay vexatious proceedings. 42 
The remaining three Lords, Lord Devlin, Lord Pearce and Lord Reid, all 
recognised that a court has a residual discretion to stay proceedings 
in order to protect its process from abuse. Lord Pearce submitted that 
the pleas of autrefois in fact evolved from the inherent power of the 
court to prevent the abuse of its process by the prosecution through 
repetition of charges after an acquittal or conviction. 43 He submitted 
that cases like Elrington, Hopkins and King44 demonstrate sufficiently 
that 
a narrow view of the doctrine of autrefois acquit and 
autrefois convict, which has at times prevailed, does not 
comprehend the whole of the power on which the court 
acts in considering whether a second trial can properly 
follow an acquittal or conviction. 45 
Lord Devlin also interpreted the decision in Elrington as being one that 
42At 1335 and 1337. 
43At 1362. Lord Devlin agreed with this thesis, commenting (at 1347) 
that "nearly the whole of the English criminal law of procedure and 
evidence has been made by the exercise of the judges of their power 
to see that what was fair and just was done between prosecutors and 
accused. The doctrine of autrefois was itself doubtless evolved in that 
way". 
44See chapter two supra under 2.3.2 for a discussion of these cases. 
45At 1364. 
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went beyond the plea of autrefois. He based his conclusion on the 
fact that, in that particular case, the crimes had distinctive legal 
elements. 46 However, in view of the rule that prevailed at the time 
that Conelly was decided, namely that a person cannot be charged 
with another crime in the same indictment on which he is charged 
with murder, none of these judges was prepared to find that Conelly 
presented a case in which this discretion should be exercised in favour 
of the accused. 47 
Nevertheless, in an instructive opinion, lord Devlin rejected the 
proposition advanced by lord Morris that the criterion of "substantial 
identity" of offences fell within the ambit of the traditional pleas of 
autrefois. Instead, lord Devlin used the same authorities cited by lord 
Morris in support of this category (for instance King's case)48 to 
conclude that these cases more probably supported the notion that the 
court has inherent discretionary powers to stop vexatious proceedings. 
lord Devlin explained that traditionally for the doctrine of autrefois 
to apply, the accused should have been put in peril of a conviction for 
the same offence as that with which he was subsequently charged. 49 
In his view, the word "offence" embraces both the facts which 
constitute the crime and the legal characteristics which makes it an 
offence. Therefore, for the doctrine to apply, his lordship argued that 
46At 1358. 
47 Although the court unanimously expressed the view that this rule is 
inherently unfair to the accused, they concluded that "it cannot be 
oppressive for the prosecution to do what the court has told it that it 
must do" (per lord Devlin at 1346). The other judges expressed 
themselves in the same vein. 
48See chapter two supra under 2.3.2, text at note 132 for a discussion 
of this case. 
49At 1339. 
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"it must be the same both in fact and in law" .50 Extending this 
premise, Lord Devlin rejected the proposition advanced by Lord Morris 
that the criterion of "substantial identity" of offences forms part of the 
doctrine of autrefois. In this regard, Lord Devlin made the following 
comment 
I have no difficulty about the idea that one set of facts 
may be substantially but not exactly the same as 
another. I have more difficulty with the idea that an 
offence may be substantially the same as another in its 
legal characteristics; legal characteristics are precise 
things and are either the same or not. If I had felt that 
the doctrine of autrefois was the only form of relief 
available to an accused who has been prosecuted on 
substantially the same facts, I should be tempted to 
stretch the doctrine as far as it would go. But as that is 
not my view, I am inclined to favour keeping it within 
limits that are precise. 51 
The value of Lord Devlin's judgment lies in the fact that he indicated 
in which circumstances a court should exercise its discretionary 
powers to stay proceedings in favour of the accused. His Lordship 
stated the following premise 
50At 1340. 
I consider it to be within this [inherent] power for the 
court to declare that the prosecution must as a general 
rule join in the same indictment charges that "are 
founded on the same facts, or form or are a part of a 
series of offences of the same or a similar 
character" 52 ..... and .... to enforce such a direction (as 
indeed is already done in the civil process) by staying a 
second indictment if it is satisfied that its subject-matter 
ought to have been included in the first. 53 
52At 1347, citing in part rule 3 , Schedule 1 of the Indictments Act, 
1915, which provides that the court may join in the same indictment 
charges to this effect. 
53At 1347. 
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Lord Devlin continued in this vein by observing that issues of fact that 
are substantially the same, should, whenever practicable, be tried by 
the same tribunal at the same time. 54 He accordingly suggested that 
as a general rule, a judge should stay an indictment (that 
is, order that it remain on the file not to be proceeded 
with) when he is satisfied that the charges therein are 
founded on the same facts as the charges in a previous 
indictment on which the accused has been tried, or form 
or are a part of a series of offences of the same or a 
similar character as the offences charges in the previous 
indictment. 55 
In his Lordship's view, it would be oppressive for an accused if the 
prosecution failed to join charges in the same indictment, where it 
could properly be done.56 However, he indicated that a second trial 
on the same or similar facts would not always and of necessity be 
oppressive; certain circumstances in a particular case could, in his 
view, make a second trial "just and convenient", for instance, where 
the judge exercises his discretion to order separate trials for offences 
charged in one indictment, or, where the accused himself obtains a 
separate trial, or, where the defence accepts the choice exercised by 
the prosecution to prefer two or more indictments.57 
Lord Devlin also pointed out by way of analogy, that the civil law 
doctrine of res judicata has been expanded to give protection to 
defendants against a multiplicity of actions, not only in respect of 
issues that have previously been raised, but also in respect of issues 
54At 1353. 
55 At 1359-1360. 
57 At 1360. 
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that could have been raised but were not. 58 In this regard, he 
referred to the classic judgment on this point, Henderson v 
Henderson59 where it was observed that 
(t]he plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, 
not only to points upon which the court was actually 
required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce 
a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged 
to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, 
exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought 
forward at the time. 60 
In Conelly, Lord Devlin submitted that the principle stated by Cockburn 
CJ in Elrington, namely that 
.... a series of charges shall not be preferred, and, 
whether a party accused of a minor offence is acquitted 
or convicted, he shall not be charged again on the same 
facts in a more aggravated form61 
expanded the doctrine of autrefois in much the same way as the court 
in the above case of Henderson expanded the doctrine of res judicata. 
According to his interpretation of Elrington, the "true principle" to be 
extracted from Cockburn CJ's statement is "the inherent power of the 
court to stop vexatious process". 62 Lord Devlin also emphasised the 
58At 1356. 
59( 1843) 3 Hare 100. 
60At 114-115 of the judgment. See the opinion of Lord Devlin in 
Conelly at 1356. 
61 At 873. See chapter two supra under 2.3.2, text at note 125 for a 
detailed discussion of this decision. 
62At 1358. His Lordship rejected the thesis advanced by Lord Morris 
that Elrington amounted to a mere application of the Vandercomb 
test. He argued (at 1357-1358) that the principle enunciated by 
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desirability of distinguishing between grounds on which the pleas of 
autrefois may be raised, and grounds whereupon a judge may exercise 
his powers to stop vexatious proceedings: the one (autrefois plea) 
gives the defendant an absolute right to relief, and the other only a 
qualified right. 63 
As indicated above, the specialised facts of Conelly resulted in a 
refusal by the court to exercise its inherent discretionary powers to 
stay proceedings in favour of the accused. 64 However, since the 
decision of the House of Lords in Conelly, there has been a plethora 
of cases in which applications for a stay of proceedings on grounds of 
double jeopardy and subsequent abuse of process were raised 
successfully. The most important of these decisions will be discussed 
in the text that follows. 
4.2.2 Subsequent cases which dealt with applications for a stay of 
proceedings on double jeopardy grounds 
The basic principle which may be extracted from cases which followed 
on Conelly, is that a prosecution for an offence will most probably be 
stayed if it relates to an activity, transaction or course of conduct 
which has already formed the basis of a previous charge on which the 
accused had been convicted or acquitted. R v Roberts65 presents a 
straightforward example. Roberts was charged in 1978 with stealing 
Cockburn CJ in Elrington goes beyond the principle of autrefois, 
because the particular offences in that case had distinct elements, 
and, the pleas of autrefois could traditionally be raised only where 
crimes had the same legal elements. 
63At 1358. 
64See supra text at note 4 7. 
65 [ 1979] Crim LR 44. 
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an outboard motor from his landlord between May 1975 and May 
1976. However, he had previously (in 1976) been charged with 
stealing some hydraulic jacks from the landlord during the same 
period. He was acquitted during the 1976 trial on the basis that the 
owner consented to the taking of the goods. In the second trial, the 
court stayed the prosecution since the matter was stale and that any 
conviction would be inconsistent with the earlier acquittal. In 
Dewhurst v Foster & Foster66 the court stayed a private prosecution 
for the same activity (theft) of which the accused had previously been 
acquitted. 67 
A number of other cases involved more complex issues inasmuch as 
the offences charged successively, contained different legal elements. 
In R v Cwmbran Justices, ex parte Pope68 the applicant was charged 
in the magistrate's court with the crime of driving without due care 
and attention after he had been acquitted by a jury in the Crown Court 
of driving with excess alcohol. The Divisional Court held that the 
proceedings should be stayed because 
... it would be a little, at least, unfair to require him to 
stand his trial before the justices upon what does involve 
the self-same issue, and because also it would not be 
entirely in the interests of public policy that one tribunal 
might be in a situation in which it feels itself driven to a 
decision directly in conflict with what was the finding of 
a jury, who after all form the basis of our administration 
of common law justice .... 69 
66[ 1982) Crim LR 582. 
67See also R (Smith) v Birch & Harrington [19831 Crim LR 193. In that 
case, a private prosecution for criminal damage to a fence was stayed 
in circumstances where the accused had previously been acquitted of 
damage to a roof and laundry (on a washing line) during the same 
course of conduct. 
68(1979) 143 JPR 638. 
69At 640. 
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In two other road-traffic cases, R v Moxon-Tritsch70 and R v 
Forest of Dean JJ Ex parte Farley, 71 the courts seem to have 
followed the thesis advanced by Lord Devlin, namely that a 
subsequent prosecution for a more aggravated form of criminal 
conduct arising from the same factual transaction previously 
adjudicated on, should be stayed in terms of inherent powers of the 
court. 72 The facts of the first case were as follows. Mrs Leona 
Maxon-Tritsch pleaded guilty in the magistrate's court on the following 
charges: driving without due care and attention and driving with 
excess alcohol. It transpired at the trial that she had transported five 
children in the back of her car, lost control of the vehicle which 
consequently landed in an upturned position in the field. As a result 
of the accident, one child, aged four died instantly. At the material 
time, the accused's blood-alcohol was well in excess of its limit. 
However, the Director of Public Prosecutions decided not to charge her 
with causing death by reckless driving. Nevertheless, she was 
convicted of the offences charged, namely driving without due 
attention and driving with excess blood-alcohol. Pursuant to those 
proceedings, the parents of the deceased child instituted a private 
prosecution against Mrs Moxon-Tritsch for causing the death of their 
daugther as a result of reckless driving. At the hearing, the defence 
pleaded autrefois convict and, alternatively, that the court had an 
inherent jurisdiction to stay proceedings because the private 
prosecution arose out of the same facts which brought Mrs Moxon-
Tritsch before the magistrates. This application was successful. Mr 
Justice Faulks expressed the view that the offences were substantially 
70( 1988] Crim LR 46. 
71 (1990] Crim LR 568. 
72See supra text at note 61 for a discussion of Lord Devlin's 
interpretation of the principle in Elrington's case. 
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similar.73 Exercising his inherent discretion, he accordingly ruled that 
it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow the private 
prosecution to continue. The reasoning of Mr Justice Faulks was 
summarised in the following terms74 
It was a fundamental principle of the English criminal law 
that no one should be. twice. put injeopardy_of conviction 
and punishment for the same offence arising out of the 
same set of facts. The proposed prosecution arose from 
the same facts as those upon which she had been 
convicted . . . . It would be oppressive to let her face a 
second trial for a more aggravated form of the same 
offence to which she had already pleaded guilty. 
However, the judgment as reported is unclear in the following respect: 
the defendant was convicted of two offences, but the judge failed to 
explain which of these two offences were substantially the same as 
the crime subsequently charged (causing death by reckless driving). 
The case has, however, been analysed as follows. 75 Driving without 
due care and attention is a lesser included offence of causing death by 
reckless driving. This is so because reckless driving is necessarily 
careless. Therefore, in respect of this offence, the accused could 
succeed with the defence of autrefois convict by invoking the 
Vandercomb or same evidence test. However, driving with excess 
alcohol is not a lesser offence of causing death by reckless driving: 
neither the in peril or the same evidence test would prevent a 
subsequent charge of causing death by reckless driving. Therefore, it 
follows that protection against a subsequent charge for the greater 
offence in this case could only have been granted in terms of the 
73At 47. 
74At 46 - 47. (My emphasis.) 
75See the explanation of the case by Smith JC in 1988 Criminal Law 
Review 47-48. 
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inherent power of the court to prevent an abuse of the process; the 
abuse being that the accused could have been charged with the 
greater (albeit different) offence at the first trial. 
In R v Forest of Dean JJ, ex parte Farley76 the court apparently 
confirmed this analysis of the decision in Maxon-Tritsch. It held that 
a prosecution for causing death by reckless driving following a 
summary acquittal or conviction for driving with excess alcohol would 
constitute an abuse of the process. 77 However, the fact that the 
evidence of alcohol consumption in this case constituted the only 
basis for the charge of causing death by reckless driving, seems to 
have been the overriding factor taken into account by the court in 
reaching its decision to stay proceedings for the more serious 
offence. 78 
R v Norman Griffiths & Others79 presents another example in this 
context. The defendant was tried for (a) conspiracy to supply cocaine 
and (b) possession of cocaine with intent to supply (before January 
1988) in one indictment. He was acquitted as no evidence was 
offered by the crown. However, later he was charged with conspiracy 
to import cocaine (between November 1987 and February 1988). The 
court held that the plea of autrefois acquit was inapplicable, 80 but 
stayed proceedings in terms of its inherent powers to prevent abuse 
76Supra. 
77 At 568-569. 
78At 569. 
79[ 1990) Crim LR 181 . 
8
°The offences had different legal elements - neither the "in peril" or 
the Vandercomb test could save the accused from a subsequent 
prosecution (see 182 of the report). 
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of process. The court (per Humphries J), remarked that the plea of 
abuse of process would be well-founded in this case. The crown was 
seeking to introduce evidence which they could have offered at the 
first trial. 81 The court argued that in these circumstances, it would be 
oppressive and unjust to the defendant to allow the case to proceed 
and the indictment was accordingly stayed. 
4.2.3 The rejection of the doctrine of issue estoppel in DPP v 
Humphrys82 
It has been argued that, once it is accepted that the verdict of a 
tribunal of fact in a criminal case ought to be protected from challenge 
(by the prosecution) in a later case between the same parties, there 
is a good prima facie case to also protect from challenge the decision 
of the tribunal of fact on a particular issue in such a case.83 This 
may be achieved by applying the civil law doctrine of issue estoppal 
in criminal proceedings. 84 In the context of criminal proceedings, the 
] 81 The court explained (at 182) that when specifically asked, the 
crown could not point to any new evidence discovered since the 
acquittal. The material or evidence available before the court in the 
second trial had in fact been available to the crown on the day that no 
evidence had been offered in the first trial. 
82Supra. 
83See Mirfield P "Shedding a tear for issue estoppal" 1980 Criminal 
law Review 336, 338. 
84The most widely accepted definition of this doctrine is that advanced 
by Turner AK and Bower SG The doctrine of res judicata 2nd ed 
( 1969) at 152F: "If the earlier case necessarily involved a judicial 
determination of some question of law or issue of fact, in the sense 
that the decision could not have been legitimately or rationally 
pronounced without at the same time determining that question or 
issue, then such determination, though not declared on the face of the 
recorded decision, is deemed to constitute an integral part of it, and 
will be res judicata in any subsequent action between the same parties 
in respect of the same subject matter". 
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doctrine of issue estoppal may be described as that aspect of the 
broader principle of res judicata which prevents (or estops) the 
prosecution from re-opening a particular issue of fact which has been 
decided in favour of the accused at an earlier trial ending in his 
acquittal. 85 
Friedland suggests that the main rationale behind the ·application of 
estoppal in criminal cases is that it prevents inconsistent results. 86 
A further reason advanced by Friedland for the application of the 
doctrine in criminal proceedings is that "it conserves judicial resources 
as it tends to force the prosecutor to exercise care in the preparation 
and presentation of his case because if he loses he may not be able to 
raise again the issues involved". 87 In this sense, the principle of 
issue estoppal serves the purpose of preventing the improper 
harassment of the accused by a multiplicity of proceedings. The 
values underlying it are the same as those underlying the double 
jeopardy prohibition. 
In the past, opportunities to test the validity of the suggestion that 
the doctrine forms part of English criminal procedure were rare 
because nearly all criminal trials involve more than one issue. 
Consequently, if the jury simply finds the accused not guilty it is 
impossible to know on which issue the prosecution failed to satisfy 
85See Sprack 98. In Conelly, Lord Devlin explained (at 1343-1344) the 
difference between issue estoppal and the autrefois principle as 
follows: "[The] latter prevents the prosecution from impugning the 
validity of the reversal as a whole, [while] the former prevents it from 
raising again any of the separate issues of fact which the jury have 
decided, or are presumed to have decided in reaching their verdict in 
the accused's favour". 
86At 117. 
87/d. 
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them; juries do not give reasons for their verdicts. As indicated 
above, a majority of the House of Lords expressed themselves in 
favour of the application of the doctrine of issue estoppel in the 
Conelly decision. 88 
However, in OPP v Humphrys,89 the House of Lords categorically 
rejected its previous point of view. The facts that gave rise to that 
decision were as follows. H was acquitted of driving a vehicle on a 
public road on a particular day in 1972 while he was disqualified. At 
the trial, the only issue before the court was whether a constable was 
correct in identifying H as the rider of a motorcycle on that particular 
day. H also gave evidence, denying that he drove on that particular 
day or any other day during 1972. The jury acquitted him, and, it was 
obvious that the jury acquitted him on the basis that the state could 
not prove beyond reasonable doubt that he drove any vehicle on a 
public road on that particular day. Eighteen months later, he was 
charged with perjury at the first trial in that he had sworn that he had 
not driven any vehicle on a public road during 1972. At this trial, the 
prosecution adduced the evidence of several witnesses who had seen 
H driving on several occasions during 1972. The prosecution also 
again called the policeman (who had testified in the previous trial) to 
testify as to the specific incident for which H was charged in the first 
indictment. H was subsequently convicted by the court of perjury. He 
appealed against his conviction on the ground that the only issue 
88Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest (at 1321), Lord Hodson (at 1334) and 
Lord Pearce (at 1366) expressed the point of view that issue estoppal 
applied in criminal cases, but that it did not apply in that case as it 
was not possible to identify from the jury's verdict of guilty of murder 
(which was quashed on appeal), any finding on the issue of robbery 
with which Conelly was charged after his conviction for murder had 
been quashed. See supra under 4.2.1 for a discussion of the Conelly 
decision. 
89Supra. 
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before the first jury was whether he was the rider of the motorcycle 
stopped by the policeman. Since he had been acquitted by that jury, 
the prosecution at the second trial was estopped from calling any 
evidence to the effect that he had been that rider and, in particular, 
the evidence of the policeman to that effect. The Court of Appeal 
reversed his conviction on the ground that the doctrine of issue 
estoppal barred a subsequent trial for perjury. Howeverr the crown 
appealed to the House of Lords on a point of law, couched in the 
following terms 
Where in a trial on indictment there is a single issue 
between prosecution and defence and the defendant is 
acquitted, is evidence tending to show that the 
defendant was guilty of that offence admissible in a 
subsequent prosecution of the defendant for perjury 
committed during the first trial?90 
The House of Lords answered this question in the affirmative, ruling 
that the civil doctrine of issue estoppal has no application in criminal 
law. Apart from the fact that the court could find very little historical 
justification for the application of the doctrine in criminal proceedings, 
a number of arguments were also raised against the introduction of the 
doctrine in criminal law. It was argued, for instance, that if the 
doctrine were to apply in criminal cases, it must be applicable equally 
to both parties (the crown and the defendant) as is the case in civil 
proceedings. 91 The court was not prepared to accept that issue 
estoppal could be available to the crown. Lord Hailsham of St 
Marylebone explained92 that the rule of issue estoppal in civil cases 
springs from a rule of public policy, namely the need for finality in 
90At 14. 
91 Per Lord Dilhorne at 20. 
92At 32-33. 
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litigation summarised in the maxim ut finis sit litium. He explained that 
in civil proceedings, this principle is applicable to both parties because 
the litigants are on equal footing. However, his Lordship observed 
that in criminal proceedings, "[t]he subject requires to be protected 
against oppression by the executive, and in particular by the maxim 
nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadam causa" .93 Therefore, to 
apply the doctrine of issue estoppal to both parties in criminal 
proceedings would (in his view) be against the policies which prevail 
in the criminal law context, namely that of state versus subject. 94 
Another argument raised was that, in contrast to civil proceedings, 
it may be extremely difficult or even impossible to identify and isolate 
an "issue" in criminal litigation.95 Lord Salmon for example, observed 
that application of the doctrine would be inappropriate because "there 
are no pleadings [in criminal litigation] defining the issues and no 
judgments explainining how the issues (even if identifiable) were 
decided". 96 His Lordship explained that since juries give general 
verdicts of guilty or not guilty, it is most of the time impossible to do 
more than guess how they have decided any identifiable issue. 
Furthermore, Lord Salmon argued that even in the rare cases in 
which an issue could be identified and isolated, the application of 
issue estoppal (in criminal cases) would often be artificial and unfair. 
His Lordship explained that where the jury decided an issue in the 
accused's favour, not because they were satisfied that their solution 
94See to the same effect the judgment of Lord Edmund-Davis (at 51-
52). 
95This argument was advanced by Lord Hailsham at 34, Lord Salmon 
at 43 and Lord Edmund-Davis at 49. 
96At 43. 
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was correct but because they were left in doubt as to whether the 
contrary had been proved, it would be unjust if the accused (who 
enjoys many advantages), "should be given the added bonus that that 
issue should thereafter be presumed for ever to have been irrevocably 
decided in his favour as between himself and the Crown". 97 
However, the majority of the House of Lords also ruled· that, in 
certain cases, an attempt (by the prosecution) to raise again an issue 
that has in effect been decided in favour of the accused in a previous 
criminal trial may amount to an abuse of process and may be stayed, 
even though it does not fall within the ambit of the principle of res 
judicata as applied in criminal law (in other words, within the ambit of 
the pleas of autrefois). 98 The subsequent perjury charge (in 
Humphrys) was not regarded by the House of Lords as an attempt to 
abuse the process; apparently, because the prosecution did not rely 
solely on evidence previously adduced and the fact that the evidence 
of perjury related mainly to the accused's evidence that he had not 
driven at all during 1972. Lord Hailsham observed that 
[i]n an indictment for perjury like the present I would think that 
it is the duty of the court to apply the double jeopardy rule 
against the Crown not as a matter of discretion but as a matter 
of law where it is satisfied in substance that all the prosecution 
is doing is trying to get behind the original verdict by re-trying 
the same evidence. But where the prosecution, by calling 
additional evidence which it could not have had available using 
reasonable diligence at the time of the first trial is in substance 
as well as in form putting the accused in jeopardy not for the 
original alleged misdemeanour of which he has been acquitted 
97 At 43. His Lordship expressed the view that the doctrine of 
autrefois amply protects the accused against double jeopardy and that 
no need exists to introduce issue estoppal into the field of criminal 
law. 
98Per Lord Hailsham at 34, Lord Salmon at 46 and Lord Edmund-Davies 
at 52-53. 
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(or convicted) but for his crime against justice committed by 
perjuring himself at the first trial, there is no double jeopardy 
and the prosecution is entitled to adduce the evidence and 
make the assertions necessary to achieve its purpose whether 
or not the effect is to give rise to the inference that the previous 
verdict of acquittal was insupportable, or the previous 
conviction and punishment right. 99 
The rejection of the doctrine of issue estoppal in Humphrys as being 
unnecessary and undesirable in criminal litigation has received a fair 
amount of criticism. 100 However, in view of the explicit recognition 
by the court of the abuse of process discretion in this context, the 
application of the doctrine has largely become unnecessary. 
Therefore, it is most unlikely that the availability of the doctrine in 
criminal litigation will be reconsidered by English courts in the near 
future. 
99At 40. The conclusion of Lord Salmon (at 47) reflects the same 
approach. Cf also Smith's comment on the Griffith's case [1990] 
Criminal law Journal 182-183 discussed supra, text at note 79. The 
commentator suggests that the difference between Griffiths (where 
the court stayed proceedings on the basis that to allow the case to 
proceed would be unjust and oppressive) and Humphrys (where the 
court refused to stay proceedings) was that in the latter case the 
prosecution relied on fresh evidence to prove facts which the jury had 
not found to be proved at the first trial. 
100See, inter alia, Mirfield (337-349) who raises a number of valid 
points why the doctrine should find application in English criminal 
procedure, and Choo ( 28-31) who criticises the "not especially 
persuasive" arguments advanced by the House of Lords against the 
doctrine (at 31). Contra Lanham D "Issue estoppal in the English 
criminal law" Criminal law Review 1971 428 who expresses the view 
(at 445) that "issue estoppal is neither appropriate nor necessary in 
the criminal law" because (inter alia), of the immense difficulties of 
isolating issues, and the fact that recognition of the doctrine would 
undermine the "interest [of the state] that the innocent are acquitted 
and the guilty convicted". 
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4.2.4 Summary 
* In English law, the accused is protected against double jeopardy 
not only by the traditional pleas of autrefois, but also by the judicial 
discretion to stay proceedings on the basis of abuse of process. The 
effect of this broader protection is that a second prosecution may be 
prohibited even if the offence charged in the second trial does not 
qualify in terms of its legal elements as a lesser or greater included 
offence of the one charged in the first trial. 
* A study of the case law reveals that the courts are willing to 
exercise their residuary discretionary powers in favour of the accused 
if the subsequent prosecution relates to an activity, transaction or 
course of conduct which has already been the basis of a previous 
charge on which the accused has been convicted or acquitted. An 
important (if not decisive) consideration is whether it was possible for 
the prosecution to bring all the charges in one trial. If this is so, the 
general premise is that it will be oppressive to have a second trial. 
However, as Lord Devlin pointed out in the Conelly decision, there 
may be certain instances where a second trial will be justified. These 
are, inter alia, where the judge (in the first trial) considered it expedient 
to order separate trials for offences charged in one indictment, or, 
where the accused has himself obtained a separate trial or where the 
defence accepts the choice exercised by the prosecution to prefer two 
or more indictments. 
* The broader principle of res judicata generally referred to as issue 
estoppal, has been found to be inapplicable in English criminal law. 
The main objection to the application of the principle of issue estoppal 
is that it is difficult for a court to identify and isolate an issue decided 
previously in favour of the accused; juries need not give reasons for 
their verdicts. 
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* The House of Lords nevertheless recognised that an attempt by the 
prosecution to raise again an issue that had in effect been decided 
previously in favour of the accused, may be viewed as an abuse of 
process which justifies a stay of proceedings in terms of residual 
discretionary powers. In Humphrys, a perjury charge following on an 
acquittal for a minor traffic offence was not regarded by the court as 
an instance which warranted exercise of broader discretionary powers 
in favour of the accused. The court based its conclusion on the fact 
that the prosecution, in the subsequent trial for perjury, called 
additional evidence (which it could not have had available using 
reasonable diligence at the time of the first trial) to prove an offence 
allegedly committed during the first trial; therefore, it was impossible 
for the prosecution to charge the accused at the first trial with the 
offence of perjury. However, the court did not imply by this decision 
that subsequent perjury charges may never justify a stay of 
proceedings on double jeopardy grounds. It expressed the view (per 
Lord Hailsham) that where the prosecution brings a perjury charge 
with the sole motive of "getting behind the original verdict by re-trying 
the same evidence", 101 it is the duty of the court to stay 
proceedings, not as a matter of discretion but as a matter of law. 
4.3 CANADIAN LAW 
4.3.1 General 
The Law Reform Commission of Canada has remarked that102 
101 See the judgment of Lord Hailsham in Humphrys 34. 
102Law Reform Commission of Canada "Double jeopardy, pleas and 
verdicts" Working Paper 63 1991 43, hereinafter referred to as 
Working Paper 63. 
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[t]he existing Code regime governing double jeopardy, 
pleas and verdicts is characterised by an occasional lack 
of comprehensiveness, confusing procedures and the 
existence of anachronisms - three characteristics that 
offend the principle of clarity. 
This is particularly true of the criteria applied in Canadian law to 
determine identity of offences. Some· of these· rules, for instance 
those pertaining to the special pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois 
convict, are contained in the Code itself. Others, for instance the rule 
of issue estoppal and the rule against multiple convictions, were 
developed by the courts. 103 Moreover, the Canadian Charter of 
Rights also offers the accused protection, albeit not as expansive as 
in terms of the ordinary law, against a successive prosecution for the 
"same offence". 
The Canadian Law Reform Commission recently suggested that all 
these rules be codified. 104 This has not as yet taken place. For the 
sake of clarity, each of the different criteria applied in Canadian law for 
determining identity of offences will be considered separately in the 
paragraphs that follow. 
4.3.2 The pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict 
The Canadian Code of Criminal Procedure permits a person charged 
with an offence to plead autrefois acquit and autrefois convict. 105 
1031n Regina v Van Rassel ( 1990) 1 (SCR) 225 the Supreme Court of 
Canada recently held that the double jeopardy concept is one of 
general application which is expressed in the form of more specific 
rules which, despite their common origin, differ in the way they are 
applied. 
104See Working Paper 63 at 46. 
105Section 607 of the Code, RSC 1985, C-46. 
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To succeed with the defence, the defendant must establish that 
( 1) (a) there was a final verdict in the first charge 106 
(b) the "matter" of the earlier charge is the same "in whole 
or in part" as the later charge 107 and 
(c) that at the former trial, if all proper amendments had 
been made that might then have been made, the accused 
might have been convicted of all the offences of which 
he may be convicted before the court to which autrefois 
acquit or autrefois convict is pleaded. 108 
It is furthermore provided in the Code that 
(2) where it appears that the accused might at the former trial have 
been convicted of an offence of which he may be convicted on 
the count [in respect of which the plea of former jeopardy is 
raised], the judge shall direct that the accused shall not be 
found guilty of any offence of which he might have been 
convicted at the former trial. 109 
The basic idea underlying all these provisions are that the accused 
must have been in peril of a conviction at the previous trial of the 
offence subsequently charged. 110 
The rule under point (b) above is discussed first. The definitions of 
106See chapter three supra under 3.3.2 for a discussion of this 
requirement. 
107Section 609( 1). 
108Section 609(2). 
109Section 609(2)(a). 
110See Regina v Ko and Yip (1977) 36 CCC (2d) (BCCA) 32, 36 and 
Regina v Van Rassel supra 235. 
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the crimes ought to be considered in order to determine whether the 
matter is the same "in whole or in part" as in the previous proceeding. 
The relevant inquiry is whether the offence subsequently charged can 
be viewed as identical to the offence charged in the first proceeding, 
or as being "lesser included" to that particular offence. 
The "lesser included offence" criterion as applied in Canadian law is 
explained as follows. 111 In the first place, a lesser included offence 
is one which by the wording of its definition is an offence which is 
essentially the same as the more serious offence minus one of the 
aggravating elements. For example, ordinary assault is a lesser 
included offence of assault with a weapon. In the second place, a 
lesser included offence may also be one which is generally part and 
parcel of the more serious offence; for example, attempt. Since some 
time along the way to the commission of the offence the accused 
must have been in the process of trying to complete it, it necessarily 
follows that the attempt is an included offence of the completed 
crime. In the third place, lesser offences may also be specifically 
provided for by statute. These are known as lesser offences indicated 
by law. 112 Furthermore, an included offence may be recognised (in 
the fourth place) not by the wording of the statute (the definition of 
the crime), but by the wording of the count charged in the indictment. 
This means that by looking at the actual words used in the indictment, 
one can tell whether an offence is included in the charge for another 
offence. For example: the indictment sets out that X, on day Y, 
attempted to murder Z by hitting him with a stick over his head. Xis 
charged with attempted murder. However, by the mere words used 
in the indictment, one can tell that an assault or an assault to do 
111 See Mewett AW An introduction to the criminal process in Canada 
2nd ed 1992 106-109. 
112See Regina v Rinnie (1970) CCC 3 218 (Alta SC App Div). 
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grievous bodily harm is a lesser included offence of the crime charged. 
As indicated in (c) above, the Code also prohibits a subsequent 
prosecution for offences of which the accused might have been 
convicted on the previous charge, had all proper amendments been 
made. In Regina v Van Rassel 113 the Supreme Court explained this 
principle as follows 
The new count must be the same as at the first trial [for 
a plea of previous jeopardy to succeed], or be implicitly 
included in that of the first trial, either in law or on 
account of the evidence presented if it had been legally 
possible at that time to make the necessary 
amendments" .114 
An example is the following. A is charged with stealing something on 
May 4th. The evidence, however, shows that the offence was 
committed on May 5th. If the accused is acquitted because of this 
error in the indictment, he may not be charged again with theft on 
either May 4th or May 5th. The reason is that the court could have 
allowed an amendment of the indictment - it was merely voidable and 
not void. 115 Therefore, a plea of former jeopardy not only lies in 
Canadian law if the accused can show that he was actually acquitted 
or convicted of an offence, but also if he can show that he could have 
been convicted of the offence, had all the proper amendments been 
made.11s 
113Supra. 
114At 226. 
115See chapter three supra under 3.3.2 for a discussion of the Moore 
decision. 
116See Mewett 108. 
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The last provision ( set out in (2) above) 117 means that the plea of 
autrefois applies if the accused in the later charge could be convicted 
of any offence of which he might have been convicted in the earlier 
charge. This principle is explained as follows. 118 If a person is 
charged with the offence X, and the court finds that X is an offence 
included in a count Y of which the accused had been or might have 
been acquitted or convicted on a previous occasion, then a plea of 
autrefois would apply. The relevant question in deciding whether the 
plea of autrefois applies, is whether the conviction or acquittal on the 
whole of the earlier charge necessarily involves a conviction or 
acquittal on every part of the later charge. If it does, the plea will 
apply; otherwise, it will not. 119 It is, however, not clear from the 
section whether the accused may nevertheless be tried for the more 
serious crime which only includes the included crime in the first 
charge. In other words, it is not clear from the section whether the 
broader or the restricted version of the "in peril" test applies. 120 
The Code also prohibits subsequent charges for greater offences. 
Section 610 makes specific provision for barring of prosecutions for 
greater offences by providing for the following specific instances 
(i) a later charge substantially the same as a previous one of 
which the accused was acquitted or convicted, but 
117Section 609(2)(a). 
118See Salhany 6-62. 
1191d. 
120See chapter two supra under 2. 3. 2, text at notes 1 21 -1 22 for a 
discussion of these versions of the in peril test as identified by 
Friedland. In terms of the broader version of the in peril test. a 
subsequent charge is barred if the accused has been in peril of a lesser 
offence (on the first indictment) for which he is again in peril on the 
second indictment for a greater offence. 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
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adding a statement of intention or circumstances of 
aggravation tending to increase the punishment, is barred 
by the previous charge 
a conviction or acquittal of murder bars a subsequent 
charge of manslaugther or infanticide 
a conviction or acquittal of first degree murder bars a 
subsequent charge of second degree murder or vice 
versa. 
a conviction or acquittal of infanticide bars a later charge 
of manslaughter and vice versa. 
An example in the case law of application of the provision in (i) is 
the following. A plea of autrefois convict was allowed to a charge of 
possession of narcotics for the purpose of trafficking in circumstances 
where the accused has previously been convicted of simple 
possession. However, it is not clear from the provisions in the Code 
itself, or from the case law pertaining to these provisions, whether a 
person, previously convicted of attempted murder (or a lesser included 
offence such as assault), may be charged in a second trial for murder 
if the victim died only after the first trial. As indicated above, these 
instances are referred to as the intervening death cases. However, 
certain other principles have been developed in the case law (for 
instance the Kienapple principle), which can be interpreted as allowing 
for subsequent prosecutions in intervening death cases. 
The common law principles of double jeopardy, namely the rule 
against multiple convictions, the rule against splitting of charges and 
the rule of issue estoppal are all discussed separately in the 
paragraphs below. 
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4. 3. 3 The rule against multiple convictions 
The criteria applied to determine the permissibility of multiple 
punishments in a single trial, have also been incorporated as a principle 
of double jeopardy in the context of successive prosecutions. These 
criteria were first introduced in the case of Kienapple v The 
Queen. 121 The facts of that case were as follows. The accused had 
been convicted at trial of the offences of rape and unlawful carnal 
intercourse with a female under fourteen years of age. The Supreme 
Court held that the conviction on the latter charge could not stand, 
because it would amount to a violation of the rule against multiple 
convictions. The court did not reach this conclusion by applying the 
lesser included offence criterion. The crime of unlawful carnal 
intercourse with a female under fourteen years of age did not qualify 
as a lesser included offence of rape; it could be committed in respect 
of a female under the age of fourteen with or without consent. The 
crime of rape only embraced the offence of unlawful carnal intercourse 
if it occurred without consent of the female under fourteen years of 
age. In other words, it did not embrace the offence of unlawful carnal 
intercourse in all instances. The court (per Lamer J), accordingly 
based its conclusion upon the broader principle of res judicata. 122 
The court explained this principle as follows 123 
The relevant inquiry as far as res judicata is concerned is 
whether the same cause or matter (rather than the same 
offence) is comprehended by two or more offences. 
121 ( 1974) 15 CCC (2d) 524 (SCC). 
122At 537. 
123At 538-539. 
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However, the court also added that124 
[i]f there is a verdict of guilty on the first count and the 
same or substantially the same elements make up the 
offence charged in a second count, the situation invites 
application of a rule against multiple convictions. 
These contradictory statements (one following a same transaction 
approach, and the other one focusing on the elements of the particular 
offences), subsequently gave rise to different interpretations of the so-
called Kienapple principle. 125 
The Kienapple principle has however, been clarified subsequently 
by the Supreme Court in the case of Regina v Prince. 126 The facts 
were as follows. On January 1st 1981, Sandra Prince stabbed Bernice 
Daniels in the abdomen. At the time, Daniels was six months 
pregnant. On the 2nd of January 1981 , Prince was charged with the 
attempted murder of Daniels. Only four days later (before the 
124At 539, relying upon the judgment of Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in 
the Conelly decision. See supra under 4.2.1 for a discussion of that 
case. 
1251n Regina v Hagen/ocher ( 1983) 65 CCC (2d) 101 the Manitoba 
Court of Appeal gave a wide meaning to the Kienapple principle. The 
court prohibited a subsequent charge of unlawfully setting fire where 
the accused had already been convicted of manslaugther for the death 
of a man asphyxiated by the smoke of the fire. (At 101-102). 
However, in Krug v The Queen (1985) 21 CCC (3d) 193 (SCC) (a 
multiple-punishment-single-trial case) the court favoured an approach 
which focuses on the elements of the offences, rather than on 
whether the offences are based on the same act. In that case the 
Supreme Court held that a conviction for attempted robbery described 
as attempted theft while armed with an offensive weapon did not 
preclude a conviction for using a firearm while attempting to commit 
an indictable offence. 
126( 1986) 30 CCC (3d) 35 (SCC). 
180 
conclusion of the trial) Daniels gave birth to a child who lived for 
nineteen minutes and then died as a result of the stabbing. Prince was 
subsequently acquitted of the attempted murder of Daniels, but 
convicted of causing bodily harm to her. Following an inquiry into the 
death of the child, Prince was in the meantime in a different 
proceeding also charged with manslaughter of the child. Her lawyer 
then made a preliminary motion to the trial judge requesting him to 
enter a stay of proceedings on the basis of the Kienapple principle. 
The argument put forward was that the Kienapple principle prohibited 
a subsequent conviction for the same act. 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument and convicted Prince of 
manslaughter of the child. The court held that the Kienapple principle 
requires that there has to be (i) a factual nexus between the two 
charges as well as (ii) a legal nexus. 127 Dickson CJ explained that 
the factual nexus could usually be found in a single act of the 
accused. He indicated that other situations such as continuing 
offences would have to be resolved on an individual case basis by 
examining such factors as the remoteness or proximity of the events 
in time and place, the presence or absence of relevant intervening 
events, and whether the accused's actions were related to each other 
by a common objective. 128 
The court then proceeded to clarify the requirement of a legal nexus. 
Mr Justice Dickson indicated that the requirement would not be 
satisfied if the offences merely shared a common element. Instead, 
he embraced the point of view that an "adequate legal nexus" would 
depend on the presence or absence of additional, distinguishing 
121 At 44. 
128At 45. 
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elements. 129 In his view, Kienapple would only apply where there 
was no additional and distinguishing element contained in the offence 
for which a conviction was being sought to be precluded. 130 
Justice Dickson explained that there are at least three ways in which 
the elements of a crime could be said to be not additional to or distinct 
from another. Firstly, where the element of one crime may be a 
particular instance of the other. An example would be the following. 
The crime of pointing a firearm is a particular instance of the crime of 
using a firearm inasmuch as the pointing of a gun is a manner of using 
it. 131 Pointing therefore, can in terms of this rule, be regarded as a 
particularisation of use. 132 Secondly, where there is more than one 
method in more than one crime of proving a single delict, a 
distinguishing element would be absent. The court demonstrated this 
by referring to the crime of "giving evidence in a judicial proceeding 
that was contrary to his own previous evidence" on the one hand, and 
the crime of perjury on the other hand. 133 The third situation 
envisaged by the court, is where Parliament deems a particular 
element of one crime to be satisfied by proof of a different nature 
because of social policies or the inherent difficulties of proof. 
Examples cited by the court are the crimes of driving while impaired 
and the crime of driving with a blood-alcohol level over 0,08 
percentage. 
129At 47. 
130At 49. 
131 Both these are substantive statutory offences in Canadian law. 
132At 50. 
133/d. These are the equivalents in Canadian law of statutory and 
common law perjury as they exist in South African law. 
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On application of these guidelines, the court concluded that 
Kienapple did not afford the accused any protection against 
prosecution for the offence of manslaughter. While a factual nexus 
existed, a legal nexus was held to be absent; the one offence required 
proof of the death of the child of D, and the other, causing of bodily 
harm to D. In the court's view, it could not be said that the one is a 
particularisation of the other or designed to facilitate proof of the 
other. 134 Moreover, the court concluded that the principle cleary 
did not apply where the respective crimes resulted in injury or death 
to different persons. 135 
It is clear that the court (in Prince) opted for an interpretation of the 
Kienapple principle which focuses primarily on the identity of legal 
elements of offences, instead of the identity of facts. The narrow 
ambit of the Kienapp/e principle as set forth in Prince, became 
particularly apparent in a subsequent decision, Wigman v The 
Queen. 136 In that case, the court held that an accused's previous 
conviction on his plea of guilty to a charge of breaking and entering 
and committing the indictable offence of robbery, did not prevent a 
subsequent trial and conviction for attempted murder arising out of the 
severe beating of the occupant of the house which was broken into. 
The court found that although there was a common element, namely 
violence, the additional element requirement was complied with 
inasmuch as the specific intent required for each offence was 
different. 137 
134At 53. 
135At 54. 
136( 1987) 33 CCC (3d) 97 (SCC). 
137 At 104. 
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4.3.4 The rule against splitting of charges 
In the past, the general approach in Canadian law has always been 
that a prosecutor is free to exercise his discretion whether to pursue 
separate trials for crimes arising from the same transaction. 138 
Canadian courts have only recently recognised the notion (advanced 
in the English case of Conelly) that the splitting up of charges arising 
from the same transaction may amount to an abuse of process which 
justifies a stay of proceedings. The leading case in this regard is 
Regina v 8, a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal. 139 
The accused was charged with sexual assault on his daughter. This 
was done on the basis of films of his daughter in different sexual 
positions which were handed to the police by the accused's son. The 
daughter (twenty five years of age at the time of the trial), refused to 
be interviewed by the police. However, at the trial she decided to 
testify and told the court that she had had sexual intercourse with the 
accused for the last ten years. The accused then testified and 
admitted that he had sexual intercourse with his daughter during this 
time but that it occurred with her consent. He was acquitted of 
assault on the basis that a reasonable doubt existed as regards the 
issue of whether she had consented. Two days later, the accused 
was charged with incest. His counsel applied for a stay of these 
proceedings on the basis of an abuse of process. The arguments 
advanced by defence counsel were that a stay would be justified 
because the crown had an ulterior motive for laying the charge, and 
that the accused had been prejudiced in that he would have contested 
the sexual assault charge had he not assumed that the crown would 
not proceed with an incest charge. The trial judge granted the stay of 
138See Working Paper 63 at 9. 
139(1986) 29 CCC (3d) 365 (Ont CA). 
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proceedings, but the Court of Appeal reversed and directed that the 
trial for incest proceed. 
In his judgment, Tarnopolsky JA discussed the English approach 
adopted in the Conelly decision. 140 On the basis of Lord Devlin's 
opinion in that case, 141 the court reached the conclusion that a 
splitting of a case does not per se amount to an abuse of the process. 
The court argued that there are however, three criteria which can be 
regarded as indicative of an abuse of process which justifies a stay of 
proceedings. These are 142 
(i) where the second trial is such that it will, in fact, 
force the accused to answer for the same 
delinquency twice or 
(ii) where the second trial is such that it will in effect 
relitigate matters that have already been decided 
on the merits raising the spectre of inconsistent 
verdicts or 
(iii) where the second trial is brought because of 
malice or spite so as to harass the accused and 
not for any proper purpose. 
A mandatory rule of joinder of all charges arising from the same 
transaction has, however, not as yet been favoured by the courts, or, 
introduced by Parliament. 143 
140At 374. See supra under 4.2.1 for a discussion of the decision. 
141 See supra under 4.2.1 for this and the other opinions in the Conelly 
case. 
142At 374. 
143See Working Paper 63 at 50 where it is recommended that a 
compulsory joinder rule be enacted in the Canadian Criminal Code as 
a matter of principle. 
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4.3.5 The rule of issue estoppel 
The rule of issue estoppal is also referred to in Canadian law as the 
defence of res judicata .144 It is not included in the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, but has been recognised in the common law from as early 
as 1905. 145 The ambit of the rule as applied in criminal proceedings 
has been considered in a number of cases. In some of these cases 
Canadian courts were confronted with complicated issues; an 
example is the question of whether the rule also prohibits subsequent 
perjury charges. The most important Canadian decisions on the 
application of the rule are considered in the following paragraphs. 
In Gushue v The Queen 146 the Supreme Court was faced with 
resolution of the following facts. G was charged with murder of M in 
the course of a robbery. He was acquitted on the basis of his 
testimony that he had not been present when the murder took place. 
However, three years after his acquittal and while being investigated 
for other offences, he admitted to the police that he had in fact tried 
to rob M and had shot him when he resisted. He was consequently 
charged with robbery in respect of M, and the statutory offence of 
144See Gushue v the Queen ( 1980) 50 CCC (2d) 4 1 7 (SCC). Ewaschuk 
( 14-20) explains that in addition to applying to a situation where the 
whole cause has previously been determined (namely autrefois acquit 
and autrefois convict), the doctrine of res judicata also includes the 
rule of issue estoppal by which a litigant is precluded from challenging 
a material fact or issue which has been adversely determined against 
him at the previous proceeding. 
145See Salhany 6-64. The author cites the early case of Regina v 
Quinn ( 1 905) 10 CCC 4 1 2 (Ont CA). The Supreme Court 
subsequently recognised application of the principle in Canadian law 
in the case of Feeley, Mc Dermott and Wright v The Queen ( 1963) 3 
CCC 201 (SCC). 
146Supra. 
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giving contradictory evidence (namely, at the trial of the murder of M 
and later before the police). On conviction of these offences, he 
appealed to the Supreme Court on the basis that the rule of issue 
estoppal prohibited the subsequent charges. He argued that, in 
acquitting him on the murder charge, the jury necessarily negated the 
commission by him of the robbery. Furthermore, he argued that the 
rule of issue estoppal also prohibited the charge of giving contradictory 
evidence. 
The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, holding that issue 
estoppal did not apply to the charge of robbery. It argued that the 
finding of the jury that G did not kill M, did not necessarily determine 
that G was not a party to the robbery. 147 In respect of the offence 
of giving contradictory evidence, the court held that it did not invoke 
protection against double jeopardy. The court explained that G's 
admission under oath that he had lied at the murder trial added a new 
element and gave rise to a situation outside the ambit of the murder 
trial. The premise of the court was that, as a matter of policy, isssue 
estoppal cannot be based upon false evidence where the evidence of 
the falsity was not available at the trial from which issue estoppal is 
alleged to have arisen. 148 The court also added that unless it could 
be said that the subsequent prosecution was an attempt by the crown 
to retry the accused, the preferable policy would be to exclude issue 
estoppal. 149 
In Grdic v The Queen 150 G was charged with driving offences, but 
147 At 423-424. 
148At 423. 
150( 1985) 19 CCC (3d) 289 (SCC). 
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acquitted because of his testimony that he had been stopped earlier 
than the time given by the police-officer who arrested him, thereby 
casting doubt on the validity of the certificate of analysis of breath 
samples. In other words, Grdic relied on an alibi. He said that he had 
been stopped at noon by the police, and that the breathalyser tests 
taken that evening could not have been his because he was at home 
at the time. The judge acquitted him despite remarking that his story 
was in actual fact unbelievable. He was subsequently charged with 
perjury. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the crown 
was estopped from raising or relitigating any or all of the issues raised 
in the first trial. 
The Supreme Court stated that the basic premise is that issue 
estoppal cannot assist an accused if it is proven that the issue was 
determined in his favour by fraud such as, for instance, perjury .151 
However, the court held that there are two exceptions to this rule 
(i) If to prove the allegation (of fraud) the crown is 
merely tendering the same evidence as that 
tendered previously, "then issue estoppal will 
survive the attack because the Crown's allegation 
is, in disguise, but a relitigation of the issue as 
litigated previously". 152 However, if additional 
evidence is rendered to prove the allegation of 
fraud, (namely, evidence not put to the trier of 
fact in the previous proceeding), this may defeat 
issue estoppal. 
(ii) However, if the additional evidence was available 
to the crown using reasonable diligence at the 
time of the first trial and the crown failed to take 
it, then it is estopped from so doing later on. The 
court pointed out that this exception is recognised 
151At 294-295. 
152Per Wilson J at 295. Cf the views of Lord Hai Isham in the English 
case of Humphrys discussed supra under 4.2.3. 
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"not per rem judicatam, but for reasons of fairness 
to the accused who was in jeopardy of answering 
the full case had the Crown been diligent" .153 
Applying these principles to the facts, the court concluded that 
because the new evidence of perjury (namely the evidence of 
witnesses) was available at the time of the first trial, the claim of issue 
estoppal had to be upheld. 
Other principles of issue estoppal applied in Canadian law are the 
following 
* 
* 
Issue estoppal does not apply where the parties in a subsequent 
prosecution are different to those in an earlier prosecution. An 
example is where a court (other than the Supreme Court of 
Canada) ruled that a video was not obscene, and a different 
distributor was subsequently charged with circulating the same 
material. 154 
Issue estoppal is not available to the crown in subsequent 
proceedings notwithstanding that a previous verdict of guilty 
necessarily resolves all the facts in issue (including identity) in 
favour of the crown. 155 The basis of this premise is that 
issue estoppal is a defence which accrues only to a defendant. 
It is also suggested that issue estoppal recognised in favour of 
the crown in a criminal trial will amount to an infringement of 
section 11 (d) of the Charter, namely the presumption of 
153At 295-296. 
154Regina v Nichols ( 1984) 43 CR (3d) 54 (Ont CA). 
155The basis of this premise is that issue estoppal is a defence which 
accrues only to a defendant. 
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innocence. 156 
4.3.6 Constitutional protection against double jeopardy 
interpretation of section 11 (h) of the Charter 
The extent to which subsection 11 (h) of the Charter of Rights protects 
against double jeopardy in the context of successive prosecutions for 
the same offence, has not as yet been fully resolved by the 
courts. 157 So far, the Supreme Court has merely considered the 
issue of whether conduct giving rise to criminal proceedings falls 
within the meaning of the term "offence" .158 The court opted for a 
very narrow approach in this regard. In Regina v Wigglesworth 159 
it held that a Royal Canadian Mounted Police officer who had been 
convicted of a service offence under the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police Act because of his assault on the accused, could be tried again 
under the Criminal Code for assault. The court argued that the 
disciplinary offence was not criminal in nature. 
In Regina v Van Rasse/160 the Supreme Court held that section 
11 (h) of the Charter applies only in circumstances where the two 
offences with which the accused is charged are the same. 161 The 
court relied on its previous holding in Regina v Wigglesworth, namely 
156See Working Paper 63 at 14. 
157See Working Paper 63 at 16. 
158See Regina v Wigglesworth referred to in chapter three supra under 
3.3.2. 
159Supra. 
160Supra. 
161At 239. 
190 
that "the same act can give rise to different offences" .162 In terms 
of the Supreme Court's holding in these cases, it may therefore be 
concluded (at this stage) that circumstances on which an accused may 
invoke double jeopardy protection on constitutional grounds are 
narrower and more onerous than those by which the Canadian criminal 
law admits recourse to the plea of res judicata. 163 
4. 3. 7 Summary 
* The accused in Canada is protected against successive 
prosecutions for the same offence by various statutory and common 
law rules. The Canadian Charter of Rights also guarantees the 
accused protection against successive prosecutions for the same 
offence. The present position is that the accused is afforded more 
protection in terms of the ordinary law than in terms of the 
constitutional guarantee. 
* In terms of statutory law, the basic premise is that an accused may 
rely on the plea of autrefois if he has previously been in peril or in 
jeopardy of a conviction of the offence charged. The relevant 
investigation is whether the offences charged successively are 
identical, or whether the offence charged in the second proceeding 
can be regarded as a lesser included offence of the one charged in the 
first trial. A lesser included offence is determined by focusing on the 
definitional elements of the offences successively charged. However, 
it may also be determined by statutory prescription or by the inclusion 
in the charge of apt words of description cognate to the offence. A 
person is also regarded as having been in jeopardy at the first trial of 
162/d. 
163This is also the position in Indian law. See infra under 4.4.2 for a 
discussion of Indian law. 
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conviction of the offence subsequently charged, if (either in law or on 
account of the evidence presented) it was legally possible in the first 
trial for the court to make the necessary amendments. 
* Subsequent charges for greater offences are also prohibited in 
terms of statutory law. An accused may rely on the plea of autrefois 
if he is charged with an offence which can be regarded as an 
aggravated form of the offence previously charged. Finally, the Code 
also provides that convictions or acquittals for certain specified crimes 
bar subsequent trials for other specified crimes. It is specified, for 
instance, that a conviction or acquittal for murder bars a second trial 
for manslaughter or infanticide, and a conviction or acquittal of first 
degree murder bars a second trial for second degree murder. These are 
crimes which do not necessarily qualify in terms of their definitions as 
lesser or greater included offences, but may be closely related 
provided they arise from the same act. All these statutory provisions 
are supplemented by common law principles developed in the case 
law. 
* There are three rules which developed in the case law. These are: 
the rule against multiple convictions; the rule against splitting of 
charges and the rule of issue estoppel. The rationale of each rule is 
summarised below. 
* The rule against multiple convictions relates to the issue of 
whether a person, tried and convicted of one crime, can also be 
convicted (in the same trial, or in successive trials) of another crime or 
other crimes. The Supreme Court of Canada clarified the rule by 
holding that for the rule to apply there must be both a factual nexus 
and a legal nexus between the charges. A factual nexus exists where 
the offences arise from the same transaction. This requirement will be 
satisfied usually if the same act of the accused forms the basis of each 
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of the charges. However, other situations will have to be resolved by 
taking into consideration factors such as the remoteness or proximity 
of the events in time and place, the presence or absence of relevant 
intervening events, etcetera. A legal nexus is satisfied only if there is 
no additional, distinguishing element in the crime charged for which 
the accused seeks to preclude a conviction. In the context of 
successive prosecutions, this means that the court will have to 
consider whether the crime charged in the second trial contains an 
additional, distinguishing element to the crime charged in the first trial. 
If not, a second trial will be barred. 
The Supreme Court explained in which instances the elements of 
crimes will not be additional to, or distinct from another. These are (i) 
where the element of one crime may be a particular instance of 
another (pointing of a firearm is, for example a particular form of using 
a firearm); (ii) where there is more than one method in more than one 
crime of proving a single delict (for example "giving evidence in a 
judicial proceeding contrary to the accused's own previous evidence" 
and perjury); and (iii) where Parliament deems a particular element of 
one crime to be established by proof of a different nature because of 
social policies or the inherent difficulties of proof (for example, 
offences relating to drunken driving). Application of these requirements 
(a factual as well as a legal nexus) in subsequent cases has 
demonstrated that the rule against multiple convictions as explained 
in Kienapple and Prince does not honor the notion that the prosecution 
should bring all the charges arising from the same criminal transaction 
in one trial. 
* Canadian law has nevertheless also developed to the extent of 
recognising the rule (proposed by Lord Devlin in the English case of 
Conelly) that the splitting up of charges (arising from the same 
transaction) may amount to an abuse of process. However, this 
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protection is limited (as the case of R v B illustrates) to situations 
where there is a second trial for the same offence (in terms of the 
criteria set out in statutory law); re litigation of matters which have 
been decided on the merits; or where a second trial is brought solely 
to harass the accused. 
* Unlike the position in English law, the rule of issue estoppel is 
recognised as an independent doctrine in Canadian law. However, a 
study of the case law reveals that the rule has been difficult to apply 
in practice. Canadian courts (employing juries as adjudicators) have 
experienced the same problems encountered by English courts, namely 
the identification of issues decided by the jury in favour of the 
accused. Moreover, need for the application of the rule was 
questioned in cases where perjury charges followed on previous 
acquittals. 
* The basic premise followed by Canadian courts is that issue 
estoppel cannot assist an accused if it is proven that the issue 
determined in his favour was brought about by fraud, for example 
perjury. The Supreme Court has reasoned, for instance, that as a 
matter of policy, issue estoppal cannot be based on false evidence 
where the evidence of the falsity was not available at the trial from 
which issue estoppel is alleged to arise. However, two exceptions are 
recognised in this regard: issue estoppel will apply if the crown, in 
order to prove the allegation of fraud, merely tenders the same 
evidence as that previously tendered. The application of issue 
estoppal is justified in this instance because it amounts merely to a re-
litigation of the issue as litigated previously. If additional evidence is 
rendered to prove the allegation of fraud, it may defeat issue estoppal, 
provided that the additional evidence was not available to the crown 
using reasonable diligence at the time of the first trial. 
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4.4. INDIAN LAW 
4.4. 1 General 
As indicated in chapter three, 164 the Supreme Court of India 
interpreted the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy as 
affording protection only against a subsequent prosecution for an 
offence in circumstances where the accused had previously been 
convicted of the same offence. If the accused had previously been 
acquitted of an offence, he cannot, on constitutional grounds, defeat 
a subsequent prosecution for the same offence. However, he may rely 
on the ordinary law of the land. The plea of autrefois acquit still forms 
part of the rules of criminal procedure as set out in the present Code 
of Criminal Procedure. 165 A separate discussion of the ordinary law 
as well as the constitutional law on the topic addressed in this chapter 
is therefore essential. 
4.4.2 Statutory protection against successive prosecutions for the 
same offence 
Section 300 of the present Code of Criminal Procedure 166 is an 
extremely complicated provision which can only be understood if read 
together with other provisions of the Code. It provides as follows 
( 1) [part one] 
164Under 3.4. 1. 
A person who has once been tried by a court of 
competent jurisdiction for an offence and 
convicted or acquitted of such offence, shall not 
165Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No 2 of 
1974) contains both the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois 
convict. 
166Act 2 of 1974. 
[part two] 
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be liable to be tried again for the same 
offence, 167 
nor on the same facts for any other offence168 
for which a different charge from the one made 
against him might have been made under 
subsection ( 1) of section 221 , or for which he 
might have been convicted under subsection (2) 
thereof. 
Section 221 enables the prosecutor to join in one trial all the offences 
arising out of a single transaction. It provides as follows 
( 1) If a single act or series of acts is of such a nature that it is 
doubtful which of several offences the facts that can be proved 
will constitute, the accused may be charged with having 
committed all or any of such offences, and any number of such 
charges may be tried at once; or he may be charged in the 
alternative with having committed some one of the said 
offences. 
(2) If in such a case the accused is charged with one offence, and 
it appears in evidence that he committed a different offence for 
which he might have been charged under subsection ( 1 ) , he 
may be convicted of the offence which he is shown to have 
committed, although he was not charged with it. 
Indian courts have held that the term "same offence" as it appears 
in part one of section 300( 1), means the same act or omission 
punishable under the same provisions of law. 169 In other words, 
167My emphasis. 
168My emphasis. 
169See Naryana PS The law of res judicata 1987 366. Batuk Lal 
Commentary on the Code of Criminal Procedure (1973) 1989 ed 830 
points out that although the term "offence" is defined in the Act as 
"any act or omission punishable by law", the meaning of the concept 
"same offence" was left to the courts to interpret. The courts have 
approached the meaning of the words "same offence" (as set out in 
the first part of this section), on the basis that the expressions "same 
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what is prohibited in terms of this part of section 300( 1 ) , is a 
subsequent prosecution for exactly the same offence as that of which 
the accused has previously been acquitted or convicted. However, 
Indian courts have recognised an exception to this rule. A person may 
be charged subsequently for the exact same offence if it can be 
regarded as a continuing offence. A "continuing" offence is described 
as "the repetition of an act or omission constituting an- offence on 
different occasions". 170 In the case of a continuing offence, an 
acquittal has not been regarded as a bar to a subsequent trial. 171 
Nevertheless, section 300( 1) does not only prohibit a second trial for 
the same offence, but also, for any other offence on the same facts 
which could have been charged in terms of section 221 of the Code. 
offence" and "same act or omission" cannot always be treated as 
interchangeable. (See Ahmad E Ejaz's Code of Criminal Procedure 
1973 Vol 3 1994, 148). The early case of Babu Lal Mahton Singh v 
Ram Saran AIR 1930 Pat 26 set the precedent for future cases: The 
court held that the first part of section 403( 1) (the identical 
predecessor of the present section 300( 1)) "deals with the case of one 
set of acts or omissions constituting one legal offence only. " (My 
emphasis). 
170See Singh 52. Ahmad 150 states that "where an act or omission 
constituting the offence is continued from day to day, a fresh offence 
is committed by the accused on every day on which the act or 
omission continues". See also Nand Lal The law and doctrine of res 
judicata in civil and criminal cases with constitutional guarantees in 
criminal trials 2nd ed 1968 418-419 for a discussion of the 
"continuing offence" exception, particularly in the field of the 
omission. 
171 See inter alia, Yamanappa v Emperor AIR 1947 Born 467 & GD 
Bhattar v The State AIR 1957 Cal 483. In the first case, the court 
held that an accused acquitted of retaining articles of stolen property 
may be subsequently prosecuted under section 412 of the Indian Penal 
Code in respect of a greater number of articles, though they might 
have been recovered at the same time as those for which he was 
indicted of retaining at the previous trial. The subsequent prosecution 
was allowed because retaining stolen property is regarded as a 
continuing offence. (At 468). 
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Read on its own, the second part of section 300( 1) seems to 
recognise a same transaction approach. 172 In Gauri Shankar Rai v 
Emperor173 the High Court of Patna stated that this section in effect 
laid down that generally no accused shall be vexed with more than 
one trial for offences arising out of the same facts. 
However, the High Court of Allahabad held in Abdul Ahmed v The 
State 174 that part two of section 300( 1 ), namely that a person 
cannot be tried again for any other offence upon the same facts, can 
only be understood in view of all the provisions of the section; in 
particular, in terms of the various exceptions to the rule, set out in 
subsections 300(2)-(4). 175 The court observed that the basic 
principle revealed by these various exceptions is not that a person 
shall not be tried more than once on the same set of facts, but rather, 
that a person shall not be put in peril more than once of being 
convicted for what can be regarded as the same offence. 176 This 
line of reasoning seems plausible in view of the interpretation by 
Indian courts of these various exceptions. 
172See infra under 4.5.4, text at note 260 for a detailed discussion of 
a same transaction approach as advocated by Mr Justice Brennan in 
American constitutional double jeopardy jurisprudence. 
17348 Cri LJ 1947 93. 
174AIR 1952 All 597. 
175At 600. 
176/d. At 601 the court categorically rejected the notion that the 
provision is based on the rule that a person may not be tried more than 
once on the same facts. Moreover, the court expressed its doubt as 
to whether "any such rule [even] exists". 
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The first exception, section 300(2), provides that 
A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be 
afterwards tried, with the consent of the State 
Government, for any distinct177 offence for which a 
separate charge might have been made against him at 
the former trial under sub-section ( 1) of section 220. 178 
Indian courts have interpreted this particular exception as follows. 179 
The words used in the second part of section 300( 1) namely, 
prohibiting a subsequent prosecution "on the same facts for any other 
offence", denotes another offence (meaning an offence punishable 
under another provision) than the one which previously had been 
charged. However, the prohibition only operates if such an offence 
(the other offence subsequently charged) contains identical elements 
to the offence previously charged. A distinct offence as envisaged in 
section 300(2) on the other hand, denotes an offence which has 
different elements than the offence previously charged. Therefore, if 
the ingredients of the offences involved in both trials are not identical, 
the courts have usually treated them as distinct offences. 180 
177My emphasis. 
178Section 220( 1) provides that if, in one series of acts so connected 
together as to form the same transaction, more offences than one are 
committed by the same person, he may be charged with and tried at 
one trial for every such offence. 
179See Om Prakash v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1957 SC 458; 
Madhaya Pradesh State v Veereshwar Rao 1957 SC 592; La/ta v State 
of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1970 SC 1381 and Leo Roy v Superintendent, 
District Jail, Amritsar AIR 1958 SC 119. 
180See id. Cf also Chandrasekharan Pillai KN Double jeopardy 
protection - a comparative overview 1988 230. Batuk Lal points out 
(at 830) that "it is necessary to analyse and compare not the 
allegations in the two complaints but the ingredients of the offences 
and see whether they are identical". See also Basu DB Commentary 
on the Constitution of India 5th ed 1965 16 to the same effect. 
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Distinct offences do not bring into effect double jeopardy protection. 
This is so, even though the successive charges may be based on the 
same criminal conduct, or the same facts, or the offences may be 
viewed as part of the same transaction. Only reprosecution for 
exactly the same offence or, (in terms of part two of section 300( 1 )) 
another offence which has identical elements to the one previously 
charged, brings into effect protection against doubl~jeopardy. 
In Om Prakash v State of Uttar Pradesh, 181 the court distinguished 
between the offences of "criminal breach of trust committed by a 
banker or merchant" (a contravention of section 409 read with section 
405 of the Indian Penal Code) and "criminal misconduct" in terms of 
section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act ( 194 7), by reasoning as 
follows 182 
181Supra. 
182At 464. 
There are three points of difference between these 
offences. The dishonest misappropriation contemplated 
ins. 405 Penal Code is different; whereas that under s. 
5( 1 )(c) is either dishonest misappropriation or fraudulent 
misappropriation. The latter section is much wider in 
amplitude than the former. In s. 405 Penal Code, the 
words are "in violation of any direction of law prescribing 
the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of 
any legal contract, express or implied". There are no 
such expressions in s. 5( 1 )(c). It is clear, therefore, that 
whereas under section 405, Penal Code there are three 
essential ingredients to constitute the offence; each one 
of them being separate and distinct, in s. 5( 1) there are 
only two. 183 
183The Om Prakash decision was followed in a subsequent decision of 
the Supreme Court, Madhaya Pradesh State v Veereshwar Rao (supra); 
the issue being raised once again in that case whether these particular 
offences are "distinct", the court applied the reasoning adopted in Om 
Prakash by focusing upon the identity of the legal ingredients of the 
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These offences were regarded as distinct despite substantial 
overlapping of elements of offences. 184 The test applied has been 
whether their ingredients are, in fact, identical. 185 However, the 
addition of the words "with the consent of the State government" 
reveals an intention of the legislature to bring some sort of restraint on 
a subsequent trial for a distinct offence arising from the same facts as 
the one previously charged.- Consent ts·expected-to .. be-given only 
after due consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case 
and in the interest of the promotion of justice. 186 
The second exception which deserves discussion is contained in 
section 300(3), and provides for the intervening death case type of 
situation. 187 It enacts 
offences. 
A person convicted of any offence constituted by any act 
causing consequences which, together with such act, 
constituted a different offence from that of which he was 
convicted, may be afterwards tried for such 
lastmentioned offence, if the consequences had not 
happened, or were not known to the Court to have 
happened, at the time when he was convicted. 
184Cf also MM Ghandi v State of Mysore AIR 1960 Mys 111. In that 
case (which focused on the ambit of the constitutional provision 
against double jeopardy- section 20(2)), offences were also regarded 
as "distinct" despite substantial overlapping of legal elements. See 
infra under 4.4.3 for a discussion of constitutional protection in this 
particular respect. 
185This was again confirmed by the Supreme Court in The State of 
Bombay v SL Apte 1961 SC 578 discussed infra under 4.4.3, text at 
note 198. 
186See Ahmad 152 & Sharma v State of Andhra Pradesh 1978 Cri LJ 
392. 
187See supra under 4.2.1, text at note 27 for a discussion of this 
exception in English law and infra under 4.5.2, text at note 237 for a 
discussion of this exception as recognised in American law. 
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The High Court pointed out that the consequences must be such as 
to indicate a type of offence different from the one of which the 
accused had previously been convicted. 188 The basic requirement 
for the application of this exception is that the new facts or 
consequences should not have been known to the court at the time of 
the first trial, or, should not have happened at the time of the first 
trial. 189 Otherwise, a second trial· would- be- prohibited on double 
jeopardy grounds. 
The fourth exception (section 300(4)) stipulates that 
[a] person acquitted or convicted of any offence 
constituted by any acts, may be subsequently charged 
with, and tried for, any other offence constituted by the 
same acts which he may have committed if the Court by 
which he was first tried was not competent to try the 
offence with which he is subsequently charged. 
This means that a person who has already been tried for an offence 
can be tried again for another offence arising from the same facts if 
the former court was not competent to try the offence subsequently 
charged. 190 The words "not competent to try" carry the same 
meaning as that of having "no jurisdiction to try" .191 An example 
188See Arsala Khan v Emperor AIR 1935 Pesh 18. In that case, the 
court allowed a person, tried and convicted previously for causing 
grievous harm, to be tried subsequently for culpable homicide in 
respect of the same victim in circumstances where the victim had died 
after the first trial. Therefore it is not enough to simply show 
circumstances of aggravation or serious consequences of the offence 
which have occurred since the first trial. 
189See in general Singh 60-61. 
190See Ahmed 152. 
191Babu Lal Mahton v Ram Saran Singh supra 26. 
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would be the following. A person previously charged with theft, may 
subsequently be charged, on the same facts, with robbery if the court 
which heard the theft charge had no jurisdiction to hear the robbery 
charge. 192 
In Ramekbal Tiwary v Madan Mohan Tiwary193 the defence argued 
that facts proven in a trial for a minor- offence could-not be proven 
against the accused in subsequent proceedings for a major offence. 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. It held that there could 
be a fresh trial on a charge of a more serious offence in spite of the 
acquittal of the accused on minor charges, because the order of 
acquittal by the Magistrate had been validly set aside by the High 
Court in its revisional jurisdiction. 194 Since the High Court, in its 
revisional jurisdiction has the power to interfere with an order of 
acquittal, it may, in the Supreme Court's view, also direct that the 
accused be retried on a graver offence than that which previously had 
been charged. 195 
4.4.3 Constitutional protection against successive prosecutions for 
the "same offence" 
As indicated above, 196 section 20(2) of the Constitution only 
affords the accused protection against a subsequent prosecution if he 
has previously been convicted of the n same offence n for which he is 
192See Ahmed 152. 
193AIR 1967 SC 1156. 
194 At 1 1 60-11 61 . 
195/d. See chapter six infra under 6.4.4 for a discussion of revisionary 
powers of superior courts in India to set aside acquittals. 
196See chapter three under 3.4.1. 
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subsequently charged. Section 20(2) is limited to indictment before 
a criminal court. Therefore, it does not bar proceedings before a civil 
court for disobedience of an injunction together with criminal 
proceedings; in Indian law, the former is not regarded as in the nature 
of criminal proceedings. 197 
The Supreme Court explained· the meaning of· the- term "same 
offence" (used in Article 20(2)) in the decision of State of Bombay v 
SL Apte. 198 In that case, the accused was charged with criminal 
breach of trust by a public servant in respect of property entrusted to 
him 199 and wrongfully obtaining or witholding property. 200 Both 
these crimes were based on the same act. He was convicted on the 
first mentioned charge, but discharged upon the second because the 
required sanction to prosecute had not been obtained (as required 
under the Insurance Act). 201 However, he was charged once again 
with the second offence (after the required sanction was obtained) 
but the magistrate acquitted him on the ground that section 20(2) 
barred his prosecution. 
The question before the Supreme Court was whether the bar 
imposed by article 20(2) was brought into effect when the allegations 
in the two complaints were substantially the same, or whether it was 
197See Jain MP Indian Constitutional Law 4th ed reprinted 1993 568 
who cites the case of Bachcha Lal Bansi Lal v Lalji AIR 1976 All 393. 
198Supra. 
199A contravention of section 409 of the Indian Penal Code 1860. 
200Section 105 of the Insurance Act 1938. 
201 See chapter three supra under 3.4.2, note 140 for an explanation 
of this requirement for the prosecution of certain offences. 
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necessary that the elements of the offences also be identical. 202 
The court held that the term "same offence" as used in article 20(2) 
denotes an offence which has identical ingredients to the offence 
previously charged. The court made the following statement203 
The crucial requirement therefore for attracting the 
Article is that the offences are-the same, i.e., they should 
be identical. If, however, the two offences are distinct, 
then notwithstanding that the allegations of facts in the 
two complaints might be substantially similar, the benefit 
of the ban cannot be invoked. It is, therefore, necessary 
to analyse and compare not the allegations in the two 
complaints but the ingredients of the two offences and 
see whether their identity is made out. 
The court compared the ingredients of the two offences and concluded 
that204 
[ w]hereas the element of dishonest intention is essential 
for the offence of criminal breach of trust as defined by 
section 405, Penal Code, mere witholding of the property 
is sufficient for the offence under section 105, Insurance 
Act. Furthermore, whereas it is sufficient for the [last-
mentioned] offence ... that the manager or director had 
obtained possession of the property, . . . the accused 
must be entrusted with property or with dominion over 
that property [under the first-mentioned offence]. 
The court accordingly held that the doctrine of double jeopardy did 
not apply because the two offences contained different legal 
202At 581. 
203/d. 
204At 581. 
205 
elements. 205 Therefore, in Indian law, even the constitutional 
protection against being placed in jeopardy more than once for the 
same offence has been limited to offences with identical legal 
elements. Moreover, this rule prevails even if only some (but not all) 
ingredients of the two offences are common. 206 
However, the narrow offence-defining test adopted in India has been 
supplemented by application of the doctrine of issue estoppal. 
Moreover, Indian courts have also employed their inherent powers to 
prevent an abuse of process in the field of double jeopardy. This 
expanded protection against double jeopardy will be discussed in the 
paragraphs below. 
4.4.4 Application of the doctrine of issue estoppel 
The principle of issue estoppal is not recognised explicitly in either 
statutory or constitutional Indian law. It is an equitable principle which 
originated (in India) from judicial pronouncements only. Naryana 
explains that the principle of issue estoppal has been invoked in 
criminal cases in order to cover cases where the plea of autrefois 
acquit will not be available because the crime with which the accused 
is charged in the later proceedings may not be the same crime of 
which he has been acquitted earlier. 201 However, the verdict of 
acquittal might have been based on a finding, the consequences of 
which would be that he must also be acquitted of the charge in the 
later proceedings. The application of this doctrine has also been 
205This approach was (despite a brief reference to treatment of the 
topic in American law), once again confirmed by the Supreme Court 
in State of Bihar v Murad Ali Khan AIR 1989 SC 1 . 
206see MM Gandhi v State of Mysore (supra). 
207 At 376. 
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viewed as an exercise of Indian courts' inherent powers to prevent an 
abuse of its process. 208 
The principle was first applied by the Supreme Court of India in 
1956, in the case of Pritam Singh v State of Punjab. 209 The 
defendant in that case was accused of murder. He had, however, 
previously been tried for possession of a revolver under· the Indian 
Arms Act. In the murder trial, the prosecution tried to prove that the 
police found the same revolver in his possession and that he had 
committed the murder with that weapon. The Supreme Court ruled 
that the doctrine of issue estoppal prevented the state from proving 
the possession of the revolver inasmuch as that issue had already 
been concluded in favour of the accused. 210 Since the prosecution 
was precluded from proving this fact, they were left with insufficient 
evidence to prove their case and the accused was acquitted on the 
murder charge. 
The doctrine was subsequently applied in a number of cases and 
retained in Indian double jeopardy jurisprudence despite the fact that 
it had been rejected in the United Kingdom. 211 In Manipur 
208See Singh 198, emphasising that an attempt to relitigate an issue 
already determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, amounts to 
an abuse of the process which justifies application of the doctrine in 
terms of the courts inherent powers to prevent such abuse. 
209AIR 1956 SC 415. 
210The court relied on a decision of the Privy Council, Sambavisam v 
Public Prosecutor Malaya (1950) AC 458 (PC). As indicated earlier 
(under 4.2.3) the Appeal Court subsequently rejected the application 
of issue estoppal in English law in the case of DPP v Humphries. 
211 In TV Sharma v R Meeraiah AIR 1980 AP 219, the Andhra Pradesh 
High Court took notice of the English rejection of the rule in 
Humphrys. However, it held that the rule was, in terms of decisions 
of the Supreme Court, binding on Indian courts. See also State of 
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Administration v Thockhom Bira Singh212 the court explained that 
the doctrine does not prevent a trial for an offence as does autrefois 
acquit, but concerns "the admissiblity of evidence which is designed 
to upset a finding of fact recorded by a competent court at a previous 
trial" .213 
In Ravinder Singh v State of Haryana214.the Supreme court limited 
the application of the rule by requiring that the parties must be the 
same in both cases. In that case, the accused tried unsuccessfully to 
rely on an issue of fact previously determined in favour of another 
person in a case between the state and that person. The issue was 
his (that other person's) non-participation in an offence of which the 
accused in the case at hand (Ravinder Singh) was subsequently 
charged in a separate trial. The court held that he could not rely on 
issue estoppal because the parties in both trials were not the same. 
The court has not as yet had an opportunity to decide whether the 
doctrine may also be invoked by the prosecution. The doctrine of 
issue estoppal has, so far, only been raised by the defence. 215 
The application of the doctrine in Indian law has been welcomed by 
Andhra Pradesh v Kokkiligoda Meeraiah AIR 1970 SC 771, a case in 
which the Supreme Court of India expressly favoured application of 
the doctrine in Indian law. 
212AIR 1965 SC 87. 
213At 961. 
214AIR 1975 SC 856. 
215See Singh 196, expressing himself against a theory of mutuality in 
this particular field of law on the basis of the presumption of 
innocence as applicable in criminal trials, namely the duty of the 
prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. 
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Indian legal commentators. 216 It has been explained, for instance, 
that the application of the doctrine was discontinued in England "not 
because the principle is unsound, but because of certain technical 
difficulties in applying it to the conditions prevalent in England" .217 
These are, inter alia, that a large category of crimes are tried by juries 
which usually do not return special verdicts. This means that they 
either find the accused guilty or not guilty (in a general verdict) 
without giving reasons for their findings, which makes it very difficult 
to identify an issue decided in favour of the accused. In the Indian 
criminal justice system this difficulty does not present itself because 
juries are not employed and specific issues are determined by 
judges. 218 Application of the doctrine of issue estoppal in India has 
therefore offered expanded protection against double jeopardy, at least 
in the field of relitigation of issues of which the accused has previously 
been acquitted. 
4.4.5 Employment of inherent powers to prevent abuse of process in 
respect of successive prosecutions for related offences 
The High Court of India has exercised its inherent powers to prevent 
an abuse of process in this field in at least two decisions. In the first, 
Chudaman Narayanan Patil v State of Maharashtra219 the defendant 
was tried and convicted for breach of trust for misappropriating, in his 
capacity as a Recovery Officer, a certain amount of money. 
Thereafter, the prosecution again brought two proceedings based on 
"the misappropration of some more amounts during the same period. 
216See Pillai 273 & Singh 197-199. 
217Singh 198. 
219AIR 1969 Born 1. 
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The Bombay High Court held that though it was perfectly legal for the 
prosecution to bring these subsequent proceedings, it would not be in 
the interests of justice to subject the defendant to further 
prosecutions. Thus, by prohibiting the subsequent proceeding, the 
court exercised its inherent powers to prevent an abuse of process. 
In Gangadhar Panda v State of Orissa220 the defendant was charged 
in the first trial with misappropriation. Subsequently, he was charged 
for the same offence on the basis of another item of defalcation. The 
High Court of Orissa held that, although perfectly legal, it was 
oppressive to subject the defendant again to a further trial. The court 
argued that since this particular item of defalcation was (at the time 
of the first trial), known to the prosecution and there was no 
explanation as to why it was not included in the first trial, the accused 
would be "prejudiced and harassed" by subsequent proceedings. 221 
The court concluded that in such circumstances, "it [would] be 
vexatious to have a piecemeal trial" .222 Therefore, the court 
exercised its inherent powers to stay proceedings in favour of the 
accused. 
These cases can be viewed as indications of Indian courts' 
willingness to expand protection against successive prosecutions for 
related offences arising from the same transaction beyond the 
parameters of what has traditionally been understood under the 
concepts "same" and "distinct" offences. 
220 1978 Cri LJ 863. 
221 At 864. 
222/d. 
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4.4.6 Summary 
* The Indian accused is protected against a second prosecution for 
the same offence both in terms of the ordinary law of the land and the 
Constitution. The Constitution only affords the accused protection 
against a subsequent prosecution if he has previously been convicted 
for the same offence. In the ordinary law of the land, the accused 
may rely on the plea of former jeopardy regardless of whether he has 
previously been acquitted or convicted of the "same offence. " 
* In determining the sameness of offences, Indian courts focus 
exclusively on the legal elements of the offences. This particular 
aspect of Indian double jeopardy jurisprudence is less sophisticated 
than in the other legal systems under consideration in this thesis. 
Instead of resorting to models of lesser and greater included offences, 
the courts have opted for a narrow approach which investigates 
merely whether the offences have identical legal elements. The courts 
have held consistently that the concept "same offence" denotes the 
identical offence than that previously charged, or another offence 
which has identical elements to the one previously charged. The same 
meaning is attached to the words "same offence" in the constitutional 
guarantee against double jeopardy. Therefore, even constitutional 
protection against being placed in jeopardy more than once for the 
same offence has been limited to offences with identical legal 
elements. 
* Although the approach adopted above may achieve the same 
results, it is also specifically provided for in the Code that an accused 
may be charged in a subsequent trial for a more serious offence in the 
so-called "intervening death" cases, and in instances where the court 
that tried the accused for a less serious offence was not competent to 
try him also for the greater offence. 
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* Provision is made in Indian law that a person may be charged 
successively for a continuing offence. A continuing offence is 
described as the repetition of an act or omission (constituting an 
offence) on different occasions. 
* The narrow offence-defining test in India has been supplemented 
by application of the principle of issue estoppal and exercise of 
inherent discretionary powers to stay proceedings as an abuse of 
process. Application of the principle of issue estoppal has expanded 
protection in the field of re litigation of issues of which the accused has 
previously been acquitted. Employment of inherent powers to prevent 
abuse of process indicate that Indian courts recognise that the identity 
of legal ingredients criterion does not always adequately protect the 
accused against oppressive state conduct. The High Court of India 
has permanently stayed proceedings for a different offence to the one 
previously tried on the basis that both offences stemmed from the 
same factual transaction, and the consideration that the prosecution 
was unable to explain sufficiently why the offence charged in the 
second trial had not been included in the first trial. 
4.5 THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
4.5.1 General 
As indicated in chapter three, the Supreme Court of the United States 
recognised that the double jeopardy clause offers the defendant in a 
criminal trial three distinct constitutional protections:223 protection 
against a second prosecution for the same offence after an acquittal; 
protection against a second prosecution for the same offence after a 
conviction; and protection against multiple punishment for the same 
223See North Carolina v Pearce supra 71 7. 
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offence. 
Although this explanation of the scope of protection afforded by the 
guarantee seems to be straight-forward, the double jeopardy clause 
has nevertheless become "one of the least understood and, in recent 
years, one of the most frequently litigated provisions of the Bill of 
Rights". 224 
A fair amount of this litigation was focused on the issue addressed 
in this chapter; the definition of the concept same offence in the 
context of successive prosecutions. 225 As will become clearer from 
the analysis of Supreme Court cases in the paragraphs that follow, 
224Whalen v US supra 669 (per Rehnquist J, dissenting). See also 
Burks v US 437 US 1, 9 ( 1978), a case in which the court commented 
that its holdings with respect to the clause "can hardly be 
characterised as models of consistency and clarity"; Albernaz v US 
450 US 333, 343 ( 1981) (double jeopardy decisions have resulted in 
"a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most 
intrepid judicial navigator"). One commentator ("Comment: twice in 
jeopardy" 263) expressed the view that the multi-faceted nature of 
the rule (not one rule, but three separate rules), and the fact that each 
rule is "marooned in a sea of exceptions" complicate the law of double 
jeopardy and undermine consistency in this particular field of 
jurisprudence. Sigler Double Jeopardy 32 partly blames the "antique" 
language used in the clause for the subsequent confusion in this field 
of law. (One writer described the clause as a "quaint relic of medieval 
jargon" - See Comley H "Former jeopardy" Yale Law Journal Vol 35 
1926 674, 675.) In Sigler's view, the drafters of the double jeopardy 
clause "were so steeped in common law that they tended to 
perpetuate its inadequacies rather than declare a precise protection for 
a criminal defendant" (at 33). He laments that the clause was 
adopted without much debate or indication of its intended meaning (at 
32). 
225By examining the double jeopardy jurisprudence of thirty states, an 
American legal commentator ( Thomas GC "The prohibition of 
successive prosecutions for the same offense: (sic) In search of a 
definition" Iowa Law Review 1986 324, 330 (hereinafter referred to 
as Thomas Successive prosecutions), has catalogued not less than 
two thousand "same offense" (sic) cases. 
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the lack of consistency during almost a century of jurisprudence on 
this definitional issue, can largely be ascribed to a basic conflict of 
policy, namely whether an inquiry into the concept same offence 
should go beyond a mere examination of the statutory elements of 
offences. In other words, whether broader protection should be given 
to the accused in the context of successive prosecutions than 
traditionally has been afforded in terms of the common law same 
evidence test. 
4.5.2 The early cases 
The same evidence test was applied for the first time in the colony of 
Massachusetts in the early case of Morey v Commonwealth. 226 
However, the court introduced a modified version of the test originally 
formulated in the English case of Vandercomb. 227 It suggested that 
[a] conviction or acquittal upon one indictment is no bar 
to a subsequent conviction and sentence upon another, 
unless the evidence required to support a conviction 
upon one of them would have been sufficient to warrant 
a conviction upon the other. 228 
The difference between the Vandercomb and the Morey versions of 
the same evidence test is explained as follows. 229 According to the 
Vandercomb test, reprosecution would not be barred unless evidence 
necessary to convict on the second indictment would have been 
sufficient to convict on the first indictment. According to Morey on 
226 108 Mass ( 12 Browne) 433 ( 1871). 
227See chapter two supra under 2.3.2 for a discussion of the "same 
evidence" standard as proposed in the case of Vandercomb. 
228At 434. My emphasis. 
229See Comment: "Twice in jeopardy" 272. 
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the other hand, the later prosecution would be barred if the evidence 
in respect of either offence would be sufficient to convict of the other 
offence. Similar to the Vandercomb test, Morey focused on the 
minimum evidence necessary to prove the crime charged (in other 
words the legal elements of the offences), instead of the evidence 
actually presented. 
Eighteen years after Morey was decided the Supreme Court of the 
United States of America had its first opportunity to give 
constitutional content to the concept same offence . The case was 
In re Nielsen. 230 An adherent of the Mormon faith (Nielsen), had 
been convicted for cohabiting with two wives over a two and a half 
year period. One day after the period of cohabitation ended he was 
charged with adultery with one of the women. The issue before the 
Supreme Court was whether the subsequent prosecution for adultery 
was prohibited in terms of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against 
double jeopardy. The court refered to the same evidence test as 
proposed in Morey. 231 However, it did not expressly apply this test 
to the relevant statutory offences. Instead, it concluded that the Fifth 
Amendment double jeopardy clause barred the subsequent prosecution 
for adultery because 
where, as in this case, a person has been tried and 
convicted for a crime which has various incidents 
included in it, he cannot be a second time tried for one of 
those incidents without being twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offence. 232 
230131 us 176 (1889). 
231 At 185. 
232At 188. (My emphasis). 
215 
The court argued that since the crimes of cohabitation and adultery 
both require proof of the same "incident" namely, living together as a 
man and wife, they constitute the same offence.233 Proponents 
of a conduct approach instead of an elements approach have made 
out a strong argument that Nielsen endorsed the principle that the 
double jeopardy clause prohibits a second trial if the prosecution has 
to rely on conduct already used to prove another offence. 234 
233At 189. 
234Thomas Successive prosecutions 343 submits, inter alia, that had 
the court followed an element-based approach, it would have allowed 
the subsequent prosecution for adultery because each offence 
necessitated proof of an element that the other did not: cohabitation 
required proof of sexual intercourse and living with more than one 
woman. On the other hand, adultery required proof of sexual 
intercourse by the defendant with one woman while married to 
another. Several other writers have interpreted Nielsen as a case 
which endorsed a same conduct or even a same transaction approach. 
See inter alia, Comment: "Constitutional law - Double Jeopardy -
Successive prosecutions for a single transaction as a violation of the 
due process clause" Rutgers Law Review Vol 20 1966 631, 641 
(hereinafter referred to as "Comment: Constitutional law"; Pace K 
"Fifth Amendment - The adoption of the 'same elements test': The 
Supreme Court's failure to adequately protect defendants from double 
jeopardy" The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Vol 84 1994 
769, 771; Blake RA "U.S. v. Dixon - Finally a 'bright line rule' in 
double jeopardy analysis?" Texas Bar Journal Vol 58 1995 453, 456. 
The Supreme Court, however, continued to grapple with the 
interpretation of Nielsen. In Brown v Ohio 432 US 1 61 , 1 66-1 67 
( 1977), Nielsen was cited in a footnote to demonstrate that the same 
evidence test " .. is not the only standard for determining whether 
successive prosecutions involve the same offense (sic)" (note 6). This 
interpretation of Nielsen was at a later stage relied on by the Supreme 
Court in adopting a same conduct test in Grady v Corbin 495 US 508, 
519 ( 1990). However, in a subsequent case, US v Dixon 113 S Ct 
2849, 2860-2861 ( 1993) the Supreme Court argued that the court in 
Nielsen barred the prosecution for adultery because it had the same 
"essential elements" as cohabitation. Cf also the views of Richardson 
EJ "Matching tests for double jeopardy violations with constitutional 
interests" Vanderbilt Law Review Vol 45 1991 273, 295 note 153, 
namely that the court in Nielsen used the term "incident" as 
synonymous with "statutory element". 
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However, twenty years later in Gavieres v US, 235 the court 
abandoned a same conduct approach and focused solely on the 
elements of the crimes charged successively. The court applied the 
Morey version of the same evidence test to the crimes successively 
charged, namely disorderly conduct and outraging and insulting a 
public official, and concluded that since each offence required proof 
of an element that the other did not, the subsequent prosecution did 
not violate the double jeopardy provision. 236 
Gavieres was followed by Diaz v United States, 237 a case in which 
the Supreme Court recognised the so-called "intervening death" 
exception.238 In that case, the court held that the double jeopardy 
clause did not prohibit Diaz from being prosecuted for homicide after 
he had already been prosecuted for assault and battery of the victim, 
if that victim died only after the first prosecution. This exception was 
also later expanded to cover offences not discovered at the time of the 
first trial, despite the exercise of due diligence. 239 The rationale 
235 220 us 338 ( 1 911 ) . 
236 At 344. The court stated (at 342) that although "[it] is true that the 
acts and words of the accused set forth in both charges are the same, 
each crime contained a distinct element: Outraging a public official 
required proof of the insult, but not that it occurred in a public place. 
Disorderly conduct on the other hand, required proof that the offense 
(sic) occured in a public place, but not proof of an insult of a public 
official". 
237223 us 442 ( 1912). 
238See the English case of Conelly supra under 4.2.1 for a discussion 
of the recognition of this exception in English law. 
239ln Brown v Ohio (supra) 168 note 7, the court (citing Diaz) 
recognised that "(a]n exception may exist where the State is unable 
to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset because the 
additional facts necessary to sustain that charge have not occurred or 
have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence". This 
was confirmed in the subsequent decision of 11/inios v Vitale 44 7 US 
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underlying these exceptions is that the prosecution was, in these 
particular instances, unable to proceed on the more serious charge at 
the first trial. 240 In American legal context, this exception is 
referred to as the Diaz due dilligence exception. 
4.5.3 The establishment of the Blockburger test 
In 1932, The Gavieres formulation of the same evidence test which 
was merely a restatement of the Morey formulation, was applied in 
B/ockburger v United States. 241 From then onwards, the test has 
commonly been known and referred to as the Blockburger test. 
Blockburger dealt with the issue of multiple punishments at a single 
trial. Blockburger was charged with two related offences in one trial: 
selling narcotics without a written prescription and selling narcotics 
from a container other than the original stamped package. Citing 
Gavieres, the court held that although both violations resulted from a 
single narcotics sale, the offences were distinct because "each 
provision require[d] proof of a fact which the other [did] not". 242 
The court concluded that the imposition of cumulative punishment 
would, in casu, not violate the double jeopardy rule. 
The same elements test as applied in Blockburger became the 
standard to determine whether cumulative punishment in a single 
prosecution setting ought to be allowed. 243 At this stage it is 
410, 420 note 8 (1980). 
240See id. 
241 284 us 299 (1932). 
242At 304. 
243See Grady v Corbin (supra) where the majority (per Brennan, J) cited 
a number of cases in which the Supreme Court applied the 
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important to mention that the issue of multiple punishments in a single 
trial has never been regarded in American law as one that involves 
double jeopardy prinicples. Instead, a study of the development of the 
doctrine of double jeopardy has led to the conclusion that "[n]either 
the historical nor modern functions of the doctine encompass more 
than prohibition of successive prosecutions". 244 
The proper investigation in the single-trial multiple-punishments 
cases has always been whether the legislature intended the imposition 
of consecutive multiple sentences. The premise has always been that 
the legislature may, "consonant with legitimate penological principles", 
authorise consecutive sentences when a single act violates several 
statutory provisions. Applied in a cumulative punishment single-
prosecution context, the Blockburger test has therefore been described 
as a mere "rule of statutory construction, a guide to determining 
whether the legislature intended multiple punishments. "245 This 
assessment of the purpose of the rule can be summarised as follows. 
A valid assumption which can be made in the interpretation of statutes 
Blockburger test in the context of multiple punishment in a single 
prosecution. 
244See Comment: "Consecutive sentences in single prosecutions: 
Judicial multiplication of statutory penalties" Yale Law Journal 1958 
91 6, 918 (hereinafter referred to as "Comment: consecutive 
sentences"). The author of this comment points out that the rule of 
double jeopardy serves the purpose of securing finality in criminal 
litigation and of protecting defendants from the threat, harassment 
and stigma of repeated criminal trials. The author refers (at 919 note 
1 7) to a number of American decisions in which American courts 
(including the Supreme Court) held that the erroneous imposition of 
two sentences for a single offence does not constitute double 
jeopardy. 
245Per Justice Brennan in Grady v Corbin 51 7. Justice Brennan 
referred to a number of cases (dealing with the issue of multiple 
punishments in a single trial) in which the Blockburger test was applied 
to determine whether cumulative punishment may be allowed. 
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is that legislatures generally do not intend to impose punishment for 
offences with the same elements under two separate statutes. The 
Blockburger test arguably ensures that a court does not impose 
punishment for a single offence under more than one statute when 
Congress intended punishment under only one statute. 246 However, 
if the prosecution can show that the legislature intended that multiple 
punishments be available, a court may impose multiple punishment 
even if, according to Blockburger, they are punishments for the same 
offence.247 In other words, American courts (including the Supreme 
Court) have treated the prohibition against multiple punishments for 
the same offences rather as a measure of legislative intent than as a 
strict constitutional prohibition against any imposition of multiple 
punishments for the same offence. 248 
· Nevertheless, the Blockburger test also came to be recognised as 
the established test for determining whether two offences are the 
same in the context of successive prosecutions. 249 Whether it has 
ever attained the status of an exclusive test to be applied in the 
context of successive prosecutions, has, however, been a highly 
246See Whalen v US 691-692. 
247See Whalen v US 692; Garret v US 471 US 773, 778-779 (1985) 
and Missouri v Hunter 459 US 359, 368-369 ( 1983). 
248See Richardson 278. However, the author points out that 
Blockburger is also a rule of constitutional dimension in the multiple-
punishments single-trial context, because the Constitution requires an 
adequate assessment of congressional intent regarding multiple 
punishment. It is suggested that application of the Blockburger test 
effects such adequate assessment 
249See Brown v Ohio 166 and Illinois v Vitale 416. Although both 
these cases recognised the application of the Blockburger test in the 
context of successive prosecutions, they also introduced broader 
criteria to determine the sameness of offences in this context. These 
cases will be discussed in detail in the text that follows. 
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contentious issue over which the Supreme Court has particularly 
during the last decade been strongly divided. 250 The development 
of this conflict of policy becomes apparent from a number of decisions 
which followed on Blockburger. These will be discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
4.5.4 Ashe v Swenson - collateral estoppel recognised as a 
component of double jeopardy protection and a new "same 
offence" test proposed 
In 1970, the Supreme Court held in Ashe v Swenson251 that the 
principle of collateral estoppal (known in English law as issue estoppal) 
is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double 
jeopardy. Without referring to the Blockburger test, the majority held 
that the defendant who had previously been acquitted in a prosecution 
for robbing one of six poker players, could not be prosecuted 
subsequently for the robbery of another player in the same poker 
game.252 The court reached this conclusion on the ground that 
250See in particular the opposing views adopted by the court in a time 
span of merely three years in Grady v Corbin (rejecting the exclusivity 
of Blockburger in favour of a two-level inquiry which also employs a 
standard based upon the same conduct) and United States v Dixon 
(reinstating Blockburger as an exclusive criterion to determine the 
sameness of offences). 
251 397 US 436 (1970). 
252At 447. In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger criticised the 
majority for ignoring Blockburger, " ... the accepted offense (sic) 
defining rule ... to reach a decision in this case. What [the court] has 
done is to superimpose on the same-evidence test a new and novel 
collateral estoppal gloss". (At 464-465). 
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. . . when an issue of ultimate fact has once been 
determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue 
cannot again be litigated between the same parties in a 
future lawsuit. 253 
The court found that the identity of the robber was the "single 
rationally conceivable issue in dispute before the jury [at the first 
hearing]". 254 Therefore, the court argued, once the jury determined 
in its verdict that Ashe was not one of the robbers, the state was 
prohibited from litigating that particular issue (the identity of the 
robber) again. 255 
However, as a tool to expand double jeopardy protection, the 
collateral estoppal rule has limited value. The rule only applies to 
previous acquittals and not to convictions. Furthermore, the collateral 
estoppal rule only forecloses litigation of an issue if it appears that a 
rational jury could have based its verdict on no other issue. Since 
criminal juries return only general verdicts (namely guilty or not 
guilty), this may be extremely difficult to assess, particularly where 
alternative defences were used. 256 
However, the significance of Ashe lies in the fact that it established 
the double jeopardy clause as more than a mere guarantee against 
being twice put in jeopardy for the same offence. In Ashe, a second 
253At 443. (Mr Justice Stewart delivered the majority opinion). 
254At 446. 
256For a discussion of the drawbacks of the collateral estoppel rule, see 
in general Comment: "The Double Jeopardy Clause as a Bar to 
Reintroducing Evidence" Yale Law Journal Vol 89 1980 10-13 
(hereinafter referred to as "Comment: reintroducing evidence") & Land 
BL "Increased double jeopardy protection for the criminal defendant: 
Grady v Corbin" Willamette Law Review Vol 27 1991 913, 924-925. 
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prosecution would most certainly have been possible if the 
Blockburger test were to have been stringently applied; it necessarily 
involved distinct factual elements namely, robbery of a different victim 
in each case. However, the court in Ashe did not simply focus on the 
meaning of the words "same offence" as used in the clause. Instead, 
it emphasised that the double jeopardy concept, inter alia, protects a 
person who has been acquitted from having to "run the gauntlet" a 
second time. 257 The court observed that the state in actual fact had 
conceded in Ashe that it used the first trial as "no more than a dry run 
for the second prosecution". 258 In the court's view, this is precisely 
what the constitutional guarantee forbids. 259 
A valuable contribution to the law of double jeopardy can also be 
found in the separate, concurring opinion of Justice Brennan in 
Ashe. 260 First of all, he emphasised that the double jeopardy clause 
"stands as a constitutional barrier against possible tyranny by an 
overzealous prosecutor". 261 In order to correct the abuse of the 
criminal process, collateral estoppel would in his opinion, not be an 
adequate tool. 262 Instead, Justice Brennan advocated that the 
concept "same offence" in the double jeopardy clause be construed to 
257 At 446, quoting the phrase used in Green v US supra (at 190). See 
also chapter eight infra under 8.5.4 for a detailed discussion of the 
Green case. 
258At 447. 
260 At 449-460. 
261 At 459. 
262/d. Justice Brennan observed that it was doubtful that collateral 
estoppal would have aided the accused if the jury had had to resolve 
additional contended issues. 
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embody a same transaction standard. 263 In his view, a same 
transaction standard would best serve the underlying purpose of a 
double jeopardy guarantee in today's modern society, namely to 
prevent abuse of the criminal process. He continued by explaining 
that in modern criminal legislation a tendency to divide the phases of 
a criminal transaction into separate crimes has developed. This 
phenomenon enhances opportunites for multiple prosecutions for "an 
essentially unitary criminal episode". 264 However, combined with 
"[an] unreviewable prosecutorial discretion concerning the initiation 
and scope of a criminal prosecution", it made continued application of 
the same evidence test (in Justice Brennan's view), "intolerable" in 
present times. 265 
Justice Brennan observed that the facts in Ashe served to highlight 
the "hazards of abuse inherent in the 'same evidence' test", 266 and 
demonstrated the necessity for the adoption of the same transaction 
test. In his view, a constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy 
in present times requires the prosecution (except in very limited 
circumstances)267 to join at one trial all the charges against the 
263 At 453-454. 
264At 452. 
266At 457. Justice Brennan noted (at 459) that in Ashe the 
prosecution plainly organised its case for the second trial to provide 
the links missing in the chain of identification evidence that was 
offered at the first trial. 
267 At 454 (note 7) Justice Brennan acknowledged the Diaz due 
diligence exception, namely that where a crime has not been 
completed or not discovered despite diligence on the part of the police, 
an exception to the same transaction rule ought to be made to permit 
a subsequent prosecution. He added that another exception would 
be necessary if no single court had jurisdiction in respect of all the 
alleged crimes. (See infra under 4.5.7, text at note 325 for a 
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defendant that develop out of a single criminal transaction. Although 
a majority of the Supreme Court has not as yet endorsed this 
approach, Justice Brennan's plea for expanded protection 
nevertheless has paved the way for adoption of a same conduct test 
in the nineties in Grady v Corbin. 268 
4.5.5 Blockburger undergoes a change in status - Brown, Harris & 
Vitale 
During the 1970's and 1980's, the Supreme Court handed down three 
decisions that suggested that Blockburger could not be regarded as an 
exclusive test to determine the sameness of offences in the context 
of successive prosecutions. Certain ambiguous dicta of the court in 
these three decisions have, however, created confusion as regards the 
scope of protection afforded the accused in the context of successive 
prosecutions. The opposing conclusions reached by the court (in the 
1 990' s) in the respective decisions of Grady v Corbin and US v Dixon, 
can be ascribed to divergent interpretations of these cases. A 
discussion of these cases is therefore essential to understand recent 
cases. 
In the first of these cases, Brown v Ohio269 an accused who had 
previously been prosecuted for joyriding was subsequently prosecuted 
for auto theft stemming from the same incident. The Ohio Court of 
Appeal held that joyriding was a lesser included offence of auto theft 
because "every element [of joyriding] is also an element of the crime 
discussion of the merits of this exception). He also suggested that an 
exception be made in circumstances where joinder of offences would 
be prejudicial to either the prosecution or the defence. 
2685ee infra under 4. 5. 6 for a detailed discussion of this decision. 
269Supra. 
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of auto theft". 270 The court explained that the only difference 
between the crime of stealing a motor-vehicle and joyriding was that 
conviction for stealing requires proof of an intent on the part of the 
thief to deprive the owner of possession permanently. 271 The 
question before the Supreme Court was whether the double jeopardy 
clause would prohibit the second prosecution for the greater offence. 
The Supreme Court initially stated that Blockburger was the 
established test to determine whether offences are the same in the 
context of multiple punishment in a single trial as well as in the 
context of successive prosecutions. 272 The court then applied 
the Blockburger test to the facts and concluded that, because the 
lesser included offence (joyriding) did not require proof of an element 
distinct from auto theft, the state was prohibited from subsequently 
proceeding against Brown on the greater charge of auto theft. 
However, the court did not end its analysis at this point. In a 
footnote, the court made the following statement273 
270At 163. 
The Blockburger test is not the only standard for 
determining whether successive prosecutions 
impermissibly involve the same offense (sic). Even if two 
offenses (sic) are sufficiently different to permit the 
imposition of consecutive sentences, successive 
prosecutions will be barred in some circumstances where 
the second prosecution requires the relitigation of factual 
issues already resolved by the first. 274 
271 At 163-164. 
272At 166. 
273At 167, note 6. 
274My emphasis. 
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The court then referred to its decisions in Ashe and Nielsen and 
observed that these broader criteria clearly appears from the Nielsen 
case. The court argued that, if the standard proposed in Blockburger 
was applied stringently in Nielsen, the offences in that case would 
have been found not to be the same. 275 However, these 
statements in Brown were clearly obiter dicta. The court stated later 
in the same footnote that "[b]ecause we conclude today that a lesser 
included and a greater offense [sic] are the same under Blockburger, 
we need not decide whether the repetition of proof required by the 
successive prosecutions agains Brown would otherwise entitle him to 
the additional protection offered by Ashe and Nielsen. "276 
The second case which implied that an accused is afforded additional 
protection in the context of successive prosecutions, was Harris v 
Oklahoma.277 The state of Oklahoma charged Harris for robbery after 
a conviction for felony murder in which the same robbery was the 
underlying felony. The state in fact conceded that, in a felony-murder 
case, proof would be required of the underlying felony (in this 
particular case robbery with a firearm) in order to prove the intent 
necessary for a felony-murder conviction. The question before the 
Supreme Court was whether the double jeopardy clause prohibited a 
subsequent prosecution for the same robbery. In a terse opinion, the 
court referred to the judgment in Nielsen to the effect that same 
incidents equalled same offences and concluded that 
2751d. 
when, as here, conviction of a greater crime cannot be 
had without conviction of a lesser crime, robbery with 
firearms, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars prosecution 
2761d. (My emphasis.) 
277Supra. 
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for the lesser crime after conviction of the greater 
one.218 
The third case, Illinois v Vitale, 279 probably cleared the way for the 
subsequent adoption of a same conduct test in Grady v Corbin. The 
facts of this case were as follows. After his automobile struck and 
killed two childrenr Vitale. (who drove the earl was. charged with a 
traffic offence of failing to reduce speed to avoid an accident. He was 
convicted on that charge but on the very next day charged with 
involuntary manslaughter. The issue before the Supreme Court was 
whether the double jeopardy clause barred a subsequent prosecution 
for involuntary manslaughter. The Supreme Court ruled that the 
subsequent prosecution for involuntary manslaughter would be barred 
in terms of the Blockburger test if the prosecution necessarily had to 
establish failure to reduce speed to prove this offence.280 In other 
words, it had to be determined whether the offence previously charged 
could be regarded as a lesser included offence of the offence of 
involuntary manslaughter. However, the court could not make a 
definitive ruling on the constitutionality of the manslaughter charge (in 
terms of the Blockburger rule) because the Illinois Supreme Court had 
not clearly delineated the necessary elements of the crime of 
manslaughter. Consequently, the court remanded the case for a 
definitive ruling as to the necessary elements of manslaughter and a 
disposal of the case consistent with the court's rulings. 281 
However, in an obiter dicta, the court indicated that Vitale's claim 
278At 682. 
279447 us 410 (1980). 
280 At 419, referring to its application of Blockburger in Brown. 
281 At 421. 
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of double jeopardy would be "substantial under Brown and our later 
decision in Harris v Oklahoma ... "282 if the prosecution would in 
actual fact (albeit not necessarily) rely on the same conduct previously 
prosecuted or concede prior to trial that it will do so, in order to prove 
a necessary element of the offence subsequently charged.283 
Therefore, the court implied that even if a subsequent prosecution 
passes the Blockburger test it may still be prohibited on constitutional 
grounds if it involves repetition of proof. 284 The approach of the 
court seems to have been that proper analysis in double jeopardy 
claims should not only focus on the elements of the offences charged 
successively, but also on the underlying conduct. 
4.5.6 Grady v Corbin: A brief expansion of protection in the nineties 
In Grady v Corbin, 285 a Supreme Court majority of five to four came 
out in support of expanded protection against double jeopardy in the 
context of successive prosecutions. The facts of that case were very 
similar to those present in Vitale. Thomas Corbin, while intoxicated, 
drove his car over the median and crashed into a young couple's car. 
282At 420. 
283At 421. 
284Henning PJ "Precedents in a Vacuum: The Supreme Court 
continues to tinker with double jeopardy" American Criminal Law 
Review Vol 31 1993 1, 11-12 expresses the view that reference to 
Brown and Harris shows that the court did not view the lesser 
included offence analysis as limited solely to crimes that necessarily 
entail a complete overlap between the elements of the offences. He 
suggests that Vitale is an indication that the court was not entirely 
comfortable in permitting the statutory definition of an offence to 
govern the meaning of "same offence" without reference to the actual 
conduct being prosecuted. See also, in the same vein, Thomas 
Successive prosecutions 351-356. 
285495 us 508 ( 1990). 
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The driver died of the injuries she had sustained in the crash. The 
District Attorney was informed of the fatality on the same night. 
Corbin pleaded guilty to two traffic offences in the Town Justice 
Court: driving while intoxicated and failing to keep to the right of the 
median. No mention was made at that trial of the fatality that he had 
caused and he received a minimum sentence. 286 
In the meantime, the District Attorney's office was investigating 
more serious charges against Corbin. Approximately two months 
later, he was indicted on charges of reckless manslaughter, vehicular 
manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, reckless assault and 
driving while intoxicated. 287 The prosecution filed a bill of 
particulars in which it identified three reckless or negligent acts on 
which it would rely to prove the homicide and assault charges: (i) 
operating a motor vehicle on a public highway in an intoxicated state; 
(ii) failing to keep to the right of the median and (iii) driving too fast 
for the weather and road conditions then pending (45-50 miles per 
hour). 
The question before the court was whether the constitutional 
protection against double jeopardy barred a second prosecution if the 
state intended to prove its case by relying on conduct which 
constitutes an offence (or offences) of which the defendant had 
already been convicted and sentenced. 288 The majority of the court 
(per Brennan, J), answered this question in the affirmative. It held 
that the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy prevented 
a prosecutor from building a criminal case around proof of conduct for 
286A 350 dollar fine and a six months licence revocation (at 513). 
287/d. 
288At 514-515. 
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which a defendant has already been tried. Relying upon its previous 
dicta in Vitale, 289 Justice Brennan stated that 
[t]he double jeopardy clause bars a subsequent 
prosecution if, to establish an essential element of an 
offense (sic) charged in that prosecution, the government 
will prove conduct that constitutes an offense (sic) for 
which the defendant has already been .prosecuted" 290 
The court rejected the proposition that the Blockburger test (applied 
exclusively) offered adequate constitutional protection against double 
jeopardy in the context of successive prosecutions. The majority 
reasoned that the Blockburger test was developed in the context of 
multiple punishments imposed in a single prosecution; more 
particulary, Blockburger was described as "a guide to determining 
whether the legislature intended multiple punishments". 291 
Quoting the famous dicta in Green, 292 Mr Justice Brennan argued 
that successive prosecutions (after acquittals or convictions) raise 
289See supra text at note 283 for a discussion of this case. 
290At 510. At face value, the same conduct test as formulated in 
Grady makes no provision for the Diaz due diligence exception. (See 
supra, text at note 237 for a discussion of this exception.) However, 
the court recognised in a footnote (note 7 at 516) that such an 
exception "may exist" in the circumstances set out in Diaz and 
reiterated in Brown v Ohio. However, the exception was found to be 
inapplicable to Grady, because the District Attorney was informed of 
all the facts on the night that the accident occurred. 
291 At 516-517. See also supra, text at note 245 for a detailed 
discussion of this argument. Justice Brennan then cited (at 51 7 note 
8) a number of cases in support of his contention that the B/ockburger 
rule is merely a test to determine the permissibility of multiple 
punishment in a single trial context. 
292See chapter three supra under 3.5.1, text at note 150 for the dicta 
in Green. 
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concerns which extend beyond the mere possibilitiy of an enhanced 
sentence. 293 He explained that, unlike the position in regard to 
multiple punishments in a single proceeding, multiple prosecutions give 
the state an opportunity to rehearse its presentation of proof, "thus 
increasing the risk of an erroneous conviction for one or more of the 
offenses (sic) charged". 294 
The court also emphasised that even when the state can bring 
multiple charges against an individual according to Blockburger, "a 
tremendous additional burden is placed on that defendant if he must 
face each of the charges in a separate proceeding". 295 Justice 
Brennan remarked that if the entire double jeopardy enquiry was based 
on Blockburger, the state would be able to try Corbin in at least four 
consecutive trials: (i) failure to keep to the right of the median; (ii) 
driving while intoxicated; (iii) assault and (iv) homicide. 296 
Therefore the state would be able to improve its presentation of proof 
with each trial by assessing which witness had given the most 
293At 518. 
294/d. Justice Brennan cited inter alia, Tibbs v Florida 45 7 US 31 , 41 
( 1982) (a case which dealt with the issue of retrial on appellate 
reversal of a conviction). In that case, the court noted that the double 
jeopardy clause "prevents the State from honing its trial strategies and 
perfecting its evidence through successive attempts at conviction" (at 
41 ). See chapter eight infra under 8.5.2 for a detailed discussion of 
that decision. The court (in Grady) also referred to Ashe v Swenson 
(discussed supra under 4.5.4) where the state in fact conceded that, 
after the defendant had been acquitted at the first trial, it "refined its 
presentation [at the subsequent trial] in the light of the turn of events 
at the first trial" (at 447) and Hoag v New Jersey 356 US 464 ( 1958) 
where the prosecution in a subsequent trial (after a previous acquittal), 
only called the witness who had testified most damagingly in the first 
trial and, subsequently, obtained a conviction. 
295At 519. (My emphasis.) 
296At 520. 
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persuasive testimony etcetera, and consequently enhance the 
possibility that an innocent person could be convicted. 
Therefore, the court concluded that a same conduct test should 
supplement the Blockburger test in the context of successive 
prosecutions. 297 This means that in order to determine whether a 
successive prosecution for the same offence is barred in terms of the 
double jeopardy clause, a court first has to apply the Blockburger test. 
If the offences prove to be the same in terms of the Blockburger test 
that would be the end of the matter. However, if the offences are 
not the same, the court also has to enquire whether the prosecution 
(in the second trial) will rely on conduct which constitutes an offence 
for which the defendant has already been prosecuted. 298 In Grady, 
the court concluded that the Blockburger test did not prohibit the 
subsequent prosecution. 299 However, it held that since the conduct 
(set out in the bill of particulars) which the state intended to rely on to 
prove the offences in the second indictment had already been relied on 
by the state in the earlier prosecution to prove "the entirety of the 
conduct for which Corbin had been convicted", 300 the subsequent 
prosecution would be barred on double jeopardy grounds. 301 
297The court found ample historical justification for the adoption of a 
same conduct test (at 520) in previous decisions such as Nielsen 
(discussed supra, text at note 230); Brown v Ohio (discussed supra, 
text at note 269) and, in particular, Vitale (discussed supra, text at 
note 279). 
298At 521. 
299At 522. 
300At 523. 
3011d. The court remarked that if the state, for example, had relied 
solely on Corbin's driving too fast in heavy rain to establish 
recklessness or negligence, the subsequent prosecution would have 
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The court went to great lengths to explain the application of the 
same conduct test in practice. It pointed out, inter alia, that the test 
does not prevent the same actual evidence from being presented at 
the subsequent trial; in other words, evidence which was also 
presented at the first trial. In Justice Brennan's words, "the critical 
enquiry is what conduct the State will prove, not the evidence the 
state will use to prove that conduct". 302 Furthermore, the court 
explained the difference between a same conduct test and a same 
transaction test: 303 adoption of a same transaction test would have 
barred the homicide and assault prosecutions (in Grady) even if the 
state was able to establish the essential elements of those crimes 
without having to rely on conduct for which Corbin had previously 
been convicted. 304 
The same conduct test as proposed and adopted in Grady could be 
regarded as a compromise between the Blockburger and the same 
transaction tests. The court did not totally discard the Blockburger 
been allowed in terms of the same conduct test. 
302At 521. Justice Brennan explained that if two bystanders had 
· witnessed Corbin's accident, it would have made no difference to the 
court's double jeopardy analysis if the state had called one witness to 
testify in the first trial that Corbin crossed the median and had called 
the other witness to testify to the same conduct in the second trial. 
The second trial would still have been prohibited in terms of the same 
conduct test: the conduct being the crossing of the median. However, 
this distinction had not been altogether clear to the two dissenting 
judges in Grady (Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia). See infra under 
4.5. 7 for a discussion of their views on the same conduct test as 
proposed by Justice Brennan, and the distinction drawn between same 
conduct and same evidence. 
303At 523 note 15. 
304/d. Ironically, Justice Brennan never achieved his long-time goal of 
adopting a same transaction test. He retired shortly after delivering 
the opinion in Grady. 
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test, but instead incorporated it in a new two-level test which also 
focused on the same conduct. 
4.5. 7 Implications of the "same conduct" test 
The move of the Supreme Court to offer the defendants in criminal 
cases broader Fifth Amendment protection in the context of 
successive prosecutions has been received favourably in academic 
circles. 305 However, it has also been acknowledged that application 
of the same conduct test may present problems in practice. One of 
these problems was addressed by Justice O'Connor in her minority 
opinion in Grady. 306 She held the view that the same conduct test 
proposed by the majority could not be reconciled with the court's 
previous decision (five months earlier) in Dowling v United States307• 
In her view, the same conduct test also casts doubt on the "continued 
305See Herrick JM "Double jeopardy analysis comes home: The 'same 
conduct' standard in Grady v Corbin" Kentucky Law Journal Vol 79 
1990/91 84 7 (arguing (at 866) that "only a same 'conduct' standard 
can adequately protect defendants against potential legislative abuse 
of the power to define offenses [sic]"); Thomas Modest Proposal 
(applauding the court at 195 for affirming "a position [he] had taken 
in previous articles"); Poulin AB "Double jeopardy: Grady and 
Dowling stir the muddy waters" Rutgers Law Review Vol 43 1991 889 
(stating at 930 that "[t]his broader protection [afforded by Grady] is 
warranted by the defendant's interest in closure and in freedom from 
fragmented prosecutions"); Land (reasoning at 944 that "[i]n 
formulating its "same conduct" test, the court has identified and 
effectuated the fundamental value that underlies the doctrine of double 
jeopardy [namely], verdict finalilty". By this, the author meant that 
Grady supports the underlying idea that "the government has no 
legitimate interest in relitigating the first factfinder' s culpability 
determination" at 915). 
306At 524-526. 
307493 us 342 (1990). 
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vitality" of Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 308 A brief 
exposition of Dowling and the provisions of the specific rule of 
evidence are essential for an understanding of her objections. 
Rule 404(b)309 provides 
Evidence of other crimes is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may however, be admissible for 
other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence 
of mistake, or accident. 
In Dowling, the Supreme Court had to consider whether the 
testimony of an eyewitness regarding a robbery (at the house of the 
eyewitness) for which Dowling had been acquitted was admissible at 
a second trial of Dowling for an unrelated bank robbery. The 
eyewitness, a certain Mrs Henry, had testified at the first trial that a 
man had entered her house with a ski-mask and a small handgun and 
that his mask had come off revealing his identity. However, Dowling 
was acquitted of the robbery of Mrs Henry's residence. In the bank 
robbery trial, it was testified that the bank robber wore a ski-mask and 
had a small hand-gun. Mrs Henry also testified at this trial. The 
evidence of Mrs Henry (namely that the perpetrator who had entered 
her house had also worn a ski-mask and had a small handgun) was 
allowed in terms of the abovementioned rule in order to establish 
identity in the bank robbery trial. 
The question before the Supreme Court was whether the collateral 
308At 526. 
309Federal Rules of Evidence. 
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estoppal rule as set out in Ashe310 barred the prosecution from 
relying on this evidence. The Supreme Court held that the collateral 
estoppal rule does not bar all evidence of conduct for which an 
accused has been acquitted. The court argued that, because the 
defence had failed to prove that the prior acquittal by the jury 
necessarily represented a determination that Dowling had not been 
the masked man who had entered the witness' home, the testimony 
rendered by Mrs Henry in Dowling was not barred in terms of the 
collateral estoppal rule. 311 
As stated above, Justice O'Connor found the ruling in Grady to be 
inconsistent with Dowling. However, several commentators suggested 
that she had failed to distinguish between repetition of proof of the 
310See supra text at note 251 for a discussion of this decision. 
311 At 351 . The court stated that there were numerous grounds other 
than identity on which the jury could have based its acquittal. The 
court reached this conclusion on the grounds that Dowling's 
presence in the house was not seriously contested by his defence, 
who "rather had claimed" that a robbbery had not taken place 
because he (Dowling) and his partner had gone to retrieve money from 
an individual in the house. The hyper-technical approach adopted by 
the majority in Dowling has been severely criticised by legal 
commentators. (See inter alia, Crawford CL "Dowling v. United 
States: A failure of the criminal justice system" Ohio State Law 
Journal 1991 991 (describing the case as "simply repugnant to the 
concepts of due process and double jeopardy" (at 1009)) and 
Goldstein RA "Double jeopardy, due process, and evidence from prior 
acquittals: Dowling v. United States" Harvard Journal of Law and 
Public Policy Vol 13 1991 1027 (emphasising the "prejudice inevitable 
in the introduction of evidence from prior proceedings" (at 1035)). In 
his minority opinion (in Dowling 361-363), Justice Brennan expressed 
concern for the potentially damaging effect that evidence from a prior 
proceeding might have on a defendant's chances of receiving a fair 
trial. More in particular, he criticised the majority's approach on the 
basis that it undermined the very purpose of constitutional safeguards 
such as the double jeopardy clause, namely to protect the defendant 
from the risk of erroneous conviction. In his view, this is exactly the 
kind of risk that Dowling created. 
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same conduct and repetition of the same actual evidence.312 
Nevertheless, the main concern has been that if Supreme Court judges 
could not make the subtle distinction between same conduct and same 
evidence, it would be difficult for ordinary judges to distinguish when 
the same evidence or the same conduct is involved. 313 
Justice Scalia, delivering a dissenting opinion in the Corbin case, 
expressed himself in favour of the exclusive application of the 
Blockburger test. 314 In a lengthy opinion, he regarded the majority 
opinion to be an activist decision without historical support. 315 
Moreover, he raised certain concerns as regards the implementation of 
the same conduct test in practice. He argued, inter alia, that since the 
double jeopardy clause protects the defendant from being twice put in 
jeopardy (namely, made to stand trial more than once), it presupposes 
that "sameness" be determined before the commencement of the 
second trial. Since the Constitution does not entitle the defendant to 
be informed of the evidence against him, the majority's "proof-of-
same-conduct-test" will be implementable before trial "only if the 
indictment happens to show that the same evidence is at issue, or 
312See Land 932, pointing out that the evidence from the first trial in 
Dowling was not being used to prove the same conduct as was 
proved in the first trial. Therefore, the second prosecution was not 
barred and Dowling could be reconciled with Grady. See also, in the 
same vein, Poulin 903. In the majority opinion (of Grady at 521 ), 
Justice Brennan reconciled Dowling with his adoption of a same 
conduct test on the basis that the same conduct test would not 
(necessarily) bar the introduction of the same actual evidence offered 
in the previous trial. 
313This point is raised by Barton S "Grady v. Corbin: An unsuccessful 
effort to define 'same offense'" Georgia Law Review Vol 25 1990 
143, 159. 
314At 527-543. 
315At 536 he stated that "[t]he Court today abandons text and 
longstanding precedent to adopt the [same conduct] theory ... " . 
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only if the jurisdiction's rules of criminal procedure happen to require 
the prosecution to submit a bill of particulars that cannot be 
exceeded" .316 Therefore, the same conduct test will in most cases 
not succeed in preventing the defendant from being tried twice.317 
Justice Scalia also raised his concern that adoption of a same conduct 
test would, eventually, lead to the application of an expanded same 
transaction test.318 
However, the only truly valid criticism raised by Justice Scalia is the 
following. The same conduct test as formulated in Grady 
necessitates that the evidence introduced to prove an essential 
element of the offence charged in the second prosecution, must prove 
conduct that constitutes an offence for which the accused had 
previously been convicted. If interpreted literally, it would mean that 
prosecution for a lesser included offence may follow upon prosecution 
for a greater offence; for example, a prosecution for drunken driving 
may follow a prosecution for vehicular homicide based on the same 
conduct. 319 In view of the purposes of double jeopardy protection 
set out in detail by the majority, Mr Justice Scalia seriously questioned 
316At 530. 
317/d. Land (933 note 132) rejected this objection as being without 
merit. He pointed out that the Court of Appeal (which long ago 
recognized expanded double jeopardy protection in the context of 
successive prosecutions) had adopted an essential procedural 
mechanism for assessing double jeopardy claims prior to trial. He 
explained that all nine federal circuits have held that "when a 
defendant puts double jeopardy in issue with a non-frivolous showing 
that an indictment charges him with an offense (sic) for which he was 
formerly placed in jeopardy, the burden shifts to the government to 
establish that there were in fact two separate offenses (sic)". In 
Land's view, this procedural mechanism ensures that the same 
conduct test may be implemented at a stage prior to trial. 
318At 536. 
319This example is taken from Thomas Modest Proposal 203. 
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whether this apparent limitation had any "rational basis". 320 
Certain legal commentators expressed concern over the fact that 
adoption of a same conduct test would lead to results that are 
contrary to "shared intuitions about what double jeopardy should 
forbid". 321 The fact that a person convicted or acquitted of a minor 
traffic offence may never be called to account in a subsequent legal 
proceeding for a death following from such traffic offence, 322 has led 
these commentators to believe that certain exceptions should be made 
to the same conduct test. Some exceptions suggested are the 
following: 
(i) A jurisdictional exception. 323 This would mean that a second 
prosecution would not be prohibited in terms of the same conduct test 
if the court of first prosecution had the required jurisdiction to hear the 
charges before it, but not the later charges. 324 However, this 
exception has not gained much ground since it permits the state to 
structure its judicial system in such a way that it forces the defendant 
to face successive proceedings for the same offence and consequently 
320At 542. 
321 See Thomas Modest Proposal 195. 
322See Clarke Ml "Double jeopardy revisited: Reflection on the recent 
expansion of protection" Western State University Law Review Vol 18 
1991 791, 802. The commentator expresses concern that when an 
overworked and understaffed District Attorney fails to monitor a case, 
"a criminal defendant may escape criminal prosecution ... ". 
323This exception is recognised in Indian law. See supra under 4.4.2, 
note 267 for a discussion of section 300(4) of the Indian Code of 
Criminal Procedure. 
324Justice Brennan raised the possibility of such an exception in Ashe 
v Swenson. See supra under 4.5.4. See also Poulin 922. 
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nullifies protection against double jeopardy. 325 
(ii) Limitation of double jeopardy protection to "grave" offences 
only. 326 The somewhat laboured argument raised in favour of such 
an exception can be summarised as follows. Conduct is the essence 
of criminal culpability. The res judicata principle presupposes that 
once determined culpability should not be redetermined. 327 
However, in the context of criminal proceedings, only serious 
culpability should be foreclosed. Therefore, double jeopardy protection 
should be limited to grave offences only. Grave offences are those for 
which incarceration is authorised. Consequently, double jeopardy 
protection should be afforded only against successive prosecutions for 
offences for which prison sentences are prescribed. 328 
(iii) Uncompleted offence. Prosecution for offences not ripe for 
prosecution at the time of the initial prosecution should not be barred 
in terms of the double jeopardy clause. This is the so-called Diaz due 
diligence exception discussed above. 329 
(iv) Collusion or manipulation by the defendant. 330 If a defendant 
325See Poulin 924, citing certain state decisions that rejected this 
possible exception on this basis. 
326See Thomas Modest Proposal 195, 216. 
327Thomas Modest Proposal 203. 
328Thomas Modest Proposal submits that this construction of double 
jeopardy protection is supported by the words used in the Fifth 
Amendment: Protection of "life and limb", in his view, is "1792 
shorthand n for "grave" penalties (at 218). 
329See text at note 237 under 4.5.2. 
330Poulin 919-9 21 discusses the merits of this exception. 
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through collusion with a public offficial obtains a conviction on a lesser 
charge in order to escape prosecution for a greater offence, the state 
should not be barred from proceeding on the greater charge. 
(v) Defendant responsible for separate proceedings. Justification for 
this exception lies in the fact that a defendant should not complain if 
he himself initiated the procedural steps that led· to· separate 
prosecutions. 331 
The year after Grady was decided, the Supreme Court recognised the 
first exception to the Grady same conduct test. In United States v 
Felix, 332 the court distinguished between cases arising out of a 
single course of conduct (single-layered conduct) and prosecutions for 
engaging in continuous criminal activity (multi-layered conduct). The 
court held that the Grady same conduct test could only be applied in 
the aforementioned cases. Therefore, the court concluded that a 
previous conviction for an attempt to manufacture illegal drugs did not 
bar the prosecution from subsequently charging the same person for 
conspiracy to manufacture the illegal drugs, even if the prosecution 
would rely on conduct (as an overt act to prove the separate 
conspiracy charge) of which the defendant had previously been 
convicted. 333 However, the court did not explain why Grady should 
be limited to cases pertaining to single-layered conduct. It also failed 
331 See supra under 4.2.1 for a discussion of the English case of 
Conelly that recognised this exception. 
332 112 S Ct 1377 (1992). 
333Before Grady the Supreme Court held in United States v Garret 4 71 
US 773 ( 1985) that a conspiracy charge and a substantive offence 
were not the same offence for double jeopardy purposes. In Felix the 
court maintained this ruling and reconciled it with Grady on the basis 
that Grady only applied to cases which arose out of a single course of 
conduct (at 1384). 
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to give guidelines to the courts enabling them to distinguish between 
single and multi-layered conduct. 334 The court merely stated that 
Grady was "less helpful" once the circumstances proceed beyond the 
lesser-included offence analysis endorsed in that decision. 335 
Felix sent a clear signal that the court was unwilling to give 
expanded protection in terms of the Grady same conduct test, 
particularly in respect of continuous criminal conduct. 
4.5.8 The downfall of Grady: United States v Dixon. 
The application of the Grady same conduct test only lasted three 
years. Instead of refining the test (for example by recognising 
exceptions to the rule), the Supreme Court opted to overrule itself in 
United States v Dixon. 336 Dixon reinstated the Blockburger test as 
the exclusive criterion for double jeopardy analysis. However, the 
majority could not even agree on how to apply this apparently 
straightforward test. Consequently, Dixon added even more confusion 
and inconsistency to this already complicated field of law. 
The issue facing the court in Dixon was "[w]hether the Double 
Jeopardy Clause bars prosecution of a defendant on substantive 
criminal charges based on the same conduct for which he previously 
has been held in criminal contempt of court". 337 Because the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals had consolidated the respective 
cases of Alvin Dixon and Michael Foster, the Supreme Court case of 
335At 1385. 
336 113 S Ct 2849 (1993). 
337At 2854. 
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Dixon involved two respondents. The first respondent, Dixon, was 
arrested for murder and released on bail. A condition of his release on 
the murder charge was that he should not commit any criminal offence 
and that violation of the release order would result in prosecution for 
contempt of court. He was subsequently convicted of contempt of 
court because he violated a drug law (possession of cocaine with the 
intent to distribute). 331t He was sentenced to 180 days 
imprisonment. He moved to have the drug violation charge dismissed 
on double jeopardy grounds. 
In the second case, Ana Foster obtained a civil protection order 
(CPO) against her husband, ordering that he not molest, assault or in 
any manner threaten or physically abuse her. 339 Ana subsequently 
filed three separate motions of contempt which alleged that her 
husband had made three separate threats and committed two assaults 
in violation of the order. Her attorney filed the motion but the state 
was already aware of the violations because a grand jury was 
investigating some charges of the same conduct. 340 Foster was 
acquitted of making the threats, but found guilty of the two assaults 
in the contempt proceedings. He was sentenced to 600 days in jail. 
In a later indictment he was charged with 
(i) simple assault (count 1) 
(ii) threatening to injure another (counts 2-4) and 
(iii) assault with intent to kill (count 5). 
All of these incidents had already been combined in the CPO 
proceedings. Foster, accordingly, also moved to have the subsequent 
indictment dismissed on double jeopardy grounds. 
338At 2853. 
339At 2853-2854. 
340At 2854. 
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Delivering the majority verdict, Justice Scalia held (in the first place) 
that, since criminal contempt is considered to be a crime, defendants 
in non-summary contempt proceedings should receive all the 
constitutional safeguards that defendants in criminal trials receive, 
including protection against double jeopardy.341 The court then 
proceeded to apply the Blockburger (same elements) test to the facts. 
It concluded that Dixon's subsequent prosecution should be barred, 
but only Foster's subsequent prosecution on count 1 . However, the 
majority disagreed concerning the proper application of the same 
elements test. For the sake of clarity, it is essential to give a brief 
synopsis of the differing applications of the Blockburger test by 
certain members of the court in Dixon. 
Justice Scalia supported a broad application of the Blockburger test. 
His application to some extent went beyond a mere comparison of the 
elements of the offences charged successively. He stated that, in the 
case of Dixon, the release order incorporated the entire Criminal Code 
of the State of Columbia. Drawing an analogy between Harris v 
Oklahoma342 and this case, he argued that the incorporation of the 
341 At 2855. Non-summary contempt proceedings are distinguished 
from summary contempt proceedings in that the former usually involve 
contempts that are committed out of the view of the court while the 
latter occur in the presence of the judge. See Chinnery A Y "United 
States v Dixon: The death of the Grady v. Corbin 'same conduct test' 
for double jeopardy" Rutgers Law Review Vol 47 1994 247, 267. 
The author explains (at 266) that this had been the first opportunity 
for the court to decide whether double jeopardy principles are also 
applicable to criminal contempt, because courts had tradititionally not 
issued orders or injunctions prohibiting violations of criminal law. See 
also Raith PA "Criminal law: Double trouble or double jeopardy -
'same conduct' (Grady) test overruled in favor [sic] of return to single 
'same element' (8/ockburger) test [United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 
2849 ( 1993)] Washburn Law Journal Vol 33 1993 429, 435 for a 
short summary of the development of criminal contempt proceedings 
in American law. 
342See supra under 4.5.5 for a discussion of this case. 
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Code in the court order made the substantive drug offence a lesser 
included offence of criminal contempt. 343 Therefore, since Dixon 
had already been prosecuted for the greater offence (contempt of 
court), he could not be prosecuted for the lesser included offence of 
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. He applied the same 
analysis to the simple assault charge (count 1) against Foster. Since 
the civil protection order forbade Foster from assaulting his· wife, the 
simple assault charge was a lesser included offence of contempt. 344 
However, Justice Scalia concluded that Foster could nevertheless be 
tried on the count of assault with intent to kill and the counts of 
threatening his wife, because in terms of Blockburger, each required 
proof that the other did not. 345 The contempt charge required 
proof of knowledge of the protective order and the charge of assault 
with intent to kill proof of specific intent. 346 Justice Scalia reached 
the same conclusion regarding the three criminal threat charges 
against Foster; in his view the charges mentioned above (on the one 
hand) and the contempt charge (on the other hand) each contained 
distinct elements. 347 
Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas on the 
application of B/ockburger) endorsed the traditional application of the 
Blockburger test. In the Chief Justice's view none of the criminal 
charges brought against Dixon or Foster were barred by the 
343At 2857. 
345At 2858. 
346At 2858-2859. The elements of the crime of criminal contempt are 
knowledge of a court order and wilful violation of one of the 
conditions of the order by the defendant. 
347 At 2859. 
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Blockburger test. 348 He criticised Justice Scalia's reliance on Harris 
in reaching the conclusion that the elements of possession with intent 
to distribute in Dixon's case and the elements of assault in Forster's 
case were incorporated into the elements of contempt. 349 He 
distinguished Harris on the ground that the elements of armed robbery 
were necessary in that case to prove felony-murder. 350 In his view, 
Harris should be limited to the context in which it arose:-- where the 
crimes in question are analogous to greater and lesser included 
offences. The elements of the crime of contempt did not require proof 
of a particular crime; therefore, Harris could not be understood as 
requiring the incorporation of the substantive criminal offence into the 
elements of contempt. 351 
Chief Justice Rehnquist also questioned how serious felonies like 
assault and possession of cocaine could logically be viewed as lesser 
offences of a relatively minor offence such as contempt. 352 He 
concluded that "Justice Scalia's double jeopardy analysis bears a 
striking resemblance to that found in Grady - not what one would 
expect in an opinion that overrules Grady". 353 
Justice White agreed with the majority that Blockburger barred the 
drug charge against Dixon and the simple assault charge against 
Foster. However, he expressed the point of view that Blockburger 
also barred the other charges against Foster (assault with intent to kill 
348At 2865. 
349At 2867. 
350See supra under 4.5.4 for a detailed discussion of this case. 
351 At 2867. 
352At 2868. 
353At 2867. 
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and threatening his wife). He reasoned as follows. The court orders 
merely "triggered the court's authority to punish the defendant(s) for 
acts already punishable under criminal law". 354 Therefore, he put 
the court orders aside and compared the elements of the substantive 
offences charged in the contempt and subsequent proceedings. 355 
This analysis led him to the conclusion that the offences charged 
subsequently by the state were either identical to or aggravated forms 
of the offences prosecuted in the respective contempt proceedings. 
In his view, this was prohibited in terms of the double jeopardy 
clause. 356 
Mr Justice White also considered the prosecution's argument that 
application of double jeopardy principles in the context of contempt 
proceedings woulds "cripple the power to enforce court orders or ... 
allow individuals to escape serious punishment for statutory criminal 
offenses [sic]" .357 He also acknowledged that delays in the 
operating of the criminal justice system were frustrating358 and that 
where the potential for violence exists delay could be perilous. 359 
However, his solutions to these difficult issues did not involve 
disregarding double jeopardy principles. Instead, he suggested that 
the courts "take appropriate steps to ensure that their authority is not 
flouted" .360 One option, in his view, would be to try the substantive 
354At 2876. 
356At 2875. 
357 At 2873. 
358At 2874. 
360At 2872. 
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and the contempt charge together. 361 The only remaining issue 
would then be to ensure that the total punishment would not exceed 
that authorised by the legislature. 362 
Justice Blackmun's opinion did not strictly relate to the scope of the 
Blockburger test. He agreed with the majority that the double jeopardy 
clause did not preclude the charges against Forster of assault with 
intent to kill and making threats. However, he felt that Dixon could 
also be prosecuted for the drug offence and Foster for the simple 
assault charge. He argued that the contempt and the substantive 
offence charges were not the same because they protected disparate 
interests. 363 Therefore, they could not even be compared in terms 
of the Blockburger test. He argued that the sole purpose of contempt 
proceedings is to vindicate the authority of the courts, and not to 
punish criminal offences. 364 He reasoned that contempt "punish[es] 
the specific offense [sic] of disobeying a court order" instead of 
"punishing an offense [sic] against the community at large" .365 He 
also warned that the majority's "willingness to overlook the unique 
interests served by contempt proceedings . . . . will undermine the 
courts' ability to respond effectively to unmistakable threats to their 
361 At 2873. 
362At 2874. 
363At 2880. 
365/d. He emphasised the difference between a battered woman who 
seeks an order to end the violence against her personally and society's 
interest in having the criminal law enforced. 
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own authority and those who have sought [the courts'] 
protection" . 366 
On concluding its Blockburger analysis, the court then turned to 
the same conduct test. The court noted that Grady would 
undoubtedly prohibit the subsequent prosecution of Foster on the four 
remaining counts because the state would only be able to rely on the 
exact same conduct. 367 However, Grady was overruled by a 
majority of 5-4. 368 The court held that Grady lacked "constitutional 
roots" 369 and has resulted in "confusion" inasmuch as it was 
"wholly inconsistent with earlier Supreme court precedent and with 
the clear common law understanding of double jeopardy" .370 
Blockburger, on the other hand, had in the majority's view "deep 
historical roots and has been accepted in numerous precedents of the 
Court". 371 • Having rejected the same conduct test, Justice 
Rehnquist accordingly remanded the case of Foster back to the State 
court to proceed on the remaining charges. 372 
In a separate dissenting opinion (Justice Blackmun, White, and 
366/d. Cf the similar views of Chinnery 281-290, who makes out a 
strong case that contempt proceedings should be excluded from 
double jeopardy protection. 
367Per Scalia J, at 2860. 
368Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Thomas and Kennedy joined Justice 
Scalia in this part of the opinion. 
369 At 2860. Justice Scalia further described Grady as a mistake which 
has contradicted an unbroken line of decisions. (At 2864). 
370 At 2864. Justice Scalia in fact pointed to his dissent in Grady as 
providing a basis for overruling Grady in Dixon (at 2860). 
371 At 2860. 
372/d. 
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Stevens concurring), Justice Souter questioned the constitutional 
adequacy of the Blockburger test. He identified a troublesome aspect 
which originated from the exclusive application of Blockburger in the 
context of successive prosecutions, namely that "the government 
could manipulate the definitions of offenses, [sic] creating fine 
distinctions among them and permitting a zealous prosecutor to try a 
person again and again for essentiallly the·same conduct". 373 Citing 
the famous Green dicta, 374 he concluded that the same conduct 
test best serve the interests which the double jeopardy clause was 
designed to protect.375 Accordingly, Justice Souter would have 
prohibited any further prosecution of Foster. 
Dixon's case has been widely critisised by academic 
commentators. 376 A shared concern of these writers are that 
373At 2883-2884. 
374See chapter three supra under 3.5.1, text at note 150. 
375At 2883. 
376See Chinnery 281,(evaluating Dixon as "an attempt to freeze double 
jeopardy protection at a level no greater than that which the Court 
believed that the Framers intended", and expressing the view that "[al 
test that could produce such varied applications can hardly be 
regarded as more workable than the purportedly unworkable Grady 
test"); Pace 794-795 (observing thatthe court focused on "historical 
application of the clause" instead of focusing on "the interests that the 
clause is intended to protect and develop a test that best protects 
those interests in the context of today's society and criminal justice 
system"); Henning 4 (stating that "the [Dixon] decision does not 
provide much meaningful guidance on how to judge whether a 
successive prosecution involves the same elements as the prior 
action"); Pamenter KA "'U.S. v. Dixon': The Supreme Court returns 
to the traditional standard for double jeopardy clause analysis" Notre 
Dame law Review Vol 69 1994 575, 577 (stating that "[t]he majority 
did not address the issue that the Blockburger standard does not 
satisfy the Green policy interests, but rather allows for piecemeal 
litigation"); Green P "Constitutional Law - Goodbye Grady! 
Blockburger wins the double jeopardy rematch" University of Arkansas 
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Blockburger fails to adequately protect the criminal defendant in 
modern society from being harassed more than once for which is 
essentially the same criminal conduct These concerns cannot be 
viewed as merely being theoretical. In the present American criminal 
justice system, new trends have developed that seriously implicate 
constitutional protection against double jeopardy. Increased focus on 
combating crime and repeat offenders have led to greater use of 
comprehensive statutory schemes (complex criminal statutes) such as 
the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Act (RIC0)377 
and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE)378 provision in the drug 
and money laundering statutes. 379 These comprehensive statutes 
at Little Rock Law Journal Vol 1 7 1995 369, 381 (aptly describing the 
Dixon decision as "woven from a tangled web of concurring and 
dissenting opinions" and expressing concern that" [u]nder Blockburger, 
the potential does indeed exist for prosecutorial abuse of fine 
distinctions and definitions in the elements of the crime, thus enabling 
a defendant to be repeatedly tried for the same offense [sic]"). Contra 
Blake 460 (expressing the view that "[f]or those of us who have 
sincere doubts that the founding fathers would have considered, for 
example, speeding and criminal homicide to be "the same" offense 
[sic], it [Blockburger] provides a fully satisfactory implementation of 
the constitutional safeguard [of double jeopardy]". In this author's (a 
practising prosecutor) view, Blockburger provides "the simple and 
effective rule for which our courts have been searching for more than 
100 years"). 
377 18 USC paras 1961-68 ( 1988). RICO requires proof that, among 
other things, the defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering 
activity involving violations of a long list of criminal statutes. See 
Henning 4 note 21 . 
37821 USC para 848 ( 1988). A continuing criminal enterprise involves 
drug violations undertaken by a group of five or more persons over 
whom the defendant occupies a supervisory or managerial position, 
and who derive substantial income or resources from the enterprise. 
See Henning 5, note 23. 
37918 USC paras 1956-57 ( 1988). Proof of money laundering requires, 
among other things, that the defendant engaged in "specified unlawful 
activity" that involves the receipt or transfer of funds arising from 
violations of a long list of criminal statutes. See Henning 5 note 23. 
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are all built on substantive offences. Therefore, constitutional 
protection against double jeopardy may be underminded by the 
legislature (as Justice Souter suggested)380 if Blockburger continues 
to be applied exclusively as a standard to determine the permissibility 
of successive prosecutions. 
However, the formulation of a same conduct test in Grady is not 
regarded unanimously as the ideal replacement of the traditional same 
elements test. Some legal commentators have questioned the 
practicality of this test and expressed themselves in favour of a 
broader same transaction test as has been advocated by Mr Justice 
Brennan in previous decisions. 381 Others expressed the view that, 
instead of overruling Grady, the court should have refined Grady by 
defining guidelines in regard to the application of the test in practice 
and delineating exceptions to the rule in the interest of society. 382 
It has been suggested that the judgment in Dixon could have justified 
the recognition of an exception in the case of non-summary criminal 
contempt prosecutions - the 11 underpinning interest of the contempt 
power as being irrelevant to the Double Jeopardy Clause 11 • 383 
One commentator expressed the alternative view that the 
380See supra, text at note 373. 
381 See Pace 800 (rejecting Blockburger as inadequate, but questioning 
Grady's efficacy because of the uncertainties surrounding the practical 
application of the test and the fact that "it does not guarantee that a 
defendant will not be subjected to the embarrrassment, expense and 
ordeal of the initial stages of a second prosecution until the court can 
make a double jeopardy determination") and Pamenter 595 (opining 
that Brennan's 11 same transaction 11 test best serves the policies set out 
in Green). 
382Chinnery 287. 
383See Chinnery 282 and the views of Justice Blackmun in Dixon 
discussed supra, text at note 363. 
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B/ockburger test (as confirmed in Dixon) would bring certainty and 
predictability in regard to the definitional issue of same offence. 384 
However, the differences of the majority (in Dixon) on the proper 
application of Blockburger has undoubtedly added confusion rather 
than certainty to this particular field of double jeopardy jurisprudence. 
It has been suggested, inter alia, that Justice Scalia's application of 
Blockburger, in reality focused on the facts underlying the contempt 
orders instead of on the statutory elements of the offences 
successively charged (as would be required in a strict application of 
Blockburger). 385 
Another commentator speculated that the broader application of 
Blockburger by Justice Scalia, namely by examining whether one 
offence has been incorporated as a lesser included offence of another 
(without necessarily enquiring whether each had an additional element 
distinct from the other), could permit courts to inquire more 
comprehensively into double jeopardy claims; particularly when it has 
to be established whether comprehensive statutory schemes 
incorporate more narrowly drawn provisions. 386 The author points 
out that in the past lower courts have consistenty found that CCE, 
RICO and money laundering offences387 are separate from the 
substantive offences on which the statutes are based and therefore, 
384Blake 460. 
385See Pamenter 593 and the opinion of Justice Rehnquist to the same 
effect, discussed supra text at note 353. 
386Henning 30. 
387See supra text at note 377 for a discussion of these particular 
offences. 
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do not qualify for double jeopardy protection.388 However, the 
author expresses the view that Justice Scalia's application of 
Blockburger in Dixon may be interpreted to mean that if the statutes 
cover the same "unit of conduct" they may be regarded as species of 
a lesser included offence that would bar a second prosecution389 -
a view that further blurs the distinction between the same conduct 
test and the Blockburger test. 
4.5.9 Summary 
* The development of double jeopardy jurisprudence in the field 
addressed in this chapter is characterised by inconsistency. This can 
be ascribed to a constant conflict of policy, namely whether inquiry 
into the concept same offence should go beyond a mere exarnination 
of the statutory elements of offences. The most important 
developments that occurred over the last century are noted below. 
* A modified version of the same evidence test was introduced in 
American law in the latter half of the previous century. The effect of 
the same evidence test as applied in America has resulted in 
prevention of subsequent prosecutions for greater as well as lesser 
included offences. However, similar to the Vandercomb test, the 
same evidence test (proposed in American law), focuses on the 
elements of the offences instead of on the evidence actually 
388Henning 30. In a state case cited by Henning (31) it was, for 
example, held that a guilty plea to conspiracy to possess marijuana 
does not bar a CCE indictment in which conspiracy is one of the 
predicate acts. This was also the approach adopted in US v Garret 
supra note 333 ( CCE charge not barred when underlying conduct 
subject of prior prosecution). In US v Felix (discussed supra, text at 
note 332) the Supreme Court relied on Garret in order to limit Grady 
to single-layered conduct. 
389Henning 31 . 
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presented. The test, initially applied to give effect to the legislature's 
intent in multiple-punishment single-trial cases, eventually also 
acquired the status of an exclusive test or criterion to determine 
whether a successive prosecution relates to the same offence of 
which the accused had previously been convicted or acquitted. The 
test has commonly been known and referred to as the Blockburger 
test. 
* During the 1970's, the Supreme Court recognised in the case of 
Ashe that the principle of issue estoppal is embodied in the 
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. Recognition of the 
principle as part of the constitutional guarantee was an important 
breakthrough. For the first time, the court focused on the underlying 
rationale of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. In 
Ashe, the court found that the state had used the first trial as a "dry 
run" for the second prosecution. The court regarded this kind of 
prosecutorial conduct to be precisely what the constitutional guarantee 
seeks to prevent, namely oppressive state conduct, abuse of power 
and harassment of the accused by multiple prosecutions. 
* However, inadequacies of the issue estoppal principle as a tool to 
protect the accused against oppressive state conduct (highlighted by 
Mr Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in Ashe), also posed 
other questions. These questions probe the essence of what 
constitutional protection against double jeopardy encompasses. Mr 
Justice Brennan for instance, expressed the point of view that a broad 
same transaction instead of a same elements test woulEI more 
effectively serve double jeopardy values. He pointed out that the 
tendency in modern criminal legislation to divide the phases of a 
criminal transaction into separate crimes enhances opportunies for 
continued prosecution for an essentially unitary criminal episode; a 
phenonemon which defeats the very purpose of the constitutional 
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guarantee against double jeopardy, namely the protection of the 
accused against "possible tyranny by an overzealous prosecutor" .390 
He consequently suggested that, in order to avoid potential 
harassment of the accused by the state, all charges arising out of a 
single criminal transaction ought (as a rule) to be joined in one charge. 
However, successive prosecutions for an essentially unitary criminal 
episode could be allowed if it were impossible to charge the accused 
with all the relevant offences at one trial, either because the crime 
(successively charged) had not yet occurred at the time of the first 
trial, or could not have been discovered despite due diligence on the 
part of the prosecutor. (The Diaz due diligence exception). He added 
that another exception would be necessitated if no single court had 
jurisdiction of all the alleged crimes and in circumstances where joinder 
of offences would be prejudicial to either the prosecution or the 
defence. 
* The identification of policies which underlie the rule against double 
jeopardy (in Ashe), paved the way for broader protection in this area 
of double jeopardy jurisprudence. The Supreme Court handed down 
a number of decisions in the 1970's and 1980's which suggest that 
constitutional protection against double jeopardy require not only an 
investigation into the elements of offences successively charged but 
also into the underlying criminal conduct. This shift in emphasis can 
be ascribed to the fact that the court recognised that relitigation of 
issues already resolved in the first trial enhances the possibility of 
state abuse of power. 
* However, the developments described above never resulted in 
adoption of a broader same transaction test. Instead, the court opted 
for a two-tiered test which focuses on elements of offences as well as 
390At 459 of his opinion in Ashe. 
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the actual conduct being prosecuted once again. In Grady the Supreme 
Court endorsed a two-tiered test which involves an application of the 
same evidence test (Blockburger), and a same conduct test. In Grady, 
the test was applied in the following way. First of all, the Blockburger 
test was applied to determine whether the offence prosecuted 
qualified (in terms of its elements) as a lesser or a greater included 
offence of another offence of which the accused had previously been 
convicted or acquitted. Because the court found that the offences 
charged successively did not qualify as lesser or greater included 
offences in terms of Blockburger, it was also considered whether the 
state (in the second trial) had relied on conduct that constitutes an 
offence for which the accused has already been prosecuted. In Grady 
the subsequent prosecution was barred on the basis that the state 
relied on the same conduct as that relied on in the first trial to prove 
the offence charged in the second trial. 
* The policy considerations underlying the Grady two-tiered test as 
reflected in the majority opinion delivered by Mr Justice Brennan in 
Grady are that the Blockburger test is insufficient to adequately protect 
the accused against double jeopardy. On the facts present in Grady, 
exclusive application of the Blockburger test would have allowed not 
less than four successive trials for the same criminal conduct. The 
majority in Grady pointed out that an exclusive application of 
Blockburger could defeat the values which underlie the constitutional 
guarantee against double jeopardy; multiple prosecutions for 
essentially the same conduct not only raise concerns of an enhanced 
sentence, but also about providing an unfair opportunity for the state 
to improve on its presentation of evidence (including cross-examination 
of witnesses for the defence) in the first trial, thereby enhancing the 
possibility that an innocent person could be found guilty. These 
considerations led the majority in Grady to believe that the state had 
no legitimate interest in relitigating the first fact finder's culpability 
258 
determination. 
* The test proposed in Grady prohibits relitigation of the same 
criminal conduct. There is a subtle difference between the same 
conduct on the one hand, and the presentation of the same actual 
evidence on the other hand. The same conduct test (as explained in 
Grady) does not necessarily bar the introduction of the same evidence 
which was presented in the previous trial. The crucial enquiry is 
whether the criminal conduct which has already been adjudicated upon 
in the first trial (in Grady, the driving of a motor car on the wrong side 
of the road), again forms the subject of adjudication in the second 
trial. It follows that the introduction of similar fact evidence in a trial 
is not prohibited in terms of the test. 
* It has also been pointed out that application of the same conduct 
test in practice may give rise to a number of difficulties. Concerns 
raised in this regard are the following. A person convicted or 
acquitted of a minor traffic offence might never be called to account 
in a subsequent legal proceeding for a death following from such 
traffic offence. Therefore, legal commentators have suggested that 
certain exceptions should be introduced to the rule. Proposed 
exceptions are, inter alia, the following: prosecution for the more 
serious offence is not possible at the time of the first trial (the Diaz 
due diligence exception); the accused obtains a conviction of the less 
serious offence as a result of collusion with a public officer, and the 
accused is responsible for the institution of the procedural steps that 
leads to separate prosecutions. 
* A second criticism which deserves to be mentioned is that raised 
by Justice Scalia in his minority opinion in Grady. Justice Scalia 
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questioned the "rational basis" 391 of the same conduct test as 
proposed in Grady on the basis that if the evidence introduced in the 
second trial to prove an essential element of the offence charged must 
prove conduct that constitutes an offence of which the accused had 
prevously been convicted or acquitted, it would mean that prosecution 
for a lesser offence may follow upon prosecution for a greater offence. 
For instance, prosecution for drunken driving could follow on a 
prosecution for vehicular manslaughter based on the same conduct. 
This can be explained as follows. If the prosecution relies on the 
drunken driving conduct of X ( which had been relied on in the first 
trial on a charge of vehicular manslaughter) to prove the offence of 
drunken driving in the second trial, the Grady test would not assist the 
accused because the conduct relied on in the second trial would not 
qualify as conduct that constitutes an offence for which the accused 
had previously been convicted. 
* In US v Felix the Supreme Court delineated the first exception to 
the Grady same conduct test. The court limited the application of the 
criterion to cases arising out of a single course of conduct (single-
layered conduct) as opposed to cases arising out of continuous 
criminal activity (multi-layered conduct). Felix gave a clear indication 
that the court was unwilling to give expanded protection to the 
accused in terms of the same conduct test, particulary in the field of 
continuous criminal conduct. The court did not explain why Grady 
should be limited to single-layered conduct, or how courts should 
distinguish between single and multi-layered conduct. 
* The Grady same conduct test was subsequently rejected by the 
Supreme Court in US v Dixon. Faced with the difficult issue of 
determining whether the double jeopardy clause barred prosecution of 
391 Per Justice Scalia in a minority opinion in Grady 536. 
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an accused on substantive criminal charges for the same conduct of 
which he has prevously been held to be in criminal contempt of court, 
the court opted to resort to Blockburger as the exclusive criterion for 
determining sameness of offences. The majority of the court preferred 
this approach to recognition of more exceptions to the same conduct 
test. However, the division of the majority on the proper application 
of Blockburger added more confusion than certainty in this particular 
field of double jeopardy jurisprudence. It has been suggested, for 
instance, that Justice Scalia's application of the Blockburger test (in 
Dixon), namely by examining whether an offence is incorporated as 
a lesser included offence of another without necessarily inquiring 
whether each offence has an additional element distinct from the 
other, in reality focused on the facts underlying the contempt orders 
instead of on the statutory elements of the offences {as required by a 
strict reading of Blockburger). However, it has also been observed 
that a broader application of Blockburger, namely by examining 
whether one offence is incorporated as a lesser included offence of 
another without necessarily enquiring whether each offence has an 
additional element distinct from the other, may result in expanded 
protection where it is found that comprehensive statutory schemes 
incorporate more narrowly drawn provisions. 
* The above observations regarding the ambit of the Blockburger test 
after Dixon, can be described as mere speculation of future double 
jeopardy jurisprudence in this particular field. Whereas Dixon and 
Grady both turned on a single vote, the question of whether 
Blockburger provides adequate double jeopardy protection for 
defendants may still be revisited in American constitutional 
jurisprudence. 
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4.6 SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
4.6.1 General 
As indicated in chapter three, colonial courts relied exclusively on 
common law principles in order to solve double jeopardy issues.392 
It was only in 1933, in the case of R v Manasewitz, 393 that the 
Appellate Division laid the foundation for the application of broader 
principles based upon equittable considerations in this particular field 
of law. However, before considering the Manasewitz decision, it is 
necessary to focus on a number of the early cases. 
As a point of departure it is essential to point out that the courts (in 
the early cases) did not draw a proper distinction between rules which 
prohibit multiple punishment in one trial on the one hand and rules 
which prohibit successive prosecutions for the same offence on the 
other hand. This can be ascribed to a failure by the courts to consider 
the particular values which underlie each of these prohibitions. 
Instead, the courts simply referred to both these different procedural 
phenomena as "splitting of charges" .394 The result of this approach 
was that the same criteria came to be applied in both contexts; cases 
which dealt with the issue of multiple charges in one trial relied upon 
decisions dealing with the pleas of former jeopardy and vice versa. It 
was only in 1936 that the Appellate Division drew a distinction 
392The courts relied on English textbooks and authoraritive case law 
dealing with the pleas, for example the early common law decisions of 
Elrington and Miles. See chapter two supra under 2.3.2, text at notes 
1 25 and 138 for a detailed discussion of these decisions. 
393Supra. 
394See for example R v Van der Merwe 19 21 TPD 1, 4 where the 
court, in dealing with a plea of autrefois acquit referred to cases 
which have been decided on the question of "splitting of charges". 
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between these separate prohibitory rules in criminal procedure. 395 
During the 1960's and 1970's the courts expanded protection in 
respect of successive prosecutions, in other words in true double 
jeopardy situations. 396 However, most probably as a result of the 
failure of our courts to distinguish between these different procedural 
rules in the early cases, the belief has persisted that the criteria to 
determine the permissibility of multiple punishment in one trial, on the 
one hand, and the criteria to determine the permissibility of successive 
prosecutions, on the other hand, are the same. 397 
This thesis will demonstrate to the contrary that the accused in 
South Africa has particularly over the last four decades, enjoyed 
broader protection against successive prosecution for the same 
offence in a multi-trial context than against the splitting of charges in 
a single-trial context. This will become apparent in the following 
discussion of the case law. 
4.6.2 The early cases (1855-1930) 
In the first decisions in which the defence raised the pleas of former 
jeopardy, colonial courts applied the criteria advanced in English case 
law to determine the sameness of offences. The most popular of 
395Ex parte Min of Justice: In re Rex v Moseme 1936 AD 52, 
discussed in detail infra under 4.6.3. 
396See S v Davidson 1964 (1) SA 192 (T) and S v Ndou 1971 (1) SA 
668 (A). 
397See Hiemstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses 5th ed by Kriegler J 
1993 222 (hereinafter referred to as Hiemstra 1993 ed) stating that 
"(d]ie vraag of daar verdubbeling van aanklagte is [in een verhoor], 
word presies net so benader soos die vraag of die beskuldigde al 
voorheen weens dieselfde misdaad tereggestaan het". Cf also Du Toit 
et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act Service 11, 1993 
14-5. 
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these were the in peril test and the same evidence ( Vandercomb) 
test. 398 The following cases are examples of early application of 
the in peril test. 
In R v Umbambeni399 the court allowed a subsequent prosecution 
for rape after an acquittal for indecent assault on the basis that the 
accused was not in jeopardy of a conviction of rape at the previous 
trial. 400 This approach was endorsed in R v Nkani. 401 In that 
case, the court allowed a subsequent prosecution for indecent assault 
after conviction of a statutory offence prohibiting the use of indecent 
language (arising from the same incident). The court argued that the 
offences were quite distinct because "the prisoner will not have been 
in peril or jeopardy for the same offence if he be now tried for indecent 
assault" .402 Nkani was followed by R v Samoosing and 
Others403 (a decision by the same Division), in which the court 
allowed a charge of assault after a conviction of breach of the peace 
(arising from the same facts) on the ground that there was not "that 
identity of crime which would justify us in coming to the conclusion 
that as a matter of fact he had been in jeopardy twice for the same 
offence" . 404 The court per Bale CJ, remarked obiter that "as a 
general rule, where as here, two crimes arose out of the same 
transaction .... it is better that the man should be tried for the major 
398See chapter two supra under 2.3.2 for a discussion of the 
development of these tests in English law. 
399( 1895) 16 NLR 61. 
400At 62. 
401 (1903) 24 NLR 255. 
402At 258. 
403(1905) 26 NLR 145. 
404At 146. 
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crime" .405 
During the first decades of this century, the in peril test was also 
applied frequently by other divisions of the Supreme Court, 406 and 
eventually approved of and applied by the Appellate Division in R v 
Long.407 An example of the early application of the same evidence 
or Vandercomb test can be found in Kerr v Rex408 which was 
decided in 1907. The facts were as follows. The accused was 
charged of murder in the first trial. The evidence presented by the 
crown was that he first committed a rape and subsequently in order 
to hide the traces of that crime committed murder. The jury disagreed 
and the presiding judge discharged them. Thereafter the Solicitor-
General withdrew the indictment on which the court discharged the 
accused. Shortly afterwards he was charged with rape and murder 
arising from the same incident previously adjudicated upon. His plea 
of autrefois acquit was upheld by the court on the murder charge on 
the basis ·that the withdrawal of the indictment amounted to a 
"stoppage of a prosecution" which was then valid in terms of a 
specific section of an Ordinance409 which entitled the accused to a 
verdict of acquittal. For the purpose of this discussion the central 
issue was whether he could nevertheless be charged subsequently for 
rape as the evidence in both charges would have been the same.410 
406See inter alia R v Cassiem 1914 CPD 886,889; R v Mabengu 1914 
EDL 21, 22; Gwenca v Rex 1938 NPD 163; Neethling v South 
African Railways and Harbours 1938 AD 487, 492. 
407 1958 ( 1) SA 115 (A). See infra under 4.6.4 for a discussion of this 
case. 
408( 1907) EDL 324. 
409Section 9 of Ordinance 40 of 1828. 
410At 340. 
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The court relied on the common law and concluded that " [whereas] 
the· evidence necessary to support the second indictment would [not] 
have been sufficient to procure a legal conviction upon the first", the 
plea of former jeopardy could not be sustained. 411 The court 
argued that even though the evidence in both charges was to a great 
extent the same, it did not follow that the two offences successively 
charged were necessarily the same. In the court's view, a person 
indicted and acquitted for murder could still be tried for rape because 
"in contemplation of law the one does not include the other" .412 
The court considered the rule laid down by Cockburn CJ in 
Elrington's case, 413 namely that a series of charges should not be 
preferred out of the same facts. 414 However, it held that the case 
at hand could be distinguished from Elrington. The court stated that 
in Elrington, the defendant had been acquitted of assault and that the 
court (in that case) had ruled that he could not again be tried for the 
same assault in a more aggravated form. The court continued by 
explaining the difference between the case at hand and the decision 
in Elrington as follows415 
That [Elrington's case] was, therefore, a case of crime 
within a crime, the assault in both instances being one 
and the same act. We have a similar rule in our own 
criminal practice, which does not allow of a splitting up 
411 /d. The court referred inter alia to Archbold 1900 ed 155 and the 
discussion therein of the facts and test (same evidence test) advanced 
in Vandercomb's case. 
412At 342. 
413See chapter two supra under 2.3.2, text at note 125 for a 
discussion of this case. 
414At 342. 
415/d. 
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of charges, where in reality they are comprised in one 
transaction ..... But rape and murder are not the same 
crime or transaction, although on an indictment for rape 
or murder a verdict of assault is a possible and a legal 
verdict. 
In an approach similar to that adopted in Vandercomb, the court in 
Kerr focused upon the legal elements of offences in order to determine 
their sameness and not on the similarity of the evidence presented in 
both trials, despite the fact that the test employed was labelled the 
same evidence test. 416 
A third test suggested during this early period was the single intent 
criterion. First suggested in cases which dealt with the issue of 
splitting of charges in a single trial, 417 it was thereafter also applied 
in cases which dealt with the pleas of former jeopardy.418 Therefore 
it is essential to explain this criterion's evolvement in the case law. 
In R v Sabuyi, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether 
convictions and cumulative sentences for both the offences of 
unlawful breaking into a home and theft amounted to an improper 
splitting of charges. The court concluded that it did. Innes CJ 
416The same evidence test was subsequently applied in Petersen v Rex 
1910 TPD 859. In that case, the court allowed a subsequent 
prosecution (on the same facts) for gross indecency following on an 
acquittal of indecent assault on the ground that the parties had 
consented. The court argued (at 866) that "there are other elements 
in a charge of indecent assault which are entirely wanting in a case of 
contravention of the section in question [gross indecency 1". 
417The test was first introduced in R v Sabuyi 1905 TS 170, a case 
which dealt with the issue of improper splitting of charges in a single 
trial. 
418See for example R v Van der Merwe supra discussed infra, text at 
note 427. 
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approached the problem as follows. He observed that although the 
offences charged were separate criminal offences in law "that does 
not in itself settle the question" .419 He continued by saying 
that420 
where a man commits two acts of which each, standing 
alone, would be criminal, but does so with a single 
intent, and both acts are necessary to carry out that 
intent, then it seems to me that he ought only to be 
indicted for one offence; because the two acts 
constitute one criminal transaction ....... [Thus] where the 
intent with which the man breaks into the premises is the 
intent which he successfullly carries out afterwards, then 
it seems to me that his conduct should be regarded as 
constituting not two crimes, but one crime. 
Sabuyi was followed by Gordon v Rex,421 another multiple charges 
single trial decision. In that case, the court relied on the English 
decision of Vandercomb and applied the same evidence test to 
determine the permissibility of multiple charges in one trial. 422 
However, Kotze JP's formulation of the test differed from the 
Vandercomb version and is strongly reminiscent of the American 
model. 423 He suggested that424 
419At 171. 
4201d. 
where two different indictments or counts each lay a 
charge differing in its elements from that laid in the other, 
though they both relate to one transaction, there the 
offences are separate and distinct. 
421 1909 EDC 254. 
422At 264. 
423See supra under 4. 5. 2 for a discussion of the test advanced in the 
early American decision of Morey v Commonwealth. 
424At 269, (my emphasis) remarking that this rule is also supported by 
Kerr v Rex. 
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However, the traditional same evidence test (the Vandercomb 
version) was thereafter again applied by another division in R v 
Klaas. 425 In that case (which allowed a charge of housebreaking and 
theft after a previous acquittal of sedition arising from the same 
incident) the court reiterated the reasoning adopted in Kerr, namely 
that the fact of the same actual evidence being relied on in both cases, 
was not sufficient to bar the subsequent charges~426 -
In R v Van der Merwe427 the Transvaal Provincial Division applied 
both the same evidence and the single intent tests in the context of 
successive prosecutions. Van der Merwe was first charged and 
acquitted of a statutory offence of indecently exposing his person. 
Thereafter he was charged of soliciting a woman on the basis of the 
same facts. The defence raised the plea of autrefois acquit, arguing 
that, the exposure was a mere continuation of soliciting in an 
aggravated form. It was submitted that all the acts of the accused 
were part of the same transaction; the indecent exposure being 
merely another step in the accused's main object, namely soliciting of 
the woman. In the defence's view, because all the acts of the 
accused formed part of the same transaction, there had been a 
splitting of charges. 428 
Mason J, rejected this argument. In his view, the evidence did not 
reveal that the accused had exposed himself with the object of 
obtaining compliance with his rejected request already refused (namely 
to have sexual intercourse with the woman) but rather amounted to a 
425 1915 CPD 58. 
426At 63. 
427Supra. 
42aAt 2. 
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separate "act of a dirty minded man". 429 Therefore, the single 
intent test could not assist the accused. The court also applied the 
same evidence test, commenting that this test as suggested in the 
decisions "seems on the whole a fair and reasonable test" .430 The 
court then concluded that since each of the crimes could be proved by 
evidence "which had no necessary connection with the evidence on 
the other charges" the plea of autrefois acquit could not be 
sustained. 431 
4.6.3 Refinement of double jeopardy principles during the 1930's -
Dayzell, Manasewitz and Moseme 
· The courts handed down three decisions during this period which 
refined the law of double jeopardy in the context adressed in this 
chapter. In the first of these, R v Dayzel/, 432 the exception of 
subsequent death was recognised.433 Dayzell was indicted for 
culpable homicide despite the fact that prior to the death of the 
deceased and on the same evidence, he had been convicted of the 
statutory offence of negligent driving. The defence did not raise the 
plea of autrefois acquit (common law authorities being not being very 
helpful to their case), 434 but relied on section 385 of Act 31 of 191 7 
429At 4. 
430/d. 
431/d. 
432 1932 WLD 157. 
433See supra under 4.2.1, 4.4.2 and 4.5.2 for a discussion of 
recognition of this exception in other legal systems. 
434See chapter two supra under 2.3.2, text at note 127 for a 
discussion of English common law law on this issue. 
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which provided that435 
[w]here an act or omission constitutes an offence under 
two or more Statutes, or is an offence against the 
Statute and the common law, the offender shall, unless 
the contrary intention appears, be liable to be prosecuted 
and punished under either Statute or (as the case may 
be) under the Statute or the common law, but shall not 
be liable to more than one punishment for the act or 
omission constituting the offence. 
The submission of the defence that the accused had, in terms of this 
provision, already been convicted of an act or omission identical to the 
act or omission set out in the second indictment was rejected by the 
court. Krause J argued that at the time when the accused had been 
charged with the act of negligent driving, no offence under the 
common law has as yet arisen because the offence of culpable 
homicide had only originated with the death of the person injured. In 
other words, the section could not assist the accused because the 
common law offence only arose after the trial for the statutory 
offence. 436 
The second case, R v Manasewitz, 437 is regarded as one of the 
landmark decisions on double jeopardy. It is also one of the most 
difficult decisions to understand in the field of double jeopardy. A 
number of complicated issues concerning the application of the rule of 
res judicata were raised in this case. However, the immediate 
discussion will deal mainly with the broader principles of double 
jeopardy introduced in this case, inasmuch as they are relevant to the 
435This provision still forms part of the present Criminal Procedure Act 
(section 336 of Act 51 f 1977). 
436At 159. 
437Supra. 
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issues addressed in this chapter. 438 
The facts of this case were as follows. M was charged in the 
magistrate's court with defrauding the Secretary for Lands. He was 
convicted. He then successfully appealed to the Transvaal Provincial 
Division on the ground that it was the Union Government which had 
been prejudiced by his misrepresentation and not the Secretary of 
Lands. He was subsequently prosecuted in the magistrate's court on 
a charge of having defrauded the Union Government. He raised the 
plea of autrefois acquit which was rejected and he was convicted of 
fraud. He then appealed once again to the Transvaal Provincial 
Division, contending that he had been in jeopardy of a conviction of 
fraud of the Union Government at the first trial despite having been 
charged with fraud of the Secretary of Lands in that tria1. His appeal 
was dismissed and he then appealed to the Appellate Division. The 
matter was argued twice in the Appellate Division. 439 At the first 
hearing, the central issue before the court was whether the accused 
was legally in jeopardy of being convicted of the crime of fraud to the 
prejudice of the Union Government at the first trial (despite the fact 
that fraud of the Secretary of Lands was alleged in the charge sheet). 
The majority of the court (Stratford ACJ, Beyers JA and De Villiers 
JA) first of all affirmed that they had the power to go beyond the 
decision of the provincial division (a decision that fraud of the 
Secretary of Lands did not also amount to fraud of the Union 
Government). In other words, the court did not regard that particular 
438Manasewitz is once again discussed in the paragraph which deals 
with issue estoppal. See infra under 4.6.9. 
439 1933 AD 165 and 1934 AD 95. 
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decision as res judicata. 440 The court then ruled that if the appellant 
had been legally in jeopardy at this first trial of being convicted of the 
offence with which he was charged at his second trial, he could validly 
plead autrefois acquit at his second trial. In order to determine this 
question the majority felt that it ought to have the record of the first 
trial before it. In the second hearing (after having obtained the 
record), it was held (per Stratford JA, Beyers JA De Virliers JA and 
Gardiner AJA) that the first charge had by implication in fact meant, 
that prejudice had been caused to the Secretary of Lands in his 
capacity as a servant of the Union Government. In other words, that 
the Union Government had in fact been prejudiced. It followed that M 
had been in jeopardy at his first trial of being convicted of the offence 
with which he was charged subsequently. Therefore, the court 
concluded that his plea of former jeopardy should have been sustained 
at the second trial. 
It is clear that the court applied the in peril test in this case in order 
to determine the permissibility of the second trial. 441 However, the 
importance of the decision lies in the fact that the Appellate Division 
also introduced broader criteria based on Roman and Roman-Dutch law 
to determine whether a subsequent prosecution should be prohibited. 
440This particular aspect of the judgment, namely that the majority of 
the Appellate Division did not regard the provincial division's decision 
as res judicata, is considered and explained in the paragraphs that deal 
with the doctrine of issue estoppal infra under 4.6.9, text at note 567. 
441 The majority agreed that in order to succeed with a plea of autrefois 
acquit, it had to be shown that the court had jurisdiction, that the 
accused was in jeopardy at the first trial and acquitted on the merits. 
See the opinions of Wessels CJ 173; De Villiers JA 179, 181; 
Stratford JA 1 73 and Curlewis JA dissenting in part but endorsing the 
view (at 188) that "a plea of former acquittal or conviction is a good 
defence to a second indictment not only for the same crime, but also 
for any other crime of which the accused might in law have been 
convicted on the first indictment". 
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In his judgment, Wessels CJ made certain statements that substantiate 
this understanding of the decision. He stated that in South African 
law, "a plea of autrefois acquit is in fact equivalent to a plea of the 
exceptio rei judicatae" of Roman law. 442 Relying on a text by 
Voet,443 he explained that no distinction is made between civil and 
criminal matters with regard to the plea of former jeopardy in our 
law. 444 The principles of the exceptio rei judicatae, as recognised 
in civil law,. should therefore also find application in the field of 
criminal law. The Chief Justice explained that in terms of these 
principles "the question whether a defendant is being vexed again for 
the same cause of action depends not upon technical considerations 
but upon matters of substance". 445 This principle is also at a later 
stage reiterated by Wessels CJ in the following terms446 
The application of the rule depends not upon any 
technical considerations of the identity of forms of 
action, but upon matters of substance. 
Beyers JA supported these views, observing that the exceptio rei 
judicatae finds application in both civil and criminal cases. 447 He 
added that the doctrine of res judicata originated from notions of 
442At 168, expressing the view that the maxim nemo debet bis vexari 
is derived from the Roman law of the exceptio rei judicatae. 
44344.2.1. See chapter two supra under 2.2, text at note 14 for this 
text. 
444At 169, citing Voet 44.2.1. 
445/d. The Chief Justice relied on the common law decision of 
Brunsden v Humphrey 14 QBD 141, 147-148. 
446At 169-170. 
447 At 176. The judge relied upon Voet 44.2.1. 
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fairness and reasonableness448 
Die leer van res judicata is juis die gevolg van en het 
ontstaan uit die natuurllike billikheidsgesvoel wat die 
woorde non bis in idem of nemo debet bis vexari ens. ten 
grondslag le. Dit druis teen die natuurlike regsgevoel of 
regskapenheid in dat iemand tweemaal vir dieselfde 
misdaad moet vervolg of gestraf word. 
The broader principles of res judicata introduced in Manasewitz 
paved the way for expanded protection in the particular field of 
double jeopardy addressed in this chapter. The emphasis placed on 
"matters of substance" as opposed to "technical considerations" 449 
sent a clear signal to the courts that the artificial same evidence and 
in peril tests, (although useful), could not be regarded as the only 
criteria to determine whether a successive prosecution ought to be 
prohibited on double jeopardy grounds. Nevertheless, the courts 
continued to apply these common law tests during the 1950' s and 
1960's. The only exception was S v Davidson. 450 In that case, the 
Transvaal Provincial Division (on the strength of Manasewitz) afforded 
broader protection to the accused by focusing upon the criminal 
conduct successively charged instead of the legal elements of the 
offences successively charged. This approach was subsequently (in 
the early 1970's) considered and approved of by Appellate Division in 
S v Ndou. 451 These cases will only be discussed at a later stage in 
this chapter. 452 
448At 178. 
449See supra texts at notes 445 and 446. 
450 1964 (1) SA 192 (T). 
451 1971 ( 1) SA 668 (A). 
452See infra under 4.6.5 and 4.6.6. 
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The third and final decision which deserves specific mention under 
the present heading, is the decision of the Appellate Division in Ex 
parte Minister of Justice: In re Rex v Moseme. 453 This decision 
finally brought clarity with regard to the difference between the pleas 
of former jeopardy and the rule against improper splitting of charges 
in one trial. De Villiers JA explained (in this case) that the question of 
splitting of charges can only arise in a case where an- accused is 
charged in one and the same trial with several offences arising out of 
the same act or with a connected series of acts or transaction. 454 
The pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict on the other hand, 
may be raised by a person who, previously acquitted or convicted of 
an offence, is subsequently charged with "an offence or offences 
arising out of the same transaction. "455 
The judge continued by explaining that the rule against splitting of 
charges in one single trial did not originate from the maxim nemo 
debet bis vexari. Instead, he suggested that the rule "owes its origin 
to the necessity of confining the magistrates' courts jurisdiction as to 
punishment within its due merits". 456 He explained that if acts 
constituting "one offence in substance" were allowed to be split up 
into several offences and all such offences charged against the 
accused in one trial, it would have the effect of multiplying by several 
times the magistrates' jurisdiction with regard to the imposition of 
453 1936 AD 52. 
454At 57. 
456At 58. De Villiers JA relied upon the early case of Regina v Marinus 
1887 (5 Juta 350) for this suggested rationale of the rule. In that 
case, the court described it an "objectionable practice" to split up 
charges and so to enable the court to impose punishment, on the 
whole, far in excess of the limit of the jurisdiction conferred on it by 
the legislature. 
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punishment. 457 He continued by pointing out that in applying the 
rule against splitting of charges, the courts have experienced difficulty 
in deciding whether, in a particular case, the accused's conduct 
constitutes only "one offence in substance" .458 He then referred to 
the various tests advanced in different decisions namely, the single 
intent test (suggested in Sabuyi's case)459 and the same evidence 
test suggested in Gordon's case), 460 and concluded that, depending 
457 At 58. The court relied on the early case of Rex v Marinus 1887 (5 
Juta 350) in which Buchanan J identified the rationale which underlies 
the rule against splitting of charges in this sense. The rationale of the 
rule was subsequently reconsidered by the Appellate Division in S v 
Grob/er 1966 ( 1) SA 511 (A). In this case the court pointed out that 
the rule is also essential to prevent multiple punishment of the accused 
for the same act. The court also explained (at 5238) that an improper 
duplication of conviction may prejudice an accused in the sense that 
a number of previous convictions proved against him may render him 
liable to one or other form of compulsory punishment upon a 
conviction of another offence in a subsequent trial. Cf also the views 
of Coetzee TF "Splitsing van aanklagte" South African Journal of 
Criminal Justice 1993 Vol 6 292 on the rationale of the rule. 
458At 59. 
459See supra text at note 4 1 7 for a discussion of Sabuyi' s case. 
460See supra, text at note 421 for a discussion of Gordon's case. In 
S v Grob/er (supra) the court seemingly added another test to 
determine whether there is an improper duplication of charges in one 
trial. The court emphasised the conduct of the accused by enquiring 
whether all the criminal aspects of the accused's conduct could be 
contained in the same charge. (At 5238 Wessels JA enquired whether 
"the whole of the criminal conduct imputed to the accused constitutes 
in substance only one offence which could have been properly 
embodied in one all-embracing charge" .(My emphasis). However, as 
pointed out by Du Toit et al ( 14-7) Service 12 1993 this is merely a 
different expression of the same evidence test. The focus remains on 
the elements or legal ingredients of the offences; if the criminal 
aspects or elements of the offences differ, they cannot be contained 
in one charge and then the test would not prevent multiple charges. 
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on the circumstances, both these tests, or only one may be applied in 
order to determine whether an improper splitting of charges has 
occurred. 461 
The judge then discussed the pleas of former jeopardy. He 
concluded that, in order to succeed with these pleas "it is as a 
general rule essential for an accused person to show (inter a/ia), that 
he was legally in jeopardy, on his first trial of being convicted of the 
offence wherewith he is charged on his second trial" .462 
During the next three decades, the in peril test as applied in 
Manasewitz and approved of in Moseme, was employed by our courts 
in the vast majority of double jeopardy decisions.463 A number of 
these decisions will be considered in the text that follows. 
4.6.4 The "in peril" test acquires superior status - { 1940-1970). 
The in peril test was again applied by the Appellate Division in R v 
long. 464 The accused was charged with theft of shares. At the 
close of the state's case she was discharged on the ground that the 
evidence did not make out a prima facie case of theft of shares. She 
461 At 159. 
462At 60, citing Rex v Manasewitz as authority. 
463See Neethling v South African Railways and Harbours 1938 AD 
492; Gwenca v Rex 1938 NPD 163; R v long 1958 ( 1) SA 115 (A); 
R v Ngetu 1958 (4) SA 175 (C); O'Neill v South African Railways 
and Harbours 1958 (3) SA 269 (A); R v Hlengwa 1958 (4) SA 160 
(N); R v Schuza 1959 (3) SA 538 (T); R v Constance 1960 (4) SA 
629 (A); S v Makutani 1961 (3) SA 799 (T); S v Sikiti 1962 ( 1) SA 
493 (E); S v Xoswa and Another 1964 (2) SA 459 (C); S v Poke/a 
1968 (4) SA 702 (E) and S v Watson 1970 ( 1) SA (RA) 3201. 
464Supra. 
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was then charged (on the same facts) of theft of money. This time it 
was alleged that she stole the proceeds of the sales of the shares in 
the form either of the cheques or of the money represented by the 
cheques. 465 She raised the plea of autrefois acquit which was 
rejected by the court. In an appeal to the Appellate Division on the 
ground that she had previously been acquitted (in terms of section 
169(2)(d) of the Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955)461> of the 
offence with which she was now charged, Schreiner JA made the 
following statement467 
The plea recognised by sec. 169(2)(d) of the Criminal 
Code is 'that he has already been acquitted of the 
offence with which he is charged'. It is not enough to 
support the plea that the facts are the same in both 
trials. The offences charged must be the same, but 
substantial identity is sufficient. If the accused could 
have been convicted at the former trial of the offence 
with which he is subsequently charged, there is 
substantial identity, since in such a case acquittal on the 
former charge necessarily involves acquittal on the 
subsequent charge. Another way of putting it is that he 
must legally have been in jeopardy on the first trial of 
being convicted of the offence with which he was 
charged at the second trial. 468 
The court held that since the appellant was charged in the first trial 
465At 117. 
466Section 169(2)(c) and (d) of Act 56 of 1955 recognised the pleas 
of former jeopardy. It provided that an accused may plead that he has 
already been convicted (c) or acquitted (d) of the offence with which 
he is charged. Similar provisions are contained in section 106 (c) 
and (d) of the present Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
467 At 117G-H. 
468My emphasis. The court relied upon Manasewitz, Moseme and the 
English case of Rex v Barron (discussed in chapter two supra under 
2.3.2, text at note 118). 
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with theft of shares, she could not have been convicted of the theft 
of the cheques or money at that trial without an amendment of the 
indictment which had in fact not occurred. Therefore her plea of 
autrefois acquit could not be sustained.469 
The "in peril" test was again applied by the Appellate Division in 
O'Neill v South African Railways and Harbours. 470 O'Neill was a 
railway ticket examiner who had been acquitted by a court of law of 
a charge of theft of certain moneys alleged to have been paid to him 
by certain passengers for tickets. It was common cause that he had 
not handed over tickets to them and also did not hand over any money 
to the Administrator. However, the state could not prove that he had 
received the money and he was therefore acquitted. He was 
subsequently charged with the same misconduct, which was also a 
contravention of a certain statutory interdepartemental Railway 
instruction. After receiving notice of the departmental disciplinary 
inquiry to be undertaken against him, he applied to the Supreme Court 
for an interdict which would prevent the Railways from proceeding 
with the enquiry. His case was based on a specific section of the 
(then existent) Railway Act471 which prohibited a disciplinary charge 
or punishment of an employee for misconduct for the same offence of 
which he had previously been acquitted by a court of law. 
The issue before the Appellate Division was whether he had in fact 
469 A further contention raised by the defence, namely that the 
defendant might have been convicted had the charge in reality been 
amended, was likewise rejected by the Appellate Division (at 118). 
See chapter three supra under 3.6.2, text at note 283 for a discussion 
of this particular aspect of the case. 
470Supra. 
471 Section 16(5) of the Railways and Harbours Service Act 23 of 
1925. 
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been acquitted of the same offence. An application of the in peril test 
would obviously have allowed the subsequent departmental inquiry for 
the same misconduct. However, counsel for the appellant raised the 
following argument. 472 In Manasewitz Wessels CJ equated a plea 
of autrefois acquit to a plea of res judicata and emphasised that it is 
necessary to consider the substance and not the form of the 
subsequent charge. A plea of res- judicata- not- only- includes a 
previous decision for which relitigation is sought, but also facts which 
have been decided in an earlier trial (whether civil or criminal) between 
the same parties. In other words, it was argued that by equating 
autrefois acquit with res judicata the court had given it a wider 
meaning which also covered cases of estoppal in respect of particular 
facts which would lead up to the verdict. Schreiner JA rejected this 
argument. In his view, the dicta of Wessels CJ in Manasewitz could 
not be interpreted so broadly. He expressed the view that "[a]ll that 
could have been intended was that autrefois acquit is one of the 
forms of res judicata in our law" .473 He added that the expression 
(namely that the pleas of former jeopardy and res judicata are 
equivalent) was introduced in Manasewitz 
to support the conclusion that, looking at the substance 
of the matter, as should be done in cases of autrefois 
acquit, it is not merely the names of the crimes and the 
misconduct that matter but their real equivalence.474 
However, the court ruled that in the past this consideration of the 
substance of the matter was held to justify treating the offences as 
the same "whenever the charge on the first was such as in law to 
472At 275C-D. 
473At 275. 
474At 276A-B. 
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permit a verdict of guilty on the second to be returned''. 475 
Therefore the in peril test was once again approved of and applied in 
this case, despite closer scrutiny and recognition of the broader 
principles introduced in Manasewitz.476 
Two subsequent decisions, Rex v Schuza477 and S v 
Makutani478 serve as good illustrations of the inadequacy of the in 
peril test to protect the individual against repetitive harassment by the 
state for substantially the same criminal conduct. In Schuza the 
accused had been found guilty on a charge of extortion. He was 
sentenced to six months imprisonment. At a later date, he was 
charged again on the same facts, this time for theft of a wristwatch. 
He was convicted of this offence and again sentenced to six months 
imprisonment. The evidence relied on by the state in both cases was 
that the accused had pretended to the complainant that he was a 
railway constable; that he had arrested him on the ground that he 
475/d. 
476The in peril test was subsequently applied by the Appellate Division 
in R v Constance (supra). In that case, the court once again 
emphasised that the fact that the same evidence is rendered in both 
trials is not decisive in determining whether succcessive prosecutions 
for offences are prohibited. However, the court ostensibly also based 
its conclusion that the offences charged successively (namely robbery 
and murder) were different on the basis that the intention required for 
these respective crimes differs radically (at 636F). In a subsequent 
decision, S v Vorster 1961 (4) SA 863 (0) the court remarked that 
the pleas of former jeopardy rest not only on the doctrine of res 
judicata, but also on considerations of reasonableness contained in the 
maxim nemo debet bis vexari (at 866). However, the court did not 
suggest than any broader protection should be afforded to the accused 
on these grounds; it suggested that the in peril or the same evidence 
tests should be applied to determine whether a successive prosecution 
ought to be barred (at 867). 
477Supra. 
478Supra. 
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failed to carry a reference book and that he had told him that he would 
release him if he handed over his wristwatch.479 The complainant 
refused this request, but shortly thereafter he felt the watch being 
plucked off his arm by the accused. 
On review, the court held that although both cases were based on 
the same facts, a plea of autrefois· convict -could not- be- sustained 
because the accused was not in peril of a conviction of theft at the 
first trial. 480 
In S v Makutani, 481 the accused was first charged of a statutory 
offence which, in essence, prohibited the brewing and/or possession 
of a substance known as skokiaan.482 He raised the plea of 
autrefois acquit on the ground that he had previously been charged 
and acquitted of a different but similar statutory offence. The 
essential elements of that offence were the brewing and/or possession 
of a substance similar to the substance known as skokiaan. 483 The 
court rejected his plea of autrefois acquit on the basis that he could 
not have been convicted on the first indictment of the offence 
subsequently charged. 484However, the court was not entirely happy 
with its conclusion. Jansen J expressed his dissatisfaction as 
479At 539F. 
480 At 539H-540A. The court applied the in peril test, relying on Long 
and Manasewitz. However, the court held that the sentences imposed 
should run concurrently. 
481Supra. 
482At 799F. 
483At 8000. 
484At 802E. 
follows485 
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Bedenkinge teen hierdie slotsom kan uit die volgende 
oorweging voortvloei. Gestel die appellant was in die 
eerste saak skuldig bevind soos aangekla en hy is toe 
weer aangekla soos in die tweede saak. As hy dan die 
verweer van autrefois convict geoppper het, wat sou die 
posisie gewees het? Die grondslag van hierdie verweer 
skyn in die algemeen dieselfde te wees as die verweer 
van autrefois acquit . . . . Volg dit nie nou op die 
voorgaande benadering dat die verweer van autrefois 
convict ook sou misluk nie? En dat die appellant dus vir 
een en dieselfde handeling dus twee skuldigbevindings en 
strawwe sou kon oploop nie? Hierteen rebelleer die 
regsgevoel - 'n regsgevoel wat horn ook openbaar in die 
sg reel teen splitsing van aanklagte .... 
The court suggested that a sense of justice (regsgevoel) could be 
satisfied in such instances, by the use of other measures which fall 
outside the ambit of the specific pleas of former jeopardy. 486 
However, he found it unnecessary to decide whether South African 
law provides for broader protection in this particular field, as is the 
position in English law. 
4.6.5 S v Davidson paves the way for broader protection - the "same 
conduct" test introduced 
One decision which was handed down in the sixties is worthy of a 
separate discussion. In this decision, S v Davidson, the Transvaal 
Provincial Division moved away from a strict element based approach 
485At 802F-G. 
486 At 802H-803A. Jansen J referred in this regard to English authority 
(R v Barron & R v King,) which suggested that the courts use its 
inherent discretionary powers to prevent a subsequent trial in such 
instances. See chapter two supra under 2.3.2 for a detailed 
discussion of these cases. 
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to a more equitable same conduct approach. Davidson was initially 
charged with two offences. Forgery, and uttering of a forged 
instrument knowing it to be forged. He was acquitted on both 
charges. Thereafter, he was again charged on the same facts; this 
time, however, he was charged with theft and alternatively with fraud. 
The relevant facts in respect of the second charge (in support of the 
main as well as the alternative count) were the same as in the 
previous trial. These were that the accused presented a forged 
document which he knew to be forged as if it were valid and thereby 
obtained value for it from a Mr X who was induced by the 
misrepresentation to give such value. 487 The magistrate upheld the 
accused's plea of autrefois acquit but the prosecution appealed against 
that decision. 
On appeal Colman J first of all remarked that the second charge (of 
theft and fraud) was based on the "same transaction" which formed 
the basis of the first charge (of forgery and uttering).488 However, 
he then referred to the famous dicta in R v Long by Schreiner JA, 
namely that it is not enough to support pleas of former jeopardy that 
the facts are the same in both trials; the offences charged must also 
be the same, but substantial identity is sufficient. 489 The 
prosecution (in Davidson's case) argued that substantial identity was 
lacking between the offences of uttering and fraud, because of the 
"difference between the definition[s]" of these offences.490 The 
prosecution also submitted that the test suggested in Long to establish 
substantial identity, namely the in peril test, had not been complied 
, 
487 At 194E. 
488At 194H-195A. 
489See supra, text at note 468 for the exact citation from Long. 
490At 1968. 
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with. 491 
Colman J, disagreed with these contentions. As a point of 
departure, he referred to the approach adopted in Manasewitz by 
Wessels CJ, namely that the rule of former jeopardy does not depend 
"upon any technical consideration of the identity of forms of action, 
but upon matters of substance". 492 Elaborating on- this premise, he 
made the important statement that in order to apply the test of 
substantial identity defined in Long, the court should "go beyond the 
definitions of the two or more offences which fall to be 
considered". 493 The judge expressed the point of view that, in 
order to establish substantial identity, the court should compare the 
offences as charged, and 
... if the offences as charged are identical in substance, 
even though they may differ in immaterial respects, the 
test is, in my judgment, satisfied. 494 
Judge Colman explained the above statement by adding the following 
statement495 
491 At197A. 
If specific unlawful conduct is such that it may properly 
be described and charged as the commission of more 
than one crime known to our law, to charge a man with 
two of those crimes on those facts would be to charge 
him twice with the same offence, or substantially the 
same offence under different names. 
492At 195H, citing Wessels CJ in Manasewitz (165). 
493At 196C. 
494/d. (My emphasis). 
495 At 960-E. 
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He then applied these rules to the facts of the case concluding that 
whatever the definitions of the particular offences charged 
successively had been, it was nevertheless clear that the prosecution 
had relied on the same conduct in both trials. 496 In his view, the 
idea that a person could have been found guilty of the uttering charge 
and punished, and again convicted of the same conduct after being 
charged of theft or fraud~ "would offend-against one~s sense of 
justice". 497 
The shift in focus from the traditional same elements approach to 
a same conduct approach could be regarded as a significant 
breakthrough in South African law on double jeopardy. Being fully 
reconcilable with the broader criteria of res judicata introduced (and 
explained) in Manasewitz, the decision in Davidson can also not be 
regarded to be without precedent. Nevertheless, an elements 
approach was maintained by other divisions of the Supreme Court 
during the 1960's; an approach which suited the state in its 
endeavours to obtain guilty verdicts for subversive acts against the 
state, which were prohibited at the time by means of various 
overlapping statutory offences.498 It was only in 1971, in S v 
Ndou, 499 that the Appellate Division supported the idea of protection 
against successive prosecutions for the same unlawful conduct. 
496At 196F. 
497 At 196G. Cf also the remarks of Jansen J, in Makutani discussed 
supra, text at note 485. 
498See for example S v Xoswa 1964 (2) SA 459 (C) and S v Poke/a 
1968 (4) SA 702 (E). See also Dugard J "Autrefois acquit and 
substantially identical offences" South African Law Journal 1971 301, 
304-305 for an example of one single act of subversive conduct 
punishable (during this period) under four different statutes. 
499 1971 ( 1) SA 668 (A). 
287 
4.6.6 S v Ndou - The Appellate Division recognises a "same 
conduct" approach 
In S v Ndou, the Appellate Division approved of and applied the same 
conduct criterion as introduced in Davidson. However, certain dicta 
of the court have apparently led to a belief in subsequent decisions 
that the court (in Ndou) merely applied the· traditional same-evidence 
test which focuses upon the elements of offences. A detailed 
discussion of the Ndou decision is therefore essential. 
The facts of Ndou were as follows. In December 1969, twenty two 
people were charged with certain statutory offences in terms of the 
Suppression of Communism Act. 500 It was alleged by the state that, 
as members of the banned organisation the ANC, they had acted in 
concert and with the knowledge that the ultimate aim of the ANC was 
the violent overthrow of the State and had engaged in a variety of 
unlawful activities or, had, by engaging in these activities, performed 
acts calculated to further the aims and objectives of communism. The 
accused pleaded guilty but before the conclusion of the case, the 
Attorney-General stopped the prosecution. The accused were 
accordingly found not guilty and discharged.501 
However, nineteen of the accused together with a certain R, were 
subsequently charged with having participated in terrorist activities in 
contravention of section 2( 1) of the Terrorism Act. The acts or 
unlawful conduct alleged in the second indictment were in actual fact 
a repetition of the conduct which had been alleged in the first 
indictment. The only fundamental addition to the second indictment 
500Act 44 of 1950. 
501 1n terms of section 8 and 169(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act 56 
of 1955. 
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was that these acts were performed with the intention of endangering 
the maintenance of law and order in the Republic; the specific 
intention necessary for a conviction of terrorism under section 2( 1) of 
the Terrorism Act. The plea of autrefois acquit was raised and upheld 
in the court of first instance. The state then reserved a question of 
law to the Appellate Division as to the correctness of this decision. 
The central issue before the Appellate Division was whether 
"substantial identity" existed between the successive charges. 502 
If so, the plea of autrefois acquit would have to succeed.503 The 
state argued (relying upon Long), that in relation to autrefois acquit, 
substantial identity comprises only those offences which would have 
been competent verdicts under the first indictment. In other words, 
the state contended that, in terms of Long, the in peril test should be 
regarded as decisive in determining substantial identity between 
offences successively charged. 504 The defence on the other hand 
(relying in particular upon Davidson and Manasewitz), 505 argued that 
the plea of autrefois acquit was valid inasmuch as the accused had 
already been acquitted of the same criminal conduct with which they 
were charged in the second indictment. 506 
Mr Justice Ogilvie Thompson rejected the state's argument. He 
502The "substantial identity" criterion was first suggested in Long's 
case. See supra, text at note 467. 
503At 673D, Ogilvie Thompson JA remarked that "the question for 
decision in this appeal revolves around the true limits of 'substantial 
identity' in relation to a plea of autrefois acquit". 
504At 673H-674A. 
505See supra text at note 437 and 487 for a discussion of these 
decisions. 
506At 673G. 
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pointed out that the court's decision in Long did not limit the enquiry 
of substantial identity to application of the in peril test. 507 He 
discussed the court's ruling in Manasewitz, namely that the plea is 
based upon the exceptio rei judicatae of Roman law508 and, 
indicated that in order to establish a plea of res judicata in civil 
proceedings, it must be shown that the earlier judgment had been in 
respect of the same subject-matter as that of the -second;509 He 
then added that510 
[s]imilarly, it appears to me that, in the criminal law, it is 
of the very essence of a valid plea of autrefois acquit 
that the conduct now averred by the State to constitute 
a crime, the conduct comprising the charge preferred 
against the accused in the second indictment, was the 
subject matter of previous adjudication and acquittal by 
a competent tribunal". 
Ogilvie Thompson JA continued by stating that it was upon "not 
dissimilar principles" that the plea of autrefois acquit was upheld in 
Davidson. 511 This is a clear indication that the court in Ndou 
507 At 675A-B. He also regarded the court's previous decision in 
O'Neill (discussed, text at note 470) in the same light, namely, that it 
did not suggest that the in peril test ought to be regarded as the sole 
or exclusive criterion to determine substantial identity (at 6750). 
508At 675E . 
509At 675H, relying upon Digest 44.2.14 and Grotius 3.49. (See 
chapter two supra under 2.1, text at note 9 and under 2.2, text at 
note 34 for a discussion of these texts). 
510At 675 H-676A (my emphasis). In the judge's view, it is that 
concept which is embodied in section 169(2) (d) of the previous 
Criminal Procedure Act (currently contained in section 106 (2) (d) of 
the present Criminal Procedure Act). 
511 At 676H. See supra under 4.6.5 for a detailed discussion of 
Davidson. 
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endorsed a conduct as opposed to an elements approach. A 
confusing aspect of the decision is that the court had also referred to 
the same evidence test as previously applied in Kerr v Rex.512 The 
judge remarked that this test (as applied in Kerr's case), had been fully 
reinstated in English law in Conelly v OPP. 513 The court then made 
the following statement (which has often been cited in subsequent 
decisions)514 
I come to the conclusion that, in relation to a plea of 
autrefois acquit, "substantial identity" is not - as 
contended by the State - confined to such offences as 
would have been competent verdicts at the previous trial. 
The overall enquiry is whether there exists that identity 
of subject-matter necessary to establish the exceptio rei 
judicatae. Such identity is well recognised to exist when 
the crime charged in the second indictment would have 
been a competent verdict on the first indictment. In my 
view, however, a plea of autrefois acquit tendered in 
terms of sec. 169 (2) (d) of the Code must also be 
upheld if the offences charged in the two indictments are 
substantially the same, even though the offence alleged 
in the second indictment would not have been a 
competent verdict in the first indictment. In determining 
whether substantial identity exists, the Court must, in my 
opinion, consider the essential ingredients of the criminal 
conduct respectively charged in the two indictments and 
apply the test as accepted by Kotze JP, in R v Kerr, .... 
namely: whether the evidence necessary to support the 
second indictment would have been sufficient to procure 
a legal conviction upon the first indictment. 
Applying these principles to the case before it the court found that 
512At 678C-D. See supra text at note 408 for a discussion of this 
decision. 
513At 678F-679E and 6808, referring to Lord Morris' fourth proposition 
in Conelly (see supra under 4.2.1, text at note 27 for a discussion of 
this proposition). 
514At 6800-F. 
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the state relied on the same conspiracy in both indictments and that 
both indictments had charged the same activities against the 
respondents. 515 The court remarked that "in reality, all that the 
second indictment does, is to repeat with some additions and 
extensions the acts, namely the same criminal conduct alleged in the 
first indictment . . . . . . with the added averment of the specific intent 
[required for a conviction of terrorism]''. 516· Ogilvie Thompson JA 
therefore concluded that the plea of autrefois acquit was rightly 
sustained because "the essential ingredients of the criminal conduct 
charged in the second indictment do not materially differ from those 
of the criminal conduct charged in the first indictment" .517 
However, in final analysis he also added that "the evidence necessary 
to support the second indictment would, ... unquestionably have been 
sufficient to procure a legal conviction upon the first indictment" .518 
Viewed in its totality, the decision undoubtedly endorses a conduct 
as opposed to an elements approach. The court's reference to a same 
evidence test can in my view, be reconciled to this approach. It is 
submitted that whenever the court referred to the same evidence test 
in Ndou, it had in mind a subsequent reliance on the same conduct, 
or the same evidence by the state. In this respect, the court perhaps 
failed to make the subtle distinction between conduct on the one hand 
515At 686C the court identified the conduct charged in both charges 
as conspiratorial activities as members of the ANC with the _ultimate 
aim of violent overthrow of the State. See also 687 A; 687E and 
688A. 
516At 685H. 
517 At 6888. 
518At 6880-E, stating that he applied the test accepted in R v Kerr. 
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and the evidence presented to prove that conduct.519 An opposite 
view, namely that the court by referring to the same evidence test 
focused purely on the elements of the offences successively charged, 
cannot be supported by the judgment as a whole. 
It is therefore submitted that the court, in referring to the same 
evidence test, had an unadulterated same evidence test in mind; a 
test which focused on the conduct (or the evidence) relied upon by 
the state in both trials in order to determine the substantial identity of 
the offences successively charged. Another explanation which may 
be advanced, is that the court, in principle, had used a conduct 
criterion, but had also found that the application of the same evidence 
test (as suggested in Kerr) could be applied to the particular facts 
present in Ndou. In other words, that application of the traditional 
same evidence test achieved the same result (in that case) as a 
conduct test. 
Unfortunately closer scrutiny of decisions which followed on Ndou 
has revealed that the distinction drawn in that case between same 
conduct and same elements has (understandably, in view of the use 
of the same evidence test as proposed in Kerr), not been fully 
appreciated by South African courts. This becomes clear from a 
discussion of a few subsequent decisions. 
4.6. 7 Subsequent decisions - a "same elements" or a "same 
conduct" approach? 
This writer's understanding of Ndou, namely that it endorses a 
519This distinction was pointed out by Mr Justice Brennan in the United 
States Supreme Court decision of Grady v Corbin, discussed supra 
under 4.5.6, text at note 302. 
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conduct instead of an elements approach, is supported by a 
subsequent decision, S v Nyati and Another. 520 The accused were 
first charged and acquitted of a statutory offence which prohibits 
dealing in dagga.521 They were then charged (on the same facts) 
with the crime of possession of dagga. 522 Their plea of autrefois 
acquit was rejected and they were convicted of this offence. On 
review, Galgut J observed that the evidence in-the·firstcase was that 
accused 1 had been allocated a small piece of ground on which he 
planted mealies. However, the police had also found five dagga plants 
among the mealie plants and according to the evidence both accused 
had known about the existence of the dagga plants. Since the state 
could not prove that they had dealt in dagga, the accused were 
acquitted (in the first tria I). 523 
In determining whether a subsequent charge for possession ought 
to be barred, the court referred to the dicta of Oglivie Thompson JA 
in Ndou's case concerning the concept of substantial identity of 
offences. 524 Applying these principles, the court concluded that the 
plea of autrefois acquit ought to have been upheld because the 
conduct which was relied on at the first hearing was the same 
conduct relied on at the second hearing. 525 The court added that 
[a] comparison of the two charge sheets and the 
5w1972(4) SA(T) 11. 
521 Section 2(a) of Act 41 of 1971. 
522Section 2(b) of Act 41 of 1971. 
523At 12E. 
524At 13F. See supra text at note 514 for this dicta. 
525At 13H. The conduct relied on in both trials was the planting or 
cultivation of dagga plants by the accused. 
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evidence led at both trials shows that such difference as 
there is in the charge sheets and the evidence, is one of 
particularity and not one of substance.526 
In a subsequent decision, S v Le Roux, 527 the court applied both 
the same evidence test (focusing on the elements of offences) and the 
same conduct test, and achieved the -same result. Le- Roux was first 
charged of the following offences 
(i) drunken driving528 or 
(ii) driving with an unlawful percentage of alcohol in his blood529 
or 
(iii) reckless or negligent driving530 or 
(iv) inconsiderate driving. 531 
The prosecution withdrew the second charge before the accused had 
pleaded, presumably because they had not at the commencement of 
the trial yet received the report on the blood analysis. 532 The case 
then proceeded on the remaining charges. Le Roux was convicted of 
negligent driving but found not guilty of drunken driving. He was 
subsequently charged with the offence which had previously been 
withdrawn, namely driving with an unlawful percentage of alcohol in 
his blood. He pleaded autrefois convict, the basis of his plea being 
that the state in both cases had relied on substantially the same act; 
526Referring also to the dicta in Davidson's case. 
527 1973 (2) SA 103 (SWA). 
528Section 140 ( 1) of Ordinance 30 of 1967. 
529Section 140(2) of the Ordinance. 
530Section 138( 1) of the Ordinance. 
531 Section 189 of the Ordinance. 
532At 104G-H, per Trengove, J. 
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the driving of a vehicle in a certain place at a certain time.533 The 
court rejected this plea and he appealed against that decision. On 
appeal, it was pointed out by counsel for the appellant that the only 
difference between the different charges was that in the first case it 
had been averred that he drove the vehicle negligently, and in the 
second charge, that he had driven the vehicle with an unlawful 
percentage of alcohol in his blood. In the view of counsel for the 
defence this constituted an extremely artificial distinction. 534 
The court rejected this contention. Mr Justice Trengove relied upon 
the dicta in Ndou535 and concluded that the offences differed 
substantially in respect of their essential elements. 536 The court 
explained that the first charge dealt with the manner in which the 
accused had driven the car, the main issue being whether he had 
driven the car in a reckless or negligent manner. However, in the 
second trial, the court was concerned with the question whether the 
percentage of alcohol present in the accused's blood at the time that 
he had driven the car had exceeded the legal limit. In the second 
charge his ability to drive the car was consequently irrelevant. 537 
The court then stated that in terms of Ndou there was another test 
which also had to be applied, namely the same evidence test. 538 
533Note that counsel for the appellant did not rely upon a same 
(unlawful) conduct test, but a same transaction or same criminal 
episode or facts test. See infra, text at note 514. 
534At 105G. 
535See supra, text at note 514. 
536At 106E. 
537 At 106C-F. 
538At 106H. 
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The court then applied this particular test to the offences and 
concluded that the plea of autrefois convict could not be sustained 
because "the evidence necessary to support the second indictment 
would not have been sufficient to procure a legal conviction upon the 
first indictment. "539 
Although the court had distinguished between the offences on the 
basis of their elements and had ultimately applied the same evidence 
test, it cannot be denied that it also distinguished between the 
offences successively charged on the basis of the difference in 
unlawful conduct. Application of the same conduct and the same 
evidence (or legal elements test) led to the same conclusion in this 
case; the offences charged successively were different in terms of 
both these tests. It is suggested that the conduct test as proposed 
in Davidson and endorsed in Ndou focuses on the similarity of the 
criminal or unlawful conduct successively charged, and not merely on 
the similarity of the facts. In Le Roux, the court (in my view) 
distinguished between the unlawful conduct of reckless or negligent 
driving on the one hand, and the unlawful conduct of driving with an 
illegal percentage of alcohol in his blood on the other hand. This 
distinction was made despite the fact that both charges were based 
on the same facts or transaction, namely the driving of a vehicle on a 
public road on a specific date. 
The important lesson to be learned from Le Roux's case is that even 
the broader and more equitable same conduct test does not guarantee 
protection against subsequent prosecutions and continuous 
harassment for offences arising from the same criminal episode or 
transaction, even if one's sense of justice would, in particular 
circumstances (like those present in Le Roux's case), require that a 
5391d. 
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person be charged with all the offences in a single proceeding. In my 
view, even if the accused in Le Roux had relied on the more apposite 
plea of autrefois acquit (that he had previously been acquitted of the 
same offence, namely drunken driving), application of a same conduct 
test would not have led to a different result. Drunken driving and 
driving with an illegal percentage alcohol in the blood requires proof of 
different types of unlawful conduct. 
Le Roux's case was followed by S v Makoko, 540 a decision which 
flies in the face of the principles laid down by the Appeal Court in 
Ndou. Makoko was a prisoner convicted on a prison regulation which 
prohibited the possession of dagga. 541 He was sentenced to 20 
days solitary confinement. He was subsequently charged in the 
ordinary courts with the statutory offence of possession of dagga542 
and convicted despite his plea of autrefois acquit. One of the issues 
on appeal was whether the crimes successively charged were 
substantially the same.543 The opening statement by the court was 
that, in order to determine this issue, the same approach as was 
necessary to determine whether there is an improper splitting of 
charges in one trial should be applied, 544 and that no definitive test 
could be prescribed to solve this problem. Suggesting that common 
sense and considerations of fairness should be applied when 
5401984 (2) SA 62 (0). 
541 1n terms of the Prison Act 8 of 1959. 
542Section 2(b) of the former Abuse of Dependence Producing 
Substances and Rehabilitation Centres Act 41 of 1971. 
543At 64H. 
544/d, relying on Hiemstra's Suid-Afrikaanse Strafprosesreg 3rd ed 233 
for this statement. 
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deliberating the question, 545 the court concluded that the offences 
ought to be regarded as different for the following reasons 
(a) the enquiry must focus on the definitions of the offences 
("misdaadomskrywings").546 The definitions of the offences were 
different.547 Also, the evidence necessary to prove one charge did 
not prove the other548 because contravention of the prison regulation 
required the additional proof that the offender was a prisoner. 
Therefore, the court followed a strict elements approach in this case. 
(b) The court also based its decision on the fact that the different 
provisions had different aims: the prison regulation was aimed at 
maintaining discipline in prison and the subsequent indictment was 
aimed at protecting the whole community against a social evil. 549 
Makoko was deservedly criticised by legal commentators and ought 
to be regarded as a decision without precedent. 550 
545 At 64H-65A. 
546At 658. 
547 At 658-C. Without even considering the leading authority on double 
jeopardy in the context of successive prosecutions (namely, S v 
Ndou), the court relied on the leading decision on splitting of charges 
in one trial (S v Grob/er supra at 814C) for this contention. 
548 At 65A-8. 
549At 65F. 
550See Du Toit et al Service 14 1994 15-6A (submitting that there was 
"real equivalence" between the offences because the "same actus 
reus and mens rea supported both convictions"); Snyman JL and 
Alberts RW "S v Makoko 1984 (2) SA 62 (0) Autrefois convict -
verrigtinge voor offisiershof ingevolge die Wet op Gevangenisse" 
Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse reg 1985 237 
(commenting that the accused was punished more than once for the 
same criminal conduct - "dieselfde inhoudelike misdadige gedrag"); 
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4.6.8 Recognition of inherent discretionary powers to prevent 
piecemeal adjudication of criminal matters - S v Khoza551 
In 5 v Khoza, the court suggested that, in terms of its inherent 
discretionary powers, it may stay criminal proceedings which have the 
effect of subjecting the accused to harassment more than once for the 
same cause of action.552 The facts of this case were the following. 
Khoza and three others were convicted of public violence. They were 
then charged with murder. The second charge alleged that they 
murdered 0 on a certain date in a certain town. It was common cause 
that the deceased had been killed during the disorder that formed the 
basis of the previous conviction of public violence. It was also 
common cause that the assault on the deceased and the fact that she 
was set alight had carried weight in the judgment of the regional court 
with regard to the conviction on the charge of public violence. 553 
In the subsequent murder trial, the state relied once again on some 
of the unlawful acts which had been relied on in the trial for public 
violence.554 The defence raised the plea of autrefois acquit, relying 
mainly on the dicta in Ndou as authority for its contention that 
Hiemstra 1993 ed (noting that the decision was incorrect inasmuch as 
the "strafwaardige handelingselement [primer] is by die identifikasie 
van 'n misdaad"). 
551 1989 (3) SA 60 (T). 
552At 66A. 
553At 641-J and 65A Mr Justice Strydom pointed out that the record 
of the case in the regional court revealed that "this conduct [various 
acts of public violence] not only caused a million rands worth of 
damage in the settlement but also the death of Ollisa Khumalo". 
554At 63H. These were several different acts of assault allegedly 
performed by the various accuseds in respect of the deceased. 
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substantial identity existed between the two charges. 555 The court 
rejected this argument. Strydom J focused on the elements of the 
offences and interpreted the principles laid down in Ndou as 
follows556 
As ek die toets toepas wat hier in Ndou se saak geopper 
is, naamlik of die .. getuienis .wat noodsaaklik is om die 
tweede aanklag te ondersteun en te vra of dit dan 
voldoende sou wees om 'n veroordeling op die eerste 
aanklag daar te stel, dan kan ek dit by toepassing op 
feite van die huidige saak, wat gemeensaak is, SOOS volg 
stel: of beskuldigdes skuldig bevind kon word aan 
openbare geweld by bewys dat hulle opsetlik en 
wederregtelik die oorledene gedood het. Die antwoord is 
myns insiens negatief. Op die benadering moet die 
beroep op art 106( 1 )(c) dus afgewys word. 
Therefore, the court applied the traditional version of the same 
evidence test, focusing upon the elements of the offences charged 
successively instead of the unlawful conduct which had been relied on 
in both trials to prove the offences or the similarity of the evidence 
which had been presented in both trials. The importance of the 
decision lies in the fact that the court (clearly uncomfortable with the 
unequitable result of its conclusion) declared itself opposed to the 
procedure adopted by the state in this case, namely to proceed on 
charges arising from the same criminal episode or transaction in a 
piecemeal fashion. 557 The court referred to a rule of practice, 
namely that courts are reluctant to participate in piecemeal litigation 
on the same facts. 558 The court explained the rationale of this rule 
555See supra, text at note 514. 
556At 64C-D. 
557At 64E. 
558At 64F. 
as follows559 
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Die grondslag van hierdie verweer is daarin gelee dat dit 
in die open bare belang is dat daar 'n einde aan 
gedingvoering moet kom: interest republicae ut sit finis 
litium en dat niemand meer as een keer aan 
gedingvoering oor dieselfde saak blootgestel behoort te 
word nie: nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem 
causa. 
The court also referred to a case in which Van Winsen AJA stated 
that560 
[t]he law requires a party with a single cause of action to 
claim in one and the same action whatever remedies the 
law affords him upon such cause. This is the ratio 
underlying the rule that, if a cause of action has 
previously been finally litigated between the parties, then 
a subsequent attempt by one of them to proceed against 
the other on the same cause for the same relief can be 
met by an exceptio rei iudicatae velitis finitae. The 
reason for this rule is given by Voet 44.2.1 (Gane's 
translation vol 6 at 553) as being: "To prevent 
inexplicable difficulties arising from discordant or perhaps 
mutually contradictory decisions, due to the same suit 
being aired more than once in different judicial 
proceedings". This rule is part of the very foundation of 
our law and is of equal application to criminal law. The 
rule has its origin in considerations of public policy which 
requires that there should be a term set to litigation and 
that an accused or defendant should not be twice 
harassed upon the same cause. 
The court also observed that the procedure adopted by the 
prosecution namely, to first charge the accused with public violence, 
559 At 65H, citing from Pretorius Burgerlike Prosesreg in die 
Landdrosshowe 677. 
560Custom Credit Corp (Pty) Ltd v Shembe 1972 (3) SA (A) 462, 472 
(my emphasis). 
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created the possibility that an accused could incriminate himself in 
respect of the subsequent charge of murder. 561 The court explained 
that if the accused had given evidence in the first case, the 
prosecution could have questioned them on the death of the deceased. 
In the court's view, this would have given the prosecution the 
opportunity to obtain evidence of an accused which could have 
incriminated him in a subsequent trial; 562 · tn view of all these 
considerations, the court decided to exercise its discretion in favour of 
the accused and had the case struck from the roll. 
It is suggested that by applying the same conduct test, the court (in 
Khoza) could have achieved the same result, which is to prevent the 
subsequent murder charges. However, by recognising inherent 
discretionary powers to stay proceedings on double jeopardy grounds, 
the court cleared the way for expanded protection against double 
jeopardy. Le Roux's case illustrates that the same conduct test 
cannot in all circumstances achieve the aims of double jeopardy 
protection, namely to prevent potential abuse of state power and 
consequent harassment of the accused. The broader protection 
offered in Khoza can therefore be of tremendous value to courts in 
achieving those aims; particularly in cases in which the application of 
the same conduct test (in terms of double jeopardy values) would not 
lead to just results. 
4.6.9 Does issue estoppel form part of our law? 
It finally remains to consider what role issue estoppal, as opposed 
to action estoppal, has played in our law. It was pointed out earlier in 
561 At 660. 
562At 660. 
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the discussion of O'Neill's case563 that the Appellate Division (in that 
case) disapproved of the idea that the broader concept of res judicata 
could also cover cases of estoppal in respect of particular facts which 
led to the verdict. The court relied (inter alia) on its previous ruling 
in Manasewitz. 564 The question whether issue estoppal is 
applicable in criminal cases also surfaced in a few subsequent 
decisions. Closer scrutiny of these cases reveal a marked reluctance 
on the part of the courts to consider seriously whether this aspect of 
res judicata should not, perhaps, also be applicable in criminal 
proceedings. These cases, which are few and far between, will be 
discussed in the text that follows. However, it is essential to first 
consider, what is regarded as the classic decision on the recognition 
or non-recognition of issue estoppal in criminal proceedings, namely 
R v Manasewitz. 
In Manasewitz, the majority of the court implied that the doctrine of 
issue estoppal has no place in criminal proceedings. 565 However, 
Manasewitz can only be regarded as authority for the proposition 
that issue estoppal cannot be raised by the prosecution to the 
prejudice of an accused who pleads autrefois acquit. 566 The 
particular issue addressed in these paragraphs which faced the 
Appellate Division in that case, was whether it was bound by the 
reason (the ratio decidendt1 on which the Provincial Division based its 
563See supra, text at note 470. 
564At 275H. 
565See the opinions of De Villiers JA 180 (stating that a point of 
general law decided in a case only applies to the court deciding the 
point); Straford JA 173 (concurring with De Villiers) and Beyers JA 
178 (stating categorically that the "leer van estoppal [in strafsake] 
onbekend is"). 
566Cf also Zeffert D "Issue estoppal in South Africa" 1971 South 
African law Journal 312. 
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decision of an acquittal in the first appeal. In other words, the ground 
on which the accused was previously acquitted.567 If the Appellate 
Division had answered this question in the affirmative, it would have 
follow that the accused would have been prohibited (estopped) from 
relying on the plea of autrefois acquit. In other words, recognition of 
the application of issue estoppal in criminal proceedings would have 
had the effect of prejudicing the accused in that case. However, the 
majority of the court reached the opposite conclusion. It held that 
although an acquittal or conviction on the merits binds all courts (it 
being res judicata), a point of general law or fact decided in a case 
only applies to the court deciding the point. 568 
The views expressed on issue estoppal in Manasewitz ought 
therefore to be limited to the particular facts of that case namely, that 
issue estoppal cannot operate to the disadvantage of the accused. 
The question whether issue estoppal may be invoked by the 
prosecution was raised again in the previous Rhodesian Appeal Court 
in the case of S v Gabriel. 569 Gabriel was charged and convicted 
of attempted murder on his wife because he had stabbed her in the 
spinal column. She died two years after the assault and he was 
subsequently charged with her murder. The central issue on appeal 
was whether he could rely on the plea of autrefois convict. The court 
(per Beadle CJ) held that the plea was not available to the appellant on 
the basis that it had not been possible to prefer the more serious 
567See supra, text at note 437 for a discussion of the facts of that 
case. 
568Per De Villiers JA 180. Contra the dissenting opinion of Curlewis 
JA who argued (at 190) that the doctrine of res judicata means that 
not only an acquittal should be accepted as correct, but also the very 
ground on which that acquittal was based. 
569 1971 ( 1) SA 646 (RA). 
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charge at the previous trial. 570 
However, counsel for the appellant argued that at the second trial 
for murder the appellant was in jeopardy of being convicted again for 
attempted murder and that this was in conflict with the principles of 
double jeopardy. 571 The court suggested that certain practical 
measures should be taken to prevent this particular situation from 
arising. Beadle CJ suggested that the Attorney-General informs the 
court before plea that he asks only for a verdict of murder, and, if 
murder is not proved, that he asks for a verdict of not guilty. 572 
However, in the Chief Justice's opinion it would be preferable in such 
cases if the second trial starts where the first trial stopped. In other 
words, that the record of the first trial be proved and the judgment of 
570At 6520-G. He relied on Voet 48.2.12 & 48.8.4. In S v Ndou 
(supra), the court assumed that the principle also applies where the 
accused had previously been acquitted. Van Rooyen JH "Opmerkings 
oor autrefois acquit" Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hol/andse reg 
1971 182 points out that Voet 48.2.12 limited the rule to previous 
convictions for the reason that a person cannot again be tried if 
already acquitted of the very act "from which the ensuing charge also 
is bound to follow" (Gane's translation of Voet). Van Rooyen agrees 
with the logic underlying this assertion. (Cf also the views of Choo 
discussed in chapter two supra under 2.3.2, text at note 127.). 
However, he (Van Rooyen) expresses the view that Voet's statement 
cannot be regarded as valid in all circumstances where a charge of 
murder or culpable homicide follows on an acquittal of a lesser 
included offence. He argues that an enquiry in respect of the grounds 
on which the accused had previously been acquitted is essential to 
determine whether a subsequent charge for murder or manslaughter 
could (logically) follow. The following example is advanced in support 
of his argument. A person acquitted of negligent driving on the 
ground that it did not occur on a public road, may be indicted 
subsequently for culpable homicide. 
571 At 655F-G. 
572At 660H. 
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the first trial considered as binding on the court in the second 
trial. 573 
However, Beadle CJ realised that this proposition involves 
recognition of the prosecution's right to invoke the principle of issue 
estoppal against the accused.574 He then embarked on a discussion 
of the doctrine as recognised (at the time) in English criminal law. 575 
He also considered whether the doctrine is applied in South African 
criminal proceedings, but, "[f]ortunately, [found] it unnecessary to 
have to come to a firm decision on the position of the plea of issue 
estoppal in South African criminal law". 576 However, he assumed 
for the purpose of the case at hand that under common law (Roman-
Dutch law), the state could raise the plea of issue estoppal against an 
accused. 577 The court based its assumption on an early decision of 
the Cape Provincial Divison, R v Kriel. 578 In that case, the accused 
had been charged with failing to pay maintenance for his child. He 
pleaded that the child was not his, but the court found the child was 
his and he was convicted. A year or two later, he was again charged 
with failing to pay maintenance in respect of the same child and he 
again raised the plea that he was not the father of the child. 
However, the court held that the accused was estopped from raising 
the paternity issue a second time. Beadle CJ, however, considered 
573 At 660H-661 A. 
574At 661 A. 
575At 6618-D. 
576At 662H. He focused mainly on the decision in Manasewitz, finding 
the case "confusing" and "concerned only with the plea of autrefois 
acquit ... " (at 662H) 
577 At 662H. 
5781939 CPD 221. 
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the case to be of "dubious validity" because the court never 
considered the question in that case of whether it was permissible in 
the circumstances to allow the accused's previous conviction to be 
accepted as proved before verdict - an inevitable consequence (in the 
majority of cases) if the principle is recognised that the prosecution 
may invoke issue estoppal against the accused. 579 Since the 
Zimbabwean Code did not allow such a practice (namely to prove a 
previous conviction before verdict), Beadle CJ suggested that it be 
amended to accommodate the type of situation which confronted the 
court in Gabriel's case. 580 
S v Vermeulen 581 presented a provincial division of the Supreme 
Court with an opportunity to decide whether issue estoppal may be 
raised in favour of the accused. However, the court in that case 
preferred to deal with the case as one relating to cause of action 
estoppal ("aksie-grond estoppal") as opposed to issue estoppal 
("geskilpunt-estoppel"). The unique set of facts which faced the court 
in that case were the following. The accused was charged in 1967 
with perjury. In evidence in a civil case in 1959, it had been alleged 
that Vermeulen had falsely testified that he had dug a trench before he 
built a dam wall. He was acquitted on the perjury charge as the court 
found that the trench had in fact been dug. However, in 1975 he was 
again charged with perjury. This time, the state alleged that his 
evidence in the previous perjury trial concerning the trench-digging 
was false. He pleaded autrefois acquit. The state advanced the 
argument that since he had only committed the offence for which he 
was charged in the case at hand in 1 967, he had not been in jeopardy 
579At 6638. 
580Such an amendment has not as yet been realised either in the 
Zimbabwean or the South African Codes. 
581 1976 ( 1) SA 623 (C). 
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of being convicted of this particular offence at the previous trial. The 
court rejected this argument. 
Steyn J observed that the plea of autrefois acquit is based on the 
exceptio rei judicatae; a doctrine which, with the necessary 
modifications, is incorporated in our criminal law. 582 He discussed 
the historical development of the rule and particularly focused on the 
interpretation of the rule by Voet. 583 Justice Steyn warned that 
great care should be taken before principles formulated in the English 
law regarding the basis of the applicability of the doctrine are 
transplanted, without more, in South African law. 584 In his view, 
considerations of policy, of which the most important is the legal 
certainty which flows from the finality of judgments in respect of 
lawsuits between parties, as well as principles of justice and fairness 
forms the basis of the doctrine of res judicata. He explained these 
considerations in the following terms 
Wanneer ek na regverdigheid en billikheid verwys het ek in 
gedagte dat hierdie leerstuk, opgewerp as exceptio rei judicatae, 
in die strafreg opgeneem is om die burger te vrywaar teen 
herhaaldelike vervolging ten opsigte van dieselfde skuldoorsaak, 
tussen dieselfde partye en waar die Staat dieselfde gevolg 
nastreef, dit wil se, 'n skuldigbevinding ten opsigte van 
dieselfde of wesentlik dieselfde misdaad.585 
582At 630H. 
583At 631C-D he referred to Voet 44.2.3 where the author noted that 
the cause of action is the same if "[w]hat was sought before the 
earlier is sought before the later Judge" and 44.2.4, where the author 
emphasised that not so much the action but the "source of the claim 
. . . makes a cause the same" . 
584At 631 H. 
585At 6328, discussing, at length, the approach followed in Ndou. 
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Regarding himself not bound by the restrictions of the traditional 
common law plea of autrefois acquit, Justice Steyn then also referred 
to application of the doctrine in a number of civil law cases. He noted 
that in African Farms and Townships Ltd v Cape Town 
Municipality586 the court held the doctrine to be applicable where the 
appellant demanded once again the "same thing on the same 
ground". 587 He pointed out that, in that case, Steyn CJ had 
explained588 that "the same thing on the same ground" relates to the 
identity of the question which is once again raised. Steyn J then 
reiterated (in the Vermeulen case) the explanation of Steyn CJ of the 
concept "same question" 
Where a court has come to a decision on the merits of a 
question in issue, that question, at any rate, as a causa 
petendi of the same thing between the same parties, 
cannot be resuscitated in subsequent proceedings. 
Where, for instance, the causa or questio is ownership, 
the claimant, if his case is that he has the ownership 
through inheritance, would not, according to Dig. 
44.2.11., para. 5, be instituting a new claim by alleging 
a donation, for no matter in what way he may have 
acquired the ownership, his right to it would be finally 
disposed of in the first action. 
Steyn J subsequently applied the approach followed in civil law to the 
facts of the criminal case before him. He concluded that since the 
prosecution had endeavoured to relitigate the identical cause of action 
previously adjudicated on (namely, whether a trench had been dug or 
586 1963 (2) SA 555 (A). 
587 At 6340-E, citing Steyn CJ in the African Farms case (at 562). 
588The Chief Justice relied in a passage upon various texts by Voet, 
Huber and Vinnius for this explanation. This passage is reiterated in 
Vermeulen's case at 634F-G. 
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not), the plea of exceptio rei judicatae should be sustained.589 The 
court preferred not to also deal with the controversial topic whether 
issue estoppal forms part of South African law. 590 However, it 
cannot be denied that the approach followed by the court in 
Vermeulen in reality amounts to a recognition of the proposition that 
issue estoppel may be invoked in favour of the accused in criminal 
proceedings. 
4. 6. 10 Summary 
* In the first decisions in which the defence raised the pleas of 
former jeopardy, colonial courts applied the criteria advanced in English 
law to determine the sameness of offences. These were the in peril 
and the same evidence tests. This practice continued during the initial 
decades of the twentieth century. Courts focused on the elements of 
offences despite the fact that one of the tests applied was labelled the 
same evidence test. 
* Up until the 1930's, courts did not draw a distinction between rules 
which prohibit multiple punishment in one trial on the one hand, and 
rules which prohibit successive prosecutions for the same offence on 
the other hand. Moreover, the courts did not consider the particular 
values which underlie each of these procedural phenomena. Instead, 
they referred to both these procedural phenomena as splitting of 
charges. In 1905, for instance, the Transvaal court introduced a third 
test to determine improper splitting of charges in one trial. This test 
was called the single intent test. Unlike the same evidence and in peril 
tests, the single intent test focused on the issue of whether the 
589At 653A-D. 
590At 635G. 
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accused, by performing offences with different legal elements, acted 
with a single intent. The test was subsequently also applied in cases 
dealing with the pleas of former jeopardy. 
* During the 1930's important progress was made in the field of 
double jeopardy jurisprudence. First of all, it was recognised that 
subsequent death cases deserve to be treated as exceptions to the 
same evidence test. However, the most important development 
occurred in 1933. In that year, the Appellate Division, in the case of 
Manasewitz ruled that the pleas of former jeopardy are based on 
broader principles of res judicata (developed in Roman and Roman-
Dutch law). By emphasising that the rules of res judicata originated 
from notions of fairness and reasonableness (for example, that a 
person should not be vexed more than once for the same matter), the 
court focused on the values which underlie the rule against double 
jeopardy. Manasewitz laid the foundation for expanded protection 
against repeated attempts by the state to prosecute an accused for the 
same unit of criminal conduct. The court pointed out, inter alia, that 
"the question whether a defendant is being vexed again for the same 
cause of action depends not upon technical considerations but upon 
matters of substance". 591 This sent a clear messsage to the courts 
that the criteria applied in the single-trial multiple- punishment context 
to determine identity of offences could not also be regarded as 
exclusive criteria to determine whether successive prosecutions for the 
same criminal conduct ought to be prohibited. 
* Shortly after the decision in Manasewitz, the court explained the 
difference between splitting of charges in one trial and successive 
prosecution for the same offence. The court pointed out that the first 
of these procedural phenomena originated from the idea that it is 
591 Per Wessels CJ in Manasewitz 169-170. 
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objectionable to split charges in order to enable the court to impose 
punishment in excess of its jurisdiction. However, the second of these 
procedural phenomena originated from the maxim nemo debet bis 
vexari. The court suggested that the same evidence test be applied 
in multiple-punishment single-trial cases, and the in peril test in the 
multiple-trial context. 
* During the next three decades ( 1940-1970), the in peril test 
became the standard applied to determine whether a successive 
prosecution relates to the same offence as that of which the accused 
had already been acquitted or convicted in a previous trial. However, 
inadequacies of the in peril test as a sole measure to protect the 
accused against repetitive harassment by the state for the same 
criminal conduct were revealed in a number of subsequent decisions. 
This eventually led to the introduction of broader criteria to determine 
the permissiblity of successive prosecutions. Gradually, the traditional 
same elements approach made way for an approach which focuses 
instead on the same criminal conduct successively prosecuted. The 
shift in emphasis was initiated in the case of Davidson and eventually 
approved of by the Appellate Division in Ndou. 
* However, due to certain ambiguities in the Ndou decision, courts 
have not altogether abandoned a same elements approach in 
subsequent cases. In Le Roux for instance, the court applied both the 
same evidence and the same conduct test. The fact that application 
of both these tests achieved the same result in that case indicates that 
a conduct test does not always offer broader protection against 
repetitive harassment by the state for offences arising from the same 
criminal episode or transaction. In other words, Le Roux illustrates 
that there may be cases where a sense of justice requires a person to 
be charged of all the offences in a single criminal proceeding, despite 
the fact that application of a same evidence and a same conduct test 
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allow successive prosecutions. 
* In 1989, the Transvaal Division of the Supreme Court in the case 
of Khoza expressed itself against the procedure adopted by the state 
to proceed on charges arising from the same criminal transaction in a 
piecemeal fashion. The court focused on the values which underlie 
the rule against double jeopardy, inter alia, that an end· should come 
to litigation (the value of finality), and that a person ought not to be 
twice harassed on the same cause (the value of prevention of state 
abuse of power). Similar to Lord Devlin's approach in Conelly, the 
court in Khoza recognised inherent discretionary powers to stay 
proceedings as an abuse of process on double jeopardy grounds. 
* It has always been a controversial issue in South African law 
whether the principle of issue estoppal also applies in criminal cases. 
In O'Neill, the Appellate Division disapproved of the idea that the 
broader concept of res judicata also covers cases of estoppal in 
respect of particular facts which lead up to the verdict. The court 
relied, inter alia, on its previous ruling in Manasewitz. However, 
Manasewitz can only be regarded as authority for the proposition that 
issue estoppal cannot be raised by the prosecution to the prejudice of 
an accused who pleads autrefois acquit. As indicated in this 
comparative study, the principle of issue estoppel is applied in criminal 
cases only in favour of the accused. In a subsequent decision of the 
Cape Division of the Supreme court, Vermeulen, the court prohibited 
the state from relitigating a matter (or "cause of action") which had 
already formed the subject of adjudication in a previous trial. The 
court preferred to base its decision on action estoppel instead of issue 
estoppel. However, the application of broader principles of res 
judicata in Vermeulen in effect amounted to a recognition of the values 
which underlie the rule of issue estoppal. 
314 
* The decisions in Vermeulen and Khoza demonstrate that South 
African courts are ready to abandon the outdated approach of applying 
certain rigid tests to determine identity of criminal matters in favour of 
a more flexible approach which focuses purely on the achievement of 
the values which underlie the rule against double jeopardy. 
PART THREE 
THE PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE 
PROSECUTION APPEAL 
CHAPTER FIVE 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
5. 1 ROMAN LAW 
The institution of appeal as we now understand it did not exist in early 
Roman law. 1 Roman courts dealing with crime during the 
1 Appeal is described by Esmein A A History of Continental Criminal 
Procedure Vol 5 1913 (reprinted 1968) 10 as "the right to bring anew 
before a higher judge the cause already decided by a lower judge". An 
important feature of the modern institution of appeal is its alterable 
character; the verdict of a lower court (or sentence imposed by such 
lower court) may be altered by a higher court. The institutions which 
existed during the Republican period, ie provocatio (an appeal to the 
Roman people by a person condemned by a criminal court) and 
intercessio (the veto of a magistrate of another magistrate's judicial 
act on formal appellatio by a private individual) could not be regarded 
as an appeal in the abovementioned sense of the word for the 
following reasons. According to the Republican process of 
provocatio, the people could only as an act of mercy ne9ate the 
sentence imposed by the magistrate. Neither the sentence nor the 
verdict of the magistrate could be altered by this process. Likewise, 
in the process of intercessio the magistrate was only allowed to 
quash, but not to alter the decision of his colleague. These institutions 
furthermore did not provide for relitigation of a cause before a higher 
(hierarchial) tribunal. See Strachan-Davidson JL Problems of the 
Roman Criminal law 1969 Vol II 176-177 and Hunter WA A 
systematic and historical exposition of Roman law in the order of a 
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Republican period2 did not form a hierarchy; they were independent 
of each other and the sovereign power of the people was theoretically 
delegated to each separate court. 3 Roman criminal procedure was 
accusatorial in its nature. The state did not prosecute crime; the 
aggrieved citizen was required to make a formal accusation against the 
alleged offender and to prosecute at the trial. The issue was limited 
to the formal allegations of the accuser, who was also obliged to 
furnish the evidence necessary to support his case. 4 If at the end of 
proceedings the accused was acquitted, the matter was regarded as 
final. 5 
In the course of the second century AD, during the period of the 
Principate6 , the institution of appeal was introduced and developed 
in Roman law. 7 The establishment of the Empire meant the abolition 
Code 2nd ed 1885, 1045 (hereinafter referred to as Hunter Roman law 
1045). 
2509-27 BC. 
3Hunter Roman law 1045. 
4For a discussion on the nature and development of criminal procedure 
during the Republican era, see in general Jolowicz HF Historical 
introduction to the study of Roman Law 2nd ed 1952 321-333 and 
Kunkel W An introduction to Roman legal and constitutional history 
1966 61-66. 
5Cfthe institutions of provocatio and intercessio which were available 
to the convicted accused, discussed above. 
6 27BC-284AD. 
7See Hunter Roman law 1046. Mommsen T Romisches Strafrecht 
1955 277 describes the importance of this event as follows: "Von 
al/em Neuerungen des Principats ist die Einfurung der reformatorischen 
Appelation die bleibendste gewesen; die damit gegebene Zerstorung 
der Unabiinderlichkeit des rechtsgultig gefundenen Judicats wirkt nach 
bis auf den heutigen Tag". (Of all developments that occurred during 
the period of the Principate, the establishment of the alterable appeal 
was the most lasting; the abolition of the idea of unalterability of 
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of all independent magistracies of the Republic and the substitution of 
a single sovereign. 8 The emperors elected themselves as the supreme 
appellate tribunal for all the courts throughout the Roman world. In 
the course of time, a hierarchical structure of tribunals developed in 
the Roman Empire which in contrast to the Republican court structure 
could and was also intended to accommodate the institution of appeal. 
During the late Empire, criminal procedure developed certain 
inquisitorial and also predominantly oppressive features. 9 
Extraordinary powers of criminal jurisdiction came to be exercised by 
the Emperor and his delegates. Although the procedure was still 
based on an accusation brought by an accuser, the judge in his official 
capacity took a more active part in the process of discovering the 
truth. 
However, the most important change that took place in criminal 
procedure during this time was the introduction of torture as a method 
of obtaining evidence against the accused. 10 Esmein suggests that 
these secret inquisitorial procedures, in particular the application of 
torture to establish the truth, eventually led to the organisation of a 
system, not only of formal "legal proofs", but also of appeals as a 
necessary counterbalance, ostensibly in the interest of the accused. 11 
legally valid judgments during this period is recognised until today). 
8Hunter Roman law 1046. 
9See in general Esmein 26-29; Kunkel 66-71 and Jolowicz 413 for a 
discussion of the inquisitorial nature of criminal procedure during the 
reign of the Roman Empire. 
10Esmein 8-9 & 28. 
11At 3-4. 
318 
It is very difficult to establish with certainty whether, during this 
period, an accuser in a criminal trial could appeal to a higher tribunal 
against an acquittal of an accused or against a sentence imposed on 
a convicted person. This is so because the institution of appeal 
developed simultaneously in civil and criminal procedure and no 
distinction is made between these procedures by Roman legal writers 
in their treatment of the institution. 12 The majority of Roman texts 
which may be interpreted as dealing with criminal appeals, deal with 
appeals on behalf of the accused (the so-called "condemned 
party"). 13 Apart from a text by Modestinus, which suggests that a 
right of appeal was afforded an accuser in bipartite proceedings 14 and 
a text by Ulpian 15 which implies a right of appeal by an accuser in 
criminal proceedings, a general statement to the effect that an accuser 
was allowed to appeal in criminal proceedings against a judgment 
favourable to the accused cannot be found in Roman legal writings. 
12Mommsen 496. 
13See 049.1.6; 49.1.18; 49.4.1; 49.4.2.3; 49.5.2 (which text deals 
with an appeal in criminal cases against an interlocutory decree that 
torture should be applied); 49.7.1 and 49.7.5. The majority of these 
texts deal with appeals against sentences imposed on a convicted 
person. 
141n this context, a "bipartite" proceeding means a combination of a 
criminal and civil matter in one. See for example 049.14.9. The text 
deals with an action instituted by a beneficiary in terms of a will, 
which was voided by the birth of a posthumous child of the testator 
and his wife. The child died shortly thereafter - an event which 
caused the entire inheritance to devolve on the mother of the child 
(the testator's wife). The beneficiary under the will alleged in her 
action that the inheritance by the testator's wife of the entire estate 
was invalid because she (the testator's wife) had poisoned her 
husband. According to the text," ... when she had lost her action, she 
appealed" . This example can therefore not be regarded as purely 
criminal but rather a combination of a criminal and civil matter in one 
proceeding. 
15049.9.1. 
319 
In view of the general treatment of appeals in Roman legal writings, 
it cannot be stated categorically that an accuser in criminal 
proceedings had no right whatsoever to challenge a judgment 
favourable to the accused. 16 However, if one takes into 
consideration that the majority of Roman texts which deal with 
criminal appeals refer to appeals instituted by the accused, a 
reasonable inference seems to be that appeal as an institution in 
criminal proceedings was developed in Roman law mainly to 
accommodate the interests of the convicted person. 
5.2 ROMAN-DUTCH LAW 
The system of criminal procedure which prevailed in the Netherlands 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was exported to the 
Cape of Good Hope in 1652. 17 An Ordinance issued by Philip II in 
the year 1570 formed the basis of criminal procedure in the 
Netherlands during this period. 18 The system was basically 
inquisitorial in its nature; although private individuals might still report 
offences to the authority, prosecution of crime was carried out by the 
state, namely by the fiscal or Attorney-General and officers, sheriffs 
16As indicated above, 049.14.9 and 49.9.1 imply that such a right of 
appeal did exist. 
17For a brief discussion of European history of criminal procedure from 
the end of the Roman Empire up to the seventeenth century, see in 
general Dugard 3-5. The most important change that occurred during 
this period was that the accusatorial system was gradually replaced by 
an inquisitorial system. This change in procedure can be ascribed 
mainly to the influence of Canon law during this period. The approach 
adopted in Canon law also eventually found its way into the 
Netherlands. 
18See Dugard 6. 
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and bailiffs of the towns and villages. 19 
The issue adressed in this chapter is whether the prosecution had a 
right of appeal during this period and, if so, to what extent such a 
right was recognized. In R v Grundlingh20 Van den Heever J stated 
that according to Roman-Dutch law, the general rule was that neither 
the prosecution nor the convicted person could appear in a criminal 
case. 21 Nathan22 on the other hand, states that in Roman-Dutch 
law, the general rule was that the prosecutor in a criminal case had 
the same right of appeal as the accused. He continues in the very 
next sentence by stating that23 "[i]n South Africa, however, if the 
accused is acquitted by a magistrate or a jury, the prosecutor cannot 
appeal from the judgment". This way of juxtaposing the two 
statements may create the impression that the prosecution was 
allowed to appeal against an acquittal of the accused. However, this 
was apparently not provided for in Roman-Dutch law. Although Voet 
states that a matter is not res judicata if there can still be an 
appeal, 24 he and other commentators on the Law of Holland25 
19See Dugard 6; Decker CW Simon van Leeuwen's Commentaries on 
Roman-Dutch Law translated by Kotze JG Chief Justice of Tvl Vol II 
1872 545-546 (hereinafter referred to as Decker Van Leeuwen's 
commentaries). 
20 1955 (2) SA 269 (A). 
21 272E-F. 
22Nathan M The Common Law of South Africa - A treatise based on 
Voet's commentaries on the Pandects Vol 1 V 1907 2725. 
23At 2725. 
24See Voet 42.1.2. The author, inter alia, makes the following 
comment: "A suit cannot be said to have been quite decided and 
brought to an end when a definitive judgment has been given by an 
inferior judge, but there will have to be a waiting until either the liberty 
of appealing has been barred by the passage of ten days or in some 
other way, or an appeal has been noted, perhaps more than once, and 
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during this period (seventeenth and eighteenth century criminal 
procedure), refer to a right of appeal only by the prosecution against 
sentence.26 Voet makes the following statement in this regard27 
If the criminal suit has been devised with due regard to 
the established order of judicial proceedings28 an 
accused just as much as an. accuser is allowed to appeal 
from such conviction. 29 
a decision has been given by the final judge whose judgment cannot 
be any longer dismembered". (Gane's translation). 
25 As distinguished from other Dutch provinces. 
26See Voet Book XLIX. 
27 At 49. 1 . 10. (Gane' s translation). 
281n Roman-Dutch law, criminal proceedings could be instituted under 
the ordinary or extraordinary process. The ordinary process is what 
is referred to by Voet in this text and was employed where the 
accused denied the crime and when there seemed to be insufficient 
evidence for a conviction. If the accused was nevertheless convicted, 
he was allowed to appeal albeit against sentence only. The 
prosecution was also afforded an appeal against sentence on the basis 
of it being too lenient. The extraordinary process on the other hand 
was used where there was a stronger case against the accused. This 
process provided for a judicial inquiry at which the accused was 
interrogated with the purpose of obtaining a confession from him. If 
the accused declined to confess, he could be tortured in order to 
extract a confession. The accused was not allowed to appeal against 
conviction or sentence in this process. See in general Dugard 7 and 
Decker Van Leeuwen1s Commentaries 556. Van der Linden J 
Rechtsgeleerd1 Practicaal en Koopmans Handboek 1 806 translated by 
Henry J under the title "Institutes of the Laws of Holland" 1828 546-
547 points out certain exceptions to this rule ie: (a) where there is no 
confession or at least not a sufficient confession; (b) where there is a 
manifest nullity in the proceedings and (c) where the punishment is 
evidently too severe and out of all proportion to the crime. 
29My emphasis. 
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Van Leeuwen30 also makes reference to an appeal by the prosecution 
against sentence only, on the basis of it being too lenient. The 
writings of Van der Linden furthermore confirm this practice. 31 
In conclusion, it seems that in Roman-Dutch law an appeal by the 
state against an acquittal of an accused in a criminal trial was not a 
recognised practice. However, the state was afforded a right of 
appeal against sentence. The statement made by Van den Heever J, 
in R v Grundlingh32 should therefore be understood in this sense. 
5.3 ENGLISH LAW 
The institution of appeal was introduced by the legislature in English 
criminal law only at the beginning of the twentieth century. However, 
before this time there were certain procedures available in English 
criminal procedure which could be applied to challenge the validity of 
a criminal judgment for serious as well as for minor offences. 
In the case of minor offences, legislation enacted in 187933 
provided that in all cases where a question of law was involved, the 
decisions of the justices in Petty Sessions could be reviewed by the 
King's Bench Division of the High Court. Both parties, namely either 
the prosecutor or defendant could question such a decision on the 
ground that it was "erroneous in point of law" or "in excess of 
30Decker Van Leeuwen's Commentaries 557 note 17. 
31At 546-547. 
32Supra. 
33Section 33 of The Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879. 
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jurisdiction". 34 In the case of serious offences on the other hand, 
certain other remedies were available in order to challenge decisions 
handed down in trial on indictments. These were the remedies of 
reserving a case for the Court of Crown Cases Reserved and appealing 
to a Court of Error by means of a so-called writ of error. The first-
mentioned, namely the remedy of reserved cases (also known as case 
stated), was a method of reviewing points of raw arising on the 
evidence. 35 This remedy (initially not available to the accused as a 
right), was a technique implemented where the trial judge had doubts 
concerning a conviction. The trial judge then, on an informal basis, 
consulted his peers and if the judges thought the conviction was 
wrong or according to law incorrect, a pardon was recommended. 
Before 1848 these judges also occasionally considered a point of law 
which had arisen at a trial where the accused was acquitted. Of 
importance is that they had no power to reverse or in any way affect 
the acquittal of an accused.36 In 1848 legislation was introduced 
which created a Court of Crown Cases Reserved. 37 In terms of this 
legislation the court's jurisdiction was limited to appeals on a point of 
34See Howard P Criminal Justice in England 1931 reprinted 1987 
345. Section 33 of the 1879 Act was the forerunner of the present 
provision contained in the Magistrates' Courts Act 1981 which 
provides for an appeal by means of "case stated" procedure on a 
question of law by both parties in criminal proceedings from a 
magistrate's court decision to a superior court. See chapter six infra 
under 6.2.2 for a discussion of this provision. 
35See Baker JH The legal profession and the common law - Historical 
essays 1986 300-301. 
-
36See Friedland 285. The author cites the case of Wright 1821 Russ 
& Ry 456 1 68 ER 895 where the trial judge submitted for the 
consideration of the judges the question whether evidence for the 
accused (who was acquitted) had been properly admitted. No formal 
resolution was reached by the judges since they had no power to 
reverse an acquittal. 
37Crown Cases Act 1848. 
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law from convictions only. 
The writ of error procedure which dates back to the sixteenth 
century, was initially a remedy brought by a defendant to a Court of 
Error (the King's Bench) as a means by which his conviction could be 
reversed. 38 This procedure was applicable only to cases in which 
some procedural irregularity apparent in the record of the proceedings 
took place. The record of proceedings during this time amounted to a 
mere abstract of the indictment, a memorandum of the pleas, verdicts 
and sentences. 39 No account was given of evidence led at the trial 
or even of the direction given by the judge to the jury. 40 Since this 
procedure required that the error had to be clearly reflected in the 
record and normally an error which had been clearly reflected in the 
record would not have prejudiced the crown,41 the crown was in 
practice limited to bring a writ of error against an acquittal only in 
cases where the acquittal was entered on a special verdict, namely on 
a question of law. 42 
38For a discussion of this remedy, see in general Stephen Criminal law 
Vol I Chapter X (hereinafter referred to as Stephen History). 
39See Stephen Criminal law Vol 1 and Baker 299. 
40Stephen Criminal law Vol 1 309 could not conceive of "anything 
more meagre, unsatisfactory or informal .... " than this record. Baker 
299 points out that "in the good old days when barbarous law was 
tempered by luck judgments might be reserved for the most trifling 
slips of form or want of certainty". Numerous judgments were 
accordingly reversed for insubstantial reasons based, according to 
Baker, most of the time on a kind of compassion for the person who 
had been convicted. 
41 Friedland 287. 
42Special verdicts are verdicts by means of which the jury, having legal 
doubts as to the applicable law, found the facts "specially" and then 
referred the verdict to the court to decide whether on these facts the 
defendant could or could not be convicted of the crime charged. See 
Stephen Criminal law Vol 1 311. Apparently, if the court entered an 
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Although certain English writers discuss the remedy of a writ of 
error as one being available to the accused only43, there are some 
writers on the criminal procedure prevailing during the eighteenth 
century whose writings imply that the crown could bring a writ of 
error after an acquittal. 44 The writings· of Hawkins45 seem to 
indicate that during the eighteenth century a writ of error could be 
filed by the crown on an acquittal of an accused, but only in 
acquittal, the crown could bring a writ of error to the Court of Error on 
the basis that the trial court had interpreted and applied the law 
incorrectly. Friedland 287 note 4 cites a few reported cases 
permitting an appeal by the crown in such instances. He points out 
however, that there was an element of consent in all of these cases; 
for example, in the case of Chadwick 1848 II QB 205 116 ER 452 
467, the trial judge, who ruled in favour of the accused stated: 
"When this case was before me in the court below, I did not mean by 
the judgment I then gave to pledge myself to any definite opinion as 
I knew that it was intended that the facts found by the jury should be 
made the subject of a special verdict with the view to the question 
being considered by a court of error". 
43See Stephen Criminal law Vol 1 309; Blackstone 1829 ed Vol IV 
Chapter XXX 391; Chitty J A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law 
2nd ed 1826 Vol I 746-754 (referring to this procedure as one being 
available to the accused only) and Baker 301 (stating explicitly that 
this remedy could not be taken on acquittal because a verdict of not 
guilty was final and could not be questioned by the crown). 
44Hawkins WA treatise of the Pleas of the Crown 6th ed 1788 528; 
Hale Vol II Chapter XXXI. The writings of Archbold ( 1900 ed) leaves 
one in some doubt as to the matter since no clear distinction is made 
between civil and criminal proceedings in his treatment of this remedy. 
A general statement (at 252) that "[A] writ of error lies at the suit 
either of the subject or of the Crown" is not elaborated on. Coke EL 
First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 1812 ed Vol Ill par 
259b (hereinafter referred to as Coke 181 2 ed) merely states that a 
writ of error lies upon a matter of law and that this remedy "properly 
lies where false judgment is given in any court which is a court of 
record". No explicit reference is made to writs of error brought on 
behalf of the crown. In the United States Supreme Court case of US 
v Sanges 144 US 310 ( 1892) 313 Mr Justice Gray stated that "the 
English law on this matter is not free from doubt". 
45At 528. 
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circumstances where the initial indictment was defective in that it 
failed to state an offence ("want of substance in setting out the 
crime")46 or that the trial court lacked jurisdiction ("want of authority 
in the judge before whom it was taken" )47 • Hale's treatment of the 
matter indicates or rather implies that a writ of error could be filed by 
the crown if an individual was found by special verdict to have 
committed an act that constituted a murder or other felony; but the 
court mistakenly adjudged the act committed not to be a felony. 48 
According to Hale, if no writ of error was entered, a plea of autrefois 
acquit would bar de nova proceedings. Hale was furthermore of the 
view that a judgment of acquittal could be reversed if the acquittal 
was the result of a defective indictment. 49 No other possible 
grounds upon which the crown could file a writ of error following an 
acquittal are suggested by this writer. 
Therefore, it would seem that if the procedure of writ of error was in 
fact regarded as a remedy available to the crown against an acquittal 
in a trial on indictment, it was limited (according to the 
abovementioned two writers), to the following three grounds50 
(a) that the trial court lacked jurisdiction 
48 At 248 & 394-395. 
49/d. The author relies upon Vaux's case discussed in chapter two 
supra under 2.3.1, text at note 65. 
5
°Ct also the findings of Office of legal Policy "Report to the Attorney-
General on double jeopardy and government appeals of acquittals" 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Spring/Summer 1989 
833, 843-851. 
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(b) that the initial indictment was fatally flawed (so that it could not 
be said that the accused was in jeopardy of conviction) or 
(c) that, by special verdict, facts had been found indicating that the 
offence of which the accused had been indicted had been 
committed, but that the trial court erroneously held that the 
facts found did not constitute a crime. 
The writ of error procedure continued to exist in English criminal 
procedure until eventually abolished in 1907 by the enactment of the 
Criminal Appeal Act.51 Furthermore, all functions of the previous 
Court for Crown Cases Reserved were in terms of that Act vested in 
the Court of Criminal Appeal. 52 The Act dealt only with appeals in 
criminal proceedings instituted on behalf of the accused. No provision 
was made whatsoever in the Act for crown appeals against a 
judgment favourable to the accused.53 As will be seen in the 
discussion of current English Law, the policy against crown appeals 
against acquittals handed down in trials on indictment adopted in the 
Criminal Appeal Act of 1907 is still in essence preserved in English law 
today. 
51 Section 20( 1) of the Criminal Appeal Act of 1907. 
52Sect 20(4) of the Act. 
53See in general Stephen JF Stephen's Commentaries on the Laws of 
England 18th ed 1925 (revised by E Jenks) Chapter XVII and Friedland 
279. No provision was made in the Act to permit of an appeal from 
an acquittal, or from a judgment given against the crown on a 
demurrer or from a successful motion to quash an indictment or to 
arrest judgment. 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE PROSECUTION APPEAL : AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT LAW 
6. 1 INTRODUCTION 
The permissibility of prosecution appeals against acquittals is one of 
the many controversial issues in the law of double jeopardy. The basic 
question that arises in this particular context of double jeopardy 
jurisprudence is whether the policy expressed in the maxim "no person 
shall be placed in jeopardy more than once for the same offence" 
should be construed as meaning also that the state may not appeal to 
a higher court against an acquittal handed down by a lower 
hierarchical court. A further question which arises is whether the 
state may appeal against a sentence imposed on a convicted person. 
From a layperson's point of view, many arguments may be advanced 
in favour of prosecution appeals against acquittals. The most common 
is the argument that the high incidence of crime in contemporary 
societies requires that suspected offenders should not only be 
apprehended and tried by a court of law for their misconduct, but that 
the guilty should also be duly convicted and punished. Consequently, 
if a person who in the layperson's view is clearly quilty of a crime, is 
acquitted by the court of first instance or if convicted, the sentence 
imposed on him for his misconduct is so outrageously lenient that it 
provokes a public outcry, the prosecution should at least get one more 
opportunity to bring its case before a higher tribunal. This higher 
tribunal, which is presumed to be more competent than the first trier 
of fact, should be empowered to reconsider the facts of the particular 
329 
case, re-evaluate the decision reached by the trial court, set aside the 
acquittal and either enter a conviction or direct a retrial of the accused. 
This argument is supported by the notion that, if the accused is 
entitled to a rehearing on the merits of the case, the prosecution 
should not be denied the same opportunity. 
Considerably more substantial is the argument-that an accused has 
not as yet been acquitted of an offence before his case has not finally 
been adjudicated upon by the highest empowered court. An appeal by 
the prosecution in the same cause of action only amounts to a 
continuation of the proceedings initiated in the trial court and can 
therefore not be viewed as violative of double jeopardy principles. The 
double jeopardy principle only comes into play after the accused has 
finally been acquitted or convicted by the highest empowered 
hierachical tribunal. In support of this contention it may also be 
argued that if the accused may be retried after his conviction has been 
set aside by a higher tribunal, then the prosecution should also be 
entitled to initiate an appeal. 
This rationale, the so-called "continuing jeopardy" theory, was first 
introduced in a dissenting opinion in an early decision of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 1 However, it has never been accepted in 
American constitutional double jeopardy jurisprudence. Nevertheless, 
it has been adopted by the Supreme Court of India which advanced 
the theory in an attempt to explain why an appeal against an acquittal 
does not amount to a violation of the Indian constitutional provision 
1The theory was first advanced by Mr Justice Holmes in a dissenting 
opinion in the early United States Supreme Court decision of Kepner 
v US 195 US ( 1904) 100, 135. See infra under 6.5.2 for a discussion 
of that decision. 
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against double jeopardy. 2 
Arguments against prosecution appeals are usually based upon 
constitutional grounds rather than considerations of public sentiment 
or ideas of logic. The main argument advanced against prosecution 
appeals is that the double jeopardy guarantee requires that the state 
(with all its power and resources) should as a rule only be allowed one 
opportunity to bring its case before a duly appointed tribunal. 3 It is 
argued that if the adjudication by this tribunal results in an acquittal, 
it should be regarded as final even if it is based on incorrect 
application of prevailing law or flawed factfinding. It is explained that 
such an understanding of the double jeopardy prohibition serves the 
most important value which underlies the rule, namely the accused's 
interest in finality. A reconsideration of an accused's guilt or 
innocence at the initiative of the state, at a stage when the state has 
already had a fair opportunity to state its case before a duly appointed 
adjudicator of fact, amounts to oppressive state conduct. It arguably 
amounts to oppressive state conduct not because it necessarily 
enhances the possibility that an innocent person may be found guilty, 
or causes anxiety, embarassment and expense to the accused, but 
because a due process system of criminal justice (requiring legal 
instead of factual guilt)4 , vests ultimate authority to find culpability in 
2See the decision of the Indian Supreme Court in Kalawati v State of 
Himachal Pradesh AIR 1953 SC 131 (discussed infra under 6.4.2.). 
3This is the approach generally followed in American constitutional 
jurisprudence. 
4 The doctrine of legal guilt (as opposed to factual guilt) is explained by 
Packer HL The limits of the criminal sanction 1968 (at 1 66) as follows. 
A person is not to be held guilty of crime merely on a showing that in 
all probability, based on reliable evidence, he did factually what he is 
said to have done. Instead, he is to be held guilty only if these factual 
determinations are made in procedurally regular fashion and by 
authorities acting within competences duly allocated to them. 
Moreover, he is not to be held guilty, even though the factual 
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the initial factfinder. 5 In the context considered in this chapter, the 
guarantee against double jeopardy arguably gives effect to these 
broader values of due process. 
Between these extreme approaches, one may also identify a 
balanced approach which recognises the accused's interest in finality 
but allows for prosecution appeals against acquittals as an exceptional 
remedy in order to serve certain valid interests of the community. 
Champions of this approach argue, for instance, that the state should 
be granted at least one fair opportunity to present its case in an error-
free trial. If an acquittal is based on an incorrect application of 
prevailing law, or the trial which ended in an acquittal was tainted as 
a result of a procedural irregularity (for example a breach of the rules 
of natural justice to the prejudice of the state), the interests of the 
community in legal certainty and in the proper administration of justice 
require that a higher tribunal should be empowered to intervene and 
set aside the acquittal on request of the prosecution. In general, this 
balanced approach is followed in the majority of legal systems under 
determination is or might be adverse to him, if various rules designed 
to protect him and to safeguard the integrity of the process are not 
given effect. These are, for instance, that he must not previously have 
been convicted or acquitted of the same offence; must have been 
presumed innocent until proven guilty and must have had access to 
legal representation. Packer explains that none of these requirements 
has anything to do with the factual question of whether the person did 
or did not engage in the conduct that is charged as the offence against 
him. However, in a due process system of criminal justice based on 
the recognition of fundamental human rights, violation of rules 
designed to protect the accused will mean that he is legally innocent. 
Cf also the explanation of "legal guilt" as opposed to "factual guilt" by 
Joubert et al Criminal Procedure Handbook 2nd ed 1996 4-6. 
5Thomas GC "An elegant theory of double jeopardy" University of 
Illinois Law Review 1988, 827 850-853 regards this as the only 
rational explanation why state appeals against acquittals are prohibited 
in terms of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy in 
America. See infra under 6.5.7 for a detailed discussion of his 
arguments. 
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consideration in this comparative study namely, England, Canada and 
South Africa. Models of this approach are the following 
(a) An appeal by the prosecution on a point of law only, which 
does not affect the acquittal afforded the particular accused in 
the court a quo. It only has prospective application for the 
future guidance of courts. This kind of appeal is known as a 
moot appeal, and prevails in English law against acquittals 
handed down in superior courts. 
(b) An appeal by the prosecution on a point of law only which, if 
successful, results in the setting aside by the court of appeal of 
the acquittal afforded the accused in the trial court and having 
it replaced with a conviction by applying the correct legal 
principles to the facts found by the trial court. This model is 
followed in Canada and South Africa. A prosecution appeal 
with this effect is also allowed in English law against acquittals 
handed down in lower courts. In the legal systems which allow 
a prosecution appeal on a point of law only, courts have been 
confronted with the problematic issue of identifying "questions 
of fact" on the one hand, and "questions of law only" on the 
other hand. As will become clear from the following 
comparative study, courts in the different legal systems under 
consideration have not always given the same content to the 
concept "question of law only". In the English legal system for 
instance, the ambit of the "question of law" appeal is much 
wider than in South African law. Therefore, the mere fact that 
the prosecution in a particular legal system is allowed only to 
appeal on a point of law, does not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that the accused in that legal system is afforded 
more protection against double jeopardy than his counterpart in 
a legal system which allows for a prosecution appeal based on 
factual as well as legal questions. This is why it is important 
333 
to consider also what is understood in the different legal 
systems under the concept "question of law only". 
c) An appeal by the prosecution against sentence imposed on the 
convicted person. This form of prosecution appeal is permitted 
in all the legal systems considered in this comparative study. 
(d) Review by a superior court of proceedings which took place in 
a lower court which resulted in an acquittal; in other words, 
the setting aside of an acquittal by a higher tribunal on the basis 
that a procedural irregularity occurred during the proceedings in 
the trial court. This is allowed in the law of Canada, England 
and India. In Canada and England courts have justified the 
setting aside of acquittals on this basis by invoking the "nullity 
theory" and the concept of "absence of jurisdiction" .6 In 
South Africa on the other hand, superior courts have been 
reluctant to set aside acquittals in terms of either statutory or 
inherent powers of review. 7 
6.2 ENGLISH LAW 
6.2. 1 General 
As indicated in chapter five, the system of criminal appeal 
introduced in England at the beginning of this century was designated 
as an exceptional procedure to accommodate the interests of the 
6See infra under 6.2.5 and 6.3.5 for a discussion of the courts' 
approach in these legal system. 
7See infra under 6.6.2.6 for a discussion of South African law in this 
regard. 
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accused only. 8 Save for exceptional circumstances where the 
accused was wrongly convicted, the general attitude was that no 
justification exists to disturb the finality of trial verdicts. In all 
probability the underlying idea was that the citizen's common law right 
against double jeopardy placed a prohibition on any challenge of an 
initial verdict of acquittal entered by a competent court of law. 9 
However, as indicated above, legislation as early as 1879 provided 
for a procedure known as "appeal by case stated" 10 in summary 
trials. 11 This procedure, which provided for an appeal on a point of 
law by either the prosecution or the accused against a decision of a 
lower court, has been retained in the English system of criminal justice 
8The creation of a system of appeal early this century was the direct 
result of the conviction and imprisonment of a person named Adolf 
Beck for an offence that he never committed. See Jackson RM The 
Machinery of Justice in England 3rd ed 1960 109. 
9See Paliwala A and Cottrell J "Appeals by the prosecution against 
sentences and acquittals: A survey of the situation in some 
commonwealth countries" Commonwealth Secretariat 2. The authors 
of this survey quote the Australian case of Thompson v Mastertouch 
TV Series Pty ltd (1978) TRRS 306, 115, 119-120: 19 ALR 547 
which assessed the source of the English rule (prohibiting state 
appeals against acquittals) as follows: "The principle is ordinarily 
stated in abstract terms without specific reference to the underlying 
common law right which it embodies ..... the right of a person who 
has been acquitted by a court of competent jurisdiction after a trial on 
the merits of a criminal charge, to be spared the renewed jeopardy of 
an appeal against acquittal". 
10Appeal by case stated is an appeal on a point of law. The procedure 
followed in this kind of appeal is for the magistrates, through their 
clerks, to prepare a statement in a document (the case) setting out the 
point of law raised and explaining why they ruled on it as they did. 
This is why the process is described as "case stated". See Eddey K 
J The English legal System 4th ed 1987 74. 
11 Summary trials are trials before justices of the peace (presently called 
magistrates), which deal with minor criminal offences, eg, most road 
traffic offences. See infra note 1 2 for an explanation of criminal 
jurisdiction in England and Wales. 
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and is presently contained in the Magistrates' Courts Act of 1981. 
Generally, the approach of according sanctity to a verdict of 
acquittal handed down in a trial on indictment12 has been preserved 
in English criminal procedure. However, a number of modifications to 
this approach have taken place in recent decades. Amendments to 
legislation occurred which ostensibly purport to a~commodate certain 
valid interests of the community; in particular the interest of the 
general public in the proper administration of justice. The first of these 
changes (or rather modifications) which took place was the 
introduction of a moot appeal procedure in superior courts. 13 The 
second change that took place was the introduction in 1988 of 
legislation which provides for an appeal by the Attorney-General 
against the imposition of a too lenient sentence. These developments 
are discussed separately in the paragraphs that follow. 
6.2.2 Appeals against acquittals handed down by lower courts 
Section 111 ( 1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act of 1981 provides 
Any person who was a party to proceedings 
12A trial on indictment is a trial by jury in a superior court (presently 
the Crown Court) for more serious offences. At present, criminal 
jurisdiction in England is established according to three classes of 
offences, listed in the Criminal Law Act 19 77, namely, (a) offences 
triable on indictment before a jury eg serious crimes like murder and 
manslaugter; (b) offences triable only summarily by the magistrates 
eg most Road Traffic offences and (c) offences triable either way (eg 
theft) depending upon the seriousness of the offence in the particular 
case and also whether the accused consented to a summary trial. See 
in general Keenan D Smith and Keenan's English law 9th ed 1989 19-
21. 
13A moot appeal can be described as an appeal by the prosecution 
against an acquittal on a point of law to a higher tribunal. However, 
the decision of the higher tribunal has no effect whatsoever on the 
acquittal afforded the particular accused in the trial court. 
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before a magistrate's court, may apply to the 
magistrate to state a case for the opinion of the 
High Court 14 on the ground that a conviction or 
acquittal15 or passing of sentence was wrong in 
law or in excess of jurisdiction. 16 
A question of law has been interpreted by the courts as to whether 
the magistrate was right to find that there was no case-· to· answer, 
whether inadmissible evidence was received or admissible evidence 
excluded and also whether the verdict of the magistrate was correct 
in view of the facts which they found proved on the evidence. 17 
However, the lower court's decision as to which facts were 
established by the evidence, cannot be appealed by case stated; only 
a finding of fact which in the superior court's view is totally 
unsupported by evidence, or which no reasonable tribunal directing 
itself could have reached, is treated as revealing an error of law. 18 
14A divisional court of the Queen's Bench Division. 
15As indicated in chapter three supra under 3.2.2 an acquittal in 
English law denotes a final determination on the merits of a case in 
favour of the accused. 
16See Sprack 357-358 for a discussion of the interpretation of the 
courts of this section. The authors point out that, because it is very 
rare that a magistrate would pass a sentence which is wrong in law or 
in excess of jurisdiction, most appeals by way of case stated are 
aimed at overturning a summary acquittal or conviction. In Tucker v 
Director of Public Prosecutions (1992] 4 All ER 901 it was held that 
only if the sentence is, by any acceptable standard, "astonishing", will 
proceedings by way of case stated be entertained. See Walker RJ and 
Ward R Walker and Walker's English legal system 7th ed 1994 543 
hereinafter referred to as Walker ( 1994) ed. 
17Sprack 357. 
18See Bracegirdle v Oxley [1947] KB 349 All ER 126 127F and 1300-
F. Devlin P Trial by Jury 3rd impression with addendum 1966 61-63 
explains that the question of whether evidence existed on which 
reasonable persons could convict essentially amounts to a matter of 
fact but came to be treated as a question of law as a result of judicial 
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Where the prosecution appeals by means of this procedure, the 
court of appeal may affirm the acquittal or remit the case to the 
magistrate with a direction that they convict and proceed to 
sentence. 19 However, where it is plain what the sentence should be 
the court may replace the acquittal with a conviction and impose an 
appropriate penalty. Except where express provision is made in a 
statute for a prosecution appeal - on- the merits of a-- case20 the 
prosecution is not allowed in terms of this procedure or any other 
procedure, to appeal from a magistrate's court to a superior court on 
any other basis than a point of law. Finally, it is essential also to 
discuss the consequences of a successful appeal by the accused 
against a conviction handed down in a summary trial. An accused 
interference by judges with the deliberations of juries acting as judges 
of fact. As the jury changed from an accusatory organ into a fact-
finding body, certain limitations were placed on the jury as a 
competent fact-finding institutions. This occurred because the view 
was held that certain questions of fact could be answered better by 
judges than juries. The underlying idea was that there should be some 
control exercised by people skilled in law over certain factual 
deliberations made by juries. These factual matters were labelled 
questions of law. The author points out that Lord Chief Justice 
Cockburn in 1879 protested strongly against the terminology which 
turned matters of fact into questions of law. The judge pointed out 
that the right mode of dealing with a question of fact (which should 
rather be considered by a judge) would be to say honestly that, 
although it amounts to a question of fact, it is a issue which has to be 
determined by a judge (at 61). However, this approach was not 
followed in English law and questions for lawyers were in fact 
incorrectly labelled as questions of law. This historical phenomenon 
explains (in my view) why a decision of a magistrate at the end of the 
prosecution's case that there is no case to anwer (essentially a factual 
determination) came to be treated as a question of law in English 
criminal jurisprudence. Cf the discussion infra under 6.6.2.3 of the 
approach adopted in South African law in Magmoed v Janse van 
Rensburg 1993 ( 1) SACR 67 (A). 
19Sprack 360. 
20See Fellman D The Defendant's rights under English law 1966 89 
note 84. 
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may appeal on the merits to the Crown Court against his conviction or 
sentence. If the conviction is overturned the prosecution may also 
appeal by means of the case stated procedure to the High Court. 
However, the prosecution may only appeal by means of this procedure 
on the ground that the Crown Court's reversal is wrong in law or in 
excess of jurisdiction. A further appeal to the House of Lords from the 
High Court is allowed by either party (prosecution or accused) if the 
High Court certified that there is a point of law of general importance 
involved and either the High Court or the House of Lords have granted 
leave to appeal. 21 
Given the wide scope of the concept "question of law" in English 
criminal procedure, 22 it seems as if the accused in a lower court of 
summary jurisdiction is in fact afforded less protection against double 
jeopardy than an accused standing trial in a superior court. One can 
only speculate as to the underlying reason for this phenomenon in 
English criminal procedure. It would appear that the policies that 
underlie the double jeopardy principle have rarely received sufficient 
attention in England. The most likely reason seems to be that the 
administration of justice in the magistrates' courts is regarded as 
being of such a low standard that the interest of the public in the 
proper administration of justice necessitates or demands that the 
public should (at this level of legal administration), at least get one fair 
opportunity to bring an offender to justice. 23 In other words, the 
21 See Sprack 372. 
22As indicated above, a finding of fact which is unsupported by 
evidence, or which no reasonable tribunal directing itself could have 
made, is treated in English law as an error of law. Cf the narrow 
scope of a question of law as interpreted by the South African courts 
discussed infra under 6.6.2.3. 
23This view is supported by Friedland 298. Although the great bulk of 
criminal work is performed in the magistrates' courts (almost 98 
percent of all criminal cases), most presiding officers in these courts 
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prosecution should at least get an opportunity to present its case in a 
trial free of errors, including errors concerning the proper evaluation of 
evidence. 
Another possible explanation may be that, traditionally, sanctity was 
accorded only to jury verdicts of acquittals handed down in trials on 
indictments. 24 However, if this thesis is accepted as correct, the 
question may be raised why the English prosecutor is not allowed a 
full appeal on the merits against an acquittal handed down in a 
summary (non-jury) trial. It seems therefore that the recognition of an 
appeal by the prosecution upon a point of law against acquittals 
handed down in lower courts and the broad interpretation that the 
courts have given to the concept "question of law", can only be 
explained on the basis of the inferior standard of administration of 
justice in lower courts. 
6.2.3 Appeals against acquittals handed down by superior courts 
Until 1972, no procedure existed in English law to test the 
correctness of a statement of law made by a judge during the course 
are lay people and have hardly any legal training. These are called lay 
magistrates as opposed to stipendiary magistrates (who have legal 
training). Although English magistrates deal with minor offences, they 
may (at present) impose a sentence of six months imprisonment for 
any one offence (or 12 months in case of consecutive sentences) or 
a fine of 5,000 pounds. See Walker 1994 ed 533-534. 
24Cf the views of Thomas Modest proposal 208-213. In considering 
the language contained in the double jeopardy provision of the 
American Constitution, the author suggests that the words used by 
the Framers, ie that "[N)or shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb "(my emphasis), 
originated in English law and denotes that the rule applied (in 
eighteenth century England) to most felonies but presumably not to 
misdemeanors. 
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of a trial on indictment which ended in the acquittal of the accused.25 
The absence of any method whereby a ruling by a Crown Court judge 
could be challenged left open the possibility that such a ruling, perhaps 
unduly favourable to the accused, could in fact have been based on 
the application of incorrect legal principles. The possibility also existed 
that suc.h a case might be reported and become accepted as 
representing prevailing law. To promote the public interest in the 
proper administration of justice and legal certainty, the legislature 
created a mechanism whereby a perpetuation of the application of 
incorrect legal principles could be avoided without necessarily 
encroaching on the citizen's common law right against double 
jeopardy. This was done by means of the enactment of section 36 of 
the Criminal Justice Act of 197226 which provides for a procedure 
whereby the Attorney-General may refer to the Court of Appeal for 
their opinion any point of law which arose in a case where a person 
had been tried on indictment and acquitted. However, the opinion 
expressed by the Court of Appeal (even an opinion that the trial judge 
was wrong and the facts of the case were such that the accused 
clearly ought to have been convicted) 27 has no effect whatsoever on 
the acquittal accorded the accused in the trial court. 28 It only serves 
the purpose of stating the correct legal principles for future reference 
in order to prevent a perpetuation of the application of incorrect legal 
principles by the courts. 
25As indicated in chapter five supra under 5.3, the writ of error 
procedure was abolished in 1907. 
26See Archbold 1995 ed Vol 1 1259-1260 for the complete text of this 
provision. 
27This also qualifies as a question of law in English law. See 
Bracegirdle v Oxley supra note 18. 
28Section 36(7) of the Act. 
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The Act and the rules made in terms of it went to great lengths to 
protect the person who has been acquitted.29 As indicated, the 
acquitted person is not put in jeopardy of conviction by the 
proceedings. 3° Furthermore, he has a right to be presented at the 
hearing by counsel and have his costs paid out of central funds. 31 
His identity may also not be disclosed at the proceedings except by his 
own consent. 32 In one of the first matters so referred33 Lord 
Widgery CJ stated that the procedure is not only available if "very 
heavy questions of law" arise, but also where "short but important 
points require a quick ruling ... "34• Finally, it should also be 
mentioned that in terms of this procedure, the Court of Appeal may 
(following a reference under section 36) of their own motion or on 
application of either the prosecution or the accused refer the point of 
law to the House of Lords, if it appears that the point ought to be 
considered by that House.35 
It is clear that the institution of a moot prosecution appeal against 
an acquittal on a point of law cannot be criticised on double jeopardy 
grounds. In fact, the institution serves the valid interest of the 
community in the proper administration of justice without violating the 
common law right of the accused against double jeopardy. 
29Criminal Appeal (Reference of Points of Law) Rules 1973. See 
Archbold 1995 ed 1 260-1 261 for a discussion of these rules. 
30Section 36(7) of the Act. 
31 Section 36(5) of the Act. 
32Criminal Appeal (Reference of Points of Law) Rules 1973 Rule 6. 
33Attorney-General's Reference (No 1of1975) [1975] QB 773. 
34At 778. 
35Section 36(3). See Archbold 1995 ed 1259. 
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6.2.4 Prosecution appeals against sentence 
In 1988 legislation was introduced which provides for an appeal by 
the Attorney-General against the imposition of a too lenient 
sentence.36 The relevant legislation gives the Attorney-General 
power to refer to the Court of Appeal cases where it appears to him 
that the sentencing of an offender in the Crown Court has· been unduly 
lenient. 37 Where a case is referred to the Court of Appeal according 
to these provisions, it has the power to review and alter the sentence 
passed, substituting such sentence as it thinks appropriate and which 
would not exceed the jurisdiction of the lower court. 38 
Although a considerable section of the English legal profession (both 
inside and outside Parliament) strongly opposed any form of 
prosecution appeal against sentence, 39 the government was 
eventually swayed to adopt the present legislation by considerations 
36Sections 35 and 36 of the Criminal Justice Amendment Act of 1988. 
See Archbold 1995 ed Vol 1 1261-1264 for the text of these 
provisions and a brief discussion thereof. 
38Section 36(b) of the 1988 Act. 
39Those who opposed a prosecution appeal against sentence were of 
the view that, apart from double jeopardy considerations, it would 
interfere with the traditional freedom of Crown Court judges to 
exercise a broad discretion when passing sentence and also undermine 
the accepted view in English law that the prosecution's role in the 
sentencing stage of proceedings is limited to a fair and impartial 
presentation of the facts and does not include the power to argue for 
a particular or more severe sentence. See Emmins CJ and Scanlan GA 
Guide to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 1st ed 1988 1 62. Cf also 
Spencer JR "Do we need a prosecution appeal against sentence?" 
Criminal Law Review 1987 724 (discussing the controversy 
surrounding the proposed legislation, but, personally, favouring such 
an appeal) and Seabrooke S "Two timing the double jeopardy 
principle" Criminal Law Review 1988 103 criticising the proposed 
legislation on double jeopardy grounds. 
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put forward by those who favoured a prosecution appeal against 
sentence. 40 
In dealing with these appeals, the Court of Appeal applied the 
normal principles of review of a discretion. It held that it could only 
increase sentences which were unduly lenient. In one of the initial 
references, the Court of Appeal laid down the following guidelines41 
The first thing to be observed is that it is implicit in the 
section that this court may only increase sentences 
which it concludes were unduly lenient. It cannot, we 
are confident, have been the intention of Parliament to 
subject defendants to the risk of having their sentences 
increased - with all the anxiety that this naturally gives 
rise to - merely because in the opinion of this court the 
sentence was less than this court would have imposed. 
A sentence is unduly lenient, we would hold, where it 
falls outside the range of sentences which the judge, 
applying his mind to all the relevant factors, could 
reasonably consider appropriate. In that connection 
regard must of course be had to reported cases, and in 
particular to the guidance given by this court from time 
to time in the so-called guideline cases. However it must 
always be remembered that sentencing is an art rather 
than a science; that the trial judge is particularly well 
placed to assess the weight to be given to various 
competing considerations; and that leniency is not in 
itself a vice. That mercy should season justice is a 
proposition as soundly based in law as it is in literature. 
401t was submitted, inter alia, that unduly lenient sentences outraged 
the public and that it was of no avail if such sentences could only be 
criticised but not altered by a superior court; that offenders whose 
crimes and characters were effectively indistinguishable might receive 
markedly different treatment and that this phenomenon undermined 
public confidence in the judiciary and the criminal law. See Emmins 
and Scanlan 1 62. It should be mentioned however, that these 
arguments are equally valid with regard to the need for an appeal 
against an acquittal - even on the factual merits of a case. 
41Attorney General's Reference (No 4 of 1989) [1990] 1 WLR 41, 45-
46. 
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From a double jeopardy perspective, the court added the following 
considerations42 
The second thing to be observed about the section is 
that, even where it considers that the sentence was 
unduly lenient, this court has a discretion as to whether 
to exercise its powers. Without attempting an 
exhaustive definition of the- circumstances-in which the 
court might refuse to increase an unduly lenient 
sentence, we mention one obvious instance; where in 
the light of events since the trial it appears either that the 
sentence can be justified or that to increase it would be 
unfair to the offender or detrimental to others for whose 
well-being the court ought to be concerned. Finally we 
point to the fact that, where this court grants leave for a 
reference, its powers are not confined to increasing the 
sentence. 43 
In the majority of subsequent cases the Court of Appeal adjusted 
an appropriate increased sentence (decided upon in review 
proceedings), on the basis that the offender has had to face the 
prospect of being sentenced twice over. In other words, the court has 
mitigated the appropriate increased sentence (decided upon on review) 
431n this particular case the court of review found that an increased 
sentence would not be in the interest of the victim (a minor sexually 
abused by her father) and the family as a whole. Also, the court 
decided not to increase the sentence because it was accepted by 
counsel for the state that the risk of repetition of the offences was 
unlikely in view of the fact that the whole family were receiving 
intensive help from social workers and the probation service which 
was directed to atttempt to rehabilitate and reunite them. In another 
early case, Attorney General's Reference (No 5 of 1989) R v Hill-
Trevor [ 1990] 90 Cr App R 358, the Court of Appeal added that it 
would not intervene unless there was some error of principle in the 
Crown Court sentence, so that public confidence would be damaged 
if the sentence was not altered on appeal. 
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on the basis of consideration of the "element of double jeopardy". 44 
For example, if the court of review found that a sentence of 12 
months' imprisonment imposed by the Crown Court was unduly 
lenient, it would state that an appropriate sentence would be two 
years' imprisonment. However, taking into consideration the "element 
of double jeopardy", the court would then reduce the appropriate 
sentence, and, for instance, impose a sentence of 18 months' 
imprisonment. Therefore, in deciding on an appropriate sentence, 
English courts of appeal have taken into consideration the double 
jeopardy implications of a prosecution appeal against sentence. 
6.2.5 Judicial review of an acquittal 
One of the High Court's tasks is to supervise the work of inferior 
tribunals. In English law, judicial review of lower court proceedings 
is instituted by means of application for one or more of three 
prerogatory orders: Certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. An order 
of certiorari quashes a decision of an inferior tribunal; mandamus 
compels an inferior tribunal to carry out its duties and prohibition 
prevents an inferior tribunal from acting unlawfully or without 
jurisdiction. 45 The functions of mandamus and prohibition on the one 
hand and appeal by case stated on the other are quite distinct. The 
appellant by case stated argues that the magistrates have made a 
44See Attorney-General's Reference No 6 of 1994 (R v Lee) Crim LR 
[ 1994] 951, 952; Attorney-General's Reference No 11 of 1994 (R v 
Hall) Crim LR (994] 953; Attorney-General's Reference No 30 of 1993 
(R v Saunders} Crim LR (1994] 953, 954; Attorney-General's 
Reference No 7 of 1994 (R v Chadwick) Crim LR [1994] 954, 955; 
Attorney-General's Reference No 14 of 1994 (R v Walker) Crim LR 
[ 1994] 955; Attorney-General's References Nos 17 and 18 of 1994 
(R v Chamberlain and Chamberlain) Crim LR [1994] 955, 956 & 
Attorney-General's Reference No 49 of 1994 (R v Brown) Crim LR 
(1994] 437, 438. 
45See Blackstone 1991 ed 1469. 
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mistake in exercising jurisdiction. The applicant for mandamus or 
prohibition argues either that the magistrates have failed to exercise 
their jurisdiction or that they should be prevented from exercising a 
jurisdiction which they do not lawfully have. Certiorari and appeal by 
case stated serve similar purposes. The effect of both remedies is to 
set aside the decisions of the court below. Blackstone points out that 
counsel advising a person aggrieved by a decisf on of a lower court 
may find the choice between the remedies difficult.46 He summarises 
the position as follows47 
(a) Where the magistrates have acted in excess of jurisdiction both 
certiorari and appeal by case stated are available.48 
(b) Where an error of law has been made, but the inferior tribunal 
was acting within its jurisdiction, appeal by case stated is the 
obvious remedy. If the error of law is patent on the face of the 
record of the inferior tribunal's proceedings, certiorari could also 
be used, but most errors of law are latent rather than patent. 
The latent error will only be revealed by means of a case stated. 
(c) If the rules of natural justice have been broken, the appropriate 
remedy is certiorari. This is because the procedural irregularities 
which typically form the basis of an alleged breach of natural 
justice (eg a magistrate had an interest in the outcome of the 
proceedings or the defence had not been given the opportunity 
to present its case properly) would not emerge from a case 
stated, which deals essentially with the facts the magistrates 
find proved and the legal issues arising from the facts. 
(d) Certiorari is the only remedy if the defence wishes to quash a 
committal for trial. Appeal by case stated will not lie because 
there has not been a final determination in the case. 
(e) Where both certiorari and appeal by case stated are available, 
the latter is preferable because it enables the facts as found by 
46At 1479. 
48The meaning of the concept "excess of jurisdiction" will become 
clearer from a discussion of the case law in the following paragraphs. 
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the magistrates to be placed clearly before the superior court. 
In the past, English courts have held consistently that review by 
a superior court of an acquittal accorded to an accused in an inferior 
tribunal amounts to a violation of the accused's rights against double 
jeopardy. 49 However, in Regina v Darking Justices, Ex parte 
Harrington, 50 the House of Lords recently added a qualification to this 
principle. It held that judicial review of an acquittal would only be 
prohibited on double jeopardy grounds if the accused had in fact been 
lawfully acquitted.51 
The facts of the Harrington case were as follows. The prosecution 
applied to the justices for an adjournment of a hearing on charges of 
assault on the ground that the principal prosecution witness was not 
available. The justices decided to adjourn the case to a particular 
date. However, defendant's counsel objected because the defendant 
would not be available on that specific date. Subsequently, without 
making any inquiry of the prosecution who had other witnesses and 
were prepared to go on with those other witnesses on the original day 
49Regina v Russel ( 1854) 3 El & Bl 942 118 ER 1394; Regina v 
Duncan ( 1 881) 7 OBD 198 and Regina v Middlesex Quarter Sessions 
(Chairman) ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions [19521 2 QB 758. 
In common law, the writ of certiorari was a means whereby the King's 
Court exercised jurisdiction over an inferior tribunal. Where it 
appeared to the Court of King's Bench that an insufficient or 
unsatisfactory trial would occur in the lower court, it could, in its 
discretion, remove the indictment out of the lower court by certiorari 
in order that the accused be tried before a judge of the King's Bench. 
Certiorari also lay to consider the validity of an indictment or 
conviction. Of importance however, is that certiorari did not lie to 
consider the validity of an acquittal. See Stephen Criminal law Vol 1 
95-96. 
50Supra. 
51 At 752. 
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of hearing, the justices dismissed the information. The prosecution 
applied for judicial review by way of certiorari to quash the decision of 
the justices and mandamus which required them to hear the evidence 
against the defendant on the ground that the failure to afford the 
prosecution the opportunity to proceed forthwith by calling such 
witnesses as were available, was a breach of the rules of natural 
justice. The Divisional Court refused the application, holding that 
although the justices had acted in breach of natural justice, the 
dismissal of the charges against the defendant amounted to an 
acquittal and since the defendant had been in jeopardy, the Divisional 
Court had not power upon an application for judicial review to quash 
the acquittals and order a new trial. 
The House of Lords reversed the decision. It held that the superior 
court could quash the acquittal by means of an order of certiorari and 
order a new trial. The reasons advanced by the court can be 
summarised as follows. 52 In determining whether an acquittal is 
susceptible to judicial review, the test is not whether there had been 
a breach of the rules of natural justice, but whether the decision to 
acquit was a nullity. The jurisdiction of a magistrate's court is 
founded on statute. The relevant statute is the Magistrates' Courts 
Act 1981 of which, inter a/is, section 9(2) provides that "[t]he court, 
after hearing the evidence and the parties, shall convict the accused 
or dismiss the information". In other words, this provision stipulates 
that the magistrates cannot dismiss any information until after they 
have heard the parties and whatever evidence the parties may properly 
lay before them, except where no evidence is tendered by the 
prosecution.53 In the court's view, failure to comply with this 
section means that the court has acted without jurisdiction, thus 
52At 750. 
53/d. 
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rendering the proceedings a nullity. 54 The result is that the defendant 
was never in jeopardy of a conviction and could therefore be tried 
again.55 The court made the following statement in this regard56 
An accused person is not, in the context of a plea of 
autrefois convict or autrefois acquit in jeopardy merely 
because that person is standing trial on a particular 
charge and in a popular sense is in jeopardy as being in 
peril of conviction. Jeopardy in the relevant sense only 
arises after a lawful acquittal or a lawful conviction. 57 
In other words, if a magistrate purports to acquit when he is not 
empowered to do so (namely has no jurisdiction to do so), the trial is 
treated as a nullity which means that the acquittal may be quashed by 
a superior tribunal and a new trial ordered. The principle laid down in 
Harrington was recently applied in Regina v Dorchester Justices , Ex 
parte Director of Public Prosecutions, 58 where the court held that if 
a magistrate pronounces an acquittal without listening to the 
prosecution evidence and also without having any good reason, the 
verdict of acquittal may be quashed by means of certiorari because the 
magistrate acted without jurisdiction. 
Therefore it may be said that because the concept of jurisdiction is 
often used in certiorari cases, the nullity theory has been used in these 
cases to effect a retrial after an acquittal. However, English courts 
have not as yet applied this approach in other instances of procedural 
irregularities except for the irregularity that occurred in both the 
54At 746. 
56At 752. 
57My emphasis. 
58RTR [ 1990] 369. 
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abovementioned decisions namely, the failure to give the prosecution 
an opportunity to present its case as required in terms of section 9(2) 
of The Magistrates' Courts Act of 1981 . 
6.2.6 Summary 
* In English law, the understanding of the common law guarantee 
against double jeopardy has always been that it prohibits the state 
from challenging a verdict of acquittal handed down in a trial on 
indictment. However, in recent decades the English legislature has 
opted for a more flexible approach which also takes into consideration 
that the recognition of a prosecution appeal may serve certain valid 
interests of the public, namely interests in the proper administration of 
justice and legal certainty. 
* In making provision for prosecution appeals against acquittals, the 
legislature has attempted to accommodate the abovementioned 
interests of the public without necessarily defeating the accused's 
right to be protected against double jeopardy. This was achieved by 
the introduction of a moot appeal against acquittals handed down in 
superior courts. The moot appeal procedure provides that the 
Attorney-General may refer to the Court of Appeal for its opinion any 
point of law which arose in a case where a person had been acquitted. 
However, the opinion expressed by the Court of Appeal has no effect 
whatsoever on the acquittal accorded the accused in the trial court; 
it only serves the purpose of stating the correct legal principles for 
future reference in order to prevent a perpetuation of the application 
of incorrect legal principles by the courts. The institution of a moot 
appeal serves the interests of the public in legal certainty and proper 
administration of justice without violating the common law right of the 
accused against double jeopardy. 
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* Traditionally, the accused acquitted in a lower court has never 
enjoyed the same protection against prosecution appeals as his 
counterpart in a superior court. From as early as 1879, legislation 
provided for an appeal on a point of law only by the prosecution 
against an acquittal handed down in a lower court, or sentence 
imposed on an accused convicted in such lower court. Moreover, 
the courts have given a wide meaning to the concept question of law. 
The reasonableness of a court's evaluation of evidence (essentially a 
factual issue) also qualifies as a question of law in English law. 59 
This may be explained on the basis that questions which were 
traditionally regarded as matters which had to be decided by judges 
instead of by juries, in other words, questions for lawyers, came to be 
referred to as questions of law. Be that as it may, where the 
prosecution appeals by means of this procedure, the court of appeal 
may affirm the acquittal or remit the case to the magistrates with a 
direction that they convict and proceed to sentence. Justification for 
the recognition of a prosecution appeal on a point of law against an 
acquittal handed down in a lower court probably lies in the fact that 
the administration of justice in the magistrates' courts is of such an 
inferior standard that the interest of the public in the proper 
administration of justice requires that the state (at this level of legal 
administration) at least gets one fair opportunity to present its case in 
an error-free trial. However, this is mere speculation; the policies that 
underlie double jeopardy protection have rarely received sufficient 
attention in English law. 
* The legislature also recently (in 1988) introduced a prosecution 
appeal against the imposition of an unduly lenient sentence imposed 
on a convicted accused in a superior court. Although there was 
59See the in depth discussion of this particular aspect in the discussion 
on South African law, in particular, the analysis of the decision of 
Magmoed v Janse van Rensburg (infra under 6.6.2.3). 
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strong opposition to any form of prosecution appeal against sentence, 
the government was eventually persuaded to adopt the legislation in 
view of the considerations that unduly lenient sentences outrage the 
public and undermine public confidence in the judiciary and the 
criminal law. The basic approach followed by the Court of Appeal is 
that a sentence may be interfered with only if the trial court acted on 
a wrong principle of law. In imposing a more severe sentence, the 
Court of Appeal has not altogether disregarded the accused's right to 
be protected against double jeopardy. To accomodate the accused's 
right, the court reduces an appropriate (increased) sentence on the 
basis that reconsideration of the sentence subjects the accused to 
double jeopardy. However, the Court has not explained why 
reconsideration of a sentence amounts to a violation of the guarantee 
against double jeopardy. 
* The traditional premise that review by a superior court of an 
acquittal handed down in a lower court is prohibited in terms of the 
common law guarantee against double jeopardy, has recently also 
been eroded. The House of Lords held that judicial review of an 
acquittal will only be prohibited on double jeopardy grounds if the 
accused has in fact been lawfully acquitted. The court laid down the 
following principles in this regard: an acquittal is susceptible to judicial 
review where a decision to acquit can be regarded as a nullity. Where 
a court acted without jurisdiction, (for example by failing to comply 
with a rule which requires that the court hears both the prosecution 
and the defence on a matter before it proceeds to make a verdict), it 
renders the trial and subsequent "acquittal" a nullity. The acquittal 
may therefore be quashed and a new trial ordered; the accused was 
never in jeopardy of a conviction at the first trial. 
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6.3 CANADIAN LAW 
6.3.1 General 
In Canadian law, the prosecution is afforded a limited right of appeal 
(namely on a point of law only) against a judgment or verdict of 
acquittal of a trial court in proceedings on indictment. Introduced as 
early as 1930, 60 the right of the crown to appeal on a point of law 
against an acquittal has been described as "a fundamental departure 
from common-law principles". 61 However, as Friedland points out, 
that which was once regarded as an extraordinary remedy of great 
concern (namely the crown appeal against an acquittal), gradually 
came to be accepted as a valid element of Canadian criminal procedure 
- in the author's view, largely as a result of the complacency of the 
legal profession.62 The prosecution's right to appeal against an 
acquittal handed down in summary proceedings has also recently been 
held in the Province of Ontario to include an appeal on the recorded 
facts. However, the Supreme Court of Canada has not as yet 
considered the constitutionality of prosecution appeals on questions 
of fact against acquittals handed down in lower courts. In the field of 
review of acquittals and appeals against sentence, Canadian courts 
have generally followed the same approach as English courts. 
6.3.2 Appeals against acquittals handed down by superior courts 
The present Criminal Code63 provides that the Attorney-General or 
60SC 1 9 30 c 11 . 
61Morgentaler v The Queen [1976] 1 SCR 616, 669. 
62At 295. 
63RSC 1985 C-46, section 676( 1). 
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counsel instructed by him for the purpose may appeal to the Court of 
Appeal against a "judgment or verdict of acquittal of a trial court in 
proceedings by indictment on any ground of appeal that involves a 
question of law alone" .64 The crown's right of appeal on a question 
of law was approved recently by the Canadian Supreme Court. 65 
After the incorporation of the Canadian Charter of Rights as part of 
Canada's written Constitution in 1982, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
was confronted in the case of Regina v Morgentaler, Smoling and 
Scott66 with the issue of whether section 605( 1 )(a)67 of the 
Criminal Code amounts to a violation of the guarantee against double 
jeopardy contained in section 11 (h) of the Charter of Rights. As 
pointed out in chapter three, 68 the latter section provides that 
[a]ny person charged with an offence has the right .... if 
finally acquitted of the offence, not to be tried for it 
again, if finally found guilty and punished for the offence, 
not to be tried or punished for it again. 
Opting for a very limited approach, the court in Morgentaler held 
that the literal meaning of the words used by the framers of the 
provision namely, "finally acquitted", specifically envisages that the 
crown may take some form of appeal against a verdict of acquittal. 
Without giving any serious consideration to the policies and ideas 
which underlie the rule against double jeopardy, the court concluded 
that the relevant section in the Criminal Code which provides for a 
64My emphasis. 
65Morgentaler, Smoling and Scott v The Queen [1988] 37 CCC (3d) 
449, 455 (SCC). 
66[ 19851 22 CCC 353 (Ont CA). 
67The present section 676( 1 )(a), discussed supra. 
68Supra under 3.3. 1. 
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crown appeal against an acquittal on a question of law alone, does not 
violate the provisions of section 11 (h) of the Charter. The court based 
its conclusion on the intention of the framers of the Charter as 
expressed in the language used in the double jeopardy provision. In 
this regard, the court made the following statement69 
It is difficult to think that if they had intended to abrogate 
such a well-established part of the Canadian Criminal 
justice system as the Crown's right of appeal on a 
question of law alone from an acquittal, the framers of 
the Charter would have chosen the language they 
employed in s. 11 (h). Rather the language of s. 11 (h) 
leads to the opposite conclusion and differs significantly 
from the language of the Fifth Amendment [of the United 
States Constitution]. 
In allowing a crown appeal against an acquittal on a ground which 
involves "a question of law alone", 70 the courts as a natural 
consequence also had to deal with the problematic issue of defining 
the ambit of the concept "question of law alone". A Canadian legal 
commentator remarked in 1976 that71 
the distinction between "law" and "fact" is a morass of 
irreconcilable precedents, ad hoc decisions and 
judgments which tend to state that "a question of law 
alone" must be interpreted in the strict sense and then 
ignore that advice. 
69 At 409. This approach was confirmed by the Canadian Supreme 
Court in Morgentaler, Smoling and Scott v The Queen supra. Freeman 
CD "Double Jeopardy Protection in Canada: A Consideration of 
Development, Doctrine and a Current Controversy" Criminal Law 
Journal 1988 Vol 12 3, 26 comments that the court's approach of 
basing its judgment on "a highly artificial construct", namely the intent 
of the drafters of the Charter amounts to reasoning which "seems 
lacking in the extreme". 
7
°The wording of section 767(1 )(a). See supra, text at note 63. 
71 Parker G "Jury reversal and the appellate court view of law and 
fact" Osgoode Hall Law Journal Vol 14 1976 287, 288. 
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The most difficult problems arise where the crown establishes the 
essential elements of the offence, but the trial judge nevertheless 
acquits, framing his reasons in terms of reasonable doubt. The 
following decisions of the Supreme Court illustrate what difficulties a 
court may encounter in attempting to distinguish between questions 
of facts on the one hand, and questions of law on the other hand. 
In Sunbeam Corporation Ltd v The Queen72 the Supreme Court 
held that the reasonableness of the verdict on the strength of the 
evidence could not be a proper ground of appeal by the 
prosecution. 73 The court held that the sufficiency or insufficiency of 
evidence to convict the accused of the crime charged, was essentially 
a question of fact for the judgment of the court. 74 This approach 
was followed in Lampard v The Queen. 75 The court stated that 
where a trial judge made findings of primary facts and drew 
inferences from them, the court was making a finding of fact. 76 
Therefore, a court of appeal may only substitute its view (as to what 
inference should be drawn) for that of the trial judge in legal systems 
which allow for appeals on factual as well as legal questions. 
Whereas the court's jurisdiction (in Lampard) was limited to questions 
of law alone, it had no such power. 77 
72[ 1969] 2 CCC 189 (SCC). 
73The same approach was followed by the South African Appeal Court 
in the case of Magmoed v Janse Van Rensburg (discussed infra under 
6.6.2.3). Contra the approach followed in English law (discussed 
supra under 6.2.2). 
74At 197-198. 
75(1969) 3 CCC 249 (SCC). 
76At 256. 
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However, in Wild v The Queen 78 the Supreme Court held that a 
question of law was raised in the following circumstances. A trial 
judge acquitted an accused on a charge of causing death by criminal 
negligence on the basis that the evidence raised a reasonable doubt 
whether the accused was indeed driving the vehicle at the time of the 
accident. However, all the evidence indicated that the accused, found 
pinned down behind the steering wheel, was the driver at the time of 
the impact. Nevertheless, the trial judge speculated that someone else 
could have been the driver and consequently acquitted the accused. 
The question which faced the Supreme Court was whether the finding 
of the trial judge that there was reasonable doubt as to whether the 
accused had driven the car, amounted to a "question of law alone" 
which permitted an appeal by the state against an acquittal. 
The Supreme Court held that on a proper view of the law, the 
evidence presented in the case was not capable of creating any doubt 
whatsoever that the accused was the driver of the vehicle. 79 In the 
court's view, a question of law alone is raised when a trial judge 
makes a finding of fact that certain specified evidence creates a 
reasonable doubt as to the accused's guilt, but on a proper view of the 
law, that evidence is not capable of creating any doubt as to his 
guilt.80 
However, in Schuldt v The Queen81 the correctness of Lampard 
78[1970] 4 CCC 40 (SCC). 
79At 52-53 of the majority opinion delivered by Martland, J. The court 
pointed out that the trial judge, in considering the facts, failed to 
appreciate their proper effect in law because he did not distinguish 
between a conjectural possibility, arising from those facts, and a 
rational conclusion arising from the whole of the evidence. 
80At 41. 
81 [1985) 23 CCC (3d) 225 (SCC). 
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was affirmed and the decision in Wild qualified. In the Schuldt case, 
the accused was found outside business premises in the early morning 
hours and charged with attempted breaking and entering. The 
evidence indicated that the accused or his companion had attempted 
to use a tyre bar to enter a gun shop. However, the trial judge 
acquitted him because he entertained a reasonable doubt concerning 
the accused's intention to enter and to commit the offence. The 
crown appealed against the acquittal on the basis that to entertain any 
doubt on the issue of intent was not reasonable and was fanciful, and 
constituted an error of law. The issue before the Supreme Court was 
whether the appeal could be regarded as one "on a point of law 
alone". 
The court pointed out that in Wild, the court had previously held that 
the total absence of a foundation for a finding of fact amounts to an 
error of law. 82 Lamer J (delivering the opinion in Schuldt) agreed 
with this premise. However, he did not agree "as to the 
circumstances [indicated in Wild] under which a finding that there is 
a total absence of evidence can properly be made" .83 In his view, a 
finding of fact which is made in the absence of any supportive 
evidence will only qualify as an error of law as regards an acquittal, if 
the accused by law carried some burden of proof. 84 The court 
explained that in the absence of a shifting of the burden of proof onto 
the accused, there would always be some evidence on which to make 
a finding of fact favourable to the accused, and, if such a finding was 
alleged to be erroneous, it would amount to an error of fact and not 
an error of law. In order to elucidate this point of view, the court 
referred to the opinion to the following effect of Cartwright CJC, in 
82My emphasis. 
83At 230. (My emphasis). 
84At 233. 
Lamparc/85 
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In a criminal case (except in the rare cases in which a 
statutory provision places an onus upon the accused) it 
can sometimes be said as a matter of law that there is no 
evidence on which the Court can convict but never that 
there is no evidence on which it can acquit; there is 
always the rebuttable presumption of innocence. Be 
In other words, the presumption of innocence (coupled with the heavy 
onus of the state) has the effect that it can never be said that there is 
a total absence of a foundation for a finding of fact favourable to the 
accused. In Schuldt, the court concluded that because no onus of 
proof was placed on the accused concerning his intent to break and 
enter, there was some evidence on which the trial judge could rest his 
finding. In the court's view, that finding, if it had been erroneous, 
would be an error of fact and not an error of law. B1 
Finally it needs to be mentioned that Canadian courts have followed 
the English approach that a discharge of the accused at the close of 
the prosecution's case amounts to a question of law which may be 
appealed by the crown.BB In determining whether an accused should 
be discharged at this stage of the proceedings, the judge must 
consider whether there is any evidence on which a jury, acting 
reasonably, might convict the accused. Bs No explanation is 
B5At 256 of the Lampard decision, cited by Lamer J at 237 in the 
Schuldt decision. 
B6My emphasis. 
B7At 238. 
BBSee Feeley v The Queen [ 1952] 104 CCC 255 (SCC) and Regina v 
Paul [1975] 27 CCC 2d 1 (SCC). 
B9At 256. 
360 
advanced in the case law as to why this determination is considered 
to be a question of law only, instead of a question of fact or a 
question of mixed law and fact. 
Be that as it may, in an attempt to clarify the law (regarding errors 
of law and errors of fact), the Supreme Court in Regina v B(G)90 
identified three areas which might constitute an error of law by the 
trial judge in assessing the facts as they apply to the law 
(a) where the trial judge has erred as to the legal effect of 
undisputed or found facts rather than the inferences to be 
drawn from such facts 
(b) where the trial judge misdirected himself as to the relevant 
evidence and his misdirection was based on a misapprehension 
of some legal principle and 
(c) where the trial judge failed to consider the totality of the 
evidence in order to determine whether the accused's guilt had 
been established beyond a reasonable doubt. 
6.3.3 Appeals against acquittals handed down by lower courts 
Similar to the position which prevails in English law, the right of the 
crown to appeal against a judgment favourable to the accused is 
somewhat different in summary proceedings than it is in proceedings 
on indictment. However, unlike English law which allows an appeal 
by the prosecution from summary proceedings on a point of law only, 
the Canadian prosecutor's right of appeal from these proceedings has 
recently been held by the Ontario Court of Appeal to include the right 
90(19901 56 CCC (3d) 181 (SCC). 
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to appeal on questions of law as well as factual issues. 91 In Regina 
v Century 21 Ramos Realty92 the appellant contended that the 
crown's right of appeal to the summary conviction appeal court on 
questions of facts in summary proceedings infringes section 11 (h) of 
the Charter. However, referring to the same court's approach in 
Morgentaler, Smoling and Scott, 93 the court held that, since an 
appeal by the prosecution on the record of proceedings in the trial 
court on questions of fact as well as questions of law had also been 
an established part of the criminal process in Canada for almost a 
hundred years, such an appeal by the state would not be in violation 
of the double jeopardy provision of the Charter. However, as pointed 
out above, the Supreme Court of Canada has not as yet ruled on the 
constitutionality of crown appeals against acquittals handed down in 
lower courts on questions of fact alone. 
6.3.4 Prosecution appeals against sentence 
Canadian criminal jurisprudence provides for a crown appeal against 
sentence imposed on an accused in a trial court to the Court of 
Appeal, with the leave of that court or any of its judges. 94 Unless 
91 Presently contained in section 813 of the Criminal Code. The 
relevant section (813(b)(i) and (ii)) provides that the Attorney-General 
may appeal to the appeal court against an order which stays 
proceedings on an information or dismisses an information, or against 
a sentence passed on a defendant. No mention is made in the section 
that an appeal by the prosecution in terms of this provision is confined 
to a question of law only. Conversely, the provision does not provide 
expressly that the crown may also appeal on factual issues. 
92[1987] 58 OR (2d) 737 discussed by Friedland Ml and Roach Kin 
Criminal law and Procedure: Cases and Materials 6th ed 1991 852-
853. 
93Supra. 
94Section 676( 1 )(b) of the Criminal Code. 
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the sentence is one fixed by law, the Court of Appeal may consider 
the fitness of the sentence appealed against. However, despite wide 
powers to interfere with a sentence imposed by a trial court, the 
general approach of the courts has been that a sentence will only be 
altered on an appeal if the trial judge relied or proceeded on a wrong 
principle.95 The general principle that the imposition of sentence is 
basically a matter for the discretion of a trial judge, has consequently 
also been honoured in the context of prosecution appeals against 
sentence. 
6.3.5 Judicial review of an acquittal 
Finally, it remains to discuss briefly whether an acquittal may be taken 
on review in Canadian criminal jurisprudence. Like its English 
counterpart, the general approach of Canadian courts has recently 
been that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may only be invoked 
by the crown to quash an acquittal in circumstances where the 
acquittal had been granted without jurisdiction.96 Justification for 
95Regina v Carr [1937] 68 CCC 343 (Ont CA) and Regina v Lauzon 
[1940] 74 CCC 37 (Que KB). See in general Salhany 9-33 and 9-34 
and Bolton 126-127. The authors point out that it is unlikely that a 
sentence will be increased on appeal if it would prejudice the accused. 
The courts have held that an accused would be prejudiced if the crown 
(on appeal), repudiated a position taken by counsel for the state at the 
trial or where the accused had already served his sentence before the 
appeal is heard. Furthermore, Bolton points out that the crown is not 
permitted to introduce fresh evidence of aggravating circumstances on 
a sentence appeal. 
96 Although it was stated in Regina v Calvert [ 1954] 110 CCC 93, 35 
MPR (NBCA) that certiorari does not lie to remove an acquittal because 
it would amount to a violation of double jeopardy principles, the court 
in Re Regina and Ritcey [ 1979) 43 CCC (2d) 510 (Nova Scotia SC App 
Div) held that the order may be invoked to quash acquittals, 
convictions or sentences "made in the complete absence of 
jurisdiction" (at 51 6). In casu, a judge heard a matter on appeal at a 
stage after he had resigned from the Bench. In Regina v Conley 
[ 1979] 47 CCC (2d) 359 (Alberta SC App Div) the principle laid down 
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this departure of common law principles in all probability, has been the 
same as in English law, namely that the accused had never been in 
jeopardy of conviction in the first place because the initial trial was a 
nullity as a result of absence of jurisdiction. 
In Regina v Dubois97 the crown applied for certiorari to quash an 
order discharging the accused after a preliminary enquiry. Dubois had 
been charged with robbery and the unlawful use of a firearm while 
committing an indictable offence. The justice had discharged the 
accused because he had a reasonable doubt that the accused had 
been properly identified. The court held that certiorari may be invoked 
by the prosecution to quash a discharge at a preliminary hearing where 
there had been a jurisdictional error. According to the court, it would 
not constitute a jurisdictional error if the presiding justice came to the 
conclusion that there was not sufficient evidence to continue with the 
trial, but that a jurisdictional error in fact occurred where the justice 
dismissed the accused on the ground that he had reasonable doubt 
that the accused had been properly identified. The court explained 
that in doing so, the justice acted without jurisdiction; he decided an 
issue reserved to another forum, namely the trial court. 
This principle (namely, that the remedy of certiorari may be invoked 
in Ritcey was followed. In that case the court held that certiorari was 
available to the crown to quash a declaration of mistrial made by the 
presiding judge in the trial court at a stage after he had pronounced a 
conviction and, according to Canadian law, had no jurisdiction to do 
so at that stage because he was functius officio. In Re Regina and 
Yanke ( 1983) 4 CCC (3d) 24 the issue was also raised before the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. Although the court held that it was 
not necessary to decide on the matter, it expressed the view obiter 
that the Attorney-General's argument that certiorari may lie in 
Canadian law to quash an acquittal, may be justified in view of the 
Canadian authorities (at 30-31). 
97(1986) 25 CCC (3d) 221 (SCC). 
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by the crown to quash an acquittal where the acquittal or discharge 
had been granted by the court acting without jurisdiction) was 
thereafter expanded by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Re 
Regina and Thompson. 98 In that case the question was raised on 
appeal whether certiorari lies to quash a stay of proceedings, and 
whether mandamus lies to compel a magistrate to proceed with a 
preliminary hearing. The facts were that the magistrate presiding at 
the preliminary inquiry had stayed the proceedings against the accused 
on the basis that the constitutional rights of the accused, namely to 
be informed without unreasonable delay of the specific offence for 
which he is charged and also to be tried within a reasonable time, 99 
had been violated. On application by the state to a higher tribunal for 
the abovementioned extraordinary remedies, the court held that when 
a judge stays proceedings in terms of section 24( 1 ) of the Charter he 
declines to exercise jurisdiction. 100 The court expressed the view 
that "a decision which goes directly to the question of whether 
jurisdiction will be exercised is ... open to review". 101 The court 
consequently quashed the decision to stay the proceedings on the 
basis that the presiding magistrate at the preliminary hearing made a 
jurisdictional error. The jurisdictional error made was that the 
presiding magistrate did not consider all the factors which had to be 
taken into account in considering whether a breach of the particular 
constitutional rights of the accused had taken place. 
98( 1983) 8 CCC (3d) 127 (BCCA). 
99Section 11 (a) and (b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights. 
1~he relevant section provides that anyone whose rights or freedoms 
as guaranteed by the Charter have been infringed or denied, may apply 
to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court 
considers appropriate and just in the circumstances. 
101At 140. 
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6. 3. 6 Summary 
* The Canadian Criminal Code provides that the prosecution may 
appeal against an acquittal handed down in a superior court on "a 
question of law alone". The Constitutional Court of Canada held that 
the crown appeal on "a question of law alone" does not violate the 
constitutional provision against double jeopardy. The court based its 
conclusion on the language used in the double jeopardy provision, as 
well as the fact that the crown appeal on a "question of law only" has 
always been an accepted practice in the Canadian criminal justice 
system. The court did not consider whether the prosecution appeal 
"on a question of law alone" can be reconciled with the values which 
underlie the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. 
* The boundaries of the concept "question of law alone" have vexed 
Canadian courts over many decades. Generally, courts have been ad 
idem that the following issues amount to "questions of law alone": 
where the trial judge has erred as to the legal effect of undisputed or 
found facts rather than the inferences to be drawn from such facts, or 
where the trial judge misdirected himself as to the relevant evidence 
because of misapprehension of some legal principle. However, it has 
been less easy to determine whether a "question of law alone" is 
raised in cases where the crown has established the essential elements 
of the offence, but the judge nonetheless acquits the accused framing 
his reasons in terms of reasonable doubt. 
* The basic premise revealed in the case law, is that the 
reasonableness of the verdict on the strength of the evidence cannot 
be a proper ground of appeal by the prosecution. This premise is 
explained in the case law as follows. Total absence of a foundation for 
a finding of fact amounts to an error of law. However, in a criminal 
case where the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty by 
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the state beyond reasonable doubt, total absence of a foundation for 
a finding of fact can never be the basis of an appeal by the 
prosecution. The reason is that the presumption of innocence has the 
effect that there will always be some evidence on which the trial judge 
could rest his finding of an acquittal. Conversely, total absence of a 
foundation for a finding of fact (for example, that the accused lacked 
the required intention) may be a proper ground of appeal by the 
prosecution in cases where the accused carries the burden to prove a 
given fact (for example, lack of intention). In other words, where the 
onus rests on the accused it is indeed possible for a decision of a trial 
judge to be challenged on the ground that there is total absence of a 
foundation for a finding of fact. 
* Similar to the position in English law, the basis of a discharge at 
the end of the prosecution's case is regarded as a "question of law 
alone" which may be appealed against by the prosecution. No 
explanation is advanced in the case law why this is regarded as a 
question of law as opposed to a question of fact or a question of 
mixed law and fact. 
* The Ontario Court of Appeal recently held that the prosecution may 
appeal against an acquittal handed down in a lower court on factual 
as well as legal questions. However, the Supreme Court of Canada 
has not as yet ruled on the constitutionality of crown appeals against 
acquittals on matters of fact. 
* The crown may also appeal against sentence imposed on a person 
who has been convicted either in the lower or superior courts. The 
principles are the same as those applied in English law. A sentence 
will, as a rule, only be altered if the judges proceeded on a wrong 
principle of law. 
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* An acquittal may also be quashed by a reviewing court by means 
of the remedy of certiorari. The rationale advanced for this departure 
from common law principles is the same as that advanced in English 
case law. If the trial was a nullity because the court acted without 
jurisdiction, the acquittal may be quashed by the reviewing court; the 
accused was never in jeopardy of a conviction at the first trial. Unlike 
the position in English law (where reviewing courts have so far applied 
this principle only where the court acted in breach of the rules of 
natural justice), Canadian courts of review have applied the "absence 
of jurisdiction" criterion in a number of contexts. For instance, the 
British Columbian Court of Appeal applied the principle where the trial 
court had made a jurisdictional error; the reviewing court found that 
the trial court, in considering whether a proceeding should be stayed 
on constitutional grounds, had failed to take into account all the 
relevant factors. 
6.4. INDIAN LAW 
6.4.1 General 
In the constitutional judicial system which came into force after India 
obtained full independence, the double jeopardy doctrine was not 
regarded as a bar to making provision for prosecution appeals against 
acquittals. This deviation from common law principles occurred 
despite the fact that the framers of the Indian Constitution had drawn 
profusely on the American Constitution. 102 The approach of Indian 
courts is that because prosecution appeals amount to a continuation 
of the initial proceedings, the practice of prosecution appeal does not 
amount to a violation of double jeopardy principles. A right of appeal 
against an acquittal has not only been conferred on the state in terms 
102See Tope TK Constitutional Law of India 2nd ed 1992 1. 
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of the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure, but from the outset has also 
been recognised as a valid practice in terms of the Constitution 
itself. 103 Moreover, an appeal by the state based purely on the 
facts against acquittals handed down in lower as well as superior 
courts is regarded as a permissible practice in Indian criminal 
jurisprudence. The Code of Criminal Procedure also provides for 
judicial review of acquittals and a prosecution · appeal -against 
sentence. However, a study of the case law reveals that Indian 
courts have not altogether negated the accused's rights in respect of 
double jeopardy protection in this particular context. In general, 
Indian courts of appeal have been reluctant to interfere with acquittals 
handed down by trial courts in the absence of manifest errors of law 
or of fact which have resulted in a miscarriage of justice. In fact, 
closer scrutiny of Indian case law reveals that although the state may 
appeal on factual and legal questions, the courts have only interfered 
with factual determinations in favour of the accused if the trial court's 
evaluation of the evidence has been considered (by the court of 
appeal) to be unreasonable and legally unsustainable. 
6.4.2 Appeals against acquittals 
The Criminal Procedure Code of India 104 provides that the state may 
direct the public prosecutor to appeal to the High Court from an 
original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any court other than 
the High Court or from an order of acquittal passed by a court of 
103Article 134( 1 )(a) of the Constitution specifically provides that an 
appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order 
or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court, if the High Court 
has on appeal reversed an order of acquittal of an accused person. 
See Tope 536. 
104Act 2 of 1974. 
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sessions in revision. 105 
The Supreme Court of India held that this provision does not violate 
the constitutional guarantee against being put in double jeopardy. As 
indicated in chapter three, the double jeopardy provision of the 
Constitution of India only provides that "[n]o person shall be 
prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once". 106 
In Kalawati v State of Himachal Pradesh 107 the Supreme Court held 
that if there was no conviction and punishment for the offence as a 
result of the prosecution, the clause had no application. The court 
argued that an appeal against an acquittal, wherever it was provided 
for in legislation, basically amounts to a continuation of the 
prosecution. Therefore, it does not amount to a violation of the 
double jeopardy guarantee. 108 
In determining the constitutional viability of prosecution appeals 
against acquittals, the courts have also not distinguished between 
legal and factual issues. An appeal by the state purely on the 
recorded facts is regarded as a permissible practice in Indian criminal 
jurisprudence. 109 Furthermore, the Code not only authorises the 
105This right of appeal can, however, be exercised only with the leave 
of the High Court. See in general Pillai 309. 
106Section 20(2) of the Constitution. See chapter three supra under 
3.4. 1 for a discussion of this provision. 
107Supra. 
108At 133. 
1091n Salim Zia v State of UP ( 1979) 2 SC 648, the Supreme Court held 
that in terms of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court has 
full power to review the evidence on which the order of acquittal was 
founded, and to reach the conclusion that on the evidence the order 
of acquittal should be reversed. See Pillai 31 1 -312 for a detailed 
discussion of that decision. 
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High Court to reverse the finding of the lower tribunal, but to direct 
further inquiry, retrial or committal for trial or find the defendant guilty 
and pass sentence on him according to law. 110 
However, the Supreme Court indicated that, although the High Court 
is entitled to re-evaluate the entire evidence independently and come 
to its own conclusion, it would not ordinarily interfere with the trial 
court's conclusion "unless there are compelling reasons to do so, inter 
alia, on account of manifest errors of law or of fact resulting in 
miscarriage of justice" . 111 
6.4.3 Prosecution appeals against sentence 
The Indian Code also provides for an appeal by the state against a 
sentence imposed on a person who has been acquitted. The 
government may, in any case of conviction on a trial held by any court 
other than a High Court, direct the public prosecutor to present an 
appeal to the High Court against the sentence imposed on the ground 
of its inadequacy. 112 The only limitation placed on the High Court 
110Section 386( 1 )(a). 
111 Umed Bhai v State of Gujarat AIR 1978 SC 424. This approach 
was confirmed in Salim Zia v State of UP (supra), a case which 
emphasised that certain factors should be taken into account by the 
High Court before reversing an acquittal on the factual merits. In S 
Murtaza Fazal Ali and AD Koshal, JJ AIR 1981 SC 612 the Supreme 
Court held that the High Court is justified in reversing the trial court's 
order of acquittal when the trial court's approach in interpreting the 
evidence is totally wrong, unsound and legally unsustainable. See also 
Pillai 311-31 2, who concludes that although the High Court has 
considerable powers to interfere with an order of acquittal, it may 
usually refrain from interference as long as no miscarriage of justice 
has occurred. 
112Section 377(1 ). Section 134( 1 )(a) of the Constitution also provides 
for a prosecution appeal against sentence to the Supreme Court. 
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is that it may not increase the sentence if the accused was not 
granted a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against such an 
increase. 113 The general approach of Indian courts is that since the 
matter of sentence is at the discretion of the trial court, the High Court 
may not increase the sentence unless it is so inadequate that it 
offends the ordinary notions of what would amount to a just 
punishment. 114 
6.4.4 Judicial review of an acquittal 
The Code of Criminal Procedure also makes provision for revisionary 
powers which may be exercised by the High Court115 in order to 
correct a miscarriage of justice as a result of misconception of the law 
or other irregularites which are deleterious to the due maintenance of 
law and order. 116 Although the Code expressly prohibits the 
conversion by the High Court (in the exercise of its revisionary 
powers) of a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, 117 the 
Supreme Court, nevertheless held that the High Court would not (in 
terms of the relevant provision) be prohibited from reversing a 
113Section 377(3). 
114See Ahmad 394. The general approach is that adequate reason 
must be given for interference with sentences imposed by trial courts. 
115Section 401 of the Code. The Sessions Court may (in terms of 
section 399) exercise the same revisionary jurisdiction as has been 
provided for the High Court in terms of Section 401 . 
116Pillai 314. The Supreme Court has pointed out, however, inPranab 
Kumar Mitra v State of West Bengal AIR 1959 SC 144 that these 
revisional powers of the High Court do not create any right in a litigant 
to take a matter on review, but only conserve the power of the High 
Court to see that justice is done in accordance with applicable rules 
and that the criminal courts do not act without jurisdiction or abuse 
their powers. 
117Section 401(3). 
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conviction on review and directing a retrial of the accused. 118 
However, the court stated that, since the ordering of a retrial amounts 
to an indirect method of converting a finding of acquittal into one of 
conviction, it would only be allowed in exceptional cases. According 
to the court, such exceptional cases would exist in, inter alia, the 
following circumstances. Where the trial court had no jurisdiction to 
try the case in the first place, or had wrongly excluded evidence 
presented by the prosecution, or where material evidence had been 
overlooked, or where the acquittal was based on a compounding of 
the offence which is invalid under the law. 119 The court indicated 
that, although there may also be other irregularities of similar nature 
which would justify interference with an acquittal by the High Court, 
the ordering of a retrial would only be permissible if a manifest error 
on a point of law or some glaring defect in the procedure which 
amounted to a flagrant miscarriage of justice had in fact occurred. 120 
6.4.5 Summary 
* In Indian law, the prosecution appeal against an acquittal is 
justified in terms of the continuing jeopardy theory. 
* Appeals by the state against acquittals handed down in lower as 
well as superior courts on questions of law, or purely on the recorded 
facts, are a permissible practice in Indian criminal jurisprudence. 
However, the Supreme Court has indicated that although courts of 
appeal are entitled to re-evaluate the entire evidence independently 
118Chinnaswamy v State of AP AIR 1962 SC 1788. See Pillai 315 
note 120. 
119At 1791-1792. See Pillai 317 for a detailed discussion of that 
decision. 
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and come to their own conclusion, they may not ordinarily interfere 
with the trial court's conclusion in the absence of manifest errors of 
law or fact resulting in a miscarriage of justice. 
* The state may also appeal against sentence imposed on the person 
who has been convicted. However, in deciding whether to increase 
a sentence, the same principles apply as in English and·Canadian law; 
the imposition of sentence is regarded as a matter at the discretion of 
the trial court. Therefore, a court of appeal may only increase the 
sentence if it is so inadequate that it offends an ordinary person's 
sense of justice. 
* The Indian High Court may also review an acquittal in order to 
correct miscarriages of justice resulting from misconception of the law 
or other irregularities which injure the due maintenance of law and 
order. The High Court may not convert an acquittal into a conviction. 
However, it may reverse an acquittal and order a retrial of the accused 
in exceptional cases. These are, inter alia, where the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction, wrongly excluded evidence presented by the prosecution 
or overlooked material evidence. The basic approach is that the 
setting aside of an acquittal and the ordering of a retrial will only be 
permissible if a manifest error on a point of law or a glaring defect in 
the procedure occurred which amounted to a flagrant miscarriage of 
justice. 
6.5 THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
6.5.1 General 
The United States Supreme Court interpreted the double jeopardy 
clause of the Constitution as prohibiting state appeals against 
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"acquittals". 121 The court has, however, not always indicated 
clearly what is understood by the concept "acquittal". In the early 
cases, the court merely held that an "acquittal" bars an appeal by the 
state to a higher court without explaining the ambit of the concept 
"acquittal". Therefore, even a mid-trial dismissal qualified as a 
termination of proceedings which effected protection against double 
jeopardy; as long as the court described the termination as an 
"acquittal" further state-initiated proceedings were prohibited, 
including an appeal to a higher hierarchical court. 122 
In an attempt to give effect to the policies which underly the 
prohibition against double jeopardy as identified in Green, 123 the 
Supreme Court suggested in the early 1970's that any termination of 
proceedings favourable to the accused at a stage after jeopardy has 
attached bars a state appeal "if further proceedings of some sort, 
devoted to the resolution of factual issues would be required upon 
reversal and remand [for a new trial by the appellate tribunal]" .124 
In the 1978 Term, the court rejected this approach and gave an 
even narrower meaning to the concept "acquittal", holding that the 
double jeopardy clause primarily protects the sanctity of acquittals on 
the merits. 125 The court indicated that any termination of 
proceedings short of an adjudication of the guilt or innocence of the 
accused would not operate as a bar to further state-initiated 
121 See chapter three supra under 3.5.1, text at note 144 for the 
provisi·ons of this clause. 
122See Fong Foo v US discussed infra under 6. 5. 3, text at note 1 51 . 
123See the discussion of these policies in chapter three supra under 
3.5.1, text at note 150. 
124See US v Jenkins 420 US 358, 370 ( 1975). 
125See US v Scott discussed infra under 6.5.5, text at note 193. 
375 
proceedings, even if further proceedings on factual issues would be 
required on reversal or remand. However, if the termination of 
proceedings amounted to an acquittal on the merits in the sense of an 
adjudication of the guilt or innocence of the accused which resulted 
in a discharge, the state would be prohibited to appeal to a higher 
court. This would be the case even if the acquittal was based on an 
incorrect application of the law. 
This principle, namely than an acquittal on the merits bars an appeal 
by the state even if it is based on an erroneous understanding of 
prevailing law, still applies in American constitutional double jeopardy 
jurisprudence. Moreover, it has also been applied by the Supreme 
Court to determine whether an appeal by the state against the 
sentence imposed on a person who has been convicted amounts to a 
violation of the double jeopardy guarantee. In order to understand the 
current approach, it is necessary to give a detailed account of the 
development of the law in this particular field. 126 
126This study will not fully canvass the permissibility of state appeals 
against acquittals in the 50 American states before the double 
jeopardy clause contained in the Fifth Amendment of the US 
Constitution was eventually made applicable to all the states in Benton 
v Maryland. Suffice it to say the following. Early American state 
courts generally denied the prosecution the right of appeal in criminal 
proceedings. The few early state cases which allowed state appeals 
in criminal proceedings involved either pre-verdict quashed indictments 
or trial court decisions which set aside guilty verdicts. There was no 
understanding that the state had a general right to appeal against 
acquittals; in fact, most cases contain strong language to the 
contrary. This view continued throughout the 19th century; the only 
exception being the state of Connecticut which allowed an appeal by 
the prosecution against an acquittal on the basis of legal error only. 
According to an American Law Institute (ALI) survey done in 1935, 
decisions disallowing state appeals were based in some cases on the 
fact that there was common law or statutory authority for such 
procedure and in other cases on the fact that their constitutions did 
not allow it. This widely held understanding (ie that state appeal was 
impermissible in criminal proceedings), continued between 1935 and 
1969, the year in which Benton v Maryland was decided. See in 
376 
6.5.2 The early cases 
The first case considered by the Supreme Court in which the federal 
government challenged the prohibition against state appeals in criminal 
trials, was US v Sanges 127 • In Sanges the defendant objected 
against an indictment of conspiracy on the basis that it revealed no 
offence. The court upheld the objection anctconsequently quashed 
the indictment. The federal government then issued a writ of error 
(namely appealed) against the termination of proceedings in favour of 
the accused. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the 
writ of error procedure was available to the state to challenge a 
decision favourable to the accused. Mr Justice Gray expressed the 
view that "[a]lthough the law of England on this matter is not wholly 
free from doubt", 128 the majority of case law and legal commentaries 
indicate that the writ of error procedure was available, in English law, 
only to the defendant. The court also stated that129 
whatever may have been, or may be, the law of England upon 
that question, it is settled by an overwhelming weight of 
American authority that the State has no right to sue out a writ 
of error upon a judgment in favour of a defendant in a criminal 
case, except under and in accordance with express statutes, 
whether that judgment was rendered upon a verdict of 
acquittal, or upon a determination by the court of a question of 
law. 
general Office of legal policy 835, 878-885 (discussing, inter alia, the 
ALI survey); Miller J "Appeals by the state in criminal cases" Yale Law 
Journal 36 1927 486-490; Kronenberg J "Right of a state to appeal 
in criminal cases" Journal of Criminal law and Criminology and Police 
Science Vol 49 1959 473, 476-479; Titus DL "Commonwealth right 
of appeal in criminal proceedings" Washington and Lee Law Review 
1986 295-316; US v Sanges 314-318. 
127Supra. 
128At 313. 
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This statement may be understood as implying that Congress could 
grant the state the right of appeal in criminal proceedings, by 
specifying in appropriate legislation that the state may bring a writ of 
error against a judgment of a court favourable to an accused. 
However, the court noted that such congressional legislation would 
constitute a serious and far-reaching innovation because the common 
law from which the American system of jurisprudence derived did not 
provide for state appeals in criminal proceedings. 130 
Four years after its decision in Sanges, the Supreme Court was 
faced in US v Ba/1131 with two separate issues which did not directly 
involve the issue under discussion in this chapter. It is nevertheless 
essential to discuss this case at this stage in order to understand the 
development of the law in later decisions. The issues addressed in Ball 
were the following 
(a) the applicablility of the double jeopardy clause to reprosecution 
in a new trial after an acquittal and 
(b) retrial after appellate reversal of a conviction. 
The court's decision in respect of the first of these two issues greatly 
130At 311, 312 and 323. Since Sanges the federal legislative body 
had in fact moved away from the notion of an absolute prohibition on 
state appeals in criminal proceedings towards statutory authorisation 
thereof in certain defined procedural contexts. This was done 
primarily through enactment of the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907 
which provided for Supreme Court review of dismissals of indictments, 
the granting of motions in arrest of judgments in cases involving the 
constitutionality of statutes and the review of cases sustaining pleas 
in bar in pretrial proceedings, before jeopardy attached. The most 
drastic or far-reaching amendment to this Act took place in 1971 . The 
provisons of this important amendment will be discussed in the text 
that follows. See in general Titus 297. 
131 163 us 662 ( 1896). 
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influenced it in later decisions which dealt directly with the issue of 
whether prosecution appeals against acquittals ought to be regarded 
as unconstitutional. It is therefore apposite to discuss the decision of 
the Supreme Court in US v Ball in detail as regards the first issue 
mentioned above, namely the applicability of the double jeopardy 
clause to reprosecution after an acquittal. 132 
The facts of Ball were as follows. Band two others (C and D) were 
indicted for murder. B was acquitted but C and D were found guilty. 
C and D appealed against their convictions which were reversed by 
the higher court on the ground that the indictment was fatally 
defective. 133 On remand, the grand jury reindicted all three accused 
of murder. B relied on former jeopardy by raising the plea of autrefois 
acquit. C and D on the other hand, raised the plea of autrefois 
convict. The court rejected these pleas and the jury found all three 
defendants guilty of murder. The issue before the Supreme Court was 
whether the three accused were entitled to rely on the different pleas 
of former jeopardy. 
With regard to the re-indictment and subsequent conviction of B 
(who had been acquitted), Mr Justice Gray rejected the English rule 
that a defective indictment could not legally place an individual in 
jeopardy. 134 The judge reasoned that the rule would unfairly grant 
a prosecutor a second opportunity to obtain a conviction whenever he 
132The court's decision with regard to the issue mentioned in (b) 
namely retrial after appellate reversal of a conviction, is discussed in 
detail in the chapter eight inf(a under 8.5.2 which deals with the 
double jeopardy implications of retrials on appellate reversal of 
convictions. 
133The indictment failed to allege that the victim died within a year and 
a day of the assault - an essential element of the offence charged. 
134At 668 the court rejected the English rule set out in Vaux's case, 
discussed in chapter two supra under 2.3.1. 
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discovered a defect in the original indictment. In the court's view, this 
would be a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth 
Amendment of the Constitution. In this regard, the court stated that 
"[t)he prohibition is not against being twice punished, but against 
being twice put in jeopardy" .135 Therefore, the court concluded that 
a verdict of acquittal on the general issue of guilt on an indictment 
which is not objected to before verdict bars a second indictment for 
the same offence. 136 
The court relied on Sanges for its conclusion, stating that 
[t]he verdict of acquittal was final and could not be 
reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting him 
twice in jeopardy and thereby violating the 
Constitution. 137 
Justice Gray distinguished between a void judgment of acquittal before 
a court which lacked jurisdiction and a mere voidable judgment on a 
defective indictment. In the court's view, an accused may be tried 
again on a void judgment of acquittal. However, a mere voidable 
judgment on a defective indictment, although it could be challenged by 
the accused, had to be regarded as final in respect of the 
prosecution. 138 
The next case in which the Supreme Court clearly addressed the 
double jeopardy status of federal acquittals, was Kepner v US. 139 
135At 669. 
136At 671. 
138At 669-670. 
139195 us 100 ( 1904). 
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This case arose out of a criminal prosecution in the Philippine Islands 
to which the principles of the double jeopardy clause had been 
expressly made applicable by an Act of Congress. 140 A trial judge 
sitting without a jury had found Kepner not guilty of embezzlement. 
The state appealed against the acquittal according to traditional 
Philippine procedure. Kepner was found guilty on appeal and 
sentenced to imprisonment. He then appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court which held that the double jeopardy clause of the 
Constitution was applicable also to the Philippines. The Supreme 
Court reversed the conviction on the basis that the prosecution appeal 
violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. 141 
The court made the following important statement142 
The court of first instance, having jurisdiction to the question of 
the guilt or innocence of the accused, found Kepner not guilty; 
to try him again on the merits, even in an appellate court, is to 
put him a second time in jeopardy for the same offence". 
It seems from this statement of the court, as well as from an 
analysis of the court's reasoning throughout this case, that the court 
in its interpretation of the double jeopardy clause in fact equated 
appellate proceedings (initiated by the state) after an initial 
determination in a court of law of the accused's guilt or innocence, 
140Because of absence of express statutory authority allowing the state 
to bring a writ of error against a judgment favourable to the accused 
at this stage in American legal history, the court was confronted with 
this question only in unusual circumstances, as were present in this 
case. 
141 The majority of the court relied on the dictum in US v Ball at 668 ie 
that the prohibition against double jeopardy "is not against being twice 
punished, but against being twice in jeopardy" and (at 671 ), that 
according to American law, "[a] verdict of acquittal .... could not be 
reviewed, on error or otherwise without putting [a defendant] twice in 
jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution" . 
142At 133. 
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with reprosecution in a new trial of an offence of which the accused 
had been acquitted. 143 
In dissent, Mr Justice Holmes formulated his famous "continuing 
jeopardy" theory144 
It seems to me that logically and rationally a man cannot be said 
to be more than once in jeopardy in the same cause, however 
often he may be tried. The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy, 
from its beginning to the end of the cause. Everybody agrees 
that the principle in its origin was a rule forbidding a trial in a 
new and independent case where a man already had been tried 
once. But there is no rule that a man may not be tried twice in 
the same case. 
Although, as Mr Justice Rehnquist remarked almost 70 years later 145 
that "the concept of continuing jeopardy would have greatly simplified 
the matter of government appeals of acquittals", the theory has never 
been accepted by a majority of the United States Supreme Court. 146 
6.5.3 Double jeopardy jurisprudence from 1950-1970 
During the 1950's, the Supreme Court held in Green v US147 that 
even an "implied acquittal" entitles an accused to protection from 
double jeopardy. Green was charged with first degree murder. The 
judge instructed the jury that it could convict Green of either first or 
143At 122, 126, 127, 128, 131 and 133 of the majority opinion 
delivered by Mr Justice Day. 
144At 135. 
145US v Scott 90 note 6. 
146/d. 
147Supra. 
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second degree murder. The jury then convicted Green of the lesser 
offence, namely second degree murder. Green appealed against his 
conviction which was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. 
At the second trial, Green was charged and convicted of first degree 
murder. To this he objected on double jeopardy grounds, alleging that 
he could not be re-indicted for an offence of which he had previously 
been acquitted. The Supreme Court ruled in his favour;-- According to 
the court, although the first jury had not returned an express verdict 
of acquittal as to the first degree murder charge, the jury's conviction 
of the lesser offence constituted an implied acquittal of the greater 
offence. 148 Inasmuch as verdicts of acquittals are final, the court 
concluded that the acquittal, albeit implicit, barred a second trial for 
first degree murder. 149 
As indicated in chapter three, Green presented the first case in 
which a serious attempt was made by the Supreme Court to identify 
the particular values which underlie the rule against double 
jeopardy. 150 
Only in 1962 was the court once again confronted with the issue 
of appellate review of an acquittal in the case of Fong Foo v US151 • 
In that case, the trial judge directed the jury to acquit at a stage when 
testimony was still being given on behalf of the prosecution. The 
judge's action was based on one or both of two grounds: supposed 
improper conduct on the part of the prosecutor and/or a supposed lack 
of credibility in the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution who 
148At 190. 
149At 191. 
150See chapter three supra under 3.2.1 for a discussion of the values 
set out in Green. 
151Supra. 
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had testified up to that point. A formal judgment of acquittal was 
subsequently entered by the jury; a so-called mid-trial acquittal. At the 
request of the prosecution, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of 
mandamus ordering the trial judge to vacate the acquittal and re-assign 
the case for trial. However, the Supreme Court reversed on double 
jeopardy grounds. It held that, even if the acquittal had been based 
on an "egregeriously erroneous foundation" 152, the verdict of 
acquittal by a court of jurisdiction on a valid indictment was final and, 
in the court's opinion, could not be reviewed " without putting (the 
petitioners) twice in jeopardy and thereby violating the 
Constitution". 153 
The importance of this decision is that the court did not consider the 
meaning of the concept "acquittal", but merely assumed that because 
the trial judge described the termination of proceedings as an acquittal, 
the issue had to be regarded as final. In a dissenting opinion, Mr 
Justice Clark stated that when a trial court had no power to direct a 
verdict of acquittal, the ensuing judgment should be regarded as a 
nullity and, remarked that "[t]he word 'acquittal' in this context is no 
magic open sesame" .154 
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court held in the landmark decision 
of Benton v Maryland, 155 that the provisions of the double jeopardy 
152At 143. It was doubtful whether the district court under the 
circumstances was empowered to direct a verdict of acquittal-at that 
specific stage in the trial, rather than declaring a mistrial. See also the 
opinion of Mr Justice Harlan 144. 
153At 143, relying on US v Ball supra. 
154At 144. 
155Supra. 
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clause also applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. 
6.5.4 Statutory recognition of prosecution appeals - a reconsideration 
of constitutional protection against double jeopardy 
In 1971, the Congress of the federal government of the United States 
introduced an Act which provides (inter alia) for a right of the state to 
appeal from any decision dismissing an indictment except where it 
would be prohibited by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. 156 The relevant section provides as follows 157 
In a criminal case an appeal by the US shall lie to a court 
of appeals from a decision, judgment or order of a district 
court dismissing an indictment as to any or more counts, 
except that no appeal shall lie where the Double 
Jeopardy Clause (sic) of the United States Constitution 
prohibits further prosecution. 
In US v Wilson 158 the court construed the new statute to mean 
that Congress intended to remove all statutory barriers to government 
appeals and to allow appeals whenever the Constitution would 
permit. 159 The facts of this case were as follows. A jury found 
15618 USC par 3731 (1971). 
157/d. 
158420 us 332 ( 1975). 
159At 337 of the majority opinion delivered by Mr Justice Marshall. 
Singer and Hartman 556 suggest that none of the earlier precedents 
were useful in determining the scope of prosecutorial appeal consistent 
with double jeopardy principles after the passage of the 1971 Act. 
These writers also suggest that because double jeopardy rules were 
not applicable to the fifty States until 1969 and precedents from state 
cases were therefore lacking, the law relating to prosecution appeals 
should be regarded as relatively recent. In my view, the earlier 
decisions dealing with the constitutionality of state appeals against 
acquittals cannot be disregarded for the very reason that the approach 
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Wilson guilty of unlawful conversion of union funds. However, the 
trial judge granted the accused's post-verdict motion 160 to dismiss 
on grounds of pre-indictment delay. The state appealed against this 
dismissal; the Court of Appeals rejected the appeal on double 
jeopardy grounds. However, the US Supreme Court reversed the 
judgment holding that the rule against double jeopardy does not bar a 
state appeal against a judge's post-trial discharge following a 
conviction by the adjudicator of fact. 161 
In reaching this decision, the court deemed it necessary to take a 
closer look at the policies underlying the double jeopardy provision in 
order to "determine more precisely the boundaries of the 
Government's appeal rights in criminal cases" .162 In its assessment 
of the historical development of the double jeopardy clause from its 
common law origins, the court found that the protection against 
double jeopardy was directed rather at the threat of multiple 
prosecutions and not at state appeals as such, "at least where those 
appeals would not require a new trial" .163 Therefore, in Wilson's 
adopted in those cases (in particular Kepner's case) was reconsidered 
by the Supreme Court in later cases (in other words, after 1971 ). 
160A post-verdict motion provides the defence with an opportunity to 
re-argue certain alleged mistakes made at a trial which resulted in a 
conviction. In such circumstances, an appeal by the accused may be 
possible, but the trial judge is first given the opportunity to change his 
mind if he is convinced that an adverse decision made against the 
petitioner was erroneous. A motion in arrest of judgment is one type 
of post-verdict motions. (The accused in Wilson asked the court in 
this post-verdict motion to reverse the decision of the jury on the 
ground of pre-indictment delay). See Schiffman JD Fundamentals of 
the Criminal Justice Process 1986 1st ed 110. 
161At 352. 
162At 339. 
163At 342. 
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case it was held that since the "controlling constitutional principle" 
underlying double jeopardy protection focuses on prohibitions against 
multiple trials, a successful goverment appeal of a post-conviction 
judgment of acquittal would not violate the double jeopardy clause 
because the threat of a second trial was not present. 164 
It must be pointed out at this stage that the criminal procedure model 
which prevails in America simply provides for the reinstatement of a 
jury verdict of conviction on reversal by an appellate court of a trial 
judge's post-verdict acquittal, without a second adjudication of the 
facts of the case. Wilson's case therefore involved a correction of an 
error of law and reinstatement of an already existing adjudication of 
fact. 165 In the court's view, such a procedure did not offend the 
purpose of the double jeopardy clause. The court concluded 166 
Although review of any ruling of law discharging a defendant 
obviously enhances the likelihood of conviction and subjects 
him to continuing anxiety and expense, a defendant has no 
legitimate claim to benefit from an error of law when that error 
could be corrected without subjecting him to a second trial 
before a second trier of fact. 
Although not explicitly stated by the court, it seems that what the 
court had in mind in stating this principle, is that a reconsideration of 
factual issues, even in appellate proceedings, would amount to a 
violation of double jeopardy rules. In this sense, the approach of the 
court cannot be regarded as detracting from the principles adopted in 
164At 346. 
165Cf also the dissenting op1mon of Mr Justice Brennan in US v 
DiFrancesco 449 US 117 ( 1980) 147 note 7 discussed infra under 
6.5.6. 
166At 345 (My emphasis). 
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Kepner's case. 167 A second trial involves a successive adjudication 
on the facts of the guilt or innocence of the accused, even in if it 
occurs in appellate proceedings. However, it must be stated the 
Supreme Court has not been, in decisions which followed on Wilson's 
case, altogether clear on this issue. 
In US v Jenkins 168 the Supreme Court held that any mid-trial 
discharge of a defendant (regardless of the character of such a mid-
trial termination of proceedings), would bar further proceedings "if 
further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolution of factual 
issues going to the elements of the offence charged would have been 
required upon reversal and remand". 169 It is submitted that this 
statement may imply that double jeopardy protection is only afforded 
an accused if the termination of proceedings made in his favour (in the 
trial court) is reversed on appeal and, he is also remanded for a new 
trial. Furthermore, an important principle that emerges from Jenkins 
is that even if a mid-trial dismissal does not amount to an "acquittal" 
in the sense of an adjudication (correct or not) by the trial court of the 
factual merits of the case, an appeal by the government would 
nevertheless be prohibited in the event that a retrial would necessarily 
follow on reversal and remand. 
The rule established in Jenkins was later described as follows by the 
Supreme Court in lee v US170 
167Supra. 
168420 US 358 ( 1975). In this case, the Supreme Court applied the 
principle enunciated in Wilson to criminal proceedings which take place 
in bench-trials (a trial without a jury). 
169At 370 (my emphasis). 
170Supra (per Justice Rehnquist in a concurring opinion at 36). 
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Dismissals . . . if they occurred at a stage of the proceedings 
after which jeopardy had attached but prior to the factfinder's 
conclusion as to guilt or innocence, were final so far as the 
accused defendant was concerned and could not be appealed 
by the government because retrial was barred by double 
jeopardy. 
However ,in the same year that Jenkins was decided, the court held 
in Serfass v US171 that because a pre-trial dismissal of an indictment 
occurs before jeopardy attaches, 172 the state may appeal against 
such a dismissal and also institute new proceedings against the 
accused. Of importance is the court's statement in this case that 
"without risk of a determination of guilt, jeopardy does not attach and 
neither an appeal nor further prosecution constitutes double 
jeopardy" .173 It is clear that the notion of "risk of a determination 
of guilt" has played an important role in American law in establishing 
a certain point in time during criminal proceedings when jeopardy 
attaches. Likewise, as will be seen from a discussion of cases that 
followed on Wilson and Jenkins, a determination by the trial court on 
the factual merits of the case eventually came to be regarded by the 
Supreme Court as decisive in determining whether an "acquittal" took 
place which bars further proceedings against the accused. 
171 420 us 377 ( 1975). 
172See the discussion of Crist v Bretz in chapter three supra under 
3.5.2 which held that jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when the jury is 
empanelled and sworn in, and in a bench-trial at a stage when the 
judge begins to hear the evidence of the first witness. 
173At 391-392 (my emphasis). 
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6.5.5 The concept "acquittal" acquires exact limits - the 1977 and 
1978 terms of double jeopardy jurisprudence 
In US v Martin Linen Supply Company174 the court had to decide 
whether an acquittal entered by a trial judge in terms of a rule which 
provides that a court could enter an acquittal after a deadlocked jury 
had been discharged by the court, was appeallable by the state. 175 
In delivering the court's opinion, Mr Justice Brennan confirmed the 
approach adopted in Wilson's case176 that an appeal by the state 
which does not present a threat of successive prosecutions does not 
offend the double jeopardy clause. 177 However, the court explained 
more comprehensively that what in fact constitutes an acquittal, 
should not be controlled by the form of the judge's action, 178 and 
added that 
[r]ather we must determine whether the ruling of the judge, 
whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or 
not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offence 
charged. 
Applying the test to the "acquittal" entered by the court in terms of 
the deadlocked jury rule, the court held that it was an acquittal in 
substance because in entering the acquittal, the court of first instance 
174430 us 564 ( 1977). 
175 A deadlocked jury is a jury which cannot agree on a finding of guilt 
or innocence of the accused. The relevant rule, Fed Rule Crim Proc 
29(c) provided that in a case of a deadlocked jury "a motion for 
judgment of acquittal may be made ... within 7 days after the jury is 
discharged and the court may enter an acquittal". 
176Supra. 
177 At 570. 
178At 571. 
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recorded that the state had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
the material allegations necessary for a conviction of the crime and 
that the defendant should consequently not be found guilty of the 
crime charged. 179 
It is not altogether clear from Mr Justice Brennan's opinion whether 
he advanced the point of view that an acquittal· in the sense of a 
finding as a matter of fact that the accused is innocent in itself brings 
into effect protection against double jeopardy which would mean that 
any further proceedings would be prohibited including proceedings on 
appeal initiated by the state, or whether he held the view that a 
prosecution appeal would only be prohibited if it would invariably lead 
to a new trial in the event of being successful. The statement made by 
Mr Justice Brennan that "a successful government appeal reversing 
the judgment of acquittal would necessitate another trial, or, at least 
further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolution of factual 
issues going to the elements of the offence charged ... " 180 seems to 
imply that any re-evaluation of factual issues by a court of appeal on 
the record of the proceedings a quo could also be regarded as a 
violation of double jeopardy rules. 
The concurring judgment of Mr Justice Stephens elucidates the 
aforementioned opinion. 181 The judge researched the legislative 
179The District Court had in fact evaluated the state's evidence and 
determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction. The 
Supreme Court was of the opinion that such a determination of 
insufficiency of evidence brings into effect double jeopardy protection. 
See at 5 7 2 of the judgment. 
180At 570. (My emphasis). In casu, to have allowed an appeal by the 
state would, if successful, have necessitated a new trial. 
181 At 576-583. 
391 
history of the relevant legislation enacted by Congress182 and 
pointed out that Congress never intended to allow appeals from 
dismissals amounting to true acquittals. He reiterated that a "true 
acquittal" is based on the insufficiency of the evidence to prove an 
element of the offence regardless whether it is called a dismissal or an 
acquittal. 183 He concluded that "Congress was interested solely in 
expanding the Government's right to appeal from the dismissal of an 
indictment; it had no desire to allow appeals from acquittals and 
believed such appeals would be unconstitutional" .184 From the 
concurring opinion of Mr Justice Stephens it seems clear that the mere 
determination of innocence of the accused, whether by means of an 
acquittal or a mid-trial dismissal on insufficiency of evidence, triggers 
double jeopardy protection and prohibits an ~ppeal by the prosecution 
regardless of the possible consequences of a successful appeal, in 
other words, regardless of whether a successful appeal would lead to 
a new trial. 
Sanabria v US185 furthermore illustrates that absolute finality is 
accorded to a termination of proceedings based on a determination of 
the guilt or innocence of the accused. In that case the Supreme Court 
was confronted with the issue of whether an acquittal by the trial 
court as factfinder bars a second trial when it is based on an 
erroneous legal judgment rather than on the fact-finding function. The 
course of events in this case can be summarised briefly as follows. 
182 18 USC para 3731. See supra, text at note 157 for the text of this 
provision. 
183At 578-581. 
184At 581. From a discussion of a Senate Report preceding this Bill 
(at 578 - 581), the judge's assessment of the purpose of the Bill 
seems plausible. 
185437 us 54 ( 1978). 
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The trial judge directed an acquittal after the trial had commenced but 
before a final verdict was rendered. The judge based his ruling on a 
clearly erroneous interpretation of the statute in question (a federal 
anti-gambling statute) and on the insufficiency of evidence resulting 
from his erroneous exclusion of certain prosecution evidence at the 
defendant's request. The Supreme Court held that this 
misinterpetation of the statute and subsequent wrongful exclusion of 
prosecution evidence led to an erroneous resolution in the defendant's 
favour of the merits of the charge 186• However, the court 
nevertheless held that 
[w]hen a defendant had been acquitted at a trial, he may 
not be retried on the same offence, even if the legal 
rulings underlying the acquittal were erroneous. 187 
In other words, the state may not appeal against an acquittal, even if 
the acquittal is based on erroneous evidentiary or substantive legal 
rulings. The court justified its holding by stating that 
[t]o hold that a defendant waives his double jeopardy protection 
whenever a trial court error in his favour on a midtrial motion 
leads to an acquittal would undercut the adversary assumption 
on which our system of criminal justice rests, . . . and would 
vitiate one of the fundamental rights established by the Fifth 
Amendment. 188 
186At 78. At 60 the court recounted the trial judge's statement that 
he would have vacated the acquittal under the interpretation of the 
statute that ultimately proved correct. 
187 At 65. 
188At 78. In US v Scott (see infra, text at note 193 for a discussion of 
that case) Mr Justice Brennan who delivered the minority judgment, 
remarked (at 84) that Sanabria teaches that the government's means 
of protecting its vital interest in convicting the guilty is its participation 
as an adversary at the criminal trial where it has every opportunity to 
dissuade the trial court from committing erroneous rulings favourable 
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Sanabria's case was followed by Smalis v Pennsylvania 189• In that 
case the Supreme Court held unanimously that a trial judge's granting 
of a demurrer (an objection) by the accused at the close of the 
prosecution's case on the basis of insufficiency of prosecution 
evidence constitutes a non-appealabe acquittal. Mr Justice White 
stated that 190 
a ruling that as a matter of law the State's evidence is 
insufficient to establish his factual guilt .... is an acquittal under 
the Double Jeopardy Clause ... 
Mr Justice White explained that the double jeopardy clause bars a 
prosecution appeal against a dismissal at the close of the 
prosecution's case for the very reason that 
subjecting the defendant to postacquittal fact-finding 
proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. 191 
and that 
[when] a successful postacquittal appeal by the prosecution 
would lead to proceedings that violate the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, the appeal itself has no proper purpose. Allowing such 
an appeal would frustrate the interests of the accused in having 
an end to the proceedings against him. 192 
to the accused. 
189476 us 140 (1986). 
190At 144. 
191 At 145. 
192/d. 
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The last, and most important case decided by the Supreme Court 
during the series of judgments on double jeopardy issues ( 1977-1978) 
was US v Scott. 193 In Scott the Supreme Court qualified its holding 
in Jenkins. 194 As discussed above, Jenkins held that any midtrial 
dismissal, even one that does not amount to an acquittal on the merits 
of the case, would bar further proceedings initiated by the prosecution 
if any further proceedings directed at the resolution of factual issues 
related to the elements of the offence charged, would be required on 
reversal and remand. 195 
In Scott, the issue before the court was whether a prosecution 
appeal against a dismissal by the trial judge granted on the ground of 
pre-indictment delay at a stage in the proceedings after jeopardy had 
already attached, ought to be prohibited in terms of the double 
jeopardy clause of the Constitution. It should be mentioned that if 
such an appeal had been allowed and the dismissal reversed on 
appeal, the result would necessarily have been a new trial; precisely 
that which had been prohibited by the Supreme Court in Jenkins. 
However, in Scott the court departed from its holding in Jenkins and 
held that the Jenkins principle cannot apply in those instances where 
the accused himself seeks to terminate the trial on grounds unrelated 
to his guilt or innocence. 196 
In the court's view, Jenkins had placed too much emphasis on the 
accused's right to have his guilt determined by the first jury to try 
193Supra. 
194Supra. 
195See supra, text at note 1 68. 
196At 99. 
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him. 197 The court stated that if the prosecution is willing to 
continue with its production of the evidence in order to show the 
accused guilty before the jury impanelled to try him, and the accused 
himself seeks to terminate the trial on grounds unrelated to his guilt or 
innocence, he has 
not been "deprived" of his valued right to go to the first jury; 
only the public has been "deprived" of its valued right to "one 
complete opportunity to convict those who have violated its 
laws" ... 198 
The court furthermore reasoned that cases in which the accused 
seeks to terminate his trial on a ground unrelated to his guilt or 
innocence can be distinguished from true acquittals which, according 
to existing double jeopardy jurisprudence, may even result from 
erroneous evidentiary rulings or erroneous interpretation of governing 
legal principles. 199 In the court's view, the fact that an acquittal 
may result from erroneous evidentiary rulings or erroneous 
interpretation of governing legal principles will affect the accuracy of 
the determination but will not alter its essential character. 200 
Therefore (as held in Sanabria), 201 the prosecution will be prohibited 
in such cases from appealing against an acquittal. However, in the 
197 At 87. 
198 At 100 referring to the words used in Arizona v Washington supra, 
where the court applied this reasoning in holding that the declaration 
of a "mistrial" by the trial judge in that case did not bar further 
proceedings against the accused. See chapter three supra under 
3.5.2.1, text at note 177 for a discussion of that case. 
199 At 98, referring to the ruling in Sanabria discussed supra, text at 
note 185. 
201Supra. 
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court's view, the dismissal of an indictment for pre-indictment delay 
represents only a legal judgment that a defendant, although perhaps 
criminally culpable, may not be punished because of a supposed 
constitutional violation. 202 The court explained that, while an 
acquittal on the merits by the trier of fact can never represent a 
determination that the defendant is innocent in any absolute sense, a 
defendant released by a court for reasons required by the Constitution 
or laws, but which reasons are unrelated to factual guilt or innocence, 
had not been determined to be innocent in any sense of that word 
absolute or otherwise. 203 
The court concluded that where the accused (in Scott) himself 
sought to terminate his trial on grounds unrelated to guilt or 
innocence, a second prosecution would not amount to oppressive 
governmental conduct. In this regard, the court made the following 
statement204 
This is scarcely a picture of an all-powerful state relentlessly 
pursuing a defendant who had either been found not guilty, or 
who had at least insisted on having the issue of guilt submitted 
to the first trier of fact. It is instead a picture of a defendant 
who chooses to avoid conviction and imprisonment, not 
because of his assertion that the Government has failed to make 
out a case against him, but because of a legal claim that the 
Government's case against him must fail even though it might 
satisfy the trier of fact that he was guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Therefore, at present, the controlling principle in determining 
whether a prosecution appeal against an acquittal or dismissal is 
permissible is whether there has been some determination by a judge 
202At 98. 
203/d, note 11. 
204At 96. 
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or jury relating to the factual guilt or innocence of the accused. As a 
matter of interest, it should, however, also be mentioned that Mr 
Justice Brennan who delivered the dissenting opinion in Scott, pointed 
out that there will be few instances indeed in which defences can be 
deemed unrelated to factual innocence, and that the majority's 
decision in Scott "may be limited to disfavoured doctrines like pre-
accusation delay" .205 He explained that this is so because defences 
which provide legal justification for otherwise criminal acts, for 
example entrapment and insanity, will in fact create double jeopardy 
bars. Therefore, only those defences that arise from unlawful or 
unconstitutional governmental acts such as pre-indictment delay, will 
not.2os 
6. 5. 6 Prosecution appeals against sentence 
It remains to consider whether an appeal by the state on the issue of 
sentence only is regarded by the Supreme Court to be a violation of 
double jeopardy principles. Two decision handed down by the court 
in the 1980' s are of importance in this respect. These are US v 
DiFrancesco 201 and Bullington v Missouri. 208 
The facts present in DiFrancesco were as follows. The state appealed 
against a sentence imposed on the accused who had been classified 
as a "dangerous special offender" on the basis that the trial court had 
abused its power in imposing too lenient a sentence. The accused 
was classified as a "dangerous special offender" in terms of the 
205At 89. 
206/d. 
207449 us 117 ( 1980). 
208451 us 429 (1981). 
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provisions of a specific federal Act, The Organised Crime Control Act 
of 1971. This Act defines a "dangerous special offender" and 
authorises the imposition of an increased sentence on an accused who 
has been classified in terms of this definition. 209 It also grants the 
prosecution the right to appeal against the sentence imposed on such 
offenders by the trial court to the Court of Appeals. The Act also 
specifies that210 
[r]eview of the sentences shall include review of whether 
the procedure employed was lawful, the findings made 
were clearly erroneous or the sentencing court's 
discretion was abused. The court of appeal on review of 
the sentence may, after considering the record, including 
the entire pre-sentence report, and the findings and 
reasons of the sentencing court, affirm the sentence, 
impose or direct the imposition of any sentence which 
the sentencing court could originally have imposed or 
remand for further sentencing proceedings and imposition 
of sentence ... 
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the above 
provisions of the Act violate the double jeopardy clause of the 
Constitution. Writing for the court, Mr Justice Blackmun confirmed 
the view expressed by the court in earlier decisions that the prohibition 
against multiple trials is the "controlling constitutional principle" in 
double jeopardy jurisprudence.211 However, the judge pointed out 
that recent Supreme Court decisions had indicated that even the 
protection against retrial was not absolute in itself; it was an acquittal 
which prevents retrial. 212 Therefore, an appeal of a sentence would 
209See 18 USC par 3575(e) and (f) & par 3575(b). 
210Par 3575(b). 
211 At 132, relying on the dictum in US v Wilson supra text at note 
163. 
212At 132. 
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only be a violation of double jeopardy rules 
if the original sentence is to be treated in the same way as an 
acquittal is treated and the appeal is to be treated in the same 
way as a retrial. 213 
The court came to the conclusion. that the ... limited appeal against 
sentence provided for in the legislation under consideration "did not 
involve a retrial or approximate the ordeal of a trial on the basic issue 
of guilt or innocence" .214 Relying on the famous dicta in 
Green,215 the court expressed the view that an accused's primary 
concern relates to a determination of his innocence or guilt, and not 
to the sentence itself. 216 Furthermore, the court argued that an 
accused whose sentence is increased on appeal, is not subjected to 
the risk of being harassed and subsequently convicted, even if 
innocent. 217 The court accordingly upheld the constitutionality of 
the particular legislation. 
In Bullington v Missouri218 the Supreme Court applied to 
sentencing proceedings the principle confirmed in DiFrancesco219 
namely, that absolute finality is accorded to an initial determination of 
an accused's guilt or innocence. Bullington was indicted and found 
guilty for capital murder following the abduction and death by 
213At 133. 
214At 136. 
215See chapter three supra under 3.5.1. 
216At 136. 
218Supra. 
219Supra. 
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drowning of a young woman. 220 He was found guilty of this crime. 
Missouri law provides for only two possible sentences in the 
circumstances: death or life imprisonment. Of importance is that a 
Missouri statute (valid at the time) contained substantive standards to 
guide the otherwise discretionary power of the sentencer; it afforded 
the defendant certain procedural safeguards, which included a pre-
sentence hearing for the defendant convicted of capital murder, to be 
held before the same jury which had found the defendant guilty. 221 
At the pre-sentence hearing the jury had to hear evidence presented 
by the prosecution concerning the existence of certain aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances specified by the statute. Only such evidence 
of aggravation as the prosecution had made known to the defence 
before trial was admissible. In order to impose the death penalty, the 
jury had to designate in writing the aggravating circumstances it had 
found and had to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there 
had been circumstances sufficient to warrant the death penalty. 222 
Nevertheless, after this pre-sentence hearing was held, Bullington 
was sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for probation or 
parole for fifty years. He applied for a new trial by means of a post-
verdict motion on the ground of constitutional defects in the jury 
selection process of Missouri. The motion was granted but the 
prosecution then notified Bullington of its intent to seek the death 
penalty again based on the same aggravating circumstances and 
evidence presented at the first trial. The United States Supreme Court 
had to decide whether this would be permissible. The court found in 
22
°Capital murder is murder which may be punished by the death 
penalty. 
221 See Bullington 432-433 for a discussion of the provisions of this 
particular statute. 
222See id. 
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favour of Bullington and held that he was protected by the double 
jeopardy clause 
because the sentencing proceeding at his first trial was 
like a trial on the question of guilt or innocence and the 
protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause to 
one acquitted by a jury, also is available to him, with 
respect to the death penalty at his retrial.223 
The court distinguished Bullington from its previous holding in 
DiFrancesco on the basis that the jury in Bullington's first trial did not 
have unlimited discretion to select a punishment from a variety of 
authorised sentences (as in DiFrancesco). The court pointed out that 
according to the prescribed sentencing proceeding for capital murder 
in Missouri, the jury had to determine whether aggravating 
circumstances sufficient to warrant the imposition of the death penalty 
were present and whether there were any mitigating circumstances 
that outweighed the aggravating circumstances. Since the jury could 
choose only between two possible sentences (the death sentence or 
life imprisonment) it had of necessity to consider whether to impose 
the death penalty. 224 The court explained that by following this 
procedure and imposing a sentence of life imprisonment, the jury had 
in fact "acquitted" the defendant of the death penalty. 225 In the 
court's view, the post-conviction hearing required in the state of 
Missouri for capital murder had the procedural "hallmarks of the trial 
on guilt or innocence". 226 
223At 446. 
224At 438. 
225At 439. 
226/d. 
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A further consideration taken into account by the court was that 
the prosecution had not merely recommended an appropriate sentence 
in this case, but had undertaken to prove beyond reasonable doubt 
that certain aggravating facts were present which warranted the death 
penalty. 227 According to the court, this sentencing proceeding (in 
contrast to that adopted in DiFrancesco) had amounted to an actual 
trial on the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused which afforded 
him protection against double jeopardy. 228 The accused's 
punishment could not be increased on reconviction because the 
evidence had already been deemed insufficient to justify the harsher 
punishment. 229 
The approach adopted in DiFrancesco has been severely criticised on 
double jeopardy grounds by a considerable number of legal 
commentators. 230 The general view expressed is that the court's 
approach in Bullington cannot be reconciled with its holding in 
DiFrancesco. It is pointed out that the court in the DiFrancesco case 
failed to acknowledge the trial judge's fact-finding role in sentencing 
221/d. 
228/d. 
229 At 444-445, relying on Burks v US discussed in chapter eight infra 
under 8.5.2. 
230See Mesec MA "Government appeals of sentence: Double talk with 
the double jeopardy clause?" Ohio Northern University Law Review 
Vol 9 1982 385; O'Hanley RP "Double jeopardy and prosecutorial 
appeal of sentences: DiFrancesco, Bullington and the Criminal Code 
Reform Act of 1981 " Vanderbilt Law Review Vol 35 1982 709; Doss 
MP "Re-sentencing defendants and the protection against multiple 
punishment" University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol 133 1985 
1409. Contra however Dewey EP "Appeals of sentences pursuant to 
Organized Crime Control Act do not violate double jeopardy clause " 
Loyola Law Review Vol 27 1981 634 and Stern RA "Government 
appeals of sentences: A constitutional response to arbitrary and 
unreasonable sentences" American Criminal Law Review Vol 18 1980 
51. 
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proceedings. 231 In Bullington the fact-finding role of the jury was 
explicit and consequently the court afforded double jeopardy 
protection. In DiFrancesco the court arguably failed to recognise that 
a judge, in meting out a sentence, makes a similar factual 
determination. It is suggested that in determining whether a 
prosecution appeal against sentence violates the double jeopardy 
prohibition the general approach should be as· follows;·· Failure to 
impose a higher penalty, like a failure to find guilt of a higher degree 
because of insufficient evidence, amounts to an acquittal of that 
degree of punishment and precludes an appeal. 232 
It is submitted that the abovementioned criticism of the holding in 
DiFrancesco case has merit. Appellate proceedings on the issue of 
sentence in essence amount to a reconsideration of factual issues. 
Any attempt to determine the constitutional permissibility of 
prosecution appeals against sentence by means of criteria such as the 
scope of the trial court's discretion in imposing sentence seems to 
amount to an overly-subtle exercise. In my view, however, the court 
in DiFrancesco's case was not concerned only with double jeopardy 
rules, but to a great extent was swayed in its final decision by the 
consideration of legitimate governmental interest in rationalising 
sentencing decisions. 233 
231 See O'Hanley 736. 
232At 737. The commentator suggests that Bullington revived the 
implied acquittal doctrine suggested in Green v US. See infra under 
8.5.4 for a discussion of that doctrine. 
233Cf the majority of the court's views (at 142) on the need for reform 
in the area of sentencing and the problem encountered in the criminal 
justice system of too lenient sentences being imposed by trial judges 
for offences which involve organised crime. The court was also 
influenced considerably by the fact that historically the pronouncement 
of sentence has never carried the finality that attaches to an acquittal. 
See at 133 of the majority opinion. 
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6.5. 7 Prosecution appeals and double jeopardy - a consideration of 
legal theories 
In conclusion, it is necessary to consider briefly certain theories 
advanced by American legal commentators concerning the rationale 
underlying the prohibition on prosecution appeals against acquittals. 
The first of these theories, which· finds considerable support in a 
number of Supreme Court decisions, 234 is the "protection of the 
innocent against wrongful conviction" rationale. In terms of this 
theory, finality is accorded to acquittals in American criminal 
jurisprudence because paramount importance is attached in that 
system of criminal justice to the protection of the innocent against 
wrongful conviction. 235 Permitting the prosecution a second 
opportunity to convince a factfinder of the accused's guilt "enhances 
the likelihood that an innocent defendant will be convicted by enabling 
the government to secure additional evidence, to restructure the 
presentation of its case, and to anticipate the evidence offered by the 
defendant at the first trial" . 236 
It is clear that an appeal on a point of law only initiated by the state 
and considered by a court of appeal on the record of proceedings 
without the possibility of remand for a new trial (on reversal of the 
finding of the trial court), would not in any material sense offend this 
234See Green v US at 188; US v Wilson at 343; US v Martin Linen 
Supply Co at 569; US v Scott at 91 and US v Difrancesco at 136. 
235See Stern 69-72. The author points out that this interest is not only 
reflected in the double jeopardy clause, but also in the rigorous burden 
of proof that must be satisfied by the state to secure a criminal 
conviction and in the great amount of procedural and evidentiary rules 
designed to enhance the accuracy of the truth-finding process. 
236See Stern 69. The author relies upon the Supreme Court decisions 
of US v Scott 91 ; Green v US 18 7-188 and Burks v US 11 . 
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theory.237 The prosecution (except in exceptional circumstances), 
cannot generally secure additional evidence on appeal and the 
likelihood that an innocent person could be convicted as a result of an 
appeal on the record seems minimal. 
Two prominent American legal commentators 238 reject the idea 
that the rationale which underlies double jeopardy protection is the 
public interest in protecting the innocent against conviction. These 
writers argue that this theory does not explain why the state may not 
challenge a defendant's acquittal which is based on an erroneous 
application of law. 239 They suggest that such a person's claim of 
innocence would remain seriously in doubt and question of why the 
prosecution should not be afforded the opportunity to present its case 
in an error-free trial. They argue that the reason cannot be that an 
innocent person may be convicted in such circumstances. It is 
suggested by these commentators that the only sound reason why 
acquittals are accorded absolute finality in American criminal 
jurisprudence is the recognised phenomenon in that system of criminal 
procedure that the jury may acquit against the evidence (better known 
as the jury-nullification rule). 240 
237The Supreme Court's approach in US v Wilson discussed supra text 
at note 158 supports this conclusion. 
238Westen P and Drubel R "Toward a general theory of double 
jeopardy" The Supreme Court Review 1978 81 (hereinafter referred 
to as Westen and Drube! General Theory) and Westen P "The three 
faces of double jeopardy: Reflections on government appeals of 
criminal sentences" Michigan law Review Vol 78 1980 1001 
(hereinafter referred to as Westen Appeals of criminal sentences). 
239See Sanabria v US discussed supra, text at note 185. In that case 
the Supreme Court held that the prosecution may not appeal against 
an acquittal even if it is based on an erroneous application of the law. 
240 Jury-nullification means that a jury may disregard the legal 
instruction of the judge and render a verdict purely on the basis of 
conscience or feelings. In terms of the Sixth Amendment of the 
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The rationale of this theory is explained as follows. 241 Acquittals 
may be erroneous for several reasons. An acquittal may, for instance, 
be erroneous because the verdict contradicts the overwhelming weight 
of the evidence. The acquittal may also be erroneous because of 
defective fact-finding as a result of either wrong exclusion of 
prosecution evidence or misdirection of the jury by the judge on the 
law. In American criminal jurisprudence, a jury acquitting an accused 
need not give reasons for doing so. A jury is also allowed to acquit 
against the evidence. In other words, the jury's role is not limited to 
simple fact-finding; it has the authority to acquit a defendant "in 
spite of the facts" .242 This means that it could, for instance, 
disregard the legal instructions of the judge or ignore the 
overwhelming evidence against the accused and render a verdict of 
not guilty purely on the basis of conscience or feelings. 
Because a jury need not give reasons for its verdict and may acquit 
against the evidence, there is no clarity concerning the basis of the 
jury's decision to acquit. Even if it could be proved by a party wishing 
to challenge an acquittal entered by a jury that a defective or 
erroneous fact-finding process had taken place at the trial, it would be 
very difficult to prove that the jury would have reached a different 
conclusion if the errors had not occurred. It follows that because 
Constitution, the accused in a criminal trial is guaranteed the right to 
a trial by jury. An accused, however, may surrender his right to a trial 
by jury by means of a waiver. He is then tried by a judge acting as 
the sole decision-maker in what is known as a bench-trial or waiver-
trial. However, in jury trials jurors are the sole triers of fact; although 
they are sworn to follow the rules of evidence and law as charged by 
the judges, cases of jury-nullification exist where the jury disregards 
such controls. See Zalman M and Siegel L Criminal Procedure: 
Constitution and Society 1991 1st ed 634 and 636. 
241Westen and Drube! General Theory 129-130. 
242See Westen and Drubel General Theory 130. 
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there are no identifiable erroneous acquittals, appellate review of 
acquittals entered by a juries would be inappropriate. 
The legal commentators who express the view that the jury-
nullification rule is the sole reason why prosecution appeals against 
acquittals are prohibited, explain that "[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause 
thus allows the jury to exercise its constitutional-function. as the 
conscience of the community in applying the law; to soften and in 
extreme cases to nullify the application of the law in order to avoid 
unjust judgments". 243 
It cannot be denied that the theory advanced by these writers sounds 
convincing. It provides a rational explanation why the American 
prosecutor is not even allowed to appeal against an acquittal on a 
point of law. However, it has one serious flaw. It fails to explain 
why the American prosecutor is also prohibited from appealing against 
a finding of not guilty by a judge, acting as the only factfinder in a 
bench trial. 244 In US v Jenkins the Supreme Court rejected the 
notion that the double jeopardy clause permits a distinction between 
bench and jury trials. 246 
243Westen and Drube! General Theory 129. 
244A judge in a bench trial cannot acquit against the evidence and 
must give reasons for his findings. The grounds on which a judge's 
verdict is based, is therefore identifiable. However, the state is not 
allowed to appeal against an acquittal handed down in a bench trial 
even if it is based on erroneous legal grounds. See in general Office 
of legal Policy 896-897 which recommends that the Department of 
Justice should recognise a right of the state to appeal against acquittal 
based on errors of law in bench trials. 
245See supra, text at note 168 for a discussion of that case. To 
overcome this flaw in their argument, Westen and Drubel General 
Theory 132-137 submit that the Supreme Court decision in Swisher 
v Brady 438 US 204 ( 1978) is authority for the proposition that the 
state may appeal against an erroneous verdict of not guilty in a bench 
trial and that this case in fact overruled Kepner's case (supra). 
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It is clear that neither the "jury-nullification" theory nor the 
"protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction" theory can 
explain entirely why finality is accorded to trial acquittals in American 
criminal jurisprudence. Therefore, there has to be other reasons why 
the Supreme Court has adopted this approach. Recent considerations 
by the Supreme Court of the constitutionality of state appeals against 
However, this argument seems to be forced. Swisher's case involved 
a juvenile proceeding in Maryland in which the magistrate was only 
authorised to make proposed findings of delinquency or non-
delinquency which had to be reviewed on the record by a judge in a 
juvenile court. In Swisher, the state filed exceptions to the 
magistrate's proposals pursuant to a state rule of criminal procedure; 
the judge in the juvenile court subsequently made an independent 
review of the records, and entered an acquittal. The issue before the 
Supreme Court was whether the double jeopardy clause of the 
Constitution prohibited the state from filing exceptions with the 
Juvenile Court to proposed findings and recommendations by the 
magistate. The Supreme Court ruled that it did not. The court argued 
that the rules of procedure of the state of Maryland (at the time) 
provided that a "master" (a magistrate) should hear such cases as may 
be assigned to him by the Juvenile Court, and that he should 
thereupon, at the conclusion of the hearing, transmit his findings and 
recommendations to the Juvenile Court. If no party had filed 
exceptions to these findings and recommendations, they had to be 
confirmed, modified or remanded by the judge. However, if a party 
filed exceptions (and in delinquency matters, only the state had the 
authority to do so), the Juvenile Court judge would hear the entire 
matter de nova. The Supreme Court clearly distinguished its holding 
in this case (namely that the exceptions by the state were permissible) 
from that in Kepner's case. Unlike Kepner's case, the magistrate in 
Swisher's case was a mere "master" making proposed findings of not 
guilty. In Kepner's case on the other hand, the trial magistrate was 
authorised to enter a judgment of not guilty which (in the absence of 
an appeal) was binding and final. In Swisher's case, the"master" had 
no power to enter a final order of acquittal. The Supreme Court 
pointed out that the procedure in Maryland provided for a single 
proceeding "which begins with a master's hearing and culminates with 
an adjudication by a judge n (at 215). Therefore, the filing of 
exceptions by the state against the findings of the magistrate could 
not be regarded as a state appeal against an acquittal (which, 
according to the decision in Kepner, amounted to a violation of the 
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy) because the 
magistrate had no power to enter an acquittal. 
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acquittals indicate that the double jeopardy prohibition in general, 
presupposes that246 
(a) in order to protect the public interest in ensuring that justice is 
meted out to offenders, the state should at least have one 
opportunity to present its case before a trier of fact and 
(b) in order to protect the valued right of the accused to have his 
trial completed by the particular tribunal- summoned- to- sit in 
judgment of him, he should only be subjected to one 
determination of his guilt or innocence. 247 
This approach would not seem to focus exclusively on considerations 
such as "protecting the innocent from being convicted" or "anxiety, 
embarrassment or expense". 248 It seems more plausible that the 
decisive underlying policy considerations are the following. A re-
consideration of an accused's guilt or innocence at the initiative of the 
state, at a stage when the state already had an opportunity to state its 
case before a duly appointed trier of fact, amounts to oppressive 
governmental behaviour. 249 However, the question of why it can 
be regarded as oppressive state conduct remains. One legal 
commentator argues that a re-consideration of an accused's guilt or 
innocence at the initiative of the state amounts to oppressive 
governmental conduct "because the [due process] system [of criminal 
justice] vests the ultimate authority to find culpability in the initial 
246See US v Scott (99) relying on the approach adopted in the so-
called "mistrial" cases ie US v Jorn and Downum v US. Both these 
cases are discussed in chapter three supra under 3.5.2.1. 
247This right of the accused may be seen as a derivative of his 
legitimate interest in the finality of a verdict of acquittal. See US v 
Wilson 352. 
248Even a retrial after a conviction is set aside by a court of appeal 
may cause these burdens. 
249See US v Scott 99-100. 
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factfinder". 250 He explains his thesis as follows251 
The crucial question is whether the double jeopardy 
clause permits the prosecutor to re-evaluate a jury's 
decision as to the degree (or existence) of 
culpability .... The distinction between legal guilt and 
factual guilt is important for double jeopardy theory. 252 
Defendants are presumed innocent until found guilty by 
a verdict of their peers and by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Moreover, juries have the inherent power to 
nullify the evidence and return a verdict that is contrary 
to the physical facts. Thus, our justice system creates 
limitations on legal guilt that have nothing to do with 
whether, in fact, the defendant committed certain acts. 
One can say that X did Y conduct but in the absence of 
a criminal verdict, one cannot say that X is guilty of 
offense [sic] Y. Because the question for the criminal 
justice system is necessarily legal guilt, rather than 
whether X did [conduct] Y, the system must prefer the 
judgment of the fact finder to that of the prosecutor. 
Because this is so, it is nonsensical to speak of the 
prosecutor correcting "errors" made by the fact finder. 
The fact finder's judgment is the defendant's culpability. 
Thus the double jeopardy clause is simply an inevitable 
part of the system [of due process] that gives the 
ultimate decision-making responsibility to the [first] fact 
finder. 
It is submitted that the rationale advanced above can be reconciled 
with current judicial precedents such as Sanabria and Scott. 
6.5.8 Summary 
* The basic approach followed in American constitutional double 
250See Thomas Elegant theory 850 (my emphasis). 
251 At 835. (My emphasis). 
252Thomas refers to Packer at 166-1 67 where the author draws a 
distinction between due process and crime control theories by 
contrasting legal guilt and factual guilt. Cf chapter six supra note 
4. 
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jeopardy jurisprudence is that the state is prohibited from appealing 
against an acquittal. 
* In the early cases, the court did not define the concept acquittal. 
The result was that any termination of proceedings at a stage after 
jeopardy had attached and which had been referred to by the court as 
an acquittal, offered the accused protection against further state-
initiated proceedings. 
* In Ball the United States Supreme Court rejected the English rule 
that a defective indictment cannot legally place an individual in 
jeopardy. The court reasoned that it would be unfair to grant a 
prosecutor a second opportunity to convict whenever he discovered 
a defect in the original indictment. The rationale underlying the 
approach adopted in Ball is that the state should not benefit from its 
own mistakes. 
* During the 1950's the court ruled in Green that even an "implied 
acquittal" entitles an accused to protection against double jeopardy. 
The court ruled that a conviction of a lesser offence constitutes an 
"implied acquittal" of a greater offence. The "implied acquittal" 
doctrine was later applied in the context of a prosecution appeal 
against sentence. 
* During the 1970's, the Congress of the federal government 
introduced an Act which provided for a right of the state to appeal 
against any decision dismissing an indictment except where it would 
be prohibited by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
This provision was construed in Wilson to mean that Congress 
intended to remove all statutory barriers to state appeals and to allow 
appeals whenever the Constitution would permit. Therefore, the 
provision required the Supreme Court to consider more closely the 
412 
policies which underlie the constitutional guarantee against double 
jeopardy. 
* In the first decisions which followed on the above-mentioned 
enactment, the court regarded the consequences of a state appeal to 
be the controlling principle in determining whether it should be 
prohibited in terms of the double jeopardy clause. In Wilson for 
instance, the court ruled that the most important purpose of the 
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy is the prohibition of 
multiple trials. Building on this premise, the court ruled that the double 
jeopardy clause does not bar an appeal of a judge's post-trial 
discharge following a conviction by the trier of fact. The court 
reasoned that a successful state appeal of such a post-conviction 
judgment of acquittal (which acquittal, in casu, was based on pre-
indictment delay), allows reinstatement of the guilty verdict without 
subjecting the accused to a second trial before a second trier of fact. 
In general, the court was of the view that an accused has no 
legitimate claim to benefit from an error of law when that error can be 
corrected without a second trial before a second trier of fact. 
* The Supreme Court followed the approach adopted in Wilson 
(namely that the double jeopardy clause primarily protects the accused 
against multiple trials) also to bench trials in Jenkins. In that case the 
court held that any mid-trial dismissal of an accused (regardless of the 
character of such mid-trial dismissal) bars a state appeal if further 
proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolution of factual issues 
going to the elements of the offence charged are required upon 
reversal and remand. Jenkins focused purely on the issue of whether 
a new trial would be required if the judgment favourable to the 
accused was reversed on appeal. Wilson, on the other hand, focused 
on the issue of whether the appeal itself would involve reconsideration 
of factual issues. 
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* During the 1977-1978 term, a shift in emphasis occurred in the 
court's approach to the constitutional permissibility of state appeals. 
Instead of focusing on the consequences of a state appeal, the court 
began to focus on the character of the termination of the proceedings 
in the trial court in favour of the accused. 
* In Martin linen the court stated that, in order to determine the 
constitutionality of a state-initiated appeal, it must be determined 
whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, represents a 
resolution correct or not, of all of the factual elements of the offence 
charged. In other words, the court ruled that it has to be determined 
whether the termination of proceedings was based on insufficiency of 
evidence to prove the offence. If this is the case, it amounts to a true 
acquittal which bars further state-initiated proceedings. 
* In Sanabria the court took this approach even one step further. It 
held that an acquittal (a termination of proceedings on the basis of 
insufficiency of evidence to prove the crime charged) bars a state 
appeal even if it was based on erroneous legal judgments rather than 
flawed fact-finding. In other words, the court ruled that a termination 
of proceedings based on insufficient evidence still qualifies as an 
acquittal on the merits even if it is based upon erroneous evidentiary 
or substantive legal rulings. The court argued that to deny the 
accused protection against double jeopardy whenever a trial court 
error in his favour led to an acquittal, undercuts the adversary 
asssumption on which the American system of criminal justice rests. 
This argument was explained in subsequent cases as follows. The 
state's means of protecting its vital interest in convicting the guilty is 
its participation as an adversary at the criminal trial where it has every 
opportunity to dissuade the trial court from committing erroneous 
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rulings favorable to the accused.253 The institution of appeal cannot 
be employed by the prosecution to serve the interest of the state to 
convict the guilty; it frustrates the interest of the accused in having 
the proceedings against him finalised. 254 Therefore, it amounts to 
a violation of the guarantee against double jeopardy. The decision in 
Sanabria was followed in a subsequent decision (Smalis). The 
Supreme Court ruled in Smalis that a discharge of the accused at the 
end of the prosecution's case on the basis of insufficiency of 
evidence, constitutes a non-appealable acquittal. Building on the 
premise advanced in Sanabria, the court stated that a ruling as a 
matter of law that the state's evidence is insufficient to establish the 
accused's factual guilt, also amounts to an acquittal that bars a state 
appeal. 
* In Scott the Supreme Court confirmed that a determination of the 
constitutionality of a state appeal involves an investigation into the 
character of the terrnination of proceedings in favour of the accused. 
Of importance is that the court rejected its previous holding in Jenkins, 
namely that any mid-trial dismissal (even one that does not amount to 
an acquittal on the merits) bars further proceedings by the state if 
further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolution of factual 
issues would be required on reversal and remand. The court explained 
(in Scott) that if the prosecution is willing to continue with its 
production of evidence, and the accused himself seeks to terminate 
the trial on grounds unrelated to his guilt or innocence (for example, 
a legal ground such as pre-indictment delay), he has not been deprived 
of his right to go to the first jury; only the public is deprived of their 
valued right to one complete opportunity to present their case to a trier 
253See the dissenting opinion of Mr Justice Brennan in Scott at 84 
discussed supra at note 188. 
254See the judgment of Mr Justice White in Smalis at 145 referred to 
supra, text at note 191 . 
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of fact. The court distinguished its decision in Sanabria on the 
following grounds. An acquittal resulting from erroneous evidentiary 
or substantive legal rulings, althought it affects the accuracy of the 
determination, does not alter its essential character. A dismissal on 
the basis of pre-indictment delay on the other hand, does not amount 
to a finding of fact that the accused was innocent of the crime 
charged. In the court's view, an appeal against such a dismissal does 
not amount to oppressive state conduct; the issue of guilt has never 
been submitted to the first trier of fact. 
* In a minority opinion in Scott, Mr Justice Brennan pointed out that 
there are few instances where defences could be deemed unrelated to 
factual guilt or innocence. He explained that most defences (for 
instance entrapment and insanity) provide legal justification for 
conduct which constitutes an offence. Thus, in most cases, 
dismissals on legal grounds would create double jeopardy bars. 
* Finally, in DiFrancesco, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a prosecution appeal against sentence on the basis 
that it does not involve a retrial or approximate the ordeal of a trial on 
the basic issue of guilt or innocence. However, in Bullington, the 
court applied the very principle advanced in DiFrancesco to prohibit a 
state appeal against sentence on double jeopardy grounds. It held that 
because the sentencing proceeding adopted in Bullington resembled a 
trial on the issue of quilt or innocence, the double jeopardy clause 
barred the state from appealing against the sentence. The court also 
relied on the "implied acquittal" doctrine as previously suggested in 
Green: it held that by imposing a sentence of life imprisonment, the 
court impliedly acquitted the accused of the only other sentence it was 
empowered to impose, namely the death sentence. The court 
distinguished Bullington from its previous holding in DiFrancesco on 
the basis that the jury in Bullington' s first trial did not have unbounded 
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discretion to select a punishment from a variety of authorised 
sentences (as was the case in DiFrancesco). This distinction has been 
criticised by legal commentators on the basis that it is artificial. For 
instance, it is suggested that in deciding which sentence to impose, 
the trial judge always performs a fact-finding role, irrespective of the 
scope of his discretion. This means that failure to impose a higher 
penalty, like failure to find guilt of a higher degree· because of 
insufficient evidence, amounts to an acquittal of the higher degree of 
punishment and precludes an appeal. 
* Unlike the position in English and Canadian law, the criterion of 
"absence of jurisdiction" is not employed in American federal 
jurisprudence to effect a review and subsequent setting aside of an 
acquittal by a higher hierarchical tribunal. This is so because it is 
highly unlikely that a trial court will lack "jurisdiction" over a matter 
that proceeded through trial to a final verdict; the prosecution would 
have requested the court to declare a mistrial at an earlier stage of the 
proceedings. As indicated in chapter three, a retrial may follow on 
declaration of a mistrial on the motion of the prosecution, unless the 
motion can be viewed as prosecutorial overreach or an attempt to 
manipulate the trial. 255 
6.6 SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
6.6.1 Historical overview 
As indicated in chapter five, 256 the system of criminal procedure 
255See chapter three supra under 3.5.2 for a discussion of the 
permissibility of retrials on declarations of "mistrials" by trial courts. 
256Supra under 5.2. 
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introduced at the Cape during the occupation of the Dutch East India 
Company ( 1652-1795) was based on the Roman-Dutch law which 
prevailed in the province of Holland at the time. 257 This system of 
criminal procedure survived the first British occupation ( 1795-1803) 
and the rule of the Batavian Republic ( 1803-1806). 258 
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, criminal cases at 
the Cape were tried before the Court of Justice which sat in Cape 
Town. 259 An appeal was possible in civil as well as criminal matters 
from this court to the Supreme Court of Batavia. As in Roman-Dutch 
law, the accused in the ordinary process260 could lodge an appeal 
against sentence only. 261 It would seem as thought the prosecution 
had a similar right of appeal, namely only against sentence imposed on 
257See Dugard 18. 
258See Dugard 18; Snyman and Markel 7 and Wessels JW History of 
the Roman-Dutch law 1908 362. 
259Botha CG "Criminal Procedure at the Cape during the 17th and 18th 
centuries" South African Law Journal Vol 32 1915 319. In the 
country districts, lower courts of justice were established which, 
during this period, exercised jurisdiction in civil matters only. 
However, it has been suggested that in practice, they heard minor 
criminal cases as well, for example, "alle soort van huyslycke 
moeilikheid" and minor cases of assault. Punishments imposed were 
minor fines, warnings and awards of damages. See in general Ferreira 
JC Strafprosesreg in die Landdroshof 1967 6. From the examples 
given by this author (at 6 note 9), it seems as if these cases were not 
regarded to be purely criminal matters. Nevertheless,_ from the 
sentences imposed by the lower courts an appeal could be instituted 
to the Court of Justice in Cape Town (see a memo written by WS van 
Ryneveld which appears in Theal GM Records of the Cape Colony Vol 
I 1898 242. However, no record seems to exist of an appeal brought 
by a public prosecutor against a sentence imposed by these courts 
during this time. 
260See chapter five supra under 5.2 note 28 for a discussion of the 
ordinary process. 
261 See Botha 323. 
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the person who had been convicted. 262 
During the rule of the Batavian Republic at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century no significant changes took place in the system of 
criminal procedure. 263 However, during the period 1806-1910 major 
changes based on English principles took place in the field of the law 
of criminal procedure. The most important changes which occurred 
for the purpose of this study will be mentioned briefly. 
With the initial restructuring of the courts264 and the fact that 
limited criminal jurisdiction was conferred on Boards of Landdrosts and 
Heemraden during this time, 265 the need arose to clarify the method 
of criminal procedure to be followed in these new court structures. A 
code of criminal procedure266 was accordingly issued in 1819, which 
262A letter from the members of the Court of Justice adressed to 
General Craig (written on 16 October 1795) states, inter alia, the 
position with regard to appeals against sentences from the court of 
Justice to the Supreme Court of Batavia at the time before surrender 
to the British in 1795, and implies that the prosecutor might also have 
brought such an appeal. This letter appears in Theal Vol 1 203, 206. 
263Wessels 376 indicates that General Janssen's Ordinance for the 
administration of the country districts and his instructions to 
Landdrosts and Heemraden clearly show that Roman-Dutch law still 
formed the basis of criminal practice at the Cape during this period. 
Cf chapter five supra under 5.2, text at note 18. 
264ln 1808 a High Court of Appeals was introduced and in 1811 a 
circuit court. The High Court of Appeals replaced the appeals to 
Batavia. See Dugard 20. 
265See Dugard 20 for an exposition of the criminal jurisdiction of lower 
courts during this period. 
266Entitled Crown Trial: or Mode of Proceeding in Criminal Cases at 
the Cape of Good Hope 1819. The text of this Code appears in 
Theal Vol XXV 90-122. The provisions of the Code was also 
considered in detail in 1827 in a Report of the Commissioner of 
Enquiry to Earl Bathurst upon Criminal Law and Jurisprudence, 
contained in Theal Vol XX.XIII 1-31 . 
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regulated the method of criminal procedure followed until 1828. 
Article 1 26 of this Code provided that all cases in which a sentence 
had been passed by a commissioner of the Court of Justice could be 
brought to a rehearing before the full court in Cape Town, or in the 
case of a sentence passed by courts of Landdrosts and Heemraden, 
to the full Board of such Landdrost and Heemraden of the respective 
districts. 267 Despite the broad terms of this provision, the provisions 
of article 53 of the same Code seem to suggest that no appeal was 
allowed against an acquittal by the prosecution.268 In fact, the only 
case which could be traced which dealt with an appeal brought by the 
prosecutor during this period (in casu the Fiscal), was an appeal 
against sentence. 269 
In 1827 trial by jury was introduced, a restructuring of the court 
system took place once again and a Supreme Court established.270 
Legislation which followed in the next year271 introduced a system 
267See Theal Vol XXV 117-118. 
268The exact wording of this section appears in Theal Vol XXV 101-
102: "After the witnesses on both sides have been examined in the 
manner before mentioned, and no further investigation is required, the 
Court shall declare the examinations closed; and in case it is found, 
by this investigation, that the Accused is innocent, ... the declaration 
of 'the investigation being closed' shall be made, accompanied by a 
Decree of Liberation of Imprisonment, or of Acquittal from personal 
Appearance, and from all further prosecution for the Crime set forth 
in the Indictment" (my emphasis). 
269See Theal Vol XX 1 244 which contains a letter from Sir Richard 
Plaskett to R Wilmot Horton Esqre in which reference is made to some 
concern shown by Lord Charles Somerset about an appeal brought by 
the Fiscal to the Full Board of the Court of Justice against a sentence 
imposed on a criminal accused, known by .the name of Carnall. 
270See Dugard 24-25. 
271 Ordinance for Regulating the Manner of Proceeding in Criminal 
Cases in this Colony 40 of 1828. 
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of English criminal procedure, inter alia, granting review powers to the 
Supreme Court in respect of proceedings of all lower courts in the 
Colony. 272 In 1830, further legislation273 imported the principle of 
English criminal procedure that it would be permissible for any person 
aggrieved by the proceedings of a lower court in any case to bring the 
same under the review of the Supreme Court on the ground that such 
lower court had at the trial of such case, rejected legal and competent 
evidence. Despite the broad scope of the wording of the provision 
(namely, any aggrieved person), there is not a single reported case 
during this period or later (up to the 1880's) indicating that this power 
of review was exercised on application of the prosecutor. 274 Since 
no provision was made in these enactments for an appeal either on the 
facts or on a point of law, the abovementioned rule de facto served 
the purpose of a disguised form of appeal on the facts, which could 
be utilised by the accused. 275 
272Section 4 of Ordinance 40 of 1828. The grounds on which 
proceedings could be brought under review of the Supreme Court (in 
terms of section 5 of this Act), were exactly the same as those which 
are provided for presently in terms of section 24 of the Supreme Court 
Act 59 of 1959. 
2730rdinance 73 of 1830 - Ordinance for explaining, altering and 
amending the Ordinance No 40. 
274This is also evident from the decision Prince Albert Board of 
Management v Jooste and Others 1886 4 SC 400, 402 discussed 
infra note 351. 
275 At a later stage, after the introduction of an appeal on a point of 
law, it was held in R v Jude/man 1893 10 SC 12 that the question of 
whether there was any evidence of the crime charged could, on the 
request of the accused, be reserved by the judge as a question of law. 
Cf the discussion infra under 6.6.2.3 of the scope and nature of a 
question of law as recently examined by the Appellate Division in 
Magmoed v Janse van Rensburg. 
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Nevertheless, in 1879276 express provision was made for an 
accused convicted in a superior court who was of the opinion that an 
irregularity took place during his trial, to appeal by means of special 
entry on the record of the proceedings. Furthermore, it was provided 
that the court could reserve a question of law to the Court of Appeals 
in circumstances where the accused had been convicted. The relevant 
section provided as follows277 
If any question of law shall arise on the trial of any 
person for any indictable crime or offence in the Supreme 
Court, Eastern Districts Court, or any Circuit Court, it 
shall be lawful for such Court to reserve such question 
for the consideration of the Court of Appeal in criminal 
cases. If the Court shall determine to reserve any such 
question, and the defendant shall be convicted, the Court 
shall state the question or questions reserved, and shall 
direct such case to be specially entered in the record, 
and a copy thereof to be transmitted to the Court of 
Appeal in criminal cases. 278 
At the time of the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 
1910, these principles already formed part of the law of criminal 
procedure of the other colonies, Transvaal, Orange Free State and 
276Administration of Justice Act 5 of 1879 Section 23. 
277Section 25 of the Act. The wording of this section was similar to 
that enacted at a later stage in section 372 of Act 31 of 1917 except 
that, in contrast to the latter provision, it was not explicitly stated in 
this provision that the prosecution may reserve a question of law. A 
subsequent enactment, section 34 of Act 35 of 1896, also did not 
make explicit provision for the prosecution to reserve a question of 
law. 
278My emphasis. 
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Natal. 279 They were re-enacted in consolidating legislation in 1917 
(sections 370 and 372 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 31 
of 1 91 7). If an accused was acquitted by a magistrate or a jury the 
prosecutor could not appeal from the judgment. 280 In a trial in a 
superior court, the accused was allowed to request the court to make 
a special entry on the record of an alleged irregularity that took place 
at the trial as a basis for an appeal to the Appellate Division. 281 It 
279This study will not purport to give a detailed account of the systems 
of criminal procedure which prevailed in the Voortrekker Republics and 
Natal from the period 1838 to annexation in 1900 an 1902. Suffice 
it to say the following in this regard. The system of criminal procedure 
in Natal was based on the law which prevailed in the Cape Colony; an 
appeal was allowed on a point of law to the Cape Supreme Court. In 
the province of the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek (Transvaal), a system 
of criminal procedure was provided for in the Constitution of 1858 
(Appendix 3 contained rules of criminal procedure which adopted a 
trial by jury and the accusatorial system). Only the accused could 
appeal in a criminal case and the state could not challenge a verdict of 
not guilty. This was, presumably, also the position in the Orange Free 
State. After annexation in 1901, Ordinance 4 of 1902 (0) was 
enacted in this province, of which section 37 provided, inter alia, for 
an appeal on a point of law from a superior court without stating 
explicitly who may apply for such reservation. Ordinance 1 of 1903 
(T) (section 270) contained a similar provision for Transvaal, which 
stated explicitly that the prosecution may also reserve a question of 
law. A similar provision was, at this stage, contained in section 34 of 
Act 35 of 1896 (C) and Rule of Court XL 23 (N). See in general 
Dugard 28-31; Kahn E "The History of the Administration of Justice 
in the South African Republic" South African Law Journal 1958 244 
et seq; Strauss SA "The development of the law of Criminal 
Procedure since Union" Acta Juridica 19 60 15 7, 1 84 et seq. 
280See Strauss 185. The author points out that in Transvaal the 
Attorney-General could, if he was dissatisfied with the finding of a 
magistrate's court on a point of law in a criminal case, bring the same 
in review before the Supreme Court for future guidance of magistrates' 
courts. However, the ruling of the Supreme Court in such review 
could in no way affect the finality of the finding of the magistrate's 
court in the particular case so reviewed. Cf also Nathan para 2752. 
281 Section 370 of Act 31 of 1917. 
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was also provided for in this Act282 that a question of law could be 
reserved on the court's own motion, on request of the accused, or on 
request of the prosecution, 283 who was only allowed to appeal on 
a point of law if the accused had been convicted. The relevant section 
provided that "[w)hen the superior court reserves any such question 
and the accused is convicted, the court shall state the question or 
questions reserved . . . " 284 In R v Solomons28s- and R v 
Herbsf86 the Appellate Division confirmed that the relevant section 
allowed an appeal by the prosecution only if it would result in some 
benefit to the accused; in other words, only in circumstances where 
the accused had been convicted. 
In 1948, in terms of the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act287, 
the accused in a criminal trial in a superior court was for the first time 
afforded a full right of appeal on the merits of a case to the Appellate 
Division. Presumably as a result of the interpretation of the Appellate 
Division of section 372 of Act 31of1917 as allowing for an appeal 
on a point of law against a conviction only, 288 this legislation now 
also expressly provided for an appeal by the prosecution on a point 
of law against an acquittal. 289 Furthermore, this Act also made 
282 Act 31 of 1 91 7. 
283Section 372 of the Act. 
284Section 372(2). 
285 1959 (2) 352, 359F-G (A). 
286 1942 AD 434, 436. 
287 Act 37 of 1948. 
288See R v Solomons and R v Herbst supra. 
289See section 10 of Act 37 of 1948, which left out the words "and 
the accused is convicted" (which appeared in the previous section 
3 7 2), and section 1 2 which deals with steps to be taken by the court 
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provision for a mechanism by which the court, when deciding a point 
of law in favour of the prosecution in an appeal against an acquittal, 
could order a retrial of the accused.290 
These principles were retained in terms of legislation introduced in 
1955, 291 and still prevails today in terms of current legislation on 
criminal procedure. 292 The law it stands today will briefly be set 
where " a question of law has been reserved on the application of a 
prosecutor in the case of an acquittal ... ". For the sake of 
completeness it should also be mentioned that at that stage (namely 
in 1948), provision had already been made in terms of The 
Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944 for an appeal by the prosecution 
on a question of law against a decision given by a lower court in 
favour of an accused (sections 103(2) and 104( 1) of that Act). 
290See sections 12(3) and 13 of Act 37 of 1948. In terms of section 
12(3), the court, where a question of law had been reserved by the 
prosecution following an acquittal, could direct such steps as set out 
in section 13. Section 13 provided inter alia for the institution of 
proceedings de novo where a conviction had been set aside as a 
result of the court lacking jurisdiction, an invalid indictment, or any 
other technical irregularity or defect in the proceedings. The 
interpretation of this provision is discussed in chapter eight infra under 
8.6.2. 
291 Section 366 of the Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955 provided for 
an appeal, inter alia, at the request of the prosecutor on a point of law. 
Section 369(3) set out the provisions of the previous section 12(3) of 
the 1948 Act, section 370 the provisions of the previous section 13, 
and section 369( 1) authorised the Court of Appeal when ruling in 
favour of the prosecution in an appeal on a question of law against an 
acquittal, to make an order for the institution of de novo proceedings. 
See R v Gani 1957 (2) SA 212 (A) 2228-E and Swift IL Swift's law 
of Criminal Procedure 2nd ed 1969 725 for a discussion of this power 
of the court of appeal. In Gani the court assumed that it would not be 
obliged, in every case, to order such proceedings. However, the court 
emphasised that without such an order, fresh proceedings in respect 
of the same offence could not be instituted. 
292Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, read 
together with sections 224(3), 322(c) and 324. Section 310 provides 
for an appeal by the prosecution on a point of law from an acquittal 
afforded an accused in the lower courts. 
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out in the following paragraphs. 
6.6.2 Current law 
6.6.2. 1 General 
It is clear from the survey above that since the time that Roman-Dutch 
law formed the basis of criminal procedure in South Africa and 
throughout the period when English legal principles were applied in 
this field of the law, the principle was maintained that an acquittal 
could not be challenged by the prosecution on appeal. Moreover, in 
according sanctity to a verdict of acquittal, no distinction was drawn 
between proceedings in superior and lower courts. 
Although, as indicated above, a moot appeal from an acquittal 
handed down in a lower court was allowed in the Transvaal at the 
beginning of this century, 293 it was only in the 1 940' s that an appeal 
by the prosecution against an acquittal granted an accused in superior 
court proceedings on a point of law only, received the clear and 
unambiguous approval of the legislature. 294 
The present Criminal Procedure Act295 likewise makes provision 
for a limited right of appeal by the prosecution namely on a point of 
law. However, different principles apply to the permissibility of 
prosecution appeals from decisions of lower courts than to prosecution 
appeals emanating from proceedings which take place in superior 
courts. In fact, as will be seen from a discussion of these principles, 
the accused in a lower court, in terms of double jeopardy protection, 
293See supra note 280. 
294See supra, text at note 289. 
295 Act 5 1 of 1 9 77. 
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finds himself in a slightly better position than the accused in 
proceedings in a superior court. No apparent rationale underlies this 
phenomenon; it can probably be explained simply on the ground that 
the different provisions (previously contained in different pieces of 
legislation), although similar in nature, developed historically and were 
interpreted by our courts on a different basis. 
6.6.2.2 Appeals against acquittals 
In terms of the Act, the prosecution may appeal from a decision of a 
lower court "given in favour of the accused on any question of 
law" . 296 The courts have interpreted these words as meaning that 
the prosecution may appeal against an acquittal and also against a 
conviction of a lesser offence than that with which the accused was 
charged, on the basis that the accused should have been convicted of 
the greater offence. 297 If the appeal succeeds, the court may itself 
impose the sentence or make the order which the lower court ought 
to have made. However, the matter may also be remitted to the lower 
court concerned with instruction as to which steps should be taken. 
If neither of these options is chosen by the court of appeal, the case 
is referred to the lower court which dealt with the case in the first 
place. The case is then re-opened and dealt with in view of the 
296Section 310 of Act 51 of 1977. This section provides that a 
question of law also includes successful objection to the charge raised 
by the accused before pleading, in other words, before jeopardy 
attaches. Cf section 106(4) of the Act discussed in chapter three 
supra under 3.6.2 which stipulates the stage in proceedings when 
jeopardy attaches namely, when the accused has pleaded to the 
charge. 
2971n S v Zoko 1983 ( 1) SA 871 (N), the court held that a conviction 
of a lesser offence (in terms of Chapter 26 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act), amounts to an acquittal of the more serious offence and 
therefore could be regarded as a decision in favour of the accused 
(876A-C). 
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question of law as decided by the court of appeal. The court a quo is 
limited to the record except if the court of appeal has granted special 
authority to hear new evidence. The court of appeal may not at its 
discretion order a retrial of the accused. 298 
From a superior court however, a question of law may be reserved 
at the request of the prosecution ih the following circumstances 
only2ss 
(a) where the accused had been acquitted, which means an 
absolute acquittal and not an implied acquittal of a greater 
offence and a conviction of a lesser offence300 
298See in general Du Toit et al Service 11 1993 30-42C for a 
comment on section 310 subsections (4) and (5) which contain these 
provisions. 
299See section 319 of the current Act read with section 322(4) and 
section 324. 
3000ur courts have held that an acquittal, in the context of a 
prosecution appeal, amounts to an acquittal as described or meant in 
terms of section 322(4) of the Act. Provision is made in this section 
that "[w]here a question of law had been reserved on the application 
of the prosecutor in the case of an acquittal, and the court of appeal 
has given a decision in favour of the prosecutor, the court of appeal 
may order that such of the steps referred to in section 324 be taken 
as the court may direct". Again, section 324 deals with the power 
of a Court of Appeal to direct that de novo proceedings be instituted 
where a conviction is set aside on appeal on the ground of certain 
delineated irregularites (namely, incompetence of the trial court, invalid 
indictment or other technical irregularity) on the original or any other 
charge. According to our courts, section 322(4) could only refer to an 
absolute acquittal because the ordering of a retrial in terms of section 
324 (which in terms of this section is the only way open to the Appeal 
Court) would give rise to unacceptable results in instances where the 
accused had been convicted of a lesser offence. See S v Haarmeyer 
1970 (4) SA 113 (0) & S v Seekoei 1982 (3) SA 97 (A) 103A-C 
where the court seriously doubted that a retrial could be envisaged by 
the legislature in such circumstances. In Seekoei the court stated 
( 103H) that although it had the discretion to order a retrial where an 
accused had been acquitted, the existence of such a discretion had no 
bearing whatsoever on the unlikelihood of an intention of the 
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(b) where the accused had been convicted and the question of law 
might be decided in his favour301 
(c) where an accused had been convicted and the question of law 
relates to the validity of the punishment which had been 
imposed.302 
The Appellate Division may. use its power pursuant to. section 322( 1) 
and deliver judgment and impose the sentence which should have 
been delivered and imposed by the trial court on the correct 
application of legal principles, if the record contains all the relevant 
information. If not, a retrial may be ordered by the Appellate Division 
which involves the adjudication of the matter by a new judge and new 
assessors. In S v Rosentha/3°3 the court held that it would not 
order such a retrial if it would not serve the interests of justice. It 
should also be mentioned in this context that no provision is made for 
remittance to the court a quo of a case heard on appeal by the 
Appellate Division from superior court proceedings. 
Therefore, from a double jeopardy point of view, the position can be 
legislature to sanction a retrial even in circumstances where an 
accused, convicted of a lesser offence, had already started serving his 
sentence. Note that no provision is made in the Act for the ordering 
of a retrial or de nova proceedings on a successful prosecution appeal 
against an acquittal from proceedings in lower courts; that is probably 
why the prosecution may also appeal against a conviction of a lesser 
offence (which was in Zoko held to be an implied acquittal of a greater 
offence), handed down in these proceedings. 
301 See R v Adams 1959 (3) SA 753 (A) 764G-H. This rule is a 
remnant of the law which prevailed before 1948 and was interpreted 
as such in R v Herbst supra 436. 
3021n this instance, it is irrelevant whether the question is answered to 
the advantage or disadvantage of the accused. See S v Ntuli 1975 
( 1) SA 429 (A) 435A-E. See also, in general, Du Toit et al Service 7 
1991 31-22. 
303 1980 ( 1) SA 65 (A) 83A-B. 
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summarised as follows 
(a) The prosecution may appeal only on a point of law against 
acquittals handed down in lower as well as superior courts. 
(b) A person who has been acquitted in a superior court is 
technically in a worse position than his counterpart in a lower 
court because a full retrial may be ordered by the Appellate 
Division on deciding a point of law in favour of the prosecution. 
However, there is no reported case where the Appellate Division 
had utilised this power. Neither is any such case known. 
(c) Conversely, a person who has been acquitted in a lower court 
finds himself in a worse position than his counterpart in a 
superior court because the prosecution may also appeal against 
a conviction of a lesser offence. This type of appeal is not 
allowed from proceedings which took place in a superior court. 
(d) The last anomaly is that from a conviction in a Supreme Court, 
the prosecution may appeal if such an appeal would be in 
favour of the accused. From a lower court, however, 
prosecution appeals are restricted to matters decided originally 
in favour of the accused. However, this anomaly has no 
double jeopardy implications. 
The Minister of Justice is also empowered to submit a decision 
(including an acquittal) given by any superior court in any criminal case 
on a question of law to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court 
and cause the matter to be argued before that court in order that it 
may determine such question of law for the future guidance of all 
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courts. 304 Any decision given by the Appellate Division in such a 
case is a ruling for future guidance and does not alter any previous 
cases decided on a different basis. Therefore, this power of the 
Minister amounts merely to a moot appeal on a point of law. 
6.6.2.3 The scope of the concept "question of law" 
In dealing with the permissibility or prosecution appeals against 
acquittals, South African courts have given a narrow meaning to the 
concept "question of law". This approach has recently recently been 
confirmed by the Appellate Division in Magmoed v Janse van 
Rensburg. 305 In this particular sense, the person who has been 
acquitted in a lower court in South Africa finds himself in a much 
better position than his counterpart in England. 306 This is so 
because the English courts have given a broad meaning to the concept 
"question of law". However, since only a moot appeal is allowed by 
the prosecution against an acquittal handed down in a superior court 
in English law, the person who has been acquitted in a superior court 
in that legal system is absolutely protected against being placed in 
jeopardy again, namely against a reconsideration of his case before 
a higher tribunal which may be deleterious. Therefore, if one 
compares the position of a person who has been acquitted in a 
superior court in South Africa with his English counterpart, it is 
obvious that the scope of the concept "question of law" becomes 
largely immaterial. 
304Section 333 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
305Supra. 
306Cf the scope of the concept "question of law" in English law 
discussed supra under 6.2.2. 
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Nevertheless, as has been mentioned above,307 the issue of 
whether a court could reasonably have convicted or acquitted on the 
evidence presented at the trial, may be posed as a question of law in 
English law, even by the prosecution. In South Africa, in the case of 
Magmoed v Janse Van Rensburg308 it was argued by counsel acting 
on behalf of the prosecution bringing the appeal309 that in the days 
before a full right of appeal existed, the person who had been 
convicted could request the reservation of a question as one of law as 
to whether there was legal evidence on which the jury or other 
factfinder could properly or reasonably have convicted. Therefore, it 
was submitted that just as it was permissible for the accused in those 
days to pose a question of law of this nature, it was also permissible 
for the prosecution to request the reservation of a question as one of 
law as to whether, having regard to the weight of the evidence 
adduced, the trier of fact could properly or reasonably have acquitted 
the accused. 
Although counsel were unable to refer to any case where such a 
question of law had been reserved at the instance of the prosecution, 
reliance was placed on an early decision of the court, R v 
lakatula. 310 In that case the trial court on application of the defence 
counsel reserved a point of law under section 372 of Act 31 of 
191 7. 311 The question had been formulated as follows312 
307Under 6.2.2. 
308Supra. 
309/n casu a private prosecutor. 
3101919 AD 362. 
311 Presently section 31 9 of Act 51 of 19 77. 
312At 363. 
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Whether the judge at the trial should not have withdrawn the 
case from the jury on the ground that there was no 
corroboration of the evidence of Notje [sic] who was an 
accomplice in the crime. 
What in fact occurred in the court a quo in that case was that at the 
close of the prosecution's case counsel for the accused had applied for 
their discharge for lack of sufficient evidence. This application had 
been refused and the accused had not given evidence. The jury had 
convicted the accused of murder and the abovementioned question 
had then been reserved for decision by the Appellate Division. During 
the appeal, the Attorney-General queried whether this was strictly a 
question of law which could be reserved in terms of section 372 and 
whether the point reserved should not have been that at the close of 
the trial there had been no legal evidence on which the jury had been 
entitled to convict. 313 
Solomon ACJ made the following important comment on this particular 
aspect314 
I agree with him [the Attorney-General] that if at the close of 
the case for the prosecution the judge refuses to withdraw the 
case from the jury because in his opinion there is evidence 
which would justify them in convicting, the exercise of his 
discretion cannot be called in question under s 372 .... That, in 
my opinion, is not a point of law within the meaning of s 372, 
seeing that it is left by s 221 (3) to the discretion of the judge 
whether or not he should withdraw the case. If, however, at 
the close of the trial, there is no legal evidence upon which the 
jury were entitled to convict, that is a point of law which may 
be raised under s 372, and the question should be reserved in 
that form. 
314At 363-364. 
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Corbett CJ who delivered the judgment in Magmoed, did not agree 
with the line of reasoning advanced by counsel for the appellant. 
After comprehensively discussing the historical development of a right 
to appeal in South African law, the judge concluded that a question 
whether a jury could properly or reasonably have inferred the guilt of 
the accused from the evidence adduced, would not inherently amount 
to a question of law. He pointed out that it came to be treated as a 
question of law by reason of separation of functions (earlier in our law) 
between judges and juries - questions of law to be decided by the 
judge and questions of fact by the jury. 315 
Mr Justice Corbett explained that in terms of Act 31 of 191 7 (the 
old Criminal Procedure Act), it had been the function of the judge to 
decide at the end of the prosecution's case, as a matter of law, 
whether there was legal evidence on which the jury could have 
convicted. If the judge was of the opinion that there was sufficient 
evidence to go to the jury, then at the end of the trial the accused, if 
convicted, could apply for reservation as a question of law the issue 
as to whether there was legal evidence upon which the jury was 
entitled to convict. 316 In such a case, the test which had to be 
applied by the court was not whether the court of appeal would have 
drawn the inference which the jury drew, but whether "[a] reasonable 
315At 1 OOf the court relied on R v Slabbert and Prinsloo 1945 AD 137 
where the court had pointed out (at 144) that the rules relating to the 
burder of producing evidence, firstly, to satisfy the judge and then to 
satisfy the jury, have their source in the bipartite constitution of the 
common law tribunal. The court in that case referred to Wigmore on 
Evidence, 2nd ed Vol 5 par 2487 where the author remarked: "Apart 
from the distinction between Judge and jury these rules need have no 
existence". Cf also the discussion of English law supra under 6.2.2, 
text at note 18. 
316At 99b. 
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man wou Id have drawn that inference". 317 
However, in the court's view, there was "no historical or juristic 
basis for equating the position of an accused who complains that no 
legal evidence exists upon which a jury could convict with that of the 
prosecutor who complains that the evidence submitted to the jury was 
so strong that the jury could not reasonably ·have- acquitted the 
accused" .318 From a historical point of view, no cases existed 
where such a question of law had been reserved at the instance of the 
prosecutor. From a juristic point of view, on the other hand, the court 
indicated that319 
the question as to whether a jury could properly or 
reasonably have inferred the guilt of the accused from 
the evidence adduced is not inherently a question of law, 
but it came to be treated as such by reason of the 
separation of functions between Judge and jury 
(questions of law being decided by the Judge and 
questions of fact by the jury) and the function of the 
Judge to decide whether there is any evidence upon 
which a jury could properly convict the accused. 
Moreover, Corbett CJ expressed the view that the principle in 
Lakatula had been adopted because of concern that absence of a right 
of appeal on the facts would have been an injustice to the 
accused. 320 
317 At 99c. 
318At 100g. 
319At 1 OOf. 
320 At 1 OOh. The court also referred to Hiemstra 775 where the author 
stated that before an appeal purely on fact was recognized, the 
provision of section 372 was used as a "kunsgreep" to appeal on the 
facts; the author pointed out that a factual question was clothed as 
a question of law by asking whether there was any legal evidence to 
support a conviction. 
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In considering (earlier in the decision) the inherent nature of a 
question of law Mr Justice Corbett pointed out that in the field of 
income tax appeals on a question of law, facts may be classified as 
primary facts, namely those facts which are directly established by the 
evidence, and secondary facts, namely those which are established by 
way of inference from the primary facts. 321 According to the court, 
an inference drawn from primary facts that an accused-had·formed a 
common purpose to kill, amounts to a factual inference and not one 
of law. 322 Therefore, although such an inference amounts to a so-
called secondary fact, it remains a factual issue because it deals with 
the question whether a factual foundation exists for the application of 
a legal rule. In other words, where the legal elements of the crime or 
a rule of law (for example a rule of evidence dealing with the 
admissibility of evidence) or its scope are not at issue, but merely the 
factual foundation for the application of the rule, it amounts to a 
question of fact and not inherently to a question of law. 323 It 
follows therefore that the question as to whether the trial court made 
the correct evaluation or drew the correct inference from the primary 
facts amounts to a question of fact. 
In Magmoed the Appellate Division expressed considerable concern 
for the interest of the accused not to be placed in jeopardy by being 
tried again after he had been acquitted. 324 Corbett CJ emphasised 
that if the court were to accede to the appellant's contention 
321 At 96g. 
322At 96h. 
323At 96i. 
324At 101 a-j. 
it would be opening the door to appeals by the 
prosecution against acquittals contrary to the traditional 
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policy and practice of our law. 325 
In view of the principles relied on in Magmoed by the Appellate 
Court, it is also apposite to consider whether a discharge of the 
accused at the end of the prosecution's case amounts to a question 
of law which may be challenged by the prosecution on appeal. 
6.6.2.4 Discharge of the accused at the end of the prosecution's case 
- a legal or a factual question? 
In the year before the judgment in Magmoed was handed down by 
the Appellate Division, the Venda Supreme Court held in Attorney-
General v Molepo326 that a discharge of the accused at the end of 
the prosecution's case in terms of section 174 of the current Criminal 
Procedure Act is appealable by the prosecution in terms of section 310 
of the same Act. 327 The question of law which was posed in this 
case by the prosecution was whether at the close of the case of the 
prosecution, " there was legal evidence upon which the trial court 
could have acquitted the accused". 328 In holding that this 
constituted a question of law which may be appealed by the 
325 At 101 h. The court referred to two earlier decisions of the Appeal 
Court (R v Herbst supra and R v Gasa 191 6 AD 24 1 ) which confirmed 
the traditional policy and practice in South Africa that, in the absence 
of any special statutory provision to the contrary, an acquittal by a 
competent court in a criminal case should be treated as final and 
conclusive. 
326 199 2 SACR 534 (V). 
327Section 174 provides: "If, at the close of the case for the 
prosecution at any trial, the court is of the opinion that there is no 
evidence that the accused committed the offence referred to in the 
charge or any offence of which he may be convicted on the charge, 
it may return a verdict of not guilty". 
328At 535i. 
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prosecution, the court seems to have based its conclusion on the 
following considerations 
(a) The fact that R v Thielke 329 and R v Louw330 are 
authority for the proposition that if there is some 
evidence on which a reasonable person may convict, the 
court has no discretion in the matter but is" has a duty to 
refer the case to the jury. According to Le Roux J, the 
decision that there is no evidence on which a reasonable 
man could convict at that stage 
is therefore one of law because the presiding 
officer has the duty to consider every bit of 
evidence presented by the State, to evaluate it and 
to test it against the essential elements of the 
crime which the State has to prove. 331 
(b) The fact that this process of evaluation, comparison and 
inference of evidence constitutes a "legal exercise". 332 
To substantiate this statement, the court referred to the 
dictum in R v Lakatula333 
If, however, at the close of the trial there is no 
legal evidence upon which the jury were entitled 
to convict, that is a point of law which may be 
raised under section 372, and the question should 
be reserved in that form. 
329 1918 AD 373, 379. 
3301918 AD 344, 352. 
331At 538d. 
332At 538b. 
333Supra. 
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With regard to the above mentioned dicta, Le Roux J made the 
following comment334 
Why otherwise would this process be categorised as a 
question of law which can be reserved under s 319 (the 
former s 372) at the end of the trial? I can see no 
difference in principle between the mechanics of the two 
exercises although the rules governing the evaluation of 
the evidence differ radically and credibility plays a much 
more important role at the later stage. 
The court's view that no difference in principle exists between the 
mechanics of the two excercises can, in my view, not be questioned. 
It is submitted that no material difference exists between the question 
determined ex post facto whether any evidence existed on which a 
reasonable court could convict, and the question posed at the close of 
the prosecution's case as to whether any evidence existed at that 
stage on which a reasonable court may convict. 
However, the purpose of this study is to point out that, in view of 
the decision in Magmoed, 335 these similar exercises relate to a 
factual issue. A rule of law or the scope of such a rule is not at issue, 
but rather the factual foundation for the application of the rule. 
Inherently, the decision of a court to discharge amounts to an (albeit 
preliminary) factual determination of the guilt or innocence of the 
accused. The fact that such a determination takes place at an early 
stage in the trial does not in any material sense alter the nature of the 
determination. Moreover, it fully accords with the principle or legal 
tenet that in a criminal case all elements of the offence must be 
proved factually beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution. If the 
prosecution fails to do this, the defence does not have to present its 
334 At 538c (my emphasis). 
335Supra. 
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own evidence in order to win an acquittal. 
6.6.2.5 Prosecution appeals against sentence 
It remains to consider whether current South African law provides 
for an appeal by the prosecution against sentence imposed on the 
person who has been convicted, and, finally, whether the prosecution 
may initiate a review by the Supreme Court of an acquittal accorded 
an accused in lower court proceedings. 
In 1990, the legislature introduced the possibility ?fan appeal by the 
prosecution against sentence imposed on the person who has been 
convicted. This step was taken probably as a result of strong 
reaction in the press against lenient sentences imposed by white 
magistrates on white accused person convicted of assault on and 
culpable homicide of black victims during the era of apartheid. Section 
31 OA provides that the Attorney-General may appeal against a 
sentence imposed on an accused in a criminal case in a lower court to 
a division of the Supreme Court, provided that an application for leave 
to appeal has been granted by a judge in chambers. 336 No provision 
is made in the Act for a further appeal by the prosecution to the 
Appellate Division. Section 31 68 of the Act provides for a prosecution 
appeal on the same conditions against sentence imposed on a 
convicted person in a superior court to the Appellate Division. In S v 
Maseti337 the court held that section 31 QA does not restrict the right 
of the prosecutor to appeal where the sentence imposed is unfair to 
the state, but that the provision may also be utilised to appeal against 
a sentence which is unfair to the accused. However, the court stated 
336This provision was inserted in the current Criminal Procedure Act by 
section 9 of Act 107 of 1990. 
3371992 (2) SACR 459 (C). 
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that it would be more appropriate in such circumstances if the 
prosecutor brought the sentence to the attention of the Supreme Court 
by way of review. 
To alleviate the invidious position of the person who had been 
convicted, it was furthermore provided in the Act338 that on 
application for leave to appeal or an appeal in terms of the Act, the 
judge or the court (as the case may be) may order that the state pay 
the accused the whole or any part of the costs which the accused 
may have incurred in opposing the application or appeal. 
In Attorney-General, Venda v Maraga339 the court considered 
whether the fact that the Attorney-General has to apply for leave to 
appeal against the sentence imposed on an accused in a lower court 
is indicative of an intention on the part of the legislature that a stricter 
or more limited approach should be adopted by the court of appeal in 
the event of an appeal against sentence by the Attorney-General. The 
court expressed the view that the fact that the legislature had curtailed 
the right of the Attorney-General to appeal against sentence imposed 
upon an accused, was indicative of an intention on the part of the 
legislature that the accused should not be taken automatically through 
an appeal against sentence by the state. 340 Therefore, the court 
concluded that the Attorney-General's right to appeal against sentence 
should be exercised sparingly and confined to those instances where, 
in the opinion of the Attorney-General, the sentence imposed by the 
trial court is n so disturbingly inappropriate or glaringly inadequate that 
338Section 310A(6) and section 316(8)(3). 
339 1992 (2) SACR 594 (V). 
340At 609a. 
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the trial court could not have exercised its discretion reasonably" .341 
However, the court stated that the principles applicable in determining 
whether a sentence imposed by a trial court should be interfered with 
on appeal remain the same as those applied in an appeal against the 
sentence by the accused person. These principles are342 
(a) that the trial court possesses a wide discretion in respect of 
punishment 
(b) that the trial court must exercise this discretion regularly, 
reasonably, judicially, properly and with balanced consideration 
of all relevant facts, factors and circumstances 
(c) that when considering a sentence on appeal, the court of appeal 
has a strictly limited function which amounts to control over, 
and not to self-exercising, of the penal discretion 
(d) that the exercise of the trial court's discretion in imposing 
sentence is only vitiated because it was exercised 
unreasonably, unjudicially, improperly, irregularly or without a 
balanced consideration of the relevant factors, facts and 
circumstances which the court of appeal has the competence 
and the power to interfere with and 
(e) that the court of appeal is strictly limited to the record of the 
proceedings before the trial court and is, generally speaking, not 
entitled to take into account facts or factors beyond the record 
or outside of the scope of the record of the proceedings before 
the trial court. 
The importance of this judgment is that the court was at pains to point 
out that the prosecution appeal against sentence should be regarded 
as a drastic measure in our law and that the courts should prevent "as 
far as is absolutely possible, an accused person from - going 
unnecessarily through the ordeal of an appeal against his sentence by 
341 At 609b. 
342At 606-607. 
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the State. "343 In the court's view, the fact that provision has been 
made which empowers the court to order that the state pays the 
whole or part of the costs incurred by the accused in opposing the 
application (if the state is unsuccessful), does not remove the duty on 
the Attorney-General and the court to consider the situation with great 
circumspection. 344 
6.6.2.6 Judicial review of an acquittal 
Finally, the double jeopardy implications of a Supreme Court 
review345 of an acquittal accorded an accused in a lower court need 
to be addressed. 
Current legislation in South-Africa dealing with review powers of the 
Supreme Court, 346 provides for two methods of review. These are 
343At 609d. 
345The review procedure differs from the appeal procedure in that a 
matter is brought before the Supreme Court by means of review 
proceedings if a party, dissatisfied with the outcome of a criminal trial, 
complains of the method followed at the trial, namely that an 
irregularity took place at the trial which influenced the outcome of the 
trial. Appeals on the other hand, deal with the factual merits of a case 
or questions of law. See Du Toit et al Service 14 1994 30-1. In the 
early stages of the development of these remedies, no clear distinction 
was made between a review and appeal on a question of law, which 
may explain why one of the grounds of review which is retained today 
in terms of section 25 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959, namely 
the admission of inadmissible or incompetent evidence or the refusal 
of evidence, in actual fact does not inherently amount to a ground of 
review, but rather to a question of law or fact depending on the 
specific issue raised. See the discussion of Magmoed v Janse van 
Rensburg supra, text at note 308. 
346The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, apart from the special 
entry procedure which is a remedy which may be utilised by the 
accused, has neither statutory nor inherent review powers. See 
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the following 
(a) Review procedures in terms of section 304 and 304A of the 
Criminal Procedure Act347 before a magistrate's court or 
regional court. These procedures are available only after a 
person had at least been convicted of an offence and need 
therefore not be considered in detail for the purpose of this 
study. 
(b) Review procedures in terms of section 24 of the Supreme Court 
Act348 which is available in respect of both civil and criminal 
proceedings of any lower court on the specific grounds set out 
in this provision. These grounds are: absence of jurisdiction of 
the court; interest in the cause, bias, malice or corruption on 
the part of the presiding judicial officer; gross irregularity in the 
proceedings and the admission of inadmissible or incompetent 
evidence or the rejection of admissible or competent evidence. 
When entertaining an application for review in terms of section 
24 of the Supreme Court Act, the court may resort to its 
inherent review jurisdiction if the initial form of review before it 
is not appropriate to the circumstances of the case. 349 
Although, in terms of the wording of this provision (section 24 of 
the Supreme Court Act), the Supreme Court ostensibly may also 
Snyman and Morkel 518. 
34751 of 1 9 77. 
34859 of 1959. 
See Taitz J The Inherent Review Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
LLD Dissertation 1983 Vol 1 342 (hereinafter referred to as Taitz LLD 
dissertation) citing S v Taylor 1979 (4) SA 185 (T) and S v Mametja 
1979 (1) SA 767 (T). 
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review an acquittal on any of the grounds set out in the provision, not 
a single reported case could be traced in our law dealing with a 
situation where a court of law exercised its statutory review powers 
to the detriment of a person where he had been wrongly 
acquitted.350 This phenomenon can be ascribed to the fact that 
traditionally the review by the Supreme Court of proceedings which 
took place in lower court has, in practice, been utilised as a 
mechanism of control to protect the interests of the accused not to 
be wrongly convicted. 351 
Apart from the above-mentioned statutory powers to review 
proceedings in lower courts, the Supreme Court in South Africa is also 
vested with an inherent review jurisdiction to correct errors occurring 
in proceedings which took place in lower courts. 352 In the case of 
3501n an unreported case, S v Johannes Masekoameng H454/78 of 23 
October 1978, the court of review in fact was of the opinion that 
where a magistrate's action in the court a quo constituted an 
irregularity (in casu the stopping of proceedings during the 
presentation of the prosecution's case and a consequent discharge of 
the accused), the proceedings could not be set aside on review 
because the court of second instance was " not convinced that 
section 24(c) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 is available to the 
State as an aggrieved party". The court observed that the remedies 
available to the prosecution are narrowly circumscribed and should not 
be extended to cases of possible prejudice to the state in the same 
way as irregularities may affect an accused found guilty after an unfair 
trial" (cited by Taitz LLD dissertation Vol 1 343). 
351 1n Prince Albert Board of Management v Jooste and Others 1886 4 
SC 400, De Villiers CJ, although conceding in obiter dicta that 
instances may exist whereupon a court of review may in fact interfere 
at the suit of a prosecutor with the judgment of a magistrate, stated 
that, in practice, review powers on the grounds set out in Ordinance 
40 and 73 (currently section 24 of Act 59 of 1959), had never been 
exercised on application of the prosecution. It would seem as if this 
tradition had been maintained in our law up to present times. 
352Wahlhaus v Additional Magistrate Johannesburg 1959 (3) SA 113 
(A). Cf also Taitz J The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
1985 79. 
, 
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S v Lubisi, 353 the Supreme Court of the Transvaal Provincial Division 
relied on its inherent power "to correct the proceedings of an inferior 
court (sic) at any stage if it appears to be in the interest of 
justice" 354 to set aside an acquittal in a criminal case before a 
magistrate's court. The somewhat complicated facts of this case 
were briefly as follows. 
The accused stood trial in a magistrate's court on a charge of stock 
theft. At the conclusion of the state's case, he indicated that he 
wished to call a witness. The case was subsequently remanded but 
the accused failed to appear on the remand date and was arrested a 
few months later. He appeared before the same magistrate, but the 
case was further postponed. For some unexplained reason, the record 
of the evidence given at the first appearance or trial was mislaid and 
separated from the charge sheet. A new charge sheet was 
accordingly prepared and placed before a new magistrate. This charge 
sheet indicated that the accused had already pleaded not guilty. 
However, a different prosecutor, who was under the impression that 
no evidence had been led before, requested that the charge be 
withdrawn as he had no witnesses available. The presiding magistrate 
pointed out that the accused who had already pleaded, was entitled 
to a verdict and accordingly found him not guilty. When the true facts 
came to light, the magistrate requested the Supreme Court to set aside 
the proceedings and acquittal before him in order that the first 
proceedings may be finally concluded. Le Roux J, delivering judgment 
in review, regarded the proceedings before the second magistrate as 
a nullity which could have been met by a plea of /is alibi pendens and 
concluded that it would "not be in the interest of justice to allow the 
3531980 ( 1) SA 187 (T). 
354 188H. A section 24 review was not applicable as no irregularity in 
terms of this section had taken place. 
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accused to escape the possible consequences of his conduct whether 
through guile or ignorance". 355 The court accordingly set aside the 
acquittal. 
In S v Makrie/356 the Cape Provincial Division strongly disapproved 
of the practice adopted in Lubisi's case, of exercising inherent review 
powers without any notice whatsoever to the accused- and regarded 
this procedure as fundamentally irregular and a breach of the rules of 
natural justice.357 However, no opinion was expressed on the 
question of whether and in what circumstances, the court would have 
the power in the exercise of its inherent review jurisdiction, to set 
aside an acquittal. In S v Makopu358 the Eastern Cape Division, 
assuming that it was vested with such a power, declined to exercise 
inherent review powers to set aside an acquittal in dealing with facts 
similar to those which were present in Lubisi. The accused in that 
case had pleaded not guilty to a charge of housebreaking with intent 
to commit an offence unknown. Another magistrate, not realising that 
the case had partially been heard, refused a postponement and 
acquitted the accused as the state witnesses were not available. 
Considering the acquittal as a gross irregularity, the magistrate 
submitted the matter for review to the Supreme Court. The Supreme 
Court disapproved of the approach adopted by the court in Lubisi. 
Jones J commented as follows359 
While it is correct that the interests of justice include 
355 At 189A-B. 
3561986 (3) 932 (C). 
357 At 933F. 
358 1989 (2) SA 572 (E). 
359At 578b-c. 
, 
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justice to the prosecution as well as the accused, there 
are a number of policy considerations which underlie our 
criminal law which may be raised to support an argument 
that even if the Court has the inherent power to make 
this sort of order, it should not do so. I refer, for 
example, to the policy considerations which require 
certainty and finality in criminal cases or which limit the 
State's right to appeal, or which preclude a second 
prosecution where fresh evidence is found. 
The approach of the Court in Makopu was subsequently approved 
of by the same division in S v Ntswayi. 360 In that case, the 
accused indicted on a charge of dealing in dagga was discharged at 
the end of the state's case because the state had failed to lead 
important evidence in respect of a link in the chain of events regarding 
the analysis of the substance in dispute.361 This failure had arisen 
because of a lack of communication between two prosecutors who 
had handled the case at different times. The court in review, stating 
that this was not a case covered by section 24 of the Supreme Court 
Act, 362 or by any of the statutory mechanisms of review in terms of 
the Criminal Procedure Act, 363 had to consider whether it could 
make use of its inherent powers to correct the error by setting aside 
the discharge and remitting the matter back to the magistrate to hear 
the evidence. The court refused to exercise its inherent review 
powers, stating that such powers could not be used to correct 
mistakes which any of the parties to the matter had made; the court 
was therefore not prepared to give the state a second opportunity to 
correct its mistakes and held the view that the approach adopted in 
360 1991 (2) SACR 397 (C) 402e. 
361 No evidence was led that the sample, which was analysed to 
contain dagga, was connected with the accused. 
36259 of 1959. 
36351 of 1977. 
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Lubisi was, in view of the dicta in that case, confined to the specific 
facts in that case and could not be regarded to be of general 
application in all cases. Tebbutt, J expressed his views in the 
following terms364 
Ek is ook van mening dat die inherente jurisdiksie wat die 
Hooggeregshof. mag he .. nie daar.voor.gebruik kan word 
om foute wat enige party tot 'n geding mag begaan, reg 
te stel nie. Dit is in wese wat hierdie hof nou gevra 
word: Om die Staat die kans te gee om 'n tout wat hy 
gemaak het reg te stel . . . Ek stem saam dat die hof 
inherente jurisdiksie het om, waar dit in die belang van 
geregtigheid is, die verrigtinge van 'n laerhof te korrigeer. 
Dit sluit egter myns insiens nie gevalle in waar die Staat 
in die voorlegging van sy saak fouteer of versuim het om 
'n belangrike of essensiele deel van daardie saak te 
bewys nie, al het die verdediging miskien tot daardie tout 
of versuim bygedra. 365 
It is submitted that the approach adopted by the Cape Provincial 
Division in the above decisions reflects the true state of our law 
regarding the reviewability of acquittals in criminal cases. Any 
assumption based on Lubisi that as a general rule, the Supreme Court 
may resort to its inherent review powers to intervene, inter alia, " in 
regard to criminal cases where the accused had been acquitted, 
despite no recognised irregularity having taken place in the 
proceedings a quo" 366 has therefore been shown to be ill-founded. 
364At 401 g and 402b. 
365My emphasis. 
366This assumption is made by Taitz J The Inherent Jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court 1985 79, hereinafter referred to as Taitz Inherent 
Jurisdiction. 
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6.6.2. 7 Summary 
* In South Africa, the traditional policy and practice has always been 
that an acquittal in a criminal case by a competent court should be 
treated as final and conclusive. It was only in the 1940's that the 
legislature for the first time made provision for a limited right of appeal 
by the prosecution against an acquittal, namely on a point of law only. 
Apart from the introduction in the 1990' s of a prosecution appeal 
against sentence, the legislature has not extended the right of the 
prosecution to appeal against an acquittal by also including the right 
to an appeal purely on the facts. In terms of present legislation, the 
prosecution's right to appeal against acquittals handed down in lower 
as well as superior courts is still limited to questions of law only. 
* Unlike the position in English law, our courts have given a narrow 
meaning to the concept "question of law". The Appellate Division 
recently held in Magmoed that the reasonableness of an acquittal on 
the strength of the evidence cannot be a proper ground for an appeal 
by the prosecution. The court argued that the reasonableness of a 
verdict of not guilty (or even of a verdict of guilty), inherently amounts 
to a question of fact; it deals with the question of whether a factual 
foundation exists for the application of a legal rule. Of importance also 
is that the Appellate Division (in Magmoed) expressed considerable 
concern for the interest of the accused not to be placed in jeopardy of 
a conviction more than once. The court warned that a broad 
interpretation of the concept "question of law" may open the door to 
appeals by the prosecution against acquittals contrary to the traditional 
policy and practice of South African Jaw. 
* The court's reasoning in Magmoed leads this writer to believe that 
the question posed at the end of the prosecution's case, namely 
whether any evidence exists on which a reasonable court may convict, 
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essentially amounts to a question of fact instead of a question of law 
(as recently argued in Molepo). 
* There are a number of differences between the legislative provisions 
which regulate prosecution appeals against acquittals handed down 
in lower courts and prosecution appeals against acquittals handed 
down in superior courts. These differences can be exptained·on the 
basis that the respective provisions (previously contained in different 
pieces of legislation) were interpreted differently by our courts. In sum, 
the differences which have an impact on protection against double 
jeopardy are the following 
The prosecution may appeal from a decision of a lower 
court given in favour of the accused on any question of 
law. Our courts interpret these words as meaning that 
the prosecution may appeal against an acquittal and also 
against a conviction of a lesser offence on the basis that 
the accused should have been convicted of the greater 
offence. In other words, the prosecution may also 
appeal against an implied acquittal. If the appeal 
succeeds, the court may make the order which the lower 
court should have made or remit the matter to the lower 
court with instruction as to which steps should be taken. 
If neither of these options is chosen, the case is returned 
to the lower court which heard the matter in the first 
place. The lower court then has to deal with the matter 
in view of the question of law as decided by the court of 
appeal. The "rehearing" by the trial court is limited to 
the record, except if the court of appeal granted special 
authority to hear new evidence. However, in deciding a 
question of law in favour of the prosecution, the court 
may not order a new trial. 
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The prosecution appeal against an acquittal handed down 
in a superior court on the other hand, is limited to an 
appeal against an absolute acquittal. This means that the 
state may not appeal against conviction of a lesser 
offence (in other words, an implied acquittal of a greater 
offence). The reason for this limitation is that the 
present Criminal Procedure Act specifically provides that, 
in deciding a point of law in favour of the state, the 
Appellate Division may order a new trial. South African 
courts therefore argue that if the legislature empowered 
the Appellate Division to order a new trial, it is most 
unlikely that the legislature intended that the prosecution 
may also appeal against conviction of a lesser offence for 
which the person convicted has perhaps already started 
serving his sentence. 
* In 1990, legislation was enacted which provides for an appeal by 
the prosecution against sentence imposed on the convicted accused 
in superior as well as lower courts. South African courts regard this 
legislation as a drastic measure. The premise is that since the 
imposition of sentence is a matter at the discretion of the trial judge, 
it should only be interfered with by a court of appeal on the grounds 
that it was exercised unreasonably, unjudiciously, improperly, 
irregularly or without a balanced consideration of all the relevant 
factors, facts and circumstances. An indication of the awareness 
(even by the legislature) of the double jeopardy implications of a 
prosecution appeal against sentence, is the fact that it is also provided 
for in the legislation that on application for leave to appeal or on an 
appeal in terms of the Act, the judge or the court (as the case may be) 
may order that the state pay the accused concerned the whole or part 
of the costs which the accused may have incurred in opposing the 
application or appeal. 
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* The Criminal Procedure Act does not provide for a superior court to 
review proceedings of lower courts which have resulted in an 
acquittal of the accused. Section 24 of the Supreme Court Act 
provides for review by the Supreme Court of proceedings conducted 
in lower courts on certain specified grounds. These are: absence of 
jurisdiction of the court; interest in the cause, bias, malice or 
corruption on the part of the presiding judicial officer; gross irregularity 
in the proceedings and the admission of inadmissible or incompetent 
evidence or the rejection of admissible or competent evidence. 
However, South African courts have not as yet exercised their powers 
of review in terms of this section to set aside an acquittal. 
* In Lubisi, the Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court 
held that it has inherent powers of review in terms of which the court 
is also empowered to set aside an acquittal. The court set aside an 
acquittal in that case on the basis that the proceedings in the lower 
court (which resulted in an acquittal) amounted to a nullity. 
* In two subsequent decisions, the Cape Provincial Division of the 
Supreme Court refused to exercise inherent powers of review to set 
aside an acquittal. In both these cases the court argued that on the 
specific facts before it, it would amount to a violation of double 
jeopardy principles to set aside an acquittal. Of importance is that the 
court emphasised that a number of policy considerations require that 
certainty and finality be achieved in criminal cases. The court 
expressed the view that the interests of justice are not served if the 
state is given an opportunity (in a second trial) to correct mistakes 
which it made at the first trial. It is suggested that the line of 
argument adopted in these two decisions has its origins in the 
traditional policy of South African courts, namely that an acquittal in 
a criminal case should be treated as final and conclusive. 
, 
PART FOUR 
REPROSECUTION FOLLOWING AN APPEAL BY THE ACCUSED AND RELATED 
ISSUES 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
7.1 ROMAN LAW 
In chapter five it was indicated that the Romans introduced and 
developed the institution of appeal in the course of the second century 
AD, during the period of the Principate. 1 A consideration of Roman 
texts in that chapter led to the conclusion that in the field of criminal 
law, the institution of appeal mainly served the interests of the person 
who had been convicted. 2 However, it is not altogether clear on 
what basis the accused was allowed to appeal against his conviction. 
Most of the texts compiled in the Digest of Justinian refer only to 
appeals against sentence imposed on the person who had been 
convicted. 3 
1See supra under 5.1 for a discussion of the development of the 
institution of appeal in Roman law. 
2See supra under 5. 1 . However, as pointed out in that discussion it is 
also suggested in certain texts that an accuser could appeal to a 
higher tribunal against an acquittal. 
3See 049.1.6; 49.1.3; 49.1.18; 49.4.1; 49.4.2.3 & 49. 7.1. 
Strachan-Davidson states (at 177-178) that "the main interest of the 
·subject [of appeal] concentrates itself on cases of life and death". He 
explains that the question from the prisoner's point of view was 
whether he could be put to death without the Emperor's consent. 
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There are nonetheless indications that the accused could also appeal 
against his conviction on a basis other than sentence only. In the 
Codex of Justinian it is recorded that the Emperors Constantius and 
Constans stipulated that4 
justice requires that where witnesses have been called, 
instruments produced; and-other.evidence o.ffered, and a 
judgment has been rendered against the culprit and the 
latter does not confess his guilt, or, terrified by fear of 
torture, states anything against himself, he shall not be 
denied the right of appeal. 
The Roman-Dutch writer Voet explains these orders in terms which 
suggest that the accused was also allowed to appeal on the factual 
merits of a case in Roman law. He states5 
In the absence of an admission from the accused himself, 
and if you assume a persistent denial on his part, there 
still remains a question of fact, namely whether he who 
denies that he is guilty is guilty. Even the wisest of men 
can generally be deceived in the interpretation of facts, 
and can pronounce one guilty who is really innocent. It 
was therefore just for the remedy of appeal to lie open 
against such a burden imposed by the judge. 
Moreover, an order issued by the Emperors Theodosius, Arcadius and 
Honorius suggests that a person was allowed to appeal from "any 
injurious decision" rendered against him by a judge "whom he regards 
as suspicious"; 6 words which may be construed as providing a 
4See Codex 7.65.2. (Scott's translation.) 
5See Voet 49.1.9. (Gane's translation). The author relies upon 
DXXll.6.2. 
6See Codex 7.62.30. (Scott's translation). 
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ground of appeal7 based on malice or prejudice of the presiding 
officer. 
The question of whether a higher tribunal was empowered to order 
a retrial of the accused before the same or a different tribunal is not 
addressed in commentaries on Roman law. This may be explained on 
the basis that the institution of appeal in Roman law probably 
amounted to a trial de novo which rendered the ordering of a retrial by 
an appellate tribunal unnecessary. 8 
7.2 ROMAN-DUTCH LAW 
The principle that emerges from Roman-Dutch authorities on criminal 
procedure is that the accused could only appeal against sentence 
imposed in the ordinary process.9 However, Van der Linden adds that 
the accused could also appeal against sentence handed down in the 
extraordinary process in the following circumstances 10 
(a) when he was convicted on no confession or at 
least not a sufficient confession 
7 A matter could also be taken on review in Roman law. However, 
unlike the appeal which was instituted to a superior court, the same 
judge that gave the judgment or his successor in office again acted as 
judge on review. An investigator of the sacred palace was however 
"attached" to the prefect of the praetorium who gave the judgment so 
that they might rehear the case together. Their decision was final. 
See Voet 49.2.4. 
8See Codex 7.62.6 (sections 1 and 2) and Codex 7.63.4. 
9See Van der Linden 3.2.5.4 (Henry's translation) and Decker Van 
leeuwen's Commentaries 5.25.14, 5.27.13 & 5.27.19. See also 
chapter five supra note 28 for an explanation of the difference 
between the ordinary and extraordinary process of criminal procedure 
applied in Roman-Dutch law. 
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{b) when there was a manifest nullity in the 
proceedings or 
(c) when the punishment was too severe and out of 
proportion to the crime. 
It is not clear from the commentaries of Voet whether an accused (as 
opposed to an accuser) was allowed to appeal on any other basis than 
sentence. 11 His writings may perhaps also be interpreted in the 
sense that the accused was allowed to appeal on the basis of non-
culpability for the crime charged and convicted. The author makes 
the general statement that "an accused just as much as an accuser is 
allowed to appeal from a conviction [handed down in the ordinary 
process]". 12 He then explains that the public prosecutor may 
nevertheless appeal against sentence handed down in the 
extraordinary process "if he considers that the punishment ordained 
by the decision is not quite appropriate to the wrongdoing". 13 
According to Voet, an appeal by the prosecutor against sentence 
handed down in the extraordinary process would have the following 
effect14 
[T]he extraordinary criminal suit is converted thereupon 
into an ordinary suit, and ... everything must thereafter 
be debated with due regard to the established order of 
judicial proceedings. There is also the effect that liberty 
of appealing is then open in turn to the very man 
11 As indicated in chapter five supra under 5.2 the accuser could 
apparently only appeal against sentence. 
12Voet 49. 1 . 1 0. (Gane' s translation). 
14/d. However, Voet notes than an appeal from a punishment made 
more severe by the Court of Holland has sometimes been dismissed 
by the Supreme Court when it was clear to the court that the accused 
had confessed. 
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convicted also, whether he thinks himself aggrieved by 
that same decision from which the prosecutor has 
appealed, or he has afterwards been sentenced by a 
judge of appeal to a harsher penalty, and wishes to 
appeal from such a sharpening of his punishment. 
The issue of whether the accused could be tried again on appellate 
reversal of a conviction is also not addressed by Roman-Dutch 
authorities. Similar to the position in Roman law, the hearing on 
appeal probably also amounted to a trial de novo. 15 
A number of Roman-Dutch writers suggest that the exceptio rei 
judicatae could not succeed unless based on a final judgment on the 
merits. 16 Writings to this effect have already been discussed in 
previous chapters and need not be repeated here. 17 Suffice it to say 
that the South African Appeal Court relied inter alia on these 
authorities in order to sanction reprosecution after an appellate 
reversal of a conviction on a basis other than the factual merits of the 
case. 18 
15See Voet 49.7.2. The author states that "in appeals what has not 
been proved can be proved, and conclusions not drawn can be 
drawn". (Gane's translation.) 
16See a discussion of the writings of Van der Keessel (chapter two 
supra under 2.2) which suggest that the accused could be tried again 
if discharged on the basis that there had been some contravention of 
a matter which relates to the procedure, and Carpzovius (chapter three 
supra under 3.6.2, text at note 281) which suggest that the accused 
could only rely on the plea if previously declared not guilty and not 
merely if he had been discharged as a result of a technical defect in 
the proceedings. 
17See id. 
18See S v Moodie ( 1962) SA 587 (A). See chapter eight infra under 
8.6.2. text at note 363 for a detailed discussion of that case. 
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7.3 ENGLISH LAW 
It was pointed out in chapter five that certain commentators on the 
law which prevailed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
implied that the crown could, in limited circumstances, bring a writ of 
error to a Court of Error in order to effect a reversal of a judgment of 
acquittal. 19 Apparently an accused whose acquittal had been 
reversed by a Court of Error, could be tried again in a new trial during 
this period.20 Be that as it may, no provision was made in legislation 
enacted at the beginning of the twentieth century for a prosecution 
appeal against an acquittal handed down in a trial on indictment. 21 • 
Therefore, the question of whether a higher tribunal could order a trial 
de novo after reversal of an acquittal handed down in a trial on 
indictment became insignificant. 
The permissibility of a new trial after reversal by a higher tribunal of 
19See chapter five supra under 5.3 for the circumstances in which the 
Court of Error could in the opinions of these writers, reverse an 
acquittal. 
20 Although the writings of Blackstone 1829 ed 361 indicate that such 
a procedure did not exist in practice ("But there hath yet been no 
instance of granting a new trial where the person was acquitted on the 
first") Chitty 756 states that "[i]f indeed, the reversal proceeded 
expressly on the ground that there was a technical error in the original 
indictment, or subsequent process, the defendant remains liable to a 
second prosecution .... his life has never been in jeopardy ... even in 
his conviction or acquittal". Hawkins 528 states that "I take it to be 
settled at this day that whenever the indictment, or appeal, whereon 
a man is acquitted, is so far erroneous either for want of substance in 
setting out the crime, or of authority in the judge before whom it was 
taken ... the acquittal can be no bar to a subsequent indictment or 
appeal ... ". Hale 247 seems to hold the view that unless the judgment 
was reversed by writ or error, the prisoner could not be indicted de 
novo and could plead autrefois acquit. 
21 The Criminal Appeal Act of 1907 only provided for an appeal against 
a conviction. 
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a conviction on the other hand, became one of the most vexatious 
issues in English criminal procedure. In order to throw some light on 
the development of English as well as South African law in this regard, 
it is necessary to give a detailed account of the history of this 
particular aspect of English criminal procedure. 
Unlike the rather uncertain position regarding the appealability of 
acquittals handed down in trials on indictment in eighteenth and 
nineteenth century English criminal procedure, legal commentators 
state categorically that an initial conviction handed down in a trial on 
indictment could be challenged by the defendant, albeit on legal 
grounds only. 22 Not only were there several recognised methods 
22However, a defendant convicted in summary proceedings could, from 
as early as 1670 (in terms of the individual Act creating the offence) 
appeal on the merits to the Court of Quarter Sessions. In 1879 
provision was made in terms of the Summary Jurisdiction Act of that 
year for a general right of appeal against conviction entered in courts 
of summary jurisdiction. Of importance is that the proceedings on 
appeal amounted to a rehearing of the whole case (a trial de nova). 
Neither the respondent nor the appellant was confined to the evidence 
given in the magistrate's court. See R v Hale 1 891 1 QB 7 4 7 and 
Friedland 263-264. Baker 271 explains how it came about that a full 
appeal on the merits was accorded the accused in summary 
proceedings. The foundation of review of summary convictions was 
the ability to remove records from inferior courts to the King's Bench 
by means of the remedy known as certiorari. These convictions were 
quashed if patent defects were found. However, the King's Bench 
could not re-examine the merits of the conviction and the procedure 
did not necessitate the presence of the accused. Some thought that 
the work of the King's Bench undermined the authority of the justices. 
Therefore provision was made for an appeal to quarter sessions by 
way of a rehearing of the whole matter. According to Baker, this gave 
the accused a better chance of making his point and saved the 
justices' faces by keeping the matter within the county. See also 
chapter five note 34 for a discussion of section 33 of the Summary 
Jurisdiction Act 1879 which provided for a right of appeal on a point 
of law to a superior court by means of the case stated procedure. A 
superior court could, in terms of the Summary Jurisdiction Act of 
1857 reverse, affirm or amend the judgment, remit the matter to the 
justices with the court's opinion thereon or make such an order as the 
460 
whereby a conviction could be reversed, but a second proceeding in 
the sense of a trial de novo, was also a recognised practice.23 
The most important method of challenging a conviction was by 
means of the writ of error procedure to a Court of Error. The 
discussion that follows will show that the Court of Error was only 
prepared to order new trials in certain defined circumstances. Despite 
more comprehensive legislation introduced in 1907, this practice 
continued during the better part of the twentieth century. 
As indicated in chapter five, the writ of error as a remedy for 
reversing convictions was not very useful because it was available 
only for errors which appeared on the face of the record. 24 Mistakes 
such as the improper reception or rejection of evidence or 
misdirections on the law by the judge to the jury did not appear on the 
record. Whereas the Court of Error had no discretion in the matter, 
court might seem fit. Although the court sent back cases to the 
justices to rehear matters, retrials were apparently not ordered by a 
superior court (see Friedland 263-267 who expresses the view that 
the possibility of second trials was apparently not of great 
significance because the court would normally confirm the conviction, 
in spite of error, if the conviction appeared to be correct). 
23Blackstone 1829 ed 392 explicitly states that "when judgment 
pronounced upon conviction is falsified or reversed, all former 
proceedings are absolutely set aside and the party stands as if he had 
never been at all accused . . . But he still remains liable to another 
prosecution for the same offence; for, the first being erroneous, he 
never was in jeopardy thereby". Archbold 1900 ed 159 states that 
"[a] plea of autrefois convict, which shows that the judgment on the 
former indictment has been reversed for error in the judgment is not 
a good bar to another indictment for the same offence". See also 
Chitty 756 and sources to the same effect cited by Friedland 240-241 
and Goodhart AL "Acquitting the guilty" Law Quarterly Review Vol 70 
1954 515, 522 (hereinafter referred to as Goodhart Acquitting the 
quilty). 
24See supra under 5. 3. 
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the anomalous situation existed that the court could reverse a 
conviction as the result of a minor procedural error which occurred at 
the trial, and order a retrial of the defendant, but could not reverse a 
conviction as a result of a serious error if it did not appear on the 
record of the proceedings. 25 
As will become clear from the discussion that follows, the Court of 
Criminal Appeal (established at the beginning of the twentieth century) 
continued to follow this practice. Furthermore, it held that a retrial 
could be ordered only if the first trial amounted to a mistrial or a 
nullity.26 Friedland criticised this position. He remarked that27 
there was no intrinsic limitation in the use of the venire de 
novo, 28 only limitations imposed by the type of error which 
could appear on the record. It was not a rule of law that the 
venire de nova was limited to cases where the trial was a 
nullity. Whenever a writ of error was brought successfully, the 
Court of Error, according to the later cases, could award a 
venire de nova. Hence if the bill of exceptions had been 
incorporated into the criminal procedure, there seems little 
doubt that a new trial (or, as it was called when ordered by a 
Court of Error, a venire de nova) would have been ordered. 
25See Friedland 238-239. At 244-245 the author points out that the 
reason why a retrial could not be had on the basis of misreception of 
evidence or misdirection by the trial judge was simply because the Bill 
of Exceptions never took root in the criminal law. In civil law, if a 
party took exception to a ruling, the party would write down the 
alleged error or exception on a bill which, according to a statute of 
1285, had to be included in the record of the proceedings. This 
procedure was never adopted in criminal law. 
26The criterion was first introduced by the Court of Criminal Appeal in 
Crane v Director of Public Prosecutions 1921 [AC) 299. 
27 At 247. 
28Abbreviation of the writ of venire facias de nova juratores, namely 
an order to summon and swear a fresh jury to retry the case. 
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Nevertheless, at the time when the previous informal body known 
as the Court of Crown Cases Reserved29 was placed on a statutory 
basis, 30 a person who had been convicted was no longer forced to 
approach a Court of Error but could reserve a point of law to that 
court which was empowered inter alia, to reverse his conviction. The 
relevant section in the Act provided that when a question was so 
reserved31 
the said Justices and Barons shall thereupon have full 
power and authority to hear and finally determine the 
said question or questions, and thereupon to reverse, 
affirm, or amend any judgment which shall have been 
given on the indictment or inquisition on the trial whereof 
such question or questions have arisen, or to avoid such 
judgment, and to order an entry to be made on the 
record, that in the judgment of the said Justices and 
Barons the party convicted ought not to have been 
convicted, or to arrest the judgment, or order judgment 
to be given thereon at some other session of oyer and 
terminer or gaol delivery, or other sessions of the peace, 
if no judgment shall have been before that time give, as 
they shall be advised, or to make such other order as 
justice require .... 
As is evident from the wording of the section, the court was not 
explicitly granted the power to order a retrial of the accused.32 
Although the words "or to make such other order as justice may 
require" could easily have been interpreted by the court as 
29See supra chapter five under 5. 3 for a discussion of the development 
of this informal body into a court of law in English law. 
301n terms of the Crown Cases Act 1848. 
31 Section 2 of the Crown Cases Act 1848. 
32However, if the court arrested the judgment in terms of this section, 
it was held that the accused could be reindicted. See Friedland 251 
citing the cases of Reid ( 1851 ) 2 Den 88 1 69 ER 429 and Moss 
( 1856) Dears & Bell 104, 169 ER 936. 
463 
manifesting a legislative intention to confer a power to order a retrial 
in the event of reversal of a conviction as a result of an error of law or 
irregularity at the first trial, the court did not give such a wide 
interpretation to these words. Opting for a "compromise solution" 33 
the court held that, in terms of the section, a venire de nova could be 
ordered only if a Court of Error could in the same circumstances order 
a venire de nova. The result of this approach was that the court laid 
down the rule that a venire de novo could only be ordered if the trial 
could be described as a so-called "mistrial" .34 However, the concept 
of a mistrial was not clearly explained by the court. 
In 1907, the writ of error procedure was abolished and all functions 
of the Court for Crown Cases Reserved vested in the Court of Criminal 
Appeal. 35 As pointed out in chapter five the Act provided for an 
appeal by the accused on matters of law as well as on the factual 
merits of a case.36 In order to understand why the Court of Appeal 
still continued to apply the mistrial criterion in order to determine 
whether it could order a retrial, it is necessary to set out in detail 
certain provisions of the 1907 Act. 
In terms of section 4( 1) of the Act the Court of Criminal Appeal was 
empowered to 
allow the appeal if they think that the verdict of the jury should 
be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable or cannot be 
33Friedland 253. 
34See R v Mellor (1858) Dears & B 468 and R v Yeadon (1861) L & 
CCC 81 discussed in detail at a later stage by Lord Atkinson in Crane 
v Director of Public Prosecutions supra 325-329. 
351n terms of section 20(4) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1907. 
36See supra under 5. 3. 
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supported having regard to the evidence, or that the judgment 
of the court before whom the appellant was convicted should 
be set aside on the ground of a wrong decision on any question 
of law or that on any ground there was a miscarriage of justice, 
and in any other case shall dismiss the appeal, provided that the 
court may, notwithstanding that they are of the opinion that the 
point raised in the appeal might be decided in favour of the 
appellant, dismiss the appeal if they consider that no substantial 
miscarriage of justice has actually occurred. 37 
Section 4(2) provided that 
subject to the special prov1s1ons of this Act, the Court of 
Criminal Appeal shall, if they allow an appeal against conviction, 
quash the conviction and direct a judgment of acquittal to be 
entered. 
Section 20(4) vested in the court 
all jurisdiction and authority under the Crown Cases Act, 1848, 
in relation to questions of law arising in criminal trials ... 
No specific provision was made in the Act for the ordering by the 
court of a retrial of the accused. In fact, the Act seemed to exclude 
such a power; on reversal of conviction, a judgment of acquittal had 
to be entered. 38 Friedland39 expresses the view that the absence 
of such a provision could be ascribed to a legislative intent, manifested 
37My emphasis. This qualification will hereinafter be referred to as 
"the proviso" . 
38See section 4(2) discussed above. 
39 At 233-236. 
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in all the abovementioned provisions, to confer wide powers on the 
Court of Criminal Appeal to reconsider the merits of a case and make 
its own determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.40 
However, from its inception the court was reluctant to retry the case 
or to substitute itself for the jury. At first it refused to reconsider 
cases where the defendant argued, in the absence of any failure of 
due process, that his conviction was wrong because of his 
innocence.41 Concerning itself exclusively with appeals based on 
the failure of due process of law, the court usually quashed the 
conviction without consideration of the guilt or innocence of the 
accused. Also, the application of the proviso which empowered the 
court to "dismiss the appeal if they consider that no miscarriage of 
justice has actually occurred" hardly ever led to a conviction; the 
court interpreted it to mean that a conviction could only be upheld 
"where a reasonable jury, after being properly directed, would on the 
evidence properly admitted, without doubt convict" .42 
40Spencer JR "Criminal Law and Criminal Appeals - The tail that wags 
the Dog" Criminal Law Review 1982 260, 263-264, expresses the 
opinion that, subject to the provision that the court could uphold the 
conviction if it thought that the appellant was guilty notwithstanding, 
the court had to quash a conviction if a miscarriage of justice occurred 
in the sense that the accused was not guilty, or if the appellant failed 
to get due process of law. The author argues that the court was 
supposed to investigate the merits of the case even if a failure of due 
process was the basis of the defendant's appeal. In his view, if the 
new court was not meant to examine the merits, but merely to quash 
the conviction when the defendant was deprived of due process, (as 
were the powers of its predecessors), Parliament would explicitly have 
provided for a mechanism to order a retrial. 
41 See Spencer 264. The author points out that the court had to make 
an exception where the defendant could produce fresh evidence of his 
innocence, because the Act conferred a power on the court to hear 
fresh evidence (in terms of section 9). 
42See Spencer 265 citing from the case of Stir/and v OPP [ 1944] AC 
315, 321. 
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In order to solve the court's dilemma of entering an acquittal in all 
cases where a conviction has been reversed as a result of an error 
(and it was, perhaps, convinced of the guilt of the accused but 
reluctant to apply the proviso), the court effected a retrial by utilising 
the provision contained in section 20(4) of the Act.43 As pointed 
out above44 section 20(4) stipulated that all jurisdiction and authority 
under the Crown Cases Act 1848, in relation to questions of law 
arising in criminal trials, now vested in the Court of Criminal Appeal. 
In Crane v Director of Public Prosecutions,45 the House of Lords held 
that since the Court for Crown Cases Reserved considered itself 
empowered to order a venire de novo when setting aside a conviction 
on the basis of the first trial being a mistrial, the Court of Criminal 
Appeal, in terms of section 20(4), could exercise the same power in 
cases in which the procedure of a case stated had been followed. 46 
Although the court in Crane did not elaborate on the concept 
mistrial, the general approach seems to have been that it denoted a 
trial which could, as a result of the alleged failure of due process, be 
regarded as void ab initio47 in the sense that the accused had as a 
result of the error never been in peril of a conviction at the first trial, 
or that "no trial at all occurred"48 in the sense that the trial could be 
described as a nullity. Following the practice adopted by the Court of 
Error, the Court of Criminal Appeal was not prepared to regard 
43See supra text at note 38. 
44/d. 
45Supra. 
46See the judgments of Lord Atkinson 325-330, Lord Summer 330-335 
and Lord Parmoor 335-338. 
47See the judgment of Lord Parmoor 336. 
48Per Lord Atkinson at 330 of the judgment. 
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misdirection to the jury or misreception of evidence (errors which 
would not have been patent from the record of proceedings in the time 
of a Court of Error), as irregularities which tainted the trial to such an 
extent that it could be described as an irregularity which rendered the 
trial a nullity. Accordingly, the court refrained from ordering a 
rehearing by the trial court or a retrial in such cases. 49 Moreover, 
the court refrained from laying down specific guidelines to determine 
whether a trial amounted to a mistrial or a nullity.50 Instead, it 
identified certain procedural irregularities as causing a mistrial on an ad 
hoc basis. 51 
The court's approach, which unfortunately seems to have involved 
a degree of arbitrariness, was subjected to severe criticism by legal 
commentators. The main objection was that the legislation as 
interpreted by the Court of Criminal Appeal was unjust and 
unsatisfactory inasmuch as the ordering of a retrial after acquittal was 
49See Neal [1949] 2 KB 590, 599 cited by Friedland 237 note 3. 
5
°Cooke RB "Venire de Novo" Law Quarterly ReviewVol 71 1955 100, 
128 states that "[t]he authorities in their present state seem to provide 
no touchstone for determining when a irregularity is so serious as to 
cause a mistrial". 
51 Cooke identifies seven categories of irregularities on the basis of 
which the court had been prepared to declare a mistrial. These are: 
where there was an error as to the true plea of the defendant or some 
doubt about the nature of his plea, whether guilty or not guilty; where 
there was misjoinder of defendants (Crane v Director of Public 
Prosecutions supra); where there was failure to take the verdict of the 
jury on a change of plea from not guilty to guilty (Hancock ( 1931) 23 
Cr App R 1 6); where there was some irregularity in the committal 
proceedings (Gee [ 1936] 2 KB 442); where there was impersonation 
of a juror (Wakefield [1918] 1 KB 216); where there was denial of the 
right to challenge a juror (Williams ( 1925) 19 Cr App R 67) and where 
the judge was unqualified to act as such. In .1982 the Court of Appeal 
in Rose [ 19821 1 WLR 614 (CA) identified an eighth category, namely, 
where the verdict of the jury was so ambiguous or ill-expressed that 
no judgment could properly be given on it. 
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made dependent on whether the court regarded the failure of due 
process as one which rendered the trial a "mistrial", and not on 
whether it would be in the interest of justice to order a retrial. 
Goodhart52 points out that the effect of the application of the 
mistrial-criterion was that many persons whose convictions had been 
reversed by the Court of Appeal would have been unjustly acquitted 
as a result of an error of law which occurred at the- first· trial. The 
learned author explains this unsatisfactory state of affairs as 
follows53 
If the error is too great, it may make the trial no trial at all 
and so enable a venire de novo to be awarded; if the 
error is too small, the conviction may be sustained by the 
application of the proviso ...... only if it is just right will 
the prisoner get a verdict o·f acquittal in place of a new 
trial or a conviction. 
Spencer on the other hand points out that although the concept 
mistrial ostensibly amounts to the occurrence of a procedural error so 
severe that it makes the proceedings a nullity from the start rather 
than something which is valid for the present but liable to be set aside 
if challenged, the practice seemed to have been exactly the 
opposite:54 things were held to be the cause of a mistrial if what 
52Goodhart AL "R v Leckey" Law Quarterly Review 1944 Vol 60 33. 
53 At 36. In a research done by Goodhart at a later stage (See Goodhart 
Acquitting the guilty), it was found that a considerable number of 
convictions were quashed because some evidence, regarded as 
essential by the prosecution, had been improperly introduced or that 
there had been misdirections to juries. This state of affairs obliged the 
author to conclude that "the administration of justice is not a game 
and it would occasionally be in the public interest that an accused 
person should have to undergo two trials before a verdict is properly 
reached, rather than that a guilty man, whose guilt or innocence has 
never been properly ascertained, should go free" (at 526). 
54Supra 1 67. 
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went wrong was "so preposterously technical, that it would be 
outrageous to let the accused free". 55 A retrial was accordingly 
ordered in such cases - a clear example, in my view, that the history 
of the criminal appeal in English law has often been based on 
procedure rather than merit. 
Despite these valid objections to the continuation of an archaic and 
anomalous procedure and the general feeling that the court should be 
granted a general discretion in awarding new trials a Departmental 
Committee, appointed in 1952 to consider whether the Court of 
Criminal Appeal should be empowered to order a new trial of a 
convicted person who has appealed to the court, declined to make 
such a recommendation. 56 The opponents of a power conferring on 
the court a general discretion to order a retrial argued that the accused 
ought not to be prejudiced by judicial errors and that such a general 
power would make an inroad into the present rights of the accused not 
to be put in double jeopardy. 57 In an informative assessment of 
these arguments, Nokes pointed out that this humane consideration to 
spare the accused the anxiety and possible expense of a second trial 
has, in practice, already given way to superior claims of the 
administration of justice: the accused may be convicted in a second 
proceeding when a jury disagrees58 or when a venire de nova is 
56See Goodhart Acquitting the guilty 514-526 for a critical analysis of 
the reasons advanced by the Department to maintain the status quo 
in respect of the ordering of retrials by the Court of Appeal. 
57See Nokes GD "The Criminal Appeal Act 1964" Criminal Law Review 
1964 565, 566-567. 
58As indicated in chapter three supra (under 3.2.2) a second 
proceeding may be instituted against the accused if the jury disagreed 
on the verdict in the trial court. See also Baker 300 for a discussion 
of the development of this practice in English law. 
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ordered on the basis that the first trial amounted to a nullity. 
However, the Departmental Committee recommended that the Court 
of Appeal may order a new trial when fresh evidenceis admitted on 
appeal. 59 Nevertheless, as the proportion of criminal appeals where 
fresh evidence is sought to be adduced has always been small, it was 
envisaged that the new provision would have very little operation but 
" may pave the way for more extensive legislation on new trials" .60 
The venire de nova procedure nevertheless remained the only avenue 
of effecting a retrial (in the absence of fresh evidence being introduced 
in the Court of Appeal) for another two decades. During this period 
legal commentators continued to criticise the illogical limits of the 
procedure. 
Spencer, in a "jaundiced bird's eye view" 61 of the English system 
of criminal appeals referred to a number of decisions where the Court 
of Appeal, in order to avoid quashing a conviction, held that an alleged 
misdirection by the trial judge was in fact legally sound.62 In other 
words, cases in which misdirections were given, in his view obtained 
"retrospective validity to the subsequent confusion of the law". 63 
59Section 1 ( 1) of the Criminal Appeal Act of 1964 provided that 
" [ w]here an appeal against conviction is allowed by the Court of 
Criminal Appeal by reason only of evidence received or available to be 
received by that court under section 9 of the Criminal Appeal Act 
1907 and it appears to the Court that the interest of justice so 
requires, the Court may, instead of directing the entry of a judgment 
and verdict of acquittal as required by section 4(2) of that Act, order 
the appellant to be retried." 
60Nokes 572. 
61 Spencer 261. 
62/d. 
63At 268. 
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Samuels expressed the view that the absence of a general power to 
order a retrial meant that every convicted person had an incentive not 
to appeal on the merits, but on some technical defect in the procedure, 
in the hope that it would lead to a quashing.64 He suggested that 
where the court would not be prepared to quash but would rather 
apply the proviso, 65 a retrial should instead be ordered " if there is 
any reason to think that in a properly conducted trial there might be a 
conviction". 66 The author's views seems to have been that the 
interest of the accused would be better served if a retrial is ordered 
rather than that the appeal is dismissed in terms of the proviso. 
These criticisms most probably led to the eventual introduction in 
1988 of more extensive legislation. The reforms introduced in this 
legislation are considered in detail in chapter eight. 
64Samuels JP "Appeal Against Conviction: Reform" Criminal Law 
Review 1984 337, 342-343. 
65For the proviso see section 4( 1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1 907 
discussed supra, text at note 37. 
66At 343. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
NEW TRIALS - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CURRENT LAW 
8. 1 INTRODUCTION . 
It is generally recognised that an unreversed verdict of a conviction is 
protected against further state action: if a conviction becomes final 
because an accused chooses not to appeal, or if it becomes final after 
the accused's appeal has failed, the state is prohibited from instituting 
further proceedings for the same offence. 
The issue addressed in this chapter is whether the state may 
institute new proceedings 1 against the accused if the accused has 
succeeded in having his conviction reversed on appeal. The question 
posed is whether the guarantee against double jeopardy necessarily 
implies that an accused who succeeds in having his conviction 
reversed, has been finally acquitted by the court of appeal and 
therefore protected against further state-initiated proceedings. The 
answer to this question should furnish the answer to a further 
question, namely whether a new trial may be justified in certain 
instances. If the answer to the latter question is in the affirmative, it 
becomes essential to investigate the grounds on which the conviction 
was set aside in order to determine precisely what type of appellate 
reversal may lead to a new trial. 
As indicated in the historical overview in chapter seven, English 
1The institution of new proceedings is referred to either as a "trial de 
nova", a "new trial" or a "retrial". In other words, these terms are 
interchangeable. 
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courts regarded the ordering of new trials as an exceptional rather 
than a general practice. At present, the approach in all the legal 
systems considered in this chapter is that new trials on appellate 
reversal of a conviction do not per se offend the rule against double 
jeopardy; it must simply be determined on what grounds the 
conviction was set aside. If the conviction was set aside on the basis 
of insufficient evidence, the general premise is that the double 
jeopardy principle prohibits a new trial. The underlying theory as 
revealed by a study of the case law is that the guarantee against 
double jeopardy requires the state to bring all its evidence against the 
accused in the first trial. Therefore, new trials should not to be 
ordered to enable the prosecution to cure deficiencies in its case by 
bringing additional evidence which it failed to produce at the first trial. 
However, reversals based on procedural errors and irregularities have 
not attained the same status of finality. In all the legal systems under 
consideration in this chapter new trials are, in principle, allowed if a 
conviction is reversed on the basis of procedural error. Justification 
for new trials in these instances seems to be that the proper 
administration of justice requires that the accused should not escape 
justice on a mere technicality. Where an accused has been proven 
guilty beyond reasonable doubt but complains only that an error has 
been committed at the trial which may have influenced the result, it is 
not unfair to have a new trial to re-determine the guilt or innocence of 
the accused. A second error-free trial is allowed because it serves the 
interests both of the state and the accused in the proper administration 
of justice. Therefore, the permissibility of new trials in these cases is 
explained not so much in terms of abstract theories of double 
jeopardy, as in terms of policy considerations. 
The distinction between procedural error and insufficient evidence 
offers an apparently simple solution to the problem of the permissibility 
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of new trials. However, the classification of the United States 
Supreme Court of erroneous admission of state evidence as one of trial 
error as opposed to insufficiency of evidence, demonstrates that a 
distinction on this basis does not always "[honor the notion] that the 
State should be given one fair opportunity to offer whatever proof [it 
can assemble]" .2 Moreover, it is doubtful whether new trials serve 
due process values in general if errors had occurred· at a trial which 
may be viewed as serious violations of fundamental human rights. 
Although courts of appeal in Canada and England have expressed 
concern for the accused's right to a fair trial in this regard, a general 
tendency in favour of permanent stay of proceedings on this basis 
(infringement of the accused's right to a fair trial) is not reflected in 
the case law. 
A number of related issues are also considered in this chapter. One 
of these is whether an appeal by way of trial de nova violates the 
double jeopardy principle. An appeal by way of trial de nova in actual 
fact amounts to a new trial before an appellate tribunal. This means 
that the subject matter of the appeal is not confined to the record of 
the proceedings in the trial court; in an appeal by way of trial de nova 
both the accused and the state may bring additional evidence not 
considered in the trial court. Legal systems which provide for these 
kind of appeals are India, and in exceptional cases, Canada. The 
Indian Supreme Court does not regard the production of fresh 
prosecution evidence on appeal per seas a violation of the accused's 
right against double jeopardy. The Canadian Supreme Court indicated 
that such a procedure may be viewed as a new trial disguised as an 
appeal; the court expressed the point of view that the appeal by way 
2Per Mr Justice Marshall who delivered the minority opinion in the 
United States Supreme Court decision Lockhart v Nelson 109 SC 285 
(1988) 293. 
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of trial de nova may be viewed as giving the state a second 
(undeserved) opportunity to procure a conviction. 
Further issues which may involve the rule against double jeopardy are 
whether the court may, on appeal or on retrial, substitute the 
conviction appealed against for a conviction of a more serious offence 
of which the accused had previously been acquitted (explicitly or 
implicitly) or impose a more severe sentence than the sentence which 
had been imposed at trial. In the majority of legal systems namely, 
English, Canadian, Indian and American law, the substitution of a 
conviction for a conviction of a more serious offence is not allowed. 3 
The basic premise is that a conviction of a lesser offence should be 
regarded as an acquittal of a greater offence. In South African law, 
legislation provides that courts of appeal may substitute convictions 
appealed against for convictions of more serious offences. As will be 
discussed below, the Appellate Division of the South African Supreme 
Court recently criticised this legislation on the basis that it violates the 
principle recognised by our courts that an acquittal ought not to be 
disturbed. However, the particular legislation has not as yet been 
challenged on constitutional grounds. 
Different approaches are followed regarding the imposition of a more 
severe sentence on appeal. Although this is not allowed in English 
and Indian law (if the accused appealed and the prosecution did not 
also file an appeal),4 it is not per se regarded as unconstitutional in 
31t is, however, uncertain whether courts of appeal in the English legal 
system may substitute a conviction for a conviction of a more serious 
offence if the accused appealed against a conviction handed down in 
a summary proceeding as opposed to a conviction handed down in a 
trial on indictment. 
4However, an English court disposing of an appeal against a decision 
handed down in summary proceedings may impose a higher sentence 
than that imposed by the magistrate's court. 
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American and Canadian law. The Supreme Court of the United States 
has nevertheless held that the imposition of a more severe sentence 
on appeal or retrial may be regarded as unconstitutional in certain 
instances. The court ruled, for instance that if the particular 
sentencing proceeding followed by the trial court resembled a trial in 
the sense that it amounted to an adjudication of the guilt or innocence 
of an accused in relation to a particular sentence, the double jeopardy 
clause of the Constitution of the United States prohibits the imposition 
of a more severe sentence on appeal or retrial. The court argued that 
if such a comprehensive sentencing proceeding took place, it may be 
said that the accused had been acquitted (albeit impliedly) of the more 
severe sentence (or sentences) that the court could have imposed. 
The constitutionality of the imposition of a more severe sentence on 
appeal (brought by the accused) or on retrial of an accused upon 
appellate reversal of his conviction, has also recently been considered 
by a South African court. As will be indicated below, the particular 
division of the Supreme Court rejected outright the submission that 
legislation which provides for imposition of a more severe sentence on 
appeal by the accused is unconstitutional; the court refused to refer 
the matter to the Constitutional Court for consideration, arguing that 
there is no merit in the contention that legislation which provides for 
the increase of sentence on appeal if only the accused appealed (in 
other words, in the absence of an appeal by the state), may be 
regarded as unconstitutional. The court inter alia, relied on a waiver 
theory (namely that by appealing, the accused re-opened the case and 
could consequently not complain). Only time will tell whether this 
particular aspect of double jeopardy will be considered in future by the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa. 
The issues identified above are all considered in detail on a 
comparative basis in the paragraphs that follow. 
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8.2 ENGLISH LAW 
8.2. 1 General 
It was indicated in chapter seven (the historical overview) that the 
English legislature never vested the first Court of Criminal Appeal with 
a power to order new trials. In order to effect de nova proceedings, 
the court had to revert to the common law procedure known as venire 
de nova. The arbitrariness inherent in this procedure eventually 
resulted in the introduction of statutory powers to order new trials; 
initially in fresh evidence cases only and subsequently (in 1988) in all 
cases if "it appears to the court of appeal that the interests of justice 
so require" . 5 However, no guidance was given in the provision as to 
whether it was intended to serve the interests of the accused rather 
than that of the state or vice versa. Moreover, the Court of Appeal 
failed to give proper consideration to the concept "interests of justice". 
Instead of formulating a clear policy in this regard, the court adopted 
a narrow approach which focused on the issue of whether there could 
be doubt that the jury would in any case have convicted if the 
irregularity or error relied on by the appellant had not occurred at the 
original trial. 
In cases arising from appeals against decisions handed down in 
lower courts, there are indications that a court of appeal should, in 
deciding upon the appropriateness of a retrial, take into account all 
relevant considerations, including the nature of the error vitiating the 
original conviction. The various approaches followed by the courts 
of appeal are considered in detail in the following paragraphs. 
5Section 7( 1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 as amended by section 
43 of the Criminal Justice Amendment Act of 1988. 
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8.2.2 New trials on appellate reversal of convictions handed down in 
superior courts 
The jurisdiction, powers and procedures of the Criminal Division of the 
present Court of Appeal are principally contained in the Criminal 
Appeal Act of 1968. Apart from the recently acquired general power 
of the court to order a retrial,6 the powers of the Criminal Division are 
basically the same as those which were vested in the old Court of 
Criminal Appeal. 
A person convicted on indictment may, subject to obtaining leave to 
appeal when that is necessary, appeal to the Court of Appeal against 
his conviction either on a point of law or a question of fact, or a mixed 
question of law and fact. 7 
The Court of Appeal will allow the appeal if it thinks 
(a) that the conviction of the court of trial should be set aside on 
the ground that under all the circumstances of the case it is 
unsafe or unsatisfactory 
(b) that the judgment of the court of trial should be set aside on the 
ground of a wrong decision on any question of law or 
(c) that there was a material irregularity in the course of the trial. 
If none of the above apply the court must dismiss the appeal. 
However, there is the following proviso 
The Court may, notwithstanding that it is of the opinion that the 
6See infra, text at note 11 for a discussion of the court's power to 
order a retrial as provided for in section 43 of the Criminal Justice 
Amendment Act of 1988. 
7Section 1 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. 
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point raised in the appeal might be decided in favour of the 
appellant, dismiss the appeal if it considers that no miscarriage 
of justice has actually occurred. 8 
The Act furthermore provides that 
(a) in the case of an appeal against conviction the court shall, if 
they allow the appeal, quash the conviction, and that9 
(b) an order of the Court of Appeal quashing a conviction shall, 
except when the appellant is ordered to be retried (in terms of 
section 7 below) operate as a direction to the court of trial to 
enter, instead of the record of conviction, a judgment and 
verdict of acquittal. 10 
Again, section 7( 1) now provides 
Where the Court of Appeal allows an appeal against conviction 
and it appears to the court that the interests of justice so 
require, they may order the appellant to be retried. 11 
The appellant may only be retried for an offence of which he has been 
convicted or could have been convicted on the indictment on which 
8Section 2( 1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. 
9Section 2(2). 
10Section 3. 
11 As amended by section 43 of the Criminal Justice Amendment Act 
of 1988. 
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he has been tried. 12 Furthermore, if a person ordered to be retried is 
again convicted on retrial, the court before which he is convicted may 
not pass a sentence of greater severity than that passed on the 
original conviction. 13 
In cases decided before 1988 (when the power to order a retrial 
arose only in fresh evidence cases), the court refused to order a retrial 
where a very long time had elapsed since the crime had been 
committed 14 or where the accused had already served a substantial 
part of his sentence. 15 
As for more timely appeals, Pattenden identifies certain principles 
which the court has applied in determining whether a retrial should be 
ordered in fresh evidence cases. 16 The writer points out, in the first 
place, that the Court of Appeal has been reluctant to order a retrial 
12Section 7(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. In terms of the 
section, this includes an offence charged in an alternative count of the 
indictment in respect of which the jury was discharged from giving a 
verdict in consequence of convicting him of the first-mentioned 
offence. 
13ltem ( 1) and (3) of Schedule 11 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. 
For the sake of completeness, it should also be mentioned here that 
this policy is also upheld in the context of an appeal against sentence 
by the accused. If an accused appeals against sentence imposed in 
the trial court (which is provided for in section 9 and 10 of the 
Criminal Appeal Act 1968), the Court of Appeal may not increase the 
sentence beyond a sentence passed at the trial taken as a whole 
(section 4(3) read together with section 11 (3) of the Criminal Appeal 
Act 1968. Cf the position in Canadian law discussed infra under 
8.3.2. 
14R v Flower [ 1966] 1 QB 146 and R v Saunders [ 1973] 58 Cr App 
R 248. 
15R v Newland [1988] 2 All ER 891 (CA). 
16Pattenden R Judicial Discretion and Criminal Litigation 2nd ed 1990 
368-370. 
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where the court has been sure that, in view of the new evidence, a 
conviction would not be "safe" .17 In such circumstances, the court 
would rather enter an acquittal. If fresh evidence could not serve to 
induce any reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the 
court would simply dismiss the appeal. 18 However, in in-between 
cases where the court would not feel "sure one way or the other", 19 
the court has been inclined to order a retrial. 20. Pattenden 
furthermore observes that 
a further trial is also in order if (a) the evidence is significant 
and the Court of Appeal is not satisfied that it is true, but thinks 
a jury might believe the evidence or (b) the prosecution wishes 
to introduce evidence in rebuttal of fresh defence evidence. A 
retrial in the latter situation enables the Court of Appeal to avoid 
adjudicating between opposing witnesses. 21 
In exercising its discretion to order a new trial in terms of section 
7( 1 ), the Court of Appeal also relies on these principles. The court is 
17 At 368. The author cites the cases of R v Egerton [1970] Crim LR 
92 (C) and R v Chioneye [19881138 NLJ 258 (CA). 
18At 369. The author relies inter alia on the case of R v Scudder 
[19651 Crim LR 36 (CA). 
19 At 368. The author cites from the case of Stafford v OPP ( 1973) 58 
Cr App R 256, 283 (HL). 
20At 368. Cf also the recent decision of Michael Gordon (1995) 1 Cr 
App R 290. In that case the court ordered a retrial on the basis that 
the court could not be sure that the jury would necessarily have 
reached the same result had they heard the additional expert e~idence 
which had been put before it during the appeal. 
21 This principle was applied in the case of Kiranjit Ahluwalia ( 1993) 96 
Cr App R 133. A retrial was ordered on the basis that the crown did 
not have a proper opportunity to consider the fresh evidence and 
obtain its own advice and evidence on the issue raised for the first 
time on appeal, namely that the accused (who had killed her husband) 
suffered from a major depressive disorder. 
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inclined to order new trials if it is not sure one way or the other if the 
trial court would have convicted the accused in any case if the error 
or irregularity had not occurred at the original trial. 22 As pointed out 
above, the grounds for allowing an appeal are not only that the Crown 
Court judge erred in law or that there was a material irregularity in the 
course of the trial, but also that the conviction is unsafe or 
unsatisfactory. However, in practice it is very rare that an appellant 
relies solely on the ground that the conviction is unsafe or 
unsatisfactory only because the evidence, on paper, is very thin. The 
vast majority of appellants refer first to specific legal or procedural 
errors which have occurred at the trial and then supplement these 
specific grounds with a general claim that the conviction was therefore 
unsafe or unsatisfactory. 23 Moreover, misdirections about law in the 
judge's summing-up to the jury (a ground of appeal in most cases), 
can be classified as either a wrong decision on a question of law or of 
facts tending to make the conviction unsafe or unsatisfactory. 24 
22See inter alia the decisions of Note Mehmet Bey [ 1994] 98 Cr App 
R 158 (retrial ordered where judge failed to direct the jury that there 
could be an innocent explanation for lies of accused); John Dickie 
Spellacie Baillie [ 1995] 2 Cr App R 31 (retrial ordered where the judge 
failed to direct the jury sufficiently on the issue of provocation); 
lmteyaz Ashghar [ 1995) Cr App R 223 (retrial ordered where the 
judge failed to give a full accomplice corroboration direction to the 
jury); Fitzroy Derek Pommel/ [1995] 2 Cr App R 607 (retrial ordered 
where the judge misdirected the jury on the defence of necessity); 
Barry Henry Durbin [ 1995) 2 Cr App R 84 (retrial ordered where the 
judge failed to give a good character direction to the jury); Dean 
Pattinson Warren Exley 1996 1 Cr App R 51 (retrial ordered on the 
basis that no sufficient warning had been given to the jury as regards 
identification evidence) and Vincent Joseph Wood [ 1996) 1 Cr App R 
207 (retrial ordered on the basis of the combined effect of prejudicial 
material in the press and the unfair tone and content of the judge's 
summing up). 
23See Emmins 322. 
24See Emmins 321 . 
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However, an appellant hardly ever relies solely on the ground that the 
conviction, evaluated on the merits only, is unsafe or unsatisfactory. 
The reason is that the court has always been reluctant to interfere 
with the factual findings of juries because (unlike the juries), they have 
not heard or seen the witnesses. In other words, if the trial had been 
legally error-free, the appellant will only succeed if he can point to 
something "exceptional in the overall circumstances which- absolutely 
drives the court to the conclusion that an injustice may have been 
done" .25 
So far, there has been no reported case where the court ordered a 
retrial where the original trial had been legally error-free; in other 
words, where no procedural or other irregularity tainted the 
proceedings. As explained above this cannot be ascribed to an 
underlying policy that the accused should be protected against double 
jeopardy. The real reason is that in practice, the quashing of a 
conviction solely on the basis of its factual merits is exceptional; it 
hardly ever happens. 
Certain writers on English criminal procedure express the view that 
the new power of the court to order a retrial has not replaced the 
25See Emmins 322. The author relies on the case of R v Cooper 
( 1969) 1 OB 267 where the court laid down the principle that it would 
not lightly interfere with the factual findings of a jury. In Cooper the 
exceptional factors which led to the quashing of the accused's 
conviction on the basis soley of being unsafe or unsatisfactory were 
the following. The case rested on a dubious identification by the 
victim. There was also evidence that X (who closely resembled the 
accused and had a record of violence) had privately confessed to the 
crime. Cooper called the third person to whom X had made his 
confession, but was unable to call X himself. In the light of these 
exceptional factors, the court of appeal set aside his conviction on the 
basis that it was unsafe. 
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inherent power of the court to order a venire de nova. 26 According 
to these writers, venire de nova cases and "ordinary appeals" 27 are, 
in fact, mutually exclusive. This argument can briefly be explained as 
follows. According to the wording of section 2( 1 )(c)28 a court may, 
inter alia, allow an appeal if it thinks that there was a material 
irregularity in the course of the trial. However, if the irregularity 
caused the trial to be a "mistrial 11 in the sense that there was 11 no trial 
that had been validly commenced", 29 the court cannot allow the 
appeal in terms of section 2( 1) and order a retrial in terms of section 
7( 1). In the case of a so-called "mistrial", no material irregularity in the 
course of the trial as envisaged in section 2( 1) has occurred. Instead 
(so the argument goes) no valid trial has even commenced. If no 
valid trial has even commenced, the court must rely on its inherent 
powers to quash the conviction and order a retrial. In practice, the 
difference would be that if a retrial is ordered by the Court of Appeal 
in terms of its statutory powers, 30 the court itself would direct a bill 
of indictment. However, if the appeal is allowed in terms of its 
inherent powers, the effect of venire de nova would be "to return the 
proceedings to the point immediately before the irregularity occurred 
so that the prosecution can cure the defect and the trial may take 
place" .31 
Furthermore, these authors point out that only if the appeal is under 
26Emmins 326-327 and Blackstone 1991 ed 1408-14 11 . 
27Meaning appeals in terms of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. See 
Blackstone 1991 ed 1410. 
28Criminal Appeal Act 1968. See supra text at note 8. 
29Per Lord Dipcock in R v Rose [ 1982] AC 822, 833 ( HL). 
301n terms of section 7(1). 
31 See Blackstone 1991 ed 1410. 
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statute, will the court have the additional power to dismiss the appeal 
by application of the proviso. 32 
In 1996, in the case of Paul Anthony O'Donne/133 the Court of 
Appeal recognised that it is vested with inherent powers to order a 
venire de nova in instances where it cannot invoke its statutory 
powers to order a retrial. The issue before the court was whether a 
retrial could be ordered after a conviction had been set aside in the 
following circumstances. A trial had taken place to determine the guilt 
or innocence of the accused in respect of the offences charged, and 
a verdict of guilty by a jury followed on a determination that the 
accused was unfit to be tried. Counsel for the appellant argued that 
once the court determined that the procedure was irregular, there is no 
valid conviction which could be set aside by the Court of Appeal in 
terms of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. Therefore, a retrial could also 
not be ordered in terms of the court's statutory powers. However, the 
court held that it might order a retrial in terms of its inherent common 
law powers. Hutchinson LJ laid down the following principles. The 
Court of Appeal may order a new trial in terms of its inherent powers 
if34 
(a) the trial had not validly commenced in the sense that it was a 
nullity from the outset (a so-called ff mistrial n) or 
(b) the trial, although validly commenced, had not been validly 
concluded by a properly constituted jury bringing an 
unequivocal verdict of guilty or not guilty followed by a 
sentence or discharge of the defendant by the court. 
32See supra, text at note 8 for the wording of the proviso. 
33( 1996] 1 Cr App R 286. 
34At 2960. 
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The court pointed out that in both the above situations the 1968 
Criminal Appeal Act would have had no application since there would 
have been no "conviction" within the meaning of that Act. The court 
observed that its power to order a venire de nova was not limited to 
cases where the proceedings were shown to be vitiated ab initio by 
some irregularity, but also where the trial had come to an end without 
a properly constituted jury ever having returned a verdict. 
8.2.3 New trials on appellate reversal of convictions handed down in 
lower courts 
At present, there are three ways of appealling against convictions 
handed down in magistrates' courts. These are 
(a) Appeal to the Crown Court. This remedy involves an 
appeal on the factual merits of the case and is available 
to the accused only.35 
(b) Appeal to the High Court by VI/SY of case stated (on a 
point of law). Unlike the position in trials on indictment, 
this remedy may be utilised in summary proceedings by 
35 Section 108 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1981 . The unsuccessful 
party in the Crown Court (whether it be the prosecution who has seen 
a summary conviction overturned or the defence who had the same 
result before the Crown Court as they had in the magistrate's court),in 
terms of section 28 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 , may bring a 
further appeal by case stated to the High Court. Similar to an appeal 
direct from the magistrate's court to the High Court (discussed in (b) 
above), the Crown Court decision may only be questioned on the 
ground that it was wrong in law or in excess of jurisdiction and not on 
the ground that it was against the weight of the evidence. The 
decision of the High Court, in terms of section 1( 1 )(a) of the 
Administration of Justice Act 1960, may further be appealed against 
by either party to the House of Lords if the case involves a point of 
law of general public importance. 
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both the accused and the prosecution. 36 
(c) Application to the High Court for judicial review of a 
decision of the trial court. 37 This remedy (certioran1 is 
in principle available to the accused only. However, the 
prosecution may also utilise this remedy in limited 
circumstances. 38 
In the text that follows these different remedies will be dealt with in 
the chronological order set out above. 
The accused convicted in a magistrate's court may, as of right, 
appeal against conviction and/or sentence to the Crown Court. 39 If 
the accused pleaded guilty, he may appeal only against sentence, 
except if he argues that the plea is equivocal; in other words, if he 
argues that it was not a genuine admission of guilt. 40 Where the 
appeal is against conviction, the hearing on appeal amounts to a 
rehearing of the whole case.41 Exactly the same steps are being 
36Section 111 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1981 . See supra chapter 
six under 6.2.2 for a discussion of this remedy in the context of 
prosecution appeals. A further appeal to the House of Lords is possible 
if the High Court certifies that there is a point of law of general public 
importance involved. 
37This remedy is available in respect of decisions by magistrates and 
in respect of decisions by the Crown Court when it is not exercising 
its jurisdiction in matters relating to a trial on indictment (section 29(3) 
of the Supreme Court Act 1981). However, there is no power to grant 
judicial review of any decision of a judge of the High Court. See 
Blackstone 1991 ed 1478. 
38See supra chapter six under 6.2.5 for a discussion of cases where 
the High Court was prepared to review an acquittal. 
39Section 108 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1981 . 
40See in general Blackstone 1991 ed 1458-1460 for a discussion of an 
appeal against conviction following a plea of guilty. 
41 Section 79(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981. 
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gone through as were gone through at the summary trial. Moreover, 
the parties (including the prosecution) are not limited to the evidence 
called at the summary trial but may rely on material which has only 
become available to them since. The hearing of appeal therefore 
amounts to a complete trial de novo. 42 
The court may dispose of the appeal by confirmation, reversal or 
variance of "any part of the decision appealed against" or may remit 
the matter to the magistrates with its opinion43 or make any such 
order as it thinks fit. 44 The last-mentioned includes the power to 
increase the sentence up to the maximum sentence which the 
magistrate could have imposed.45 Commentators explain that the 
reason the Crown Court is vested with the power to increase 
sentence, is that leave is not required to appeal to this court and such 
a provision would therefore "inhibit unmeritious appeals" .46 
Previously, it was merely provided that the Crown Court could vary 
"the decision appealed against" .47 The words "any part of the 
decision appealed against" were inserted in 1988 to enable the court 
to review, not only the part of the decision against which the accused 
42However, the Crown Court may not amend the information on which 
the appellant was convicted. See Garfield v Maddocks (1974) QB 7. 
43This would, apparently, usually be a direction to enter a plea of not 
guilty and hear the case if it thought the plea was equivocal. See Inns 
of Court School of Law Criminal litigation and sentencing 5th ed 1993 
74 (hereinafter referred to as Inns of Court: Criminal litigation). 
44Section 48 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 as amended by section 
156 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. 
45See Inns of Court: Criminal litigation 74. 
46See Blackstone 1991 ed 1461 and Inns of Court: Criminal litigation 
id. 
47Section 48(2) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1981. 
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appealed, but the whole decision of the court of trial. 48 
The legislature felt obliged to bring about this amendment in view of 
the decision in Dutta v Westcott. 49 In that case D had been 
convicted by magistrates of (a) having used a vehicle without 
insurance and (b) other road traffic matters which also carried the 
penalty of endorsement of the licence and penalty points. The 
magistrates had disqualified him from driving a motor vehicle for the 
insurance offence but had not ordered penalty points for the other 
matters; the fact that he had been disqualified was regarded as 
sufficient punishment for all the offences. On appeal, the conviction 
for using a vehicle with no insurance was quashed. The result was 
that the accused was no longer disqualified from driving a motor 
vehicle and the issue arose on a further appeal whether the court was 
empowered to impose a sentence for the other offences (by endorsing 
penalty points) as the magistrates' decisions in those matters had not 
been the subject of appeal. In order to achieve a just result, the court 
gave a broad interpretation to the words "the decision appealed 
against" and held that it meant that the whole of the decision by the 
magistrates may be reconsidered by the court of appeal. This 
"remarkably convoluted" 50 interpretation of the court of the section 
had obliged the legislature to amend the section so as to explicitly 
provide for cases such as Westcott. 
In practice, the amendment has the effect that if the accused 
appeals only against conviction, the Crown Court may dismiss the 
appeal and increase the sentence imposed by the magistrate for that 
48Section 48(2) as amended by section 156 of the Criminal Justice 
Amendment Act of 1988. (My emphasis). 
49(1987] QB 291. 
50See Emmins and Scanlan 170. 
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offence or allow the appeal but increase the sentence for any other 
offence of which the trial court had convicted the accused even if the 
accused did not appeal against such a conviction. 51 Moreover, if the 
new provision is interpreted literally, the court is also empowered to 
substitute a conviction (appealed against and quashed) for a 
conviction of an offence of which the magistrate acquitted the 
accused; the acquittal is also "part of the decision appealed 
against" !52 
The potential effect of these powers on double jeopardy rights of the 
convicted accused are extraordinary. The prosecution gets a second 
opportunity to obtain a conviction of an offence for which the accused 
has previously been acquitted on the merits. Nevertheless, it remains 
to be seen whether the court will in fact give such a broad 
interpretation to this provision, namely that it may also substitute an 
acquittal for a conviction. 
The appeal by means of the case stated procedure, namely on a 
point of law, was discussed in detail in chapter six. 53 As indicated, 
both the prosecution and the accused may in terms of this procedure 
appeal to the High Court on a point of law. The High Court may affirm, 
reverse or vary the decision of the court below, make any other order 
it thinks fit or remit it back to the original court with its opinion.54 
51 However, the sentence imposed by the Crown Court may not exceed 
that which the magistrate could have imposed. See section 48(4) of 
the Act. 
52See Blackstone 1991 ed 1462 and Emmins 356 who both express 
the view that the court should use these powers sparingly. 
53See supra under 6.2.2 for a discussion of section 111 of the 
Magistrates' Courts Act 1981 . 
54Section 6 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1857. 
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The High Court's decision is enforced as if it was the decision of the 
lower court. Therefore, if the High Court thinks that the acquittal is 
incorrect, it can refer it back to the magistrates with a direction to 
convict and sentence. In the discussion that follows, the powers of 
the court to order a rehearing after reversal of an acquittal or reversal 
of a conviction is considered. 
In Rigby v Woodwarcf' 5 the question whether a retrial may be 
ordered by the High Court arose in the context of a successful appeal 
by the accused against his conviction. The facts were as follows. 
The magistrates had refused to allow counsel for R to cross-examine 
a co-accused who had given evidence in his own defence which had 
implicated R. R had been convicted and his co-accused had been 
acquitted. On appeal, the decision to refuse the cross-examination 
was held to be plainly wrong in law. The High Court subsequently 
quashed R's conviction. The prosecution asked them to remit the case 
for a rehearing on the ground that it was more than likely that the 
verdict would have been the same even if R's counsel had been able 
to cross-examine the co-accused. The court refused the application. 
Lord Goddard CJ stated that the power "to remit" a case to the 
magistrates includes sending a case back with a direction to convict 
if it is plain on the facts stated that that would be the correct verdict, 
or setting an acquittal aside and instructing the magistrates to 
continue with the hearing if the acquittal had followed the erroneous 
upholding of a submission of no case to answer at the end of the 
prosecution's evidence.56 However, his Lordship concluded that 
"there is no power to order a retrial in the ordinary sense of the 
55[1957] 1 WLR 250. 
56See Emmins 360. 
492 
expression" . 57 
In a subsequent case, Griffiths v Jenkins58 it was suggested by 
counsel for the appellant that the above words of Lord Goddard in 
Rigby meant that a court of appeal may not send a case back for a 
rehearing, regardless of whether it would be before the same or a 
different bench and regardless of whether the prosecution or the 
accused brought the appeal. In Griffiths the prosecution appealed 
against a dismissal of an information by the justices on the basis that 
the defendants had no case to answer. The High Court held that the 
justices had erred in law and quashed the dismissal. The matter could 
not be remitted to the same bench to continue the hearing (which 
would have been allowed in terms of Rigby) because two of the three 
justices who were party to the decision had since retired. The issue 
was whether the High Court had the power to remit the case for 
rehearing before a differently constituted bench of justices; in other 
words, whether the accused could be tried de nova. The High Court 
held that it had no such power. On a further appeal to the House of 
Lords, that court concluded that there is always power vested in the 
High Court to order a rehearing before either the same or a different 
bench if the court, in its discretion, decides that it would be the 
appropriate course to take. 59 In the court's view, the dicta in Rigby 
ought to be confined to the particular facts of that case.60 
57At 254. 
581992 AC 76 (HL). 
59At 84. 
60Emmins points out (at 360) that a retrial would have been unfair in 
Rigby's case because he would not have been able to insist on the 
prosecution's calling the co-accused and if he called him himself he 
would have been disadvantaged by the rule that one cannot cross-
examine one's own witness. Emmins concludes (at 360) that "Rigby 
v Woodward was merely saying that retrials should not be directed 
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The court added that the question of whether the High Court has 
power to order a rehearing before either the same or a different bench 
could not receive different answers depending on whether it was the 
prosecutor or the defendant who was appealing. 61 The court then 
made the following important statement62 
It is axiomatic of course, that a rehearing will only be 
ordered in circumstances where a fair trial is still 
possible. But where errors of law by justices have led to 
an acquittal which is successfully challenged and where 
the circumstances of the case are such that a rehearing 
is the only way in which the matter can be put right, I 
apprehend that the court will normally, though not 
necessarily, exercise its discretion in favour of that 
course. I recognise that very different considerations may 
apply to the exercise of discretion to order a rehearing 
following a successful appeal against conviction by the 
defendant in circumstances where the error in the 
proceedings which vitiated the conviction has left the 
issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence unresolved. In 
some such cases to order a rehearing may appear 
inappropriate or oppressive. But this must depend on 
how the proceedings have been conducted, the nature of 
the error vitiating the conviction, the gravity of the 
offence and any other relevant consideration. 
On the facts before it the court refused to exercise its discretion in 
favour of a retrial because the offences were relatively trivial. The fact 
that the retrial would take place more than three years after the date 
when the offences were alleged to have been committed, was also 
considered to be a sufficient reason for not ordering a retrial which 
would not be fair in the case at hand. 
where the successful appellant by case stated would be in a worse 
position at the retrial than he was at the original trial". 
61At 83. 
62At 848-D. (My emphasis). 
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Although no explicit reference was made in this important decision 
to the double jeopardy rights of the accused, the court seems to have 
recognised that the ordering of retrial on reversal of either a conviction 
or acquittal is an extraordinary measure which should not be 
implemented in circumstances where it would deny the accused the 
right to a fair trial. 
The final method whereby a conviction or acquittal handed down in 
a magistrate's court may be challenged is an application for review by 
means of certiorari. In disposing of such an application, the High 
Court has the powers of 
(a) remitting the case to the lower court with a direction to 
reconsider it and reach a decision in accordance with the 
High Court's findings and 
(b) replacing an unlawful sentence which it has quashed 
with the sentence it considers fit. 63 
If a conviction is quashed by certiorari, it seems as if the High Court 
will be prepared to order a retrial if it finds that as a result of the 
irregularity the accused "has never been technically in peril" 64 and if 
it would be in the interests of justice in the sense that it would not be 
63Section 31 (5) and 43 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. 
64See Regina v Kent Justices. Ex parte Machin [ 1952] 2 QB 355, 361 . 
In that case the High Court held on review that the justices acted 
"without jurisdiction" because they failed to comply with a rule which 
required that they explain to the accused that if he was tried by them 
for an indictable offence and convicted, he might be committed to 
Quarter Sessions for sentence. The court stated that the accused 
could be tried again because he had never been technically in peril of 
a conviction. However, the fact that the accused had already been in 
custody for seven months, persuaded the court that a retrial would 
not serve the interests of justice and would not be right. 
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unfair to the accused in the circumstances of the particular case. 65 
In chapter three the appeal by means of certiorari against an acquittal 
was discussed in detail. It was pointed out that the High Court holds 
the view that review of an acquittal is prohibited in terms of the rule 
against double jeopardy, but that the court has recognised an 
exception to this rule, namely where the presiding officer at the trial 
court acted "without jurisdiction" .66 Therefore, where the trial, as a 
result of the fact that the presiding officer acted "without jurisdiction", 
is treated as a "nullity", 67 the accused may, according to recent 
cases, be tried again.68 
Therefore, the anomalous situation now exists that, in respect of 
appeals on a point of law, the superior court has a discretion to order 
a retrial but, where a conviction or acquittal is taken on review by 
means of the remedy certiorari, a retrial may only be ordered if the 
alleged irregularity which occurred in the court of trial was of such a 
nature that the trial could be described as a nullity. It would appear 
that no logical rationale underlies this phenomenon. The remedies of 
certiorari and appeal by case stated serve similar purposes in English 
law. These remedies are interchangeable in the following 
65/d. Blackstone 1991 ed 14 71 points out that the ordering of a retrial 
on reversal of a conviction by means of certiorari is most unlikely to 
happen in practice. 
661n common law, the position was that an acquittal could not be 
quashed by certiorari. See chapter five supra under 5.3 for the 
position in common law. 
67Because the concept of jurisdiction is often used in certiorari cases, 
the nullity theory has been used to effect a retrial. See Friedland 265. 
68See In re Harrington and Regina v Dorchester Justices, Ex parte 
Director of Public Prosecutions discussed in chapter six supra under 
6.2.5. 
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circumstances: (a) where the Magistrate's or Crown Court acted in 
excess of jurisdiction (b) where an error of law was made and the error 
was patently revealed in the record of the inferior tribunal's 
proceedings. However, a latent error would only be revealed through 
the statement of case procedure. The effect of both these remedies 
is to set aside the decision of the court below. Apparently, counsel 
advising a person aggrieved by a decision of an inferior court may find 
the choice between these remedies difficult. In my view, the 
discrepancy in English law in this respect can only be seen as a 
historical accident. 
8.2.4 Summary 
The following principles apply with regard to appeals against 
convictions handed down in superior courts. 
* The accused convicted in a superior court may appeal against his 
conviction to the criminal division of the Court of Appeal either on a 
point of law, a question of fact, or a mixed question of law and fact. 
* In terms of its statutory powers, the Court of Appeal may set aside 
a conviction and order a new trial whenever "the interests of justice 
so require". 69 The court has so far given little indication of what it 
understands by the concept "interests of justice". The basic criterion 
which the court applies in order to determine the appropriateness of 
a new trial is whether it can find with certainty that the accused would 
in any case have been convicted had the error or irregularity not 
occurred at the original trial. If the court cannot make this finding with 
69See section 7( 1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 discussed supra, 
text at note 11 . 
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certainty, it usually orders a new trial. However, a study of the case 
law reveals that the court also takes into consideration the following 
factors 
(a) the nature of the offence charged (if serious, the court may be 
inclined to order a retrial) 
(b) the time which has elapsed since the appellant was convicted 
(if a long time has elapsed, the court may be inclined to quash 
the conviction without ordering a retrial) and 
(c) whether the accused has already served a substantial part of his 
sentence (if so, the court may be inclined to quash the 
conviction without ordering a retrial). 
* The court has not indicated whether an error or irregularity which 
amounts to a serious breach of fundamental human rights should 
operate as a bar to de nova proceedings. In other words, the court 
has not yet used its new powers to quash more convictions and 
prevent multiple prosecutions on the basis of violations of fundamental 
human rights. 
* If a new trial is ordered, the appellant may only be retried for an 
offence for which he was convicted or could have been convicted on 
the indictment on which he was tried. Moreover, the court that tries 
him again may not impose a more severe sentence than that which 
could have been imposed in the original trial. 
* Apart from its statutory powers, the court may also revert to 
inherent powers to order a new trial. The court may exercise these 
powers not only in circumstances where the trial had not validly 
commenced (in other words, had been ab initio null and void), but also 
where it had not been validly concluded. 
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The following principles apply with regard to appeals against 
convictions and acquittals handed down in lower courts. 
* A person convicted in a lower court may appeal against his 
conviction to the Crown Court on the factual merits of the case. The 
appeal amounts to a trial de nova. The accused who appeals on this 
basis has very little (if any) protection against double jeopardy. If the 
relevant provisions are interpreted literally, the court may even 
substitute the conviction appealed against for a conviction of an 
offence of which the accused had been acquitted in the trial court. 
* Both the prosecution and the accused may appeal by way of case 
stated (on a point of law) to the High Court against a decision handed 
down in a lower court. The High Court has wide powers to dispose 
of the appeal, including the power to order a new trial. In deciding 
whether to remit the matter for a rehearing to the same bench, or 
before a differently constituted bench, the general principle is that a 
court of appeal must consider whether a fair trial is still possible. 
Although the High Court may order a rehearing regardless of whether 
the accused or the prosecution appealed, different considerations may 
apply to the exercise of the discretion to order a rehearing after a 
successful appeal against conviction by the accused in circumstances 
where the error in the proceedings which vitiated the conviction has 
left the issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence unresolved. In 
order to determine whether a rehearing or retrial may be inappropriate 
or oppressive, the nature of the error vitiating the conviction should be 
taken into account, the manner in which the proceedings were 
conducted, the gravity of the offence as well as any other relevant 
considerations. 
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8.3 CANADIAN LAW 
8.3.1 General 
In chapter 7 it was indicated that legislation introduced at the 
beginning of this century in the English legal system did not explicitly 
provide that the Court of Criminal Appeal may order new trials on 
reversal of convictions. 70 The first Canadian statute71 which made 
provision for appeals in criminal matters was essentially based on the 
English model. However, it differed from the English model in one 
important respect: under the Canadian statute a new trial could be 
ordered by a court of appeal on reversal of a conviction handed down 
in a trial on indictment. 72 Moreover, as early Canadian legislation 
also provided for a right of appeal by the crown on a point of law, 73 
the courts of appeal could also order a new trial on reversal of an 
acquittal. Therefore, in Canadian law, there has never been a clear 
legislative policy against the ordering of retrials as was initially the 
case in English law. 
In determinig the appropriateness of a new trial on reversal of a 
conviction or acquittal, Canadian courts of appeal have adopted a 
slightly different approach than that adopted in the English courts: 
the probable outcome of the new trial seems to be the decisive 
criterion, instead of the uncertainty of the matter. The Canadian 
approach offers slightly more protection to the accused. Courts have 
70See supra under 7 .3 for the provisions of the Criminal Appeal Act 
1907. 
71 Criminal Code 1923. 
72The provisions of the pre-1955 Code. See Salhany 9-1. 
73See supra chapter six, under 6.3.2. 
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also refused to order new trials where the judicial process has been 
delayed and where the accused has already served a portion of an 
intermittent jail sentence. 
8.3.2 New trials on appellate reversal of convictions handed down in 
superior courts 
In terms of current legislation, an accused convicted of an indictable 
offence may appeal to the Court of Appeal for the province on any 
ground that involves a question of law, 74 on any ground that involves 
a question of fact alone or on a question of mixed law and fact, 75 on 
any ground not mentioned previously which appears to the court of 
appeal to be a sufficient ground of appeal. 76 
Section 686( 1 )(a) of the Code empowers the court of appeal to allow 
an appeal from a conviction in the following circumstances 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
where the verdict is unreasonable or cannot be supported 
by the evidence or 
where there was a wrong decision by the trial court on 
a question of law or 
where there was a miscarriage of justice. 
74Section 675( 1 )(a)(i) of the Criminal Code. 
75Section 675( 1 )(a)( ii). Leave is required from the court of appeal. 
76Section 675( 1 )(a)(iii). Leave is required from the court of appeal. A 
further appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court of Canada as of 
right by the accused from the judgment of the court of appeal for the 
province on any question of law on which a judge of the court of 
appeal dissents (section 691( 1 )(a). The crown has a similar right of 
appeal from a judgment of a provincial court of appeal which sets 
aside a conviction or quashes an indictment or stays proceedings on 
indictment (section 693( 1 )(a)). 
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In terms of section 686(2), if an appeal is allowed, the court must 
quash the conviction and either enter a verdict of acquittal or order a 
new trial. However, as in English law the court may dismiss the 
appeal if it is of the opinion that no substantial wrong or miscarriage 
of justice has occurred.77 When a conviction is quashed on a legal 
ground, the general principle which determines whether a new trial is 
apposite is reflected in the following question. Is there, despite the 
error of law, admissible evidence which would enable the jury to 
conclude that the appellant is guilty of the offence with which he is 
charged?78 It follows that the court must acquit the appellant if there 
is no reasonable evidence in the record of an essential element of the 
offence with which the accused was charged. 79 
However, these principles are not absolute and it has been 
suggested that 
while the existence of a triable cause between the Crown and 
the subject is a sine qua non of an order for a new trial [a new 
trial should not be ordered] where there is a strong possibility 
of an acquittal. 80 
77Section 686(1 )(b)(iii). The test applied by Canadian courts is 
whether the evidence is such that the jury could not (despite the 
miscarriage of justice), have reached any other conclusion but that the 
accused was guilty. 
78See R v Woodward (1975) 23 CCC (2d) 508 (Ont CA). In that case 
the court held (at 510) that where it could not be said that there was 
no evidence to go to the jury, the proper disposition of the appeal was 
the quashing of the conviction and the direction of a new trial. 
79See R v Brown ( 1967) 3 CCC 210 and Leigh LH "New trials in 
criminal cases" Criminal Law Review 1977 525, 528. 
80See Leigh 528, quoting the Canadian decision of R v Rusnak [1963] 
CCC 143. 
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Furthermore, Canadian courts are reluctant to order new trials after 
setting aside a conviction on a legal ground in cases where the judicial 
process was delayed81 and in cases where the accused had already 
served a portion of an intermittent gaol term prior to a successful 
appeal.82 In such instances Canadian courts prefer to enter an 
acquittal rather than to order a new trial of the accused. 
In disposing of appeals against convictions on the grounds of 
miscarriages of justice, the courts have applied essentially the same 
criteria. In R v Silvini83 the accused appealed against his conviction 
on the ground that he was denied a fair trial because defence counsel 
had failed to apply for a severance so that he could call the co-
accused as a witness to support his defence. The court held that the 
conviction should be quashed and a new trial ordered if 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would 
have been different. 84 
Where the ground of appeal relied on by the convicted accused is that 
the verdict is unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence, 
Canadian courts of appeal either dismiss the appeal or enter an 
81 See R v Jamieson (1989) 48 CCC (3d) 287. In that case the court 
quashed the accused's conviction following a third trial for trafficking 
(sic) in narcotics on the basis of, inter alia, misdirection of the jury and 
improper admission of evidence. The court held that, in view of the 
delay in the case, the appropriate order was to enter an acquittal. Cf 
also the case of Conway v the Queen discussed in chapter three supra 
under 3.3.2, text at note 115. 
82See R v Dillabough (1975) 28 CCC (2d) 482 (Ont CA). 
83( 1991) 68 CCC (3d) 251 (Ont CA). 
84At 262. 
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acquittal. In Savard and Lizotte v The King85 the court laid down the 
principle that where the appellate court finds that there is no evidence 
to support a conviction on the basis of liability advanced by the 
crown at trial, a court should enter an acquittal rather than order a 
retrial which would enable the crown to place before the jury a new 
theory of liability not relied upon at trial. 
In Corbett v The Queen86 the court held that the Criminal Code 
expressly provides that the appeal may be allowed, not only when the 
verdict cannot be supported by the evidence, but also where it is 
unreasonable.87 The court explained that a court of appeal 
must satisfy itself not only that there was evidence requiring 
the case to be submitted to the jury, but also that the weight of 
such evidence is not so weak that a verdict of guilty is 
unreasonable. 88 
The court explained its role in determining whether a verdict is 
unreasonable as follows 
This cannot be taken to mean that the Court of Appeal is to 
substitute its opinion for that of the jury. The word of the 
enactment is "unreasonable", not "unjustified" .89 
The court concluded that the proper test to determine whether a 
85 (1945) 85 CCC 2541CR105, [1946] SCR 20 (5:0). See Martin JC 
Martin's Annual Criminal Code 1994 ed CC/1002 for a discussion of 
that case. 
86( 1973) 14 CCC (2d) 385 (SCC). 
87See supra text at note 76 for the wording of the specific provision. 
88At 386. 
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verdict is unreasonable is 
whether the verdict is one that a properly instructed jury acting 
judicially could reasonably have rendered. 90 
The general approach in Canadian law is that an acquittal is entered 
if the question, as set out above, is answered in the negative. 
Accordingly, a court of appeal in Canada either dismisses an appeal 
based on this ground, or enters an acquittal. The third option, namely 
to order a new trial is not, in practice, applied in disposing of such 
appeals. 91 The only exception to this practice is, if the court finds 
that the verdict is unreasonable, but there is some evidence to support 
a conviction on a lesser charge, the court will be prepared to order a 
new trial on the lesser charge. 92 
If a court of appeal allows an appeal from a conviction, it can only 
order a new trial in respect of an offence against which the person 
who has been convicted appeals. This means that it cannot order a 
new trial of the full offence charged in the trial court. 93 Similarly, in 
the absence of a crown appeal against an acquittal, the court of 
appeal cannot substitute a conviction for a conviction of an offence of 
which the accused has been acquitted when it allows an appeal from 
90At 389. 
91 Not a single case could be traced where a court of appeal ordered a 
new trial upon setting aside a conviction on this ground. 
92See Regina v Ruptash ( 1982) 68 CCC (2d) 182 (Alb CA). In that 
case the accused appealed against his conviction for first degree 
murder. The court found the conviction for first degree murder 
unsafe, but some evidence to support a conviction for second degree 
murder. The court ordered a new trial limited to a charge for second 
degree murder. 
93See Guillemette v The Queen ( 1986) 26 CCC (3d) (SCC). 
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a conviction for a related offence. 94 However, where on an appeal 
by the accused the court of appeal quashes the conviction and orders 
a new trial, it may order a new trial for an alternative charge which 
had been dismissed at the previous trial solely because of the 
application of the doctrine precluding multiple convictions even 
though the crown has not appealed against this latter acquittal. 95 
A person convicted of an offence tried on indictment may also 
appeal to the court of appeal against sentence passed on him.96 The 
court of appeal is required to consider the fitness of the sentence 
imposed and either vary the sentence within the limits prescribed by 
law or dismiss the appeal. 97 In Hill v The Queen it was held by the 
Supreme Court that, in terms of the above power, the court of appeal 
is also authorised to increase a sentence even though no counter-
appeal has been filed by the crown.98 In view of this decision, it 
seems as if a court on retrial may also be free to impose a more severe 
sentence than the one initially imposed, as long as the sentence is 
within the prescribed limits. 
As indicated in chapter six, the prosecution may also appeal against 
an acquittal handed down in a trial on indictment. 99 However, such 
94See R v Sullivan ( 1991) 63 CCC (3d) 97 (SCC). 
95See R v Letendre (1979) 46 CCC (2d) (BCCA). 
96Section 675( 1 )(b). 
97Section 687( 1). 
98(1975) 23 CCC (2d) 321 (SCC). 
99See supra under 6.3.2. A further appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Canada may be taken by the crown from the judgment of the court of 
appeal of the province which dismissed such an appeal from an 
acquittal (section 693( 1 )(a). A similar right of appeal may be 
exercised by the accused, namely against a successful appeal by the 
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appeals are limited to questions of law only. In disposing of the crown 
appeal the court may dismiss the appea1100 or it may allow the 
appeal, set aside the verdict and either enter a verdict of guilty in 
respect of the offence if in its opinion the accused should have been 
found guilty except for the error of law, and then pass sentence, or 
order a new trial. 101 However, where the verdict of acquittal came 
from a court composed of a judge and a jury, the court, when setting 
aside a verdict, cannot enter a verdict of guilty but must order a new 
trial. 102 In order to obtain a new trial, the crown must discharge 
the onus that, if the trial judge had properly instructed himself on the 
law or had properly directed the jury, the verdict of acquittal would 
not necessarily have been the same. 103 In Regina v Morin 104 the 
court explained the onus which the crown must discharge as 
follows 105 
[T]he onus is a heavy one and ... the Crown must satisfy 
the court with a reasonable degree of certainty. An 
accused who has been acquitted once should not be sent 
back to be tried again unless it appears that the error at 
the first trial was such that there is a reasonable degree 
crown to the provincial court of appeal (section 691 ( 1 )(a). 
100Similar to the disposal of an appeal against a conviction, the court 
may dismiss the appeal if, in its opinion, no miscarriage of justice 
occurred. 
101 Section 686(4). Before the court may enter a conviction (instead of 
directing a new trial), it must be demonstrated that all the findings 
necessary to support a verdict of guilty had been made either explicitly 
or implicitly or not be in issue. See R v Cassidy ( 1989) 50 CCC (3d) 
193. 
102Section 686(4). 
103See Vezeau v The Queen ( 1976) 28 CCC (2d) 81 (SCC). 
104( 1988) 44 CCC (3d) 193 (SCC). 
105At 221. 
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of certainty that the outcome may well have been 
affected by it. 
In Canadian law fresh evidence may also, in exceptional 
circumstances, be introduced on appeal if the court of appeal 
considers it to be in the interests of justice. 106 Unlike English law 
which does not provide for an appeal- by the crown · against an 
acquittal in a trial on indictment, fresh evidence may be introduced on 
appeal on the application of either the crown or the defence. 
Generally, the appeal court has only allowed the crown to tender 
further evidence to rectify errors or omissions which, if they had been 
noted at the original trial, would have been rectified. However, where 
it was not clear if the course of the trial would have differed in any 
respect if the error had been discovered at trial, then the application 
by the crown would be refused. 107 
The court of appeal is usually reluctant to hear fresh evidence 
because this would be inconsistent with the institution of a trial by 
jury. However, Salhany explains that this inconsistency can only arise 
where the court assumes the function of the jury and either acquits 
the accused or substitutes one verdict for another. The author 
submits that108 
[w]here new evidence not available at trial is sought to 
be raised on appeal, it is difficult to understand how 
there can be any inconsistency if the court in the end 
only order a retrial. 
The general test applied by the courts in order to determine whether 
106Section 683( 1 ). 
107See Martin 989 and R v Cheung (1990) 56 CCC (3d) 381 (BCCA). 
108At 9-35. 
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a new trial should be ordered upon reception of fresh evidence, is the 
same as that applied by the English Court of Criminal Appeal. 109 If 
the evidence raised on appeal is conclusive in nature, the court of 
appeal may deal finally with the matter. 110 However, if the evidence 
is not "of such compelling influence to enable the Court to finally 
come to a decision" 111 it may, in the court's view, be of sufficient 
strength to reasonably affect the verdict of a jury. 112 In such cases 
a new trial may be ordered so that the case together with all of the 
evidence may be considered by a jury. 113 
8.3.3 New trials on appellate reversal of convictions handed down 
in lower courts 
Until 1976, an appeal from a trial for an offence punishable on 
summary conviction constituted an appeal by way of a trial de nova. 
In that year, the trial de nova procedure was substituted for an appeal 
on the record of the proceedings in the lower court. 114 At present 
109See supra under 8.2.2, text at note 16. 
110See Salhany 9-37. 
111R v Miller (1981) 59 CCC (2d) 131, 134. 
112ln R v Buckle (1949) 94 CCC 84, 85-86 the test was for the first 
time formulated as follows. "Is the evidence of sufficient strength that 
it might reasonably affect the verdict of the jury and would it be a 
miscarriage of justice not to allow it to go before the jury to be 
weighed by that jury in the light of all the evidence". 
113/d. See also R v Roberts ( 1977) 34 CCC (2d) 177. 
114See in general Salhany 9-50 and 9-51. The author points out that 
the Minister of Justice explained in a news release that there was no 
longer any justification for the de nova appeal procedure. According 
to the Minister, the de nova appeal procedure was formulated when 
most cases for summary offences were heard by lay magistrates and 
it was thought essential to permit a dissatisfied party the opportunity 
of having the case heard by a legally trained judge. However, in view 
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the accused may appeal against a conviction or against sentence 
passed on him. 115 The prosecution may also appeal against an order 
that stays proceedings on an information or dismisses an information, 
or against sentence passed on the accused. 116 An appeal may be 
taken by both these parties on matters of law, mixed law and fact, or 
fact alone. The court of appeal is given the same powers as a court 
of appeal in indictable cases, including the power to order a new 
trial. 117 The same principles which guide a provincial court of appeal 
in disposing of appeals in respect of indictable offences are applied 
by courts hearing appeals for summary offences. 118 
The Code also provides for an appeal by way of case stated based 
on a transcript of evidence or an agreed statement of facts. 119 Such 
an appeal lies against a conviction, judgment or verdict of acquittal or 
other final order or determination of a summary conviction court on a 
question of law or excess of jurisdiction, or from a refusal to exercise 
jurisdiction. 120 The appeal judge may affirm, reverse or modify the 
of the broad availability of trained magistrates in Canada at the time 
of the proposed amendment, this justification no longer existed. It 
was also felt that the procedure of de nova trials is unnecessarily time 
consuming and a serious inconvenience for witnesses. 
115Section 813 (a) (i) and (ii). 
116Section 813 (b)(i) and (ii). 
117Section 686( 1) is incorporated into the appeal provisions for 
summary proceedings by section 822( 1) of the Act. See supra under 
8.3.2. for a discussion of these powers. 
118See Bolton 71. See also supra under 8.3.2 for a discussion of these 
principles. 
119Section 830( 1 ) . 
120/d. In R v Appleby ( 1974) 21 CCC (2d) 282 (NBSC) the court held 
that a "determination" implies an ending or finality of a controversy 
and does not apply to interlocutory matters which are not pertinent to 
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conviction, judgment or verdict of acquittal or other final order or 
determination. 121 He may also remit the matter to the summary 
conviction court with his opinion. 122 However, no power is vested 
in the court to order a new trial. 123 
It was pointed out above that the trial de novo appeal procedure, 
previously applied in summary proceedings, was substituted for an 
appeal on the record in 1976 and that the latter is at present the 
standard form of appeal from summary convictions or acquittals. The 
legislature nevertheless deemed it necessary to reserve a discretion in 
a court of appeal to order that such an appeal be heard by way of trial 
de novo. Section 822(4) of the present Criminal Code provides that 
an appeal court may order than an appeal be heard by way of trial de 
novo if it 
... is of the opinion that the interests of justice would be better 
served by hearing and determining the appeal by holding a trial 
de novo. 
bringing finality to the charge. 
121 Section 834( 1 )(a). 
122Section 834( 1 )(b). 
123From the abovementioned two forms of appeal against summary 
convictions or acquittals a further appeal may be taken by the accused 
or the prosecution to the court of appeal of the province with leave of 
that court, on any ground that involves a question of law (section 
839( 1)). The provincial court of appeal may (on such an appeal) 
exercise the same powers that it possesses in the case of an appeal 
from a conviction or acquittal of an indictable offence (section 839(2)). 
A new trial may be ordered if the appeal is from a section 81 2 appeal 
court. The Criminal Code does not provide for a further appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Canada from a summary conviction or acquittal. 
511 
In R v Faulkner124 the court indicated that the trial de novo 
procedure would now be used only in exceptional cases, for example, 
where there had been a failure of the judicial system to provide natural 
justice. 125 On an appeal by trial de novo, the accused is in exactly 
the same position as he was after the entry of his plea before the 
summary conviction court; the findings of the lower court are 
irrelevant to the appeal and the crown is required to prove every 
element of the offence charged. 126 
In chapter six127 and above128 it was indicated that the 
prosecution may also appeal against an acquittal or final order in 
favour of the accused for a summary offence. It was further indicated 
that the Ontario Court of Appeal recently held that the prosecution's 
right of appeal (on the record of proceedings) from summary 
proceedings include the right to appeal on questions of law as well as 
questions of fact. 129 The abovementioned power of the court of 
appeal to hear an appeal by way of trial de novo is contained in the 
general provisions of the Code which deal with the disposition of 
appeals from summary convictions or acquittals. Therefore, if the 
Code is interpreted literally, the prosecution may also obtain a trial de 
novo on appeal if the court of appeal deems it to be in the interest of 
124( 1977) 37 CCC (2d) 26 (NS Co Ct). 
125At 27. In R v Steinmiller (1979) 47 CCC (2d) 151 (Ont CA) the 
court held that in appropriate circumstances, the discovery of fresh 
evidence may provide grounds for allowing an application under 
subsection (4). 
126See Salhany 9-59. 
127Supra under 6.3.3. 
128See supra, text at note 120. 
129See Regina v Century 21 Ramos Realty discussed in chapter six 
supra under 6.3.3, text at note 92. 
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justice, or if the accused appeals against a conviction and a de novo 
trial is granted, new evidence may also be introduced by the 
prosecution. The constitutionality of these provisions has not as yet 
been considered by the Supreme Court of Canada. However, in 
Corporation Professionnelles des Medecins du Quebec v Thibault130 
the Supreme Court held that provincial legislation which gave the 
complainant and the crown a right of appeal by way of a trial de novo 
from an acquittal for a provincial offence, was of no force and effect 
by reason of section ll(h) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 131 
Similar to the de novo trial procedure provided for in the Canadian 
Criminal Code, the de novo appeal procedure provided for in the 
provincial legislation which was under scrutiny in the above case, 
provided that the hearing on appeal takes the form of a trial; that the 
judge hears witnesses; that the parties may adduce evidence both as 
to credibility of those witnesses and as to the essential facts of the 
case and that the prosecutor is also entitled to adduce evidence 
whether or not it had been adduced at the first trial. 
The facts of that case were as follows. The accused was charged 
with statutory offences which prohibit the unlawful practice of 
medicine. Following a trial, the charges against him were dismissed 
for lack of evidence identifying the accused. The prosecution then 
appealed against this acquittal to a superior court in terms of the 
abovementioned provincial legislation. The issue before the Supreme 
Court was whether the appellant was, in terms of section 11 (h) of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, "finally acquitted" by the decision of 
the judge of the court of first instance. If so, section 11 (h) guaranteed 
him the right not to be tried again for these offences. As indicated 
130( 1988) 42 CCC (3d) 1 (SCC). 
131 See chapter three supra under 3.3.1 for the wording of this section. 
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above, the court reached the conclusion that a prosecution appeal by 
way of trial de nova as provided for in the provincial legislation 
infringes on the accused's constitutional right against double jeopardy 
as set out in section 11 (h) of the Charter. The reasons advanced by 
the court for its conclusion can be summarised as follows. 132 
Initially, the court reiterated its views expressed in the Margentaler 
case, 133 namely that an accused, in terms of section 11 (h), is not 
finally acquitted until all the appeals provided for by law have been 
exhausted. However, the court stated that the fact that a proceeding 
is called an "appeal" is not sufficient to make it a true appeal and so 
prevent the accused from relying on section ll(h) of the Charter of 
Rights. In the court's view, one should not confuse an appeal which 
is decided in accordance with the record established in the lower court 
with a hearing at which each party adduces his evidence over again 
and may even add to it in the event of any deficiency. The appeal by 
trial de nova is actually a new trial disguised as an appeal; it is as if, 
once the accused was acquitted, the prosecutor has filed a new 
information alleging the same offence based on the same facts. In the 
court's view, this is precisely the type of abuse that section 11 (h) of 
the Charter seeks to prevent. Section 11 (h) guctrantees the accused 
the right to plead autrefais acquit if the prosecution attempts to have 
him tried again for an offence of which he has been acquitted. 
According to the court, the provincial legislation which is under 
scrutiny in this case bars him from raising this argument by authorising 
the prosecution to repeat the trial as part of the appeal proceedings. 
This legislation was accordingly found to be in violation of the 
accused's constitutional right against double jeopardy. 
132 These reasons are set out at page 9 of the judgment delivered by 
the court. 
133Supra at 542. 
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Finally, no provision is made in the Code for the ordering of a new 
trial by a superior court in disposing of a matter taken on review by 
means of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. In Canadian law, 
certiorari is mostly used where the applicant complains that the lower 
tribunal was improperly constituted or exceeded or abused its 
jurisdiction. 134 The Supreme Court also interpreted certain 
provisions in the Code,' which place limitations on the use of this 
remedy, as revealing an intention of the legislature to preclude the co-
existence of the two remedies of certiorari and appeal and to compel 
a recourse to appeal procedures where they are available. 135 The 
court laid down the principle that if an accused pleads and the case 
proceeds on the merits, his taking exception to the jurisdiction of the 
court can then only be made by way of appeal. 136 However, a plea 
of autrefois acquit will most probably not be available to an accused 
charged again if the proceedings at the first trial were declared a 
nullity by the superior court. 
8.3.4 Summary 
The following principles apply regarding appeals against convictions or 
acquittals handed down in a superior courts. 
* An accused convicted in a superior court may appeal to the 
provincial Court of Appeal on a question of law, a question of fact, a 
question of mixed law and fact or any other ground which appears to 
the court of appeal to be a sufficient ground for appeal. 
134Bolton 134. 
135See R v Sanders (1970) 2 CCC 57 (SCC). 
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* If a conviction is quashed on the basis of an error of law and the 
matter cannot be set right by the court of appeal itself, the court 
investigates whether there is admissible evidence, despite the error, 
on which a jury may conclude that the appellant is guilty. If this 
question is answered in the affirmative, the court may order a new 
trial. On the other hand, if there is a strong possibility of an acquittal, 
the court of appeal may be reluctant to order a retrial. 
* If an acquittal is quashed on an appeal brought by the prosecution 
and the court is unable to dispose finally of the matter, a retrial will 
only be ordered if there is a reasonable degree of certainty that if the 
error had not occurred, the verdict of acquittal would not have been 
given. 
* If a conviction is quashed on the basis of a miscarriage of justice, 
it is also required that there be a reasonable probability that the result 
of the proceedings (at the original trial) would have been different had 
the error not occurred. 
* Canadian courts of appeal have permanently stayed proceedings on 
the basis that the judicial process has been delayed. It follows that 
Canadian courts have recognised that serious violations of human 
rights may bar a second prosecution. 
* Where the ground of appeal relied on by the person who has been 
convicted is that the verdict is unreasonable or cannot be supported 
by the evidence, Canadian courts either dismiss the appeal or enter an 
acquittal. The basic premise is that if the trial had been error-free, the 
crown ought not to get a second opportunity to prosecute the 
accused, thereby enabling it to place before the jury a new theory of 
liability not relied upon at the first trial. 
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* In the absence of a crown appeal against an acquittal, the court 
may not substitute a conviction for an offence of which the accused 
was acquitted when it allows an appeal from conviction of a related 
offence. However, it may impose a more severe sentence on appeal 
(also in the absence of a counter-appeal by the prosecution) and 
probably also on retrial. 
* The test whether a new trial may follow on receipt of new 
evidence on appeal is the same as applied by the English Court of 
Appeal. 
The following principles apply regarding appeals against convictions or 
acquittals handed down in lower courts. 
* Both the accused and the prosecution may appeal against final 
verdicts handed down in lower courts on matters of law as well as on 
matters of fact. The powers of the courts of appeal are the same as 
in indictable offences. 
* Unlike the position in English law, the appeal from lower Canadian 
courts is confined to the record of the proceedings. However, the 
legislature reserved a discretion in a court of appeal to order that an 
appeal be heard by way of trial de nova if it is of the opinion that the 
interests of justice would better be served more effectively in this 
manner. The courts have indicated that the de nova procedure would 
be used only in exceptional cases, for example where fresh evidence 
has come to light. The constitutionality of the provision (where the 
prosecution appeals against an acquittal) has not as yet been 
considered by the Supreme Court. Similar provincial legislation has 
nevertheless been viewed by the court to be unconstitutional; it has 
been held that a prosecution appeal by way of trial de nova as 
provided for in the provincial legislation infringes on the accused's 
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right against double jeopardy as set out in section 11 (h) of the 
Charter. It remains to be seen if the same reasoning will apply if the 
discretionary powers vested in a court of appeal to hear a matter de 
novo ( also in favour of the prosecution) is subjected to constitutional 
scrutiny. 
8.4 INDIAN LAW 
8.4. 1 General 
In Indian law wide powers are conferred on appellate tribunals to order 
retrials on reversal of both convictions and acquittals. The courts 
justify this practice in terms of the "continuing jeopardy" theory. 137 
However, in exercising their discretion to order a retrial, Indian courts 
have not altogether denied the accused protection against double 
jeopardy. In fact, close scrutiny of decisions of the various High 
Courts and the Supreme Court reveals that there has been a reluctance 
on the part of the courts to order retrials if further proceedings might 
be viewed as a harassment of the accused. 
8.4.2 The power of appellate tribunals to order new trials on reversal 
of convictions or acquittals 
As already discussed, the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure 
authorises the High Court, inter alia, to order a retrial of an accused 
whose acquittal (on a prosecution appeal), had been set aside by that 
137See Pillai 301. The author cites the early case of Queen Empress 
v Jabanulla 23 C 975, 977 (1895). See also the decisioh of the 
Supreme Court of India in Kalawati v State of Himachal Pradesh 
discussed in chapter six supra under 6.4.2. 
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court. 138 It was also pointed out that although the Code expressly 
prohibits the High Court, in the exercise of its revisionary powers, to 
convert a finding of acquittal into a conviction, the Supreme Court of 
India nevertheless held that the High Court may order a retrial of an 
accused in exceptional circumstances. 139 
The Code also provides for appeals against convictions. 140 These 
lengthy provisions will not be discussed in detail. Suffice it to say that 
the ambit of an appeal from an order of acquittal or conviction is the 
same except that an appeal against a conviction is as of right and lies 
to courts of different jurisdictions depending on the nature of 
sentence, the kind of trial and the court in which it was held. An 
appeal against an order of acquittal can only be made to the High 
Court by the state or by a complainant (where the case started on 
complaint) with the special leave of the High Court. Similar to appeals 
against acquittals, appeals against convictions lie on matters of fact 
as well as matters of law. 141 
138See section 386(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act 1973 ( 1 
of 1974). 
139See Chinnaswamy v State of AP discussed in chapter six supra 
under 6.4.4. The court allowed this practice despite recognising that 
the ordering of a retrial on review of an acquittal would in fact amount 
to an indirect method of converting an acquittal into a conviction. 
140Section 374 of the Code. 
141 A further appeal to the Supreme Court of India may be taken in the 
following circumstances: (a) when the High Court in exercising its 
original extraordinary criminal jurisdiction convicts a person (section 
374( 1) of the Code); (b) when the High Court on appeal reverses an 
order of acquittal and sentences a person to death or to imprisonment 
for life or to imprisonment for a term of 10 years or more (section 379 
of the Code); (c) when the High Court certifies that a case involves 
a substantial question of law concerning the interpretation of the 
Constitution (article 132( 1) of the Indian Constitution) or, when such 
certificate is refused by the High Court and the Supreme Court grants 
special leave to appeal from such a decision (article 132(2) of the 
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The powers of the court to dispose of an appeal against a conviction 
are in essence the same as those which are provided for in dealing 
with appeals against acquittals. Apart from the power to dismiss the 
appeal, section 386(b) of the Code also provides that the court may 
(i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge 
the accused,. or. order him to be .. retried by a court of 
competent jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate 
Court or committed for trial or 
(ii) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence or 
(iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or 
the extent, or the nature and extent, of the sentence, but 
not as to enhance the same. 
In State of AP v Thadi Narayana 142 the court held that the words 
"alter the finding" should be limited to the finding of conviction against 
which the accused has appealed. This means that the court cannot 
alter the finding by substituting the conviction against which the 
accused has appealed with a conviction of a greater offence for which 
the accused had been acquitted by the trial court. It is also 
specifically provided that, if the accused appeals (in the absence of a 
counter-appeal by the prosecution), the court may not increase the 
sentence imposed by the trial court. 
In Ukha Ko/he v State of Maharashtra 143 the Supreme Court 
Indian Constitution); (d) when the High Court withdraws for trial 
before itself any case from any court subordinate to its authority and 
convicts the defendant and sentences him to death or certifies that the 
case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court (article 134( 1) of the 
Constitution) or (e) when the Supreme Court itself grants special leave 
to appeal from any decision of a court or a tribunal (article 136 of the 
Constitution). 
142AIR 1962 SC 240. 
143AIR 1963 SC 1531. 
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formulated the policy that retrials should be ordered only in exceptional 
circumstances. The court stated that the following circumstances 
would justify a retrial: 144 where the trial court had no jurisdiction 
or that the trial was vitiated by serious illegalities or irregularities; or 
on account of misconception of the nature of the proceedings there 
had been no real trial; or if the prosecutor or an accused, for reasons 
over which they had no control, had been prevented from leading 
evidence material to the charge, and in the interest of justice the 
appellate court deemed it to be appropriate, in the light of the 
circumstances of the case, that the accused should be tried again. 
This is not an exhaustive list of circumstances in which retrials have 
been ordered. However, decisions of the various High Courts and the 
Supreme Court reveal that the courts have also taken into account that 
a new trial may amount to oppressive state conduct and possible 
harassment of the accused. 
A number of decisions of Indian courts serve as illustrations of this 
approach. In Abinash Chandra Bose v Bimal Krishna Sen 145 the 
Supreme Court held that an accused who appealed on the facts 
against his conviction for misappropriation of his client's money could 
not be tried again in new proceedings. The court argued that it would 
amount to further harassment of the accused and an additional 
opportunity for the prosecution to advance evidence. The fact that 
the prosecution could have tendered the evidence at the first trial (had 
it acted properly), convinced the court that a second trial would be 
oppressive to the accused. In State of Punjab v Gurmit Singh 146 the 
High Court of Punjab and Haryana. refused to order a retrial on the 
144At 1537. 
145AIR 1963 SC 316. 
1461972 74 PLR 845. 
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ground that the accused's trial had previously been postponed on 
several occasions. The High Court dismissed the prosecution appeal 
on the basis that the accused had already been harassed in the first 
trial. In Bishan Singh v State of Rajasthan 147 the trial court 
neglected to do its duty to frame correct charges in accordance with 
the law. The accused appealed against their convictions on the basis 
that they were irregularly charged. The court allowed their appeal, 
arguing that the mistake amounted to a serious illegality which had 
materially prejudiced the accused. The court entered an acquittal 
instead of ordering a retrial; it held that the accused, who had already 
faced the agony of a prolonged criminal proceeding including detention 
in jail for two years, could not be subjected to the further harassment 
in a new trial. 148 The court made the following important 
comment149 
Justice is not one sided. It has many facets. While it is 
incumbent upon the Court to see that the guilty persons 
do not escape punishment, it is even more necessary to 
see that persons accused of crimes are not indefinitely 
harassed. The scales of justice have to be kept on an 
even balance whether for the accused or against him, 
whether in favor of the state or not. In these 
circumstances, I am not prepared to order a retrial in the 
case because of the facts that appear here. 
However, in other cases the Supreme Court and High Courts held 
that retrials should not be refused merely on the ground of harassment 
of the accused if the circumstances of the case made it otherwise 
desirable; in other words, if it would be in the interests of the proper 
1471973 Cri LJ 1079. 
148At 1081. 
149At 1082. 
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administration of justice to order a retrial. 150 It may therefore be 
concluded that Indian courts balance the conflicting interests of the 
accused and society in the exercise of its discretion to order a retrial. 
The Indian Code of Criminal Procedure also makes provision for the 
receipt of fresh evidence on appeal. 151 These provisions have been 
interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean that fresh evidence may be 
introduced on appeal irrespective of whether the prosecution or the 
defence institute the appeal. 
In Rajeswar Prasad Misra v State of West Benga/152 the Supreme 
Court considered the interrelationship between the provisions for 
receiving fresh evidence on appeal and for ordering retrials. In that 
case the prosecution appealed against an acquittal. The High Court 
deemed it necessary to hear additional evidence on behalf of the 
prosecution. In the light of this additional evidence the court then set 
aside the acquittal on the basis that there was sufficient evidence to 
convict the accused of the crime charged. The accused appealed 
against this decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that the High 
150See Madhukdhari Singh v Janardhan 1966 Cri LJ 307 (SC) where 
the court ordered a retrial on the ground that the first trial was not 
properly conducted and S v Kishan Dayal AIR 1952 HP & Bilaspur 46 
where the court ordered a retrial despite the argument that it would 
result in harassment of the accused. Both these cases are discussed 
in detail by Pillai 364-365. 
151 Subsection ( 1 ) of section 391 of the Code provides that "[in] dealing 
with any appeal under this chapter, the Appellate Court, if it thinks 
additional evidence to be necessary, shall record its reasons and may 
either take such evidence itself, or direct it to be taken by a 
Magistrate, or when the appellate court is a High Court, by a Court of 
Session or a Magistrate". Subsection (2) provides that "[w]hen the 
additional evidence is taken by the Court of Session or the Magistrate, 
it or he shall certify such evidence to the Appellate Court, and such 
Court shall thereupon proceed to dispose of the appeal" . 
152AIR 1965 SC 1887. 
523 
Court acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by the statute in 
receiving additional evidence which had helped the prosecution to 
strengthen its case. The accused relied on the earlier decision of the 
Supreme Court in Abinash Chandra Bose v Bimal Krishna Sen. 153 In 
that case the court barred the retrial of an accused whose conviction 
had been set aside on appeal on the ground that it would be 
oppressive to the accused to be tried again in circumstances where 
the prosecution could have supplied additional evidence at the first 
trial. Therefore, the accused in Rajeswar argued that the same 
considerations, namely the denial of a second opportunity to the 
prosecution to fill in the gaps in the case, should also be applied if 
fresh evidence was to be presented on appeal. The Supreme Court 
rejected this argument. It held that although there is some analogy 
between the power to order a retrial and the power to take additional 
evidence on appeal 
.... the Code contemplates that a retrial may be ordered 
after setting aside the conviction or acquittal (as the case 
may be) if the trial already held is found to be 
unsatisfactory or leads to a failure of justice. In the same 
way, the Code gives the power to the appellate Court to 
order one or the other as the circumstances may require 
leaving a wide discretion to it to deal appropriately with 
different cases. 154 
Pillai submits that the provisions in the Code which authorise a court 
of appeal to hear additional evidence in fact reflects an intention of the 
legislature to limit the need for ordering retrials. 155 The above 
discussion of Indian decisions demonstrates that the courts hav.e been 
153See supra, text at note 145 for a discussion of this decision. 
154At 1891. See Pillay 357-359 for a detailed discussion of that case. 
155At 357. 
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cautious about ordering retrials. However, after a proper consideration 
of the case law, it cannot be stated categorically that the courts have 
preferred to hear additional evidence on appeal rather than order 
retrials with a view to avoid subjecting the accused to a new trial. 
Concerning conviction and sentence on retrial, the general approach 
in Indian law is that if there is only an appeal by an accused against 
his conviction, the High Court may order a retrial only for the offence 
against which he has appealed. 156 This means that in the absence 
of an appeal against an acquittal, a retrial of the accused may not be 
ordered for an offence (or offences) of which he had been acquitted 
at the first trial. However, if the state appealed against an acquittal, 
or the High Court exercised it revisionary powers in terms of section 
401 of the Code, suo motu, or at the instance of the prosecution, 157 
the High Court may order a retrial of an accused for an offence of 
which he had been acquitted provided that the accused was given an 
opportunity to be heard. 158 
In respect of resentencing, the provisions of section 386 of the 
Code clearly indicate that in the event of an appeal by the accused 
against his conviction, his sentence may not be increased on 
appeal. 159 Although there is no authority on the specific point, this 
section can also be interpreted to mean that on reconviction at retrial, 
after the initial conviction had been set aside on appeal, the court is 
prohibited from imposing a more severe sentence than that which had 
156Gopalan v State of Kera/a 1962 2 Cri LJ 427. 
157See supra chapter six under 6.4.4 for a discussion of this provision. 
158Gopalan v State of Kera/a at 432. 
159See section 386(b)(ii) and (iii) discussed supra, text at note 142. 
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been imposed at the original trial. However, if the prosecution appeals 
against the acquittal of a more serious offence handed down by the 
trial court, it appears that the court retrying the case would be free to 
retry the accused on the original charge and sentence him in 
accordance with the law. 160 
8.4.3 Summary 
* Generally, appeals and new trials are not regarded as a violation of 
the rule against double jeopardy in Indian law. Prosecution appeals 
and new trials are justified in terms of the "continuous jeopardy" 
theory. 
* Nevertheless, in considering the appropriateness of new trials, 
Indian courts have recognised that the accused ought to be protected 
against state abuse of power. In a number of cases Indian courts have 
refused to order new trials on the basis that a subsequent prosecution 
may be viewed as harassment of the accused. Potential harassment 
has for instance been identified in circumstances where a conviction 
was set aside on the basis of insufficient evidence; it was felt that a 
second trial would unduly advantage the prosecution by enabling it to 
bring additional evidence which could have been supplied at the first 
trial. 
* However, courts have allowed retrials despite potential harassment 
if the court considered it to be in the interests of the proper 
administration of justice to order a new trial. Therefore, in deciding on 
the appropriateness of a new trial, Indian courts attempt to balance 
the conflicting interests of the state and the accused. 
160See Pillai 370. 
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* The receipt of fresh prosecution evidence on appeal is not per se 
regarded as an infringement on the accused's double jeopardy rights. 
* A court of appeal may not substitute a conviction against which 
the accused has appealed for a conviction of a more serious offence 
of which the accused had been acquitted at the trial. If the state 
appeals against an acquittal, the court of appeal may not substitute 
the acquittal for a conviction, but may order a new trial for the 
offence of which the accused was acquitted. 
* A sentence may not be increased on appeal if only the accused 
appeals against his conviction and/or sentence. Although there is no 
direct authority on the issue, the same apparently applies as regarding 
the imposition of punishment at retrial. However, if the prosecution 
appeals against an acquittal and a retrial is ordered, a more severe 
sentence might be imposed by the court retrying the case. 
8.5 THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
8.5.1 General 
In chapter six it was pointed out that the Supreme Court of the 
United States consistently held that an accused may not be tried again 
for an offence of which he had previously been acquitted by a court 
of trial. 161 In that discussion it was also indicated that the Supreme 
Court in recent years limited the definition of an acquittal to a 
161 See Kepner v US; Sanabria v US; US v Martin linen Supply Co and 
US v Scott discussed supra under 6.4. The only exception to this rule 
is the one recognised in US v Wilson, namely, that the rule against 
double jeopardy does not bar a state appeal against a judge's post-trial 
discharge following a conviction by the adjudicator of fact. See supra 
under 6.5.4, text at note 158 for the reasons advanced by the court 
in making this exception. 
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termination of proceedings in favour of the accused based on the 
factual merits of the case. 162 
In doing this, the Supreme Court opened the door for prosecution 
appeals against so-called dismissals (terminations of proceedings in the 
trial court on a different basis than that of the factual merits of a 
case), and also for successive prosecutions of accused in new trials 
on appellate reversals of so-called dismissals. 163 
The shift in emphasis that occurred in the definition of an acquittal 
can to an extent be ascribed to the approach adopted by the Supreme 
Court in cases dealing with the constitutional permissibility of new 
trials on appellate reversal of convictions. These decisions are 
considered in detail in the following paragraphs. The issue of whether 
a de novo trial system is regarded as an infringement of the rule 
against double jeopardy will consequently be considered briefly. 
Finally, the double jeopardy implications of convictions and sentence 
on retrial will be considered. 
8.5.2 The permissibility of a retrial on reversal of a conviction by a 
higher tribunal 
The first instance in which the Supreme Court considered in any 
detail the double jeopardy implications of an appellate reversal of a 
conviction was in the case of US v Ball. 164 As pointed out in 
162As pointed out in chapter six, a termination of proceedings in favour 
of the accused on this basis is regarded as an acquittal for the purpose 
of double jeopardy protection, even if it is based upon erroneous 
substantive or evidentiary legal rulings. See Sanabria v US discussed 
in chapter six supra under 6. 5. 5, text at note 185. 
163See US v Scott discussed supra under 6.5.5. 
164Supra. 
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chapter six, the English rule that a defective indictment cannot legally 
place an individual in jeopardy was rejected in Ball; 165 the court held 
that an accused who had been acquitted on the general issue of guilt 
or innocence may not be tried again, even if the indictment on which 
he had been charged in the first trial was defective. 166 However, 
the Supreme Court was not prepared to accord the same finality to an 
appellate reversal of a conviction on a defective indictment. It held 
that if a conviction is set aside on appeal as a result of the fact that 
the indictment was irremediably defective, the accused may be re-
indicted in a new trial. The court relied, inter alia, on an early English 
case, 167 but mainly based its conclusion on the premise that 
(t]heir plea of former conviction cannot be sustained 
because upon a writ of error sued out by themselves the 
judgment and sentence against them were reversed and 
the indictment ordered to be dismissed. 168 
Because the Supreme Court did not give sufficient reasons for the 
disparity in its treatment of acquittals and reversed convictions based 
on defective indictments, several attempts have been made to explain 
its rationale. In Trono v US169 the theory was advanced that by 
successfully appealing his erroneous conviction the accused "waives" 
the protection against being retried for the same offence which was 
165See chapter six supra under 6. 5. 2, text at note 131 for a detailed 
discussion of the court's decision in this regard. 
1661d. 
167 At 672 of the majority opinion Mr Justice Story referred to R v 
Drury 3 Cox CC 544 3 Car & K 193 as comparative authority for his 
point of view. 
168At 672. (My emphasis). 
169 199 (US) 521, 533 (1905). 
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afforded him by the original judgment. The waiver theory was also 
endorsed in a series of decisions in the middle part of this 
century. 170 
These cases are inconsistent because in some cases the waiver 
theory was only applied where the accused requested a new trial on 
appeal but in others it was applied where the accused asked for a new 
trial as an alternative to a motion for acquittal or simply moved for a 
judgment of acquittal. 171 What is more, in decisions that followed 
on Ball, the Supreme Court did not distinguish between appellate 
reversal of convictions based on procedural errors and reversals based 
on insufficient evidence, but instead cited Ball to justify the assertion 
that appellate reversals did not impinge on double jeopardy. 172 
In the 1960's, American legal commentators advanced valid 
criticisms against the waiver theory. 173 It was submitted that a 
waiver connotes a voluntary act which is absent if the accused 
appeals against his conviction and moves for an acquittal without 
170Bryan v US 338 US 552 ( 1950) (where the defendant successfully 
appeals against his conviction, he waives any double jeopardy 
protection that he might have); Sapir v US 348 US 373 (1955) (the 
court limited the Bryan rule by holding that if a defendant requests a 
new trial, he may not rely on double jeopardy); Yates v US 354 US 
298 ( 1957) (applying the Bryan waiver rule to cases in which the 
defendant asks for a new trial in the alternative to a motion for 
acquittal, but stating that appellate courts have full authority to order 
a retrial as a remedy for evidentiary insufficiency even if the defendant 
only moved for a judgment of acquittal). 
171 See id. 
172See US v Forman 361 US 41 6 ( 1960) which confirmed this 
approach. 
173See Mayers DK and Fletcher L Yarbrough "Bis vexari: New trials 
and successive prosecutions" Harvard Law Review Vol 74 1960 1. 
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requesting a new trial. 174 These authors also expressed the view 
that a waiver theory must start with the assumption that the 
Constitution itself protects the defendant from a new trial after appeal 
in the absence of his consent. They explain that if this is correct, the 
criticism by Mr Justice Holmes of the waiver theory in Kepner v 
US175 would seem indisputable. In that case Justice Holmes 
commented that 
[i]t cannot be imagined that the law would deny to a prisoner 
the correction of a fatal error unless he should waive other 
rights so important as to be saved by an express clause in the 
Constitution. 176 
In the abovementioned legal commentators' views, the continuing 
jeopardy theory is a more satisfactory explanation or reason why an 
accused may be tried again on reversal of his conviction. 177 Their 
arguments amount to the following. 178 The word "jeopardy" was 
substituted for "trial" in the final amendment of the Constitution. The 
concept "jeopardy" may be construed to mean that it continues until 
the final settlement of any prosecution. This means that an unappealed 
conviction, by its finality, would bar a new proceeding by the 
government. However, a correction of error on appeal may be viewed 
174/d. At 6 the authors stated that" it is obvious that a waiver 
rationale here, as elsewhere, serves only to state the conclusion 
without explaining the reason for it. The defendant, if given his 
choice, would prefer both to have and eat his cake, but the term 
waiver connotes a voluntary act". 
175See chapter six supra under 6.5.2 for a discussion of this case. 
176At 135 of the dissenting opinion. 
177The continuing jeopardy theory was first introduced by Mr Justice 
Holmes in Kepner's case. See chapter six supra under 6.5.2, text at 
note 144 for a discussion of the dissenting opinion in that case. 
178Mayers and Fletcher 7. 
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as a continuation of both the jeopardy and the proceedings from which 
it arises. A new trial on reversal of conviction would therefore be 
permissible in terms of the constitutional provision against double 
jeopardy. 
However, in decisions that followed in the latter half of this century, 
neither the waiver theory nor the continuing jeopardy theory has been 
advanced by the Supreme Court as the only reason that an accused 
may be tried again on appellate reversal of his conviction. In US v 
Tateo 179 the question raised before the Supreme Court was whether 
an accused who had his conviction reversed on the ground that his 
plea of guilty entered during trial was not voluntary, but induced by 
comments of the trial judge, could be tried again for the same crimes. 
The court concluded that this case fell squarely within the reasoning 
of Ball and subsequent cases, which allowed the state to retry persons 
whose convictions had been overturned. The conviction was 
accordingly reversed and the case remanded to the District Court with 
instructions to reinstate the original charges. 
The decision in Tateo was important because the court did not 
attempt to advance a specific theory which explained the rule, but 
rather attempted to identify the policies which underlie this rule. 
Justice Harlan who delivered the majority opinion made the following 
comments180 
While different theories have been advanced to support the 
permissibility of retrial, of greater importance than the 
conceptual abstractions employed to explain the Ball principle 
are the implications of that principle for the sound 
administration of justice. Corresponding to the right of an 
179337 us 463 ( 1964). 
180At 466. 
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accused to be given a fair trial is the societal interest in 
punishing one whose guilt is clear after he has obtained such a 
trial. It would be a high price indeed for society to pay were 
every accused granted immunity from punishment because of 
any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the 
proceedings leading to conviction. From the standpoint of a 
defendant, it is at least doubtful that appellate courts would be 
as zealous as they now are in protecting against the effects of 
improprieties at the trial or pretrial stage if they knew that 
reversal of a conviction would put the accused irrevocably 
beyond the reach of further prosecution. In reality, therefore, 
the practice of retrial serves defendants' rights as well as 
society's interests. 
These remarks influenced the court considerably in the landmark 
decision of Burks v US. 181 In that decision, the Supreme Court 
limited the ambit of the rule previously endorsed (namely that new 
trials after appellate reversals of conviction do not implicate the 
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy). Burks had been 
charged with robbing a federal bank. His defence was insanity. Three 
psychiatrists testified on behalf of the defence that he was unable of 
conducting himself in accordance with the law. The state presented 
two experts whose testimony was ambiguous on the question of 
whether his mental state was such that he could conduct himself in 
accordance with the law. He was convicted by the jury but the case 
was reversed on appeal because the state had failed to rebut 
testimony of the defendant's expert witnesses. The Court of Appeals 
then remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to 
determine whether the defendant should receive a directed verdict of 
acquittal or whether a new trial should be ordered. However, The 
Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals had erred in its remand 
order. 
181 437 US 1 (1978). 
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The Supreme Court distinguished between reversals due to 
insufficiency of evidence and reversals due to procedural errors at trial. 
Chief Justice Burger who delivered the opinion of the court pointed 
out that the reversal in Ball182 had not been based on insufficient 
evidence but rather on trial error. The court found that it was 
unfortunate that cases which had followed on Ball had failed to draw 
this important distinction. In the court's view, this failure had 
contributed substantially to the "state of conceptual confusion" which 
had existed in this area of the law. 183 Therefore, the Supreme 
Court in Burks made use of the opportunity to clarify the law in this 
area. The court explained that reversal for trial error (as distinguished 
from reversal for evidentiary insufficiency), does not constitute a 
decision to the effect that the state has failed to prove its case. 184 
In other words, it implies nothing with respect to the guilt or 
innocence of the accused. 185 It rather amounts to a determination 
that an accused has been convicted through a judicial process which 
is defective in some fundamental respect, for example incorrect 
reception or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions or 
prosecutorial misconduct at trial. The court expressed the opinion 
that if these errors occur 
. . . the accused has a strong interest in obtaining a fair 
readjudication of his guilt free from error, just as society 
maintains a valid concern for insuring that the guilty are 
punished. 186 
182See chapter six supra under 6.5.2, text at note 131 for a discussion 
of the court's decision in Ball. 
183At 15. 
185/d. 
186At 16. 
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The court stated that various rationales (for example the waiver 
theory and the continuing jeopardy theory) had been advanced to 
support the policy of allowing a retrial to correct a trial error. 
However, the court did not deem it necessary to consider the validity 
of these theories. Instead, the court expressed the view that the most 
reasonable justification for this policy is that advanced in Tateo 187 
in which the court stated that188 
It would be a high price indeed for society to pay were every 
accused granted immunity from punishment because of any 
defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings 
leading to conviction. 
However, the court in Burks expressed the view that different 
considerations come into play if a conviction is reversed on the ground 
of insufficiency of evidence. In such instances the court argued that 
[t]he prosecution cannot complain of prejudice, for it has been 
given one fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it could 
assemble. Moreover, such an appellate reversal means that the 
government's case was so lacking that it should not even have 
been submitted to the jury. 189 
The court stated categorically that the double jeopardy clause forbids 
a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another 
opportunity to supply evidence which it had failed to prersent in the 
first proceedings. 190 Quoting the famous dictum in Green v US, 191 
187See supra, text at note 180. 
188At 466 of the majority opinion of Tateo. 
189At 16. 
190At 11. 
191 See chapter three supra for the dictum in Green. 
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the court identified this consideration as central to the objective of the 
prohibition against successive trials. 192 
In casu the court concluded that the appellate court's reversal 
based on insuffficiency of evidence was tantamount to holding that 
the trial court should have granted the defendant's motion for 
acquittal. Had the trial court done so, there could be no retrial. 
Therefore, the mere fact that the appellate court had declared the 
defendant's innocence was irrelevant. In the Supreme Court's view, 
a determination by some court had been made to acquit the accused. 
After that no retrial was possible in terms of the double jeopardy 
provision of the Constitution. Furthermore, the court regarded the fact 
that the accused had sought a new trial as one of his remedies or even 
as a sole remedy, as irrelevant. 193 
Burks was confirmed in the same year in Greene v Massey194 
and, in 1981, in Hudson v Louisiana. 195 Unfortunately, the clarity 
that Burks brought was somewhat obscured in two later decisions of 
the Supreme Court, namely, Tibbs v Florida 196 and Lockhart v 
Nelson. 197 In these decisions the court gave a narrow interpretation 
of the principles laid down in Burks and once again limited the rights 
193The court rejected the notion (at 8) that a person "waives" his right 
to a judgment of acquittal by moving for a new trial. Previous cases 
which suggested that by applying for a new trial an accused waives 
his right to a judgment of acquittal, even if his appeal had been based 
on evidentiary insufficiency, were therefore overruled in Burks. 
194437 us 19 (1978). 
195450 us 40 (1981). 
196457 us 31 (1982). 
197 109 SC 285 (1988). 
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of a person who had been convicted against double jeopardy. 
In Tibbs the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a reversal 
of a conviction by an appellate court based on the weight of the 
evidence, as opposed to the sufficiency of the evidence, makes a 
difference in terms of double jeopardy analysis. In order to understand 
the distinction drawn in Tibbs between sufficiency and weight of 
evidence, it is necessary to first of all explain which test is applied in 
American law to establish evidentiary sufficiency. 198 
In Jackson v Virginia 199 the Supreme Court formulated the test 
for a review of the evidentiary sufficiency of a jury's guilty 
verdict. 200 In that case, the court stated that the presumption of 
innocence requires proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 201 This 
means that, in reviewing a guilty verdict, the appellate court must 
decide whether any rational adjudicator of fact could find proof of the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 202 In 
reaching a conclusion about the sufficiency of evidence, the reviewing 
court must consider the evidence in the light most favourable to the 
prosecution. 203 However, the evidentiary sufficiency enquiry does 
not require that the court must also weigh the sufficiency of the 
198The evidentiary sufficiency test is the standard of review applied in 
the federal law of the United States. 
199443 us 307 (, 979). 
2001n Burks the Supreme Court applied the Jackson standard of review 
in order to determine whether the evidence against the accused was 
insufficient. 
201 At 309. 
202At 324. 
203At319. 
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evidence on the basis of the court's personal opinion. 204 This means 
that it does not require the court to enquire as to whether the jury's 
verdict is believable. The jury is the factfinding body responsible for 
resolving conflicting testimony and weighing evidence. 205 However, 
if the reviewing court finds that no rational factfinder could have found 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the court must rule that the evidence 
was insufficient. 206 
The evidentiary sufficiency test as laid down in Jackson is the 
federal standard of review applied in the law of the United States. As 
the accused in Burks had committed a federal offence, the Supreme 
Court applied this standard of review in order to assess whether the 
evidence on which the accused was convicted in the trial court was 
insufficient. However, the review by the Florida Appellate Court of the 
trial court's decision in Tibbs was done in terms of a rule of appellate 
procedure which at the time prevailed in that state. This rule was 
interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean that an appellate court was 
required to review sufficiency of evidence as well as weight of 
evidence in capital cases. 207 
As already noted, the issue before the Supreme Court in Tibbs was 
whether a reversal of a conviction based on the weight of the 
evidence rather than the sufficiency of the evidence bars a retrial of 
2os310. 
206At 324-325. 
207The particular rule (Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. 140(f) 
(Supp 1982) provided that "[i]n capital cases, the court shall review 
the evidence to determine if the interests of justice requires a new 
trial, whether or not insufficiency of the evidence is an issue presented 
for review". (My emphasis). 
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the accused. 
Tibbs was convicted in a Florida District Court for first degree 
murder and rape of the murder victim's companion. He appealed 
against his conviction to the Florida Supreme Court. On appeal, the 
court identified six weaknesses in the state's case which cast doubt 
on the credibility of the rape victim's testimony and the substantiality 
of the state's evidence in placing Tibbs at the scene of the crime. 
The Florida Supreme Court consequently reversed the decision and 
remanded the case for a new trial, in terms of the Florida rule of 
appellate procedure discussed above. 208 At the retrial Tibbs moved 
for a dismissal on the basis of the decisions of the Supreme Court of 
the United States in Burks and Massey. He argued that a retrial 
would, in terms of these decisions, violate his constitutional rights 
against double jeopardy. The Florida court of appeal dismissed his 
appeal stating that the original reversal of his conviction by the Florida 
Supreme Court was not simply on the basis of pure insufficiency of 
evidence, but rather on the view that the evidence was inherently 
weak and seriously contradictory. Consequently, since the reversal 
was not based on insufficiency of evidence, but rather on its 
insubstantial weight, Tibbs could not rely on Burks to prevent a new 
trial. 
This approach was confirmed by the Supreme Court. Justice 
O'Connor who delivered the majority opinion in Tibbs began by 
characterising Burks as a "narrow exception from the understanding 
that a defendant who successfully appeals a conviction is subject to 
retrial" .209 In the court's view, Burks precludes retrial of the 
defendant only in those cases where the reviewing court had found 
208See supra note 207. 
209At 40. 
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the evidence to be legally insufficient to support a conviction. 
According to the court's interpretation of Burks, this standard requires 
that the government's case was so lacking that it should not have 
been submitted to the jury. 210 In other words, the rule barring retrial 
would be confined to cases "where the prosecution's failure is 
clear". 211 
In order to justify the court's conclusion, Justice O'Connor argued 
that the exception recognized in Burks rested on two closely related 
policies. Firstly, that the double jeopardy clause attaches special 
weight to judgments of acquittals. In the court's view, a reversal 
based on insufficiency of evidence also amounts to an acquittal 
"because it means that no rational factfinder could have voted to 
convict the defendant". 212 Secondly, Burks implemented the 
principle that the double jeopardy clause "forbids a second trial for the 
purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply 
evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding" .213 In 
Justice O'Connor's words214 
[t]his prohibition, lying at the core of the Clause's protections, 
prevents the State from honing its trial strategies and perfecting 
its evidence through successive attempts at conviction. 
Repeated prosecutorial sallies would unfairly burden the 
defendant and create a risk of conviction through sheer 
governmental perseverance. 
210At 41. 
211 At 41, citing Burks 17. 
212At 42. 
213At 41, citing Burks 11. 
214At41. 
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Therefore, because the abovementioned reasons bar a retrial where a 
reversal rests on the ground that the prosecution has failed to produce 
sufficient evidence, they do not have the same force when a judge 
disagrees with a jury's resolution of conflicting evidence and 
concludes that a guilty verdict is against the weight of the 
evidence.215 In the court's view216 
[a] reversal on this ground, unlike a reversal based on 
insufficiency of evidence, does not mean that acquittal was the 
only proper verdict. Instead, the appellate court sits as a 
thirteenth juror and disagrees with the jury's resolution of the 
conflicting testimony ..... 
The judge also pointed out that a reversal based on the weight of 
the evidence can occur only after the state has presented sufficient 
evidence to support a conviction. 217 In the court's view, if a 
reviewing court finds that the evidence adduced by the state is 
sufficient, but the court disagrees with the jury's weighing of the 
evidence, a reversal and remand would serve the interests of the 
accused to obtain a favourable judgment in a new trial. In Justice 
O'Connor's words 
215/d. 
216/d. 
[g]iving the defendant this second opportunity when the 
evidence is sufficient to support the first verdict, hardly 
amounts to "governmental oppression of the sort against which 
the Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to protect". 218 
217Namely if the evidence, viewed in the light most favourable to the 
prosecution, would be sufficient to convict the accused. 
218At 44 citing Mr Justice Rehnquist in US v Scott 91. 
541 
An appellate court's decision to "give the defendant this second 
chance" would therefore, in terms of the majority opinion in Tibbs, 
"not create an unacceptable high risk that the government, with its 
superior resources, will wear down the defendant solely through its 
persistence" .219 
Several legal commentators considered the validity of the 
sufficiency /weight distinction as proposed in Tibbs. 22° From a 
jurisprudential perspective, the most valid criticism advanced is the 
following. In making a subtle distinction between reversal based on 
sufficiency of evidence and weight of evidence, the court placed form 
over substance.221 Although the Jackson standard222 may support 
a distinction, the relevant distinction that should be made in order to 
determine whether a retrial is barred in terms of the double jeopardy 
clause, is whether the appellate reversal is based on procedural or 
substantive evidentiary grounds. 223 All reversals based on 
substantive evidentiary grounds are due to a failure of proof beyond 
219At 43. 
220See Johnston MM "Double Jeopardy: A systematic method for 
evaluating evidentiary sufficiency and weight of the evidence" 
Washington and lee Law Review Vol 40 1983 1619; Geary CJ 
"Double jeopardy: Retrial after reversal of a conviction on evidentiary 
grounds" Louisiana law Review Vol 43 1983 1061; Ginter TS 
"Weight v Sufficiency of Evidence: 'Tibbs v Florida' Buffalo law 
Review Vol 32 1983 759; Seward M "The Sufficiency-Weight 
distinction - a matter of life or death" University of Miami Law Review 
Vol 38 1985 147; Singer DL "Tibbs v Florida: Reversals based on 
weight of the evidence and the double jeopardy clause" South Texas 
law Journal Vol 24 1983 365. 
221 Singer 377. 
222See supra text at note 199 for a detailed discussion of this 
standard. 
223Singer 380. 
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reasonable doubt at trial. If the factual proof was beyond reasonable 
doubt, the state would not need a second opportunity to prove its 
case. 224 
However, some commentators expressed themselves in favour of 
the sufficiency-weight distinction advanced in Tibbs. Tibbs is 
evaluated, inter alia, as "leaning away from notions of judicial 
efficiency towards a concern for fair play" .225 It is suggested that 
the Supreme Court adopted a more flexible attitude in Tibbs with a 
view to encourage reviewing courts to act in the "interests of 
justice"; thereby promoting a fair process which takes into account 
the interests of both society and the accused. 226 
However, the fact that the prosecution may obtain a new trial on 
reversal of a conviction based on weight of evidence and present 
additional evidence on retrial is regarded as the "most troublesome 
aspect" of the Supreme Court's holding in Tibbs. 227 The critics 
argues that this is precisely the kind of oppressive conduct identified 
in Green228 and Burks229 which the double jeopardy clause seeks 
to prevent. A retrial is allowed after reversal on procedural grounds 
because the prosecutor has no special incentive to uncover additional 
evidence, polish the testimony of his witnesses or otherwise 
225Geary 107 4. 
226/d. 
227Geary 1078. At 44 (notes 18 and 19) of the majority opinion in 
Tibbs, the court stated that it would be possible for the prosecution to 
offer new evidence on retrial. 
228Discussed in chapter three supra under 3.5.1. 
229See the discussion of the court's opinion in Burks supra, text at note 
181. 
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strengthen his case, thereby increasing the risk that an innocent 
defendant will be convicted. 230 However, where a conviction is 
reversed on the weight of the evidence, the prosecution,in fact has 
been alerted that its case is not solid. Therefore, the reversal will 
motivate the prosecution to uncover and provide more evidence 
resulting in a more effective presentation at retrial. 231 
Geary argues that if the purpose in granting a retrial (as the court 
argued in Tibbs) is to give the accused a "second chance at 
acquittal", 232 the prosecution should not be given another chance 
to introduce evidence. In his view, this would be in contradiction of 
the established policies supporting the protection against double 
jeopardy. 233 The introduction of additional evidence by the 
prosecution at retrial violates the policies determined in Green, namely 
allowing the state "with all its resources and power ... to make 
repeated attempts to convict" and to "enhance the possibility that 
even though innocent [the defendant} may be found quilty" .234 In 
view of these established policies which underly the guarantee against 
double jeopardy, the abovementioned author suggests that, as a 
prophylactic rule protecting the defendant's constitutional rights, the 
prosecution should not be allowed to present additional evidence in its 
case against a defendant whose conviction has been reversed because 
it was "against the weight of the evidence or "in the interests of 
justice". 235 
230Geary 1075. 
231/d. 
232See the majority opinion in Tibbs supra 44. 
233Geary 1075. 
234/d quoting Green at 187-188. 
235/d. 
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The last decision which deserves scrutiny in the analysis of double 
jeopardy protection against retrial on reversal of a conviction is 
Lockhart v Nelson. 236 The problematic question which the court had 
to resolve in this case was whether the double jeopardy clause 
permits retrials if an appellate court identified the erroneous admission 
of evidence against an accused as ground for reversal of his 
conviction, but draw the further conclusion that without this evidence 
the remaining evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction. 
The majority of the court ruled that a retrial would not be prohibited 
by the double jeopardy clause in such a situation because the ground 
for reversal had been an error in the trial. 237 In a brief opinion 
concerning the matter, Mr Justice Rehnquist expressed the view that 
in evaluating insufficiency of evidence for double jeopardy purposes, 
the reviewing court should look at all the evidence which had been 
admitted at trial and not only at the properly admitted evidence. 238 
The court then reviewed all the evidence presented by the 
prosecution at the trial and concluded that as the sum of the evidence 
complied with the requisite standard of the evidentiary sufficiency test, 
the accused could be tried again in a new trial. In order to strengthen 
its argument, the court also stated that 
236Supra. 
[p]ermitting retrial in this instance is not the sort of 
governmental oppression at which the Double Jeopardy 
Clause is aimed; rather, it serves the interest of the 
defendant by affording him an opportunity to "obtain a 
fair readjudication of his guilt free from error". 239 
237The court based its conclusion on the rule laid down in Burks, 
namely that the double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial of an 
accused after reversal of a conviction for trial error. 
238At 290. 
239At 291, quoting the majority opinion in Burks 15. 
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In a dissenting opinion, Mr Justice Marshall rejected the 
majority's views that a reviewing court should look at all admitted 
evidence in evaluating evidentiary insufficiency for double jeopardy 
purposes. The judge described the majority's reliance on Burks for this 
view as "ipse dixit jurisprudence of the worst kind". 240 Mr Justice 
Marshall interpreted the Burks rule, namely that a retrial is barred if the 
reversal is based on insufficiency of evidence, as being "based on the 
time honoured notion that the state should be given only 'one fair 
opportunity to offer whatever proof it [can assemble]"' .241 The 
minority opinion indicated that the insufficiency of admissible evidence 
constitutes a decision to the effect that the government had failed to 
prove its case. 242 Therefore, the state must be denied a further 
opportunity to convict the accused. 243 
It is submitted that the minority opinion in Lockhart presents a true 
reflection of the court's approach in Burks. However, as yet, the court 
has not had another opportunity to reconsider its ruling in Lockhart. 
8.5.3 De novo trials 
In Justices of Boston Municipal Court v Lydon244 the issue before 
the court was whether the de nova trial system which applied in the 
240At 296 of the dissenting opinion. 
241At 293 quoting the majority opinion in Burks 16. 
242At 44, relying on Burks 15. 
243See also Collins T "Double Jeopardy: Evidentiary insufficiency v. 
trial error after Lockhart v. Nelson" Detroit College of Law Review 
1989 283, 300 which submits that the majority's opinion of the 
Supreme Court in this case directly contradicts its reasoning set forth 
in Burks. 
244466 us 294 ( 1984). 
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state of Massachusetts should be declared unconstitutional in terms 
of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution. Under the Massachusetts two-tier trial system, a 
defendant could choose to be tried either before a judge or a jury. If 
an accused who elected to have a bench trial was dissatisfied with the 
outcome, he could not appeal, but had an absolute right to a trial de 
nova before a jury. However, if he initially chose to be tried by a jury 
and was convicted, he could then appeal through the usual appellate 
process. In Lydon the accused elected to have a bench trial and was 
convicted despite his claim that the evidence failed to prove the 
element of intent required for the crime charged. He then sought to 
be tried de nova before a jury but prior to trial, he moved to have the 
charge dismissed claiming that the evidence at the first-tier trial had 
been insufficient and that the second tiered trial was barred according 
to Burks. 
The majority of the Supreme Court rejected this argument. It held 
that this case could be distinguished from Burks. In Burks, an 
appellate court had made a determination that the appellant should be 
acquitted. The court pointed out that no such determination had been 
made by a reviewing court in lydon. 245 Instead, the Supreme Court 
viewed the trial de nova procedure which prevailed in the State of 
Massachusetts as part of a single continuous process. 246 Also, the 
defendant received extra advantages under the two-tiered system. If 
he won, he was acquitted. If he lost, he had an absolute right to a 
retrial. The court expressed the view that, under these circumstances, 
neither the double jeopardy clause nor the holding in Burks would be 
245At 309-310 of the majority opinion delivered by Mr Justice White. 
246At 309. 
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violated. 247 
Considered in the context of the two-tier system under review, the 
Supreme Court's decision in Lydon cannot be criticised. However, 
only three months after its decision in Lydon, the Supreme Court 
applied the "continuous jeopardy" theory as invoked in Lydon, to 
justify a retrial of the accused on a declaration of a hung-jury mistrial 
in Richardson v US. 248 This case has already been considered in 
detail in chapter three which focuses upon the issue of attachment of 
jeopardy. 249 
Suffice it to say that the criticisms raised against the decision 
(discussed in chapter three) are also recognised in the context 
addressed in this chapter. 
8.5.4 Conviction and sentence on retrial 
In the chapter which deals with the right of the prosecution to 
appeal against an acquittal, it was pointed out that the Supreme Court 
held in Green v US that an accused who had been convicted of a 
lesser included offence on a charge of a more serious (or greater) 
offence, may not be tried again for the greater offence at a second 
trial. 250 The court argued that the accused's conviction for the 
lesser offence at the first trial should be regarded as an implied 
247312. 
248Supra. 
249See chapter three supra under 3.5.2.1, text at note 198. 
250See supra chapter six under 6. 5. 3, text at note 14 7 for a discussion 
of that case. 
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acquittal of the greater offence. 251 Therefore, the accused may not 
be tried again for the greater offence, even if his conviction for the 
lesser offence had been set aside on appeal. 
The rule laid down in Green came to be known as the "implied 
acquittal doctrine". 252 The implied acquittal doctrine could easily 
have been adapted to all sentencing decisions. On the strength of the 
court's decision in Green, it may be argued that when a particular 
sentence is chosen from a range of authorised penalites, the judge or 
jury is implicitly acquitting the defendant of a greater penalty, just as 
the jury in Green implicitly acquitted the accused of a greater degree 
of the same offence. 253 However, the Supreme Court has in several 
leading cases wrestled with varying approaches to the problem 
whether an accused may receive a harsher sentence on retrial. 
The first of these cases was North Carolina v Pearce, 254 decided 
twelve years after Green. Pearce was convicted and sentenced to 
imprisonment in the trial court. Several years later, his conviction was 
reversed on the ground of trial error and he was retried. The second 
trial resulted in a conviction and sentence which, when added to the 
time he had already served, amounted to a longer sentence than that 
imposed at the original trial. The issue before the Supreme Court was 
whether the double jeopardy clause protects an accused against 
imposition of a more severe sentence on retrial. 
2511d. 
252See Doss MP "Resentencing defendants and the protection against 
multiple punishment" University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol 133 
1985 , 409, 14, 2. 
253Doss 1412. 
254395 us 71, (, 969). 
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The court stated initially that the double jeopardy clause not only 
protects an accused against a second prosecution for the same 
offence after conviction or acquittal, but also against multiple 
punishment for the same offence. 255 The constitutional guarantee 
against multiple punishment would therefore require that punishment 
already exacted must be fully credited when sentence is imposed in a 
new conviction for the same offence. 256 However, the court 
expressed the view that it does not follow that the double jeopardy 
clause protects an accused against the imposition of a more severe 
sentence on retrial. Therefore, the court rejected the notion that the 
imposition of a sentence less than the prescribed maximum operates 
as an implied acquittal of any greater sentence. 257 In the court's 
view, the Green principle could not be applied in the context of 
sentencing, because it was based on the double jeopardy provision's 
guarantee against retrial for an offence of which the defendant had 
been acquitted. 258 
Instead, the court professed that a necessary corrollary to the 
power to retry an accused is the ability 
upon the defendant's reconviction, to impose whatever 
sentence may be legally authorised.259 
The new sentence imposed on retrial cannot be regarded as multiple 
255At 717. 
256/d. 
257 At 720. 
258At 720 note 14. 
259At 720. 
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punishment, since 
... the original conviction has, at the defendant's behest, 
been wholly nullified and the slate wiped clear. 260 
The court concluded that to hold to the contrary, would be to cast 
doubt on the validity. of the- basic.. principle enunciated. in. US v 
Ball. 261 Pearce has accordingly been interpreted by legal 
commentators as manifesting the idea that an accused who 
successfully appeals his conviction forfeits his right to have the court 
treat the inital sentence as a "ceiling". 262 
However, the court in Pearce placed some limitations on the power 
of a court to impose a more severe sentence on retrial. The court 
stated that it would be a violation of the due process clause (the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution) if a state trial court 
impose a heavier sentence on a reconvicted person with the explicit 
purpose of punishing the defendant for having succeeded in obtaining 
a reversal of his original conviction. 263 Therefore, in order to give 
effect to due process requirements, the court required that should a 
judge impose a more severe sentence on a reconvicted person at a 
new trial, he must give reasons for doing so and these reasons "must 
be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct 
on the part of the defendant occuring after the time of the original 
260At 721. (My emphasis). 
261 /d. As discussed above under 8.5.2, text at note 164 the court held 
in Ball that an accused whose conviction is reversed on appeal, may 
be reprosecuted in a new trial. 
262See Westen 1059-1060. 
263At 726. 
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sentencing proceeding" . 264 
It is clear that in ruling that the constitutional guarantee against 
double jeopardy does not prohibit the imposition of a more severe 
sentence at retrial after appellate reversal of a conviction, the Supreme 
Court had been greatly influenced by its previous holding in US v 
Ball. 265 However, as indicated above, the Supreme Court in 1978 
in Burks v US qualified its holding in Ball. 266 In Burks the court held 
that the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution prohibited 
reprosecution of an accused whose conviction had been reversed on 
appeal on the ground of insufficient evidence. A reversal based on 
insufficient evidence was regarded by the court in Burks to be an 
acquittal which barred retrial. 267 
In 1980, in the case of US v DiFrancesco, the Supreme Court 
applied this principle, namely that an acquittal bars retrial, in the 
context of sentencing. 268 In this case, the Supreme court ruled that 
the double jeopardy clause does not prohibit the prosecution from 
2641d. The court also required that the factual data on which the 
increased sentence is based must be made part of the record, so that 
the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully 
reviewed on appeal. The Pearce rule was accepted in later decisions 
by the Supreme Court and it was emphasised that actual 
vindictiveness should be found on the part of the court or prosecution 
before an increased sentence on retrial could be regarded as 
unconstitutional in terms on the fourteenth amendment. (See 
Blackledge vPerry417 US 21 (1984); Thigpen vRoberts 468 US 27 
( 197 4) and Wasman v US 468 US 559 ( 1984). 
265See supra under 8.5.2, text at note 167 for a discussion of the rule 
laid down by the Supreme Court in Ball. 
266See supra, texts at notes 181 and 182. 
268This case is discussed in detail in chapter six supra under 6.5.6. 
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appealing against sentence. As indicated in the detailed discussion of 
that case in chapter six, 269 the court argued that an appeal of a 
sentence would only violate double jeopardy principles if the original 
sentence was to be treated in the same way as an acquittal and the 
appeal was to be treated in the same way as a retrial. 270 The court 
concluded in DiFrancesco that the sentence imposed by the trial court 
could not be regarded as an acquittal nor the appeal as a retrial 
because it 11 did not ... approximate the ordeal of a trial on the basic 
issue of guilt or innocence 11 • 271 
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied mainly on its previous 
rulings in Burks and Scott. 272 However, the court (in DiFrancesco), 
also justified its conclusion that a prosecution appeal against sentence 
does not amount to double jeopardy by referring to its previous ruling 
in Pearce. The court regarded the rejection of the implied acquittal 
doctrine in Pearce in the context of resentencing on retrial as of equal 
force in the context of prosecution appeals against sentence.273 The 
court expressed the view that just as an increase of sentence on retrial 
was not prohibited on double jeopardy grounds, an appeal by the 
prosecution against sentence could also not be regarded as a violation 
of double jeopardy principles. 274 
269/d. 
270At 133 of the majority opinion discussed supra under 6.5.6. 
271At 136 of the majority opinion. 
272Discussed in text at note 1 81 supra, and chapter six supra under 
6.5.5, text at note 193. The approach adopted by the Supreme Court 
in both these decisions is that a termination of proceedings based 
upon an adjudication of the factual guilt or innocence of the accused, 
bars further proceedings initiated by the prosecution. 
273At 136 note 14. 
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However, the court's subsequent decision in Bullington v 
Missouri275 cleared the way for the application of the implied 
acquittal doctrine in the context of resentencing. As pointed out in 
chapter six, the court in Bullington held that because Missouri's capital 
sentencing procedure sufficiently resembled a trial of guilt or 
innocence, a jury's sentence of life imprisonment in that state served 
as an acquittal of "whatever was necessary to impose the death 
sentence 11 • 276 Mr Justice Blackmun reasoned in Bullington that 
Missouri's capital sentencing procedure which required a pre-sentence 
hearing in which counsel makes opening statements; testimony is 
taken, and evidence is introduced, and the jury is instructed and final 
arguments are made, "resembled and indeed, in all relevant respects 
was like the immediately preceding trial on the issue of guilt or 
innocence 11 • 277 Moreover, Missouri law explicitly required that the 
prosecution prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt at the 
sentencing hearing. The court expressed the view that since the 
sentencing phase at the first trial could be viewed as the guilt or 
innocence phase of the trial, the double jeopardy clause protected an 
accused in respect of the death penalty because he was implicitly 
acquitted of the death penalty by a jury. 278 
The court distinguished Bullington from those cases in which there 
were no separate sentencing proceedings in which the prosecution 
was required to prove additional facts in order to justify the particular 
275See chapter six supra under 6.5.6, text at note 218 for a detailed 
discussion of this case. 
276At 445 of the majority opinion. 
277At 438. 
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sentence. 279 For all these reasons, the court concluded that 
Bullington (after being convicted again in a new trial) could not be 
sentenced to death without violating the double jeopardy clause. 280 
Therefore, in Bullington the Supreme Court (albeit in exceptional 
circumstances) endorsed the application of the implied acquittal 
doctrine in the context of resentencing. These exceptional 
circumstances are present where the sentencing proceeding adopted 
at the first trial sufficiently resembles a trial, because it amounts to an 
adjudication of the guilt or innocence of the accused in respect of a 
particular sentence. 
The Supreme Court took the exception established in Bullington 
one step further in Arizona v Rumsey. 281 In that case, the court held 
that a bifurcated sentencing proceeding, similar to that which prevails 
in Missouri for capital offences, barred the state from seeking the 
death penalty on retrial after a life sentence had been imposed 
although the imposition of the life sentence instead of the death 
sentence could be ascribed to the fact that the trial judge had 
interpreted the law incorrectly. 282 
279At 439. 
280At 438. 
281 104 us 2305 ( 1 984). 
282 ln Rumsey, the trial judge did not impose the death penalty because 
he incorrectly interpreted a statute which set out which aggravating 
circumstances should be taken into account in deciding whether the 
death sentence should be imposed. He consequently sentenced the 
accused to life imprisonment. Rumsey appealed against his sentence, 
which enabled the state to file a counter-appeal on the issue of the 
judge's interpretation of the aggravating citrcumstance statute. The 
Arizona Supreme Court held that the statute was interpreted 
incorrectly. The court subsequently set aside the life sentence and 
remanded the case for determination of aggravating and mitigating 
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Justice O'Connor who delivered the majority opinion in that case 
found that the trial-like elements of the Arizona sentencing procedure 
were comparable to those of Missouri. She pointed out that both 
sentencing procedures involved a choice between the options of 
death and life imprisonment, a decision based on evidence presented 
and a burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the 
prosecution. 283 The court reasoned that the fact that the sentencer 
in Arizona was the trial judge and not the jury did not render the 
sentencing proceeding less like that of a trial. 284 Moreover, the 
judgment of life imprisonment at the initial sentencing hearing had 
been based on findings "sufficient to establish legal entitlement to the 
life sentence". 285 This amounted to an acquittal on the merits and, 
as such, barred any retrial on the issue of the death penalty. The fact 
that the acquittal resulted from an erroneous interpretation and ruling, 
in the court's view, did not change the double jeopardy effect of a 
judgment which amounted to an acquittal on the merits. The court 
opined that although "[i]t affects the accuracy of that determination, 
... it does not alter its essential character" .286 Therefore, the implied 
acquittal doctrine was also extended to cases which were conducted 
according to bifurcated sentencing procedures in which the trial 
court's ruling had been overturned because of an error. 
circumstances and resentencing. On resentencing, the trial court 
found that the aggravating circumstance (which incorrectly had not 
taken into account at the first trial), existed and resentenced Rumsey. 
283At 2309. 
285/d. 
286At 2310 quoting US v Scott discussed supra under 6.5.5, text at 
note 193. 
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8.5.5 Summary 
* In Burks the United States Supreme Court held that a reversal of 
a conviction by a court of appeal on the basis of insufficient evidence 
as opposed to procedural error, effects double jeopardy protection. 
The rationale advanced was that the prosecution, having already had 
a fair opportunity to offer the proof which it could procure, ought not 
to be offered another opportunity to present evidence which it failed 
to present in the first trial. This would amount to a violation of the 
values which underlie the constitutional guarantee against double 
jeopardy as identified in Green. 
* In Tibbs the Supreme Court made a distinction between reversal on 
the basis of insufficiency of evidence and reversal based on the weight 
of the evidence. The court argued that reversal on the basis of the 
weight of the evidence does not violate the accused's rights against 
double jeopardy. The decision in Tibbs was criticised, inter alia, on the 
basis that the court failed to recognise that the introduction of 
additional evidence by the prosecution at a retrial defeats the values 
which the rule against double jeopardy seeks to protect regardless of 
the basis on which a conviction is reversed (sufficiency or weight of 
evidence). 
* In Lockhart the Supreme Court held that in determining whether 
evidence is insufficient, a court of appeal should consider all the 
evidence including inadmissible evidence which was rendered at trial. 
If the sum of the evidence was sufficient to convict, the accused may 
be tried again. The court argued that to try a person again, in such 
instances, does not amount to oppressive state conduct but rather 
serves the interests of the accused by enabling him to obtain a fair 
adjudication of his guilt in a trial free of error. Criticism raised against 
this argument is that a finding of insufficiency of admissible evidence 
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means that the state failed to prove its case; a further opportunity to 
convict will therefore undermine the values which underlie the double 
jeopardy rule. 
* Both Tibbs and Lockhart can be viewed as an attempt by the 
Supreme Court to narrow the application of the constitutional 
guarantee against double jeopardy as professed in Burks. As indicated 
in the above discussion of these cases, the court justified its decisions 
in both these cases as being well within the boundaries of Burks. Be 
that as it may, there can be no doubt that the rulings of the court in 
both Tibbs and Lockhart undermine the values which und~rlie the 
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy; values which the 
court was at pains to identify in Burks. 
* In Pearce the Supreme Court laid down the rule that the imposition 
by a court of a sentence less than the maximum does not operate as 
an "implied acquittal" of any greater sentence. The court 
subsequently applied this principle in the context of prosecution 
appeals against sentence. In DiFrancesco the court ruled that just as 
an increase of sentence on retrial is not prohibited on double jeopardy 
grounds, an appeal by the prosecution against sentence can also not 
be regarded as a violation of the constitutional guarantee against 
double jeopardy. The court argued that only an acquittal offers the 
accused protection against double jeopardy; a sentencing proceeding 
ccannot be regarded as an acquittal because it does not amount to a 
trial on the issue of guilt or innocence. 
* In Bullington, the argument advanced in DiFrancesco to justify 
prosecution appeals against sentence, was used to prohibit the 
imposition of a more severe sentence on retrial. The court held that 
because the sentencing hearing followed in Bullington resembled a trial 
inasmuch as it amounted to an adjudication of guilt or innocence, a 
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jury's sentence of life imprisonment served as an acquittal of the more 
severe sentence that could have been imposed, namely the death 
sentence. In Rumsey the court applied this principle despite the fact 
that the trial judge, in imposing the less severe (life imprisonment 
instead of death), interpreted the law incorrectly. 
* The court has not as yet extended the application of the implied 
acquittal doctrine to sentencing proceedings other than those which 
involve the imposition of the death penalty. 
* In view of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in the cases 
discussed above, it may be concluded that, at present, the accused 
whose conviction is reversed on appeal may receive a more severe 
sentence on retrial unless due process violations are involved and the 
procedural method employed for the imposition of sentence does not 
give rise to double jeopardy implications. 
8.6 SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
8.6.1 Historical overview 
The development in South African criminal law of the institution of 
appeal was discussed comprehensively in chapter six. 287 This 
discussion focuses on the development of South African law with 
regard to the permissibility of new trials on appellate reversal of 
convictions and (at a later stage) acquittals. 
As indicated in chapter six legislation enacted in 1828 provided for 
the Supreme Court to review proceedings of all lower courts on certain 
287See supra under 6.6.1. 
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specified grounds. 288 These grounds were the following: 
incompetency of the court; malice or corruption on the part of the 
judge; gross irregularity in the proceedings and the admission of illegal 
or incompetent evidence. 289 This legislation also empowered the 
Supreme Court, if necessary, "to set aside or correct the proceedings 
of inferior [sic] courts" .290 However, no provision was made for the 
Supreme Court to order new trials. 
In 1879 the legislature introduced a right of appeal by the accused 
against a conviction handed down by a superior court by means of 
special entry on the record of the proceedings on the basis of an 
irregularity which had occurred at trial. 291 The Act also empowered 
a superior court suo motu to reserve a question of law to the Court of 
Appeal in circumstances where the accused had been convicted. 292 
Specific provision was also made for the powers of the Court of 
Appeal in disposing of appeals. Based purely on English law, section 
27 of the Act provided essentially as follows 
In case of any appeal against a conviction, or of any 
question being reserved as aforesaid, it shall be lawful for 
the Court of Appeal in criminal cases 
(a) to confirm the judgment of the Court below ... 
2880rdinance 40 of 1828. 
289Section 5 of Ordinance 40 of 1828. 
290Section 4. 
291 See section 23 of the Administration of Justice Act 5 of 1879 
discussed in chapter six supra under 6.6.1. 
292See section 25 of the Administration of Justice Act 5 of 1879. 
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(b) or direct that the judgment shall be set aside, 
notwithstanding the verdict, which order shall 
have for all purposes the same effect, as if the 
defendant had been acquitted 
(c) or direct that the judgment of the Court shall be 
set aside, and that instead thereof such judgment 
shall be given by the Court before which the trial 
took place as ought to have been given at the trial 
(d) or if such Court has not delivered judgment, remit 
the case to it in order that it may deliver judgment 
(e) or make such other order as justice may require. 
However, the prov1s1on was added that no 
conviction be set aside by reason only of some 
irregularity or illegality, whereby the defendant 
was not prejudiced in his defence, or because 
evidence was improperly admitted or rejected, by 
which no substantial wrong was, in the opinion of 
the Court of Appeal, done to the defendant. 
The same provisions applied in Transvaal except that where a 
judgment had been set aside, the Court of Appeal could not direct the 
lower court to give such judgment as ought to have been given at the 
trial but had to give the proper judgment. 293 However, decisions 
handed down after these provisions were enacted do not indicate 
whether the provision set out in (e) above had been invoked to order 
new trials. 
In 191 7 these provisions were re-enacted in consolidating 
legislation. Act 31 of 191 7 dealt inter alia with appeals against 
decisions handed down in superior courts. These appeals were still 
limited to special entries of irregularities in the proceedings or 
reservations of questions of law. Section 3 7 4 of that Act repeated the 
293Section 272 of Transvaal Ordinance 1 of 1903. See Nathan 2755. 
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provisions of section 27 of the 1879 Act as set out above. 294 No 
indication was given in the new Act of whether and in which particular 
circumstances a court of appeal would have the competency to order 
a new trial. 
In R v Silber295 the court set aside a conviction in terms of these 
provisions on the basis of a serious miscarriage of justice. One of the 
jurymen at the trial, unknown to the presiding judge, had been unable 
to understand the language in which the complainant had given her 
evidence. The court did not order a new trial, but acting in its 
inherent jurisdiction, added that "under the circumstances, however, 
this order [which sets aside the conviction] will be without prejudice 
to the right of the Attorney-General if so advised, to bring fresh 
proceedings against the accused in respect of the crime with which he 
was charged". 296 
In R v Harmse297 the court relied on the "nullity" theory as 
proposed in English law in order to set aside a conviction and order a 
new trial. The facts of that case were as follows. Harmse pleaded 
guilty to the offence of being an accessory after the fact of the crime 
of theft before a Special High Court constituted under a War Measure 
during the second World War. On conviction and sentence the court 
reserved the following question of law for the decision of the Appellate 
Division 
Whether the Special High Court had jurisdiction to 
294See supra text beneath note 29 2. 
295 1940 AD 186. 
296At 194. 
297 1944 AD 295. 
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convict the accused of being an accessory after the fact 
to the crime of theft. 
The Appellate Division held that although the Special High Court had 
jurisdiction to try a person for the crime of theft, it had no jurisdiction 
to try a person for the offence of being an accessory after the fact to 
the crime of theft. 298 It accordingly set aside the conviction and 
sentence. The issue was then raised whether the court of appeal 
could order a new trial. 
It was contended on behalf of Harmse that if the court set aside the 
verdict, subsection (b) of section 374 would become applicable. This 
subsection stipulated that an order that the judgment should be set 
aside "shall have for all purposes the same effect as if the accused 
had been acquitted". Defence counsel submitted that this meant that 
the accused may not be tried again for the same offence. Tindall JA 
rejected this argument. He stated that there were no decisions of 
South African courts which set out the effect of subsection (b). 299 
He pointed out that if it was held that the effect of subsection (b) was 
that remittal to the trial court was precluded 
in a case like the present where the proceedings after 
arraignment were a nullity and there has in law been no 
proper trial, the result of the order would ... not be in 
accordance with the requirements of justice. 300 
Instead, the court suggested that in a case where all the 
298At 300. 
299At 305. 
300At 306. 
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proceedings in the trial after arraignment could be regarded as a 
nullity, a court should order a new trial by exercising the power 
conferred by subsection (e), namely to "make such other order as 
justice may require" .301 The court referred to English case law, for 
instance Crane's case,302 as authority for its conclusion that a court 
of appeal may set aside a conviction and order a new trial in 
circumstances where the accused "had not been tried at all" in the 
court of trial. 303 
It is also necessary to consider briefly the relevant provisions of the 
Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 191 7 enacted at the same time as the 
above legislation. This Act provided for an appeal by the person who 
had been convicted in a magistrate's court against his conviction as 
well as sentence, both on questions of law and of fact. The Act also 
empowered the court of appeal to affirm or set aside the conviction or 
vary the sentence imposed by the magistrate's court. 304 However, 
in the Magistrates' Courts Act the additional provision was inserted 
that305 
[w]henever a conviction or sentence of a magistrate's 
court is set aside on appeal or on review on the ground 
that evidence was admitted which should not have been 
admitted, or that evidence was rejected which should 
have been admitted or on the ground of any other 
irregularity or defect in the procedure, proceedings in 
respect of the same offence to which the conviction and 
302That case is discussed in chapter seven supra under 7 .3, text at 
note 45. 
303At 308. 
304Section 100 of the Act set out the same provisions as section 374 
of Act 31 of 191 7 dealing with appeals from superior courts. 
305Section 100(7) which was added by the Criminal and Magistrates' 
Courts Procedure Amendment Act 39 of 1926. 
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sentence referred, may again be instituted either on the 
original summons or charge or upon any other 
indictment, as if the accused had not previously been 
arraigned, tried and convicted: Provided that such 
proceedings shall be instituted before some other judicial 
officer than the judicial officer who recorded the 
conviction and imposed the sentence set aside on appeal 
or review. 
In Sewmangel v Rex 306 the court set aside a conviction on the 
basis that it had been partially obtained as a result of inadmissible 
evidence. The court relied on the above section and stated that "the 
Crown is at liberty to institute fresh proceedings before some other 
judicial officer" .307 In Ngobese v Rex3°8 the provision was relied 
on in the following circumstances. At the close of the crown's case 
the accused wished to call three witnesses who were not present. 
The magistrate declined to allow the witnesses to be called. On 
appeal the court held that the failure of the magistrate to allow the 
accused to call evidence had prejudiced him and amounted to an 
irregularity within the meaning of the above section.309 The court 
added that "the Crown will be entitled, if so advised, to institute 
proceedings again before another magistrate". 310 
In 1935 all courts of appeal were given the express power to impose 
punishment, which could be more or less severe or of a different 
nature to the punishment imposed by the court a quo, which ought to 
306 1939 NPD 105. 
307 At 106. 
3081940 NPD 286. 
309Section 1 00( 7) of Act 32 of 1 91 7. 
310At 287. See also to the same effect Cebekulu v Rex 1945 NPD 
284, 286. 
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have been imposed at the original trial. 311 
In 1944 the provisions dealing with appeals from magistrates' courts 
discussed above were re-enacted in the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 
1944. 312 Subsequently (in 1948), the legislature for the first time 
provided for an appeal against a conviction and sentence handed down 
in a superior court on factual as well as legal issues. 313 As indicated 
in chapter six, this legislation also made provision for an appeal by the 
prosecution on a point of law against an acquittal. 314 However, the 
Appellate Division had no power in terms of the 1 948 legislation to 
increase a sentence imposed by a superior court. 315 Of importance 
is that the legislature added a new provision which stipulated in which 
circumstances de novo proceedings could be instituted when a 
conviction or acquittal is set aside on appeal. These circumstances 
were the following316 
(a) where the court lacks competence to convict 
(b) where the indictment is invalid 
(c) where there is any other technical irregularity or 
defect in the proceedings. 
311 See Strauss 186. 
312Sections 103( 1 )-(7). Section 98(2)(d) set out the powers of courts 
of appeal in disposing of an appeal. 
313Act 37 of 1948. 
314See chapter six supra under 6.6.1. 
315See Swift 721. However, it still had the power to increase a 
sentence where the case originated in the magistrate's court. See 
Strauss 187 citing R v Theunissen 1952 ( 1) SA 201 (AD). 
316See section 13 of Act 37 of 1948. 
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In 1955 these provisions were re-enacted in the Criminal Procedure 
Act 56 of 1955. The 1955 legislation once again vested the power 
to increase a sentence imposed by a superior court in the Appellate 
Division. 317 The grounds (set out above) on which de nova 
proceedings could be instituted were re-enacted and authoritatively 
interpreted by the Appellate Division in two decisions handed down 
during the 1960' s. These decisions are discussed in detail in the 
paragraphs that follow. 
8.6.2 Current law 
8.6.2. 1 General 
The current powers of a court of appeal to dispose of a matter before 
it are basically the same as those provided for in the 1955 legislation. 
As indicated above, the English law of criminal procedure has 
undergone significant changes in the last decades, particularly in the 
field of new trials on appellate reversal of convictions. Although South 
African law of criminal appeals is based on the original English model, 
no reforms have been introduced in this particular field of criminal 
procedure. The legislature has maintained the position that new trials 
may be ordered only in certain defined circumstances. The basic 
premise is that the defence of autrefois acquit will be of no avail to 
an accused whose conviction is set aside on the basis of a technical 
irregularity in the proceedings which technicality is of such a nature 
that it precludes the court of appeal from considering the merits of the 
conviction. 
Provisions which empower a court of appeal to substitute a 
conviction of a lesser offence for a conviction of a more serious 
317See section 369(5) of the 1955 Act. 
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offence, have recently been considered and criticised by the Appellate 
Division on the basis of the "implied acquittal" doctrine. Provisions 
which empower a court of appeal to increase a sentence where only 
the accused appealed against his conviction and/or sentence, have 
been challenged on constitutional grounds; inter alia on the basis that 
they violate the accused's rights to a fair trial. However, the 
prohibition against double jeopardy has not specifically been relied on 
in this context. The appropriateness of the setting aside of a 
conviction on the ground of an irregularity has also been considered 
on the basis of the more comprehensive right of the accused to a fair 
trial. However, the appropriateness of a new trial following on a 
reversal of a conviction has not as yet been considered from 
constitutional perspectives. 
8.6.2.2 New trials on appellate reversal of convictions handed down 
in superior courts 
In terms of the current Criminal Procedure Act318 a person who has 
been convicted in a superior court and has been granted the necessary 
leave may appeal with the required leave to the Appellate Division or 
a full bench of the provincial division (as the case may be)319 on the 
following bases 
(a) against conviction on the factual merits320 
318Act 51 of 1977. 
319Section 315 of Act 51 of 1977 sets out the circumstances in which 
an accused may appeal either to the Appellate Division or to a 
provincial division. 
320Section 316( 1 )(b) of Act 51 of 1977. An accused found guilty on 
the basis of a guilty plea may only appeal against sentence and not 
against his conviction. However, a person who pleaded guilty in a 
superior court to a charge of murder may appeal against his conviction 
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(b) against sentence only321 
(c) on a point of law322 or 
(d) by means of special entry on the record on the ground of an 
irregularity or illegallity that occurred during the proceedings in 
connection with or during his trial. 323 
As indicated in chapter six, a superior court of first instance may also 
on its own motion or on request of the prosecutor, reserve a question 
of law for the consideration of the Appellate Division.324 Moreover, 
the Attorney-General may also appeal against a sentence imposed on 
a person convicted in a superior court. 325 
The powers of the court of appeal are set out in section 322 of the 
Act. In the case of an appeal against conviction or of any question of 
law reserved the powers of the court are the following 
(a) it may allow the appeal if it thinks that the judgment of the trial 
court should be set aside on the ground of a wrong decision of 
any question of law or that on any ground there was a failure 
of justice326 or 
which had been based on such a plea. (See S v Mavhungu 1981 ( 1) 
SA 56 (A) 63G-H). 
321 Section 316( 1 )(b). 
322Section 319( 1). 
323Section 3 1 7. 
324See supra under 6.6.2.2. 
325See section 31 68. 
326Section 322( 1 )(a). 
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(b) give such judgment as ought to have been given at the trial or 
impose such punishment as ought to have been imposed at the 
trial327 or 
(c) make such other order as justice may require 
provided that no conviction or sentence shall be set aside or 
altered by reason of an irregularity or defect in the record or 
proceedings, unless it appears to the court of appeal that a 
failure of justice has in fact resulted from such irregularity or 
defect.328 
In the case of an appeal against sentence by the accused or the 
prosecution, the court of appeal may confirm the sentence or may 
delete and amend the sentence and impose such punishment as ought 
to have been imposed at the trial. 329 The Act also specifically 
provides that the powers of the court of appeal in relation to the 
imposition of punishment should include the power to impose a 
punishment more severe than that imposed by the court of trial or to 
impose another punishment in lieu of or in addition to such 
punishment. 330 
The Act furthermore provides that where a conviction and sentence 
are set aside by the court of appeal on the ground that a failure of 
justice has in fact resulted because of the admission against the 
accused of evidence otherwise admissible but not properly placed 
before the trial court by reason of some defect in the proceedings, the 
court of appeal may remit the case to the trial court with instructions 
to deal with any matter, including the hearing of such evidence, in 
327Section 322( 1 )(b). 
328Section 322( 1 )(c). 
329Section 322(2). 
330Section 322(6). 
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such manner as the court of appeal may think fit. 331 The court may 
also receive further evidence on appeal or remit the case to the court 
of first instance for a further hearing, with the necessary instructions 
regarding the taking of further evidence as is deemed necessary. 332 
Finally, the Criminal Procedure Act provides that where a question 
of law has been reserved on the application of a prosecutor in the case 
of an acquittal, and a court of appeal has given a decision in favour of 
the prosecutor, the court of appeal may order that the applicable steps 
referred to in section 324 be taken "as the court may direct". 333 
Again, section 324 deals with the institution of proceedings de novo 
when a conviction is set aside on appeal. It provides that 
proceedings, in respect of the same offence to which the conviction 
and sentence refer, may again be instituted before a different judge on 
the original charge (suitably amended) or on any other charge, as if the 
accused had not previously been arraigned, tried and convicted. 
However, proceedings de novo may only be instituted on the following 
grounds 
(a) that the court which convicted the accused was not competent 
to do so 
(b) that the indictment on which the accused was convicted was 
invalid or defective 
(c) that there has been any other technical irregularity or defect in 
the procedure. 
The interpretation of these provisions by South African courts will 
accordingly be considered. The first issue to be considered is whether 
331 Section 322(3). 
332Section 22(a) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. 
333Section 322(4). 
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a court of appeal may, in terms of the power "to give such judgment 
as ought to have been given at the trial", 334 set aside a conviction 
and substitute it for a conviction of a more serious offence. In R v 
Makwanazi335 the Appellate Division answered this question in the 
affirmative. However, the court added the provision that the accused 
originally had to be charged with the offence substituted. In that 
case the court, on an examination of the evidence as a whole, found 
that the accused's conviction of assault with intent to do grievous 
bodily harm had to be substituted for a conviction of assault with the 
intent to rape. The accused was originally charged in the trial court 
with rape. In S v E336 the court confirmed this position. Corbett JA 
laid down the principle in the following terms337 
[W]aar 'n Appellhof oortuig is dat die verhoorhof, weens 
6f 'n verkeerde feitebevinding of 'n regsdwaling, die 
appellant skuldig gevind het aan 'n mindere ernstige 
misdaad as die waaraan hy, ingevolge die akte van 
beskuldiging, skuldig bevind behoort te gewees het, die 
Appelhof die bevoegdheid het, kragtens die huidige 
Strafproseswet, om die skuldigbevinding 
dienooreenkomstig te verander. 
The court added that in such cases, a court of appeal may also set 
aside the sentence, substitute it for an appropriate sentence, or refer 
the matter back to the trial court to impose sentence.338 In a recent 
decision, S v Morgan, 339 the Appellate Division explained in which 
334Section 322( 1 )(b). 
335 1948 (4) SA 686 (A). 
3361979 (3) SA 973 (A). 
337At 977D. 
338/d. 
3391993 (2) SACR 134 (A). 
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circumstances a court of appeal will be entitled to substitute a 
conviction of a lesser offence for a more serious offence. One of the 
several accused (Ms Winnie Madikizela Mandela), was charged with 
kidnapping and assault to do grievous bodily harm. She was found 
guilty of kidnapping, but only of being an accessory after the fact to 
the crime of assault on the basis that, at the time of the assaults she 
was away from home and therefore unable to take part in the assaults. 
On appeal against her conviction, the state requested the court to 
reverse the decision of the trial court on her alibi in respect of the time 
when the victims were assaulted and asked the court to change the 
conviction on the assault charge from guilty as an accessory after the 
fact to one of guilty as charged. The state argued that the court was 
empowered to do so in terms of the provisions of section 322( 1 )(b) 
and the explanation of these powers of a court of appeal in S v E. 340 
The court in Morgan rejected this argument. Delivering judgment, 
Corbett CJ stated that if the court were to re-open the question of the 
alibi it would have to re-assess the evidence of all the witnesses who 
testified in this respect, resolve evidential conflicts and consider the 
probabilities.341 Moreover, (so the court argued), it would have to 
do so without the assistance of the trial judge's full reasons for 
accepting the alibi, his impressions of the witnesses concerned and his 
weighing of the probabilities. 342 
The court observed that in all previous cases of relevance, the court 
substituted a conviction for a conviction of a more serious offence 
generally on the basis of the facts found by the trial court, or the 
undisputed facts, or the appellant's own evidence. The court 
340See supra, text at note 336 and 337. 
341 At 162c. 
342/d. 
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emphasised that in no case did the court "completely overturn the trial 
Court's finding of fact, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses 
and its weighing of the probabilities" . 343 Corbett CJ pointed out 
that the furthest the court went was in the cases of Makwanazi and 
E, namely in drawing a different inference from the evidence as a 
whole to that which had been drawn in the trial court. 344 
Of importance, however, is that the court also advanced other 
reasons, based on considerations of fairness, why section 322(2)(b) 
ought to be interpreted narrowly. The court explained that the 
formula "to give such judgment as ought to have been given by the 
court of trial" has a long history which can be traced back to 
legislation passed in the Cape colony in 1896. 345 The court 
pointed out that prior to the enactment of Act 51 of 1 9 77, the 
Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944346 had conferred these powers, 
which included the power to increase a sentence imposed by the trial 
court, on the court of appeal (including the Appellate Division). 347 
Corbett CJ continued by observing that in R v V348 the Appellate 
Division had interpreted the relevant provisions in the Magistrates' 
343At 162e. 
344At 162f. 
345Section 36 of the Administration of Justice Act 35 of 1896. The 
court observed that these provisions were re-enacted in consolidating 
legislation in 1917 (section 37 4(d) of the Criminal Procedure and 
Evidence Act 31 of 1 91 7). 
346Sections 98(2) read with section 103(4). 
347These powers were subsequently enacted in Act 51 of 1977 
(sections 304 and 309 - see infra for discussion of these provisions.) 
348 1953 (3) SA 314 (A). 
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Courts Act on the basis that these provisions also authorised the court 
of appeal to convict the appellant on an alternative count when 
quashing a conviction on another count. The facts of V were as 
follows. The accused was charged in the magistrate's court with inter 
alia, the offence of sodomy (the main charge) and alternatively with 
the statutory offence of aiding or being party to the commission by 
any male person of any act of gross indecency with another male 
person. V had been acquitted on the main charge but convicted and 
sentenced on the alternative charge. On appeal the court held that the 
evidence did not support the conviction on the statutory offence and 
that the magistrate's verdict should be set aside. However, the court 
found that the evidence did establish at least an attempt by V to 
commit sodomy and that a verdict to this effect (on the main charge) 
should be substituted. 
The importance of the decision lies in the fact that counsel for the 
appellant argued that it was not competent for the appeal court to do 
this where the accused had been acquitted in respect of the charge on 
which the prosecution had sought a conviction; it could only do so 
where the magistrate had returned no verdict on the charge. Counsel 
for the appellant based this argument on the contention that it is a 
fundamental principle of South African law that once an accused had 
been acquitted on a charge, the matter is finally concluded and no 
court of appeal can alter that acquittal to a conviction. Greenberg ACJ 
(who delivered judgment in the V case) passed the following comment 
concerning this argument349 
But this sacrosanctity of an acquittal has been 
encroached upon by the Legislature; s 104 of the Act 
entitled the Court of appeal to reverse a decision on a 
point of law which has resulted in an acquittal by a 
349 At 322G of the V case. 
575 
magistrate, and s 103(4) provides that on an appeal on 
facts, the Court of appeal may increase the sentence 
which, apart from special legislation, had enjoyed the 
same security, in regard to an increase, as an acquittal. 
The reason advanced therefore affords no ground for not 
giving the passage in regard to alternatives their plain 
meaning and this meaning does not justify the distinction 
contended for. 
In Morgan Corbett CJ pointed out that this fundamental principle (the 
11 sacrosanctity of an acquittal") had recently been referred to by the 
Appellate Division in the case of Magmoed v Janse van Rensburg. 350 
The Chief Justice added that just as it was held in R v V that this 
practice relating to an acquittal had been encroached by the legislature 
when it enacted sections 103(4) and 98(2) of the Magistrates' Courts 
Act, "so also must it be acknowledged that a similar encroachment 
results from the provisions of section 322 of Act 51 of 1977 11 • 351 
The court emphasised that in determining the extent of the powers 
of the court of appeal under section 322, the background of this 
principle ought to be borne in mind. Returning to the facts of the case 
at hand, Corbett CJ pointed out that although the court a quo had not 
acquitted the accused in the technical sense of the word on any of the 
charges preferred against her, the court's verdict in respect of the 
assault charges (based on an acceptance of her alibi) did "in effect" 
amount to an acquittal on the charges as formulated in the indictment 
and to a return of competent (but lesser) verdicts on those charges on 
the strength of different facts. 352 The court expressed the view that 
350See chapter six supra under 6.6.2.3 for a detailed discussion of that 
case. 
351 At 161b. 
352At 161 c. 
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"in such a case, too, one should not lose sight of the aforementioned 
practice". 353 In other words, the court held that one should not lose 
sight of the practice adverted to in Magmoed's case {namely to 
preserve the sacrosanctity of an acquittal) also in cases as the one at 
hand. This means that the court in Morgan came out in favour of, 
what is popularly referred to in American double jeopardy 
jurisprudence as the "implied acquittal doctrine" .354 
Section 322{c) vests in the court of appeal a general discretion to 
dispose of the matter. The section therefore may also be interpreted 
on the basis that it empowers the court of appeal to order a new trial. 
However, South African courts have not utilised this particular section 
to order new trials. This is probably so because section 324 
specifically provides for the institution of de nova proceedings. 
The proviso to section 322( 1) refers to an irregularity in the record 
or the proceedings. The term "irregularity" was explained by the 
Appellate Division in S v Pretorius355 as "any irregular or illegal 
departure from those formalities, rules and principles of procedure in 
accordance with which the law requires a criminal trial to be initiated 
or conducted". 356 In the past, appeals on the basis of an irregularity 
only succeeded if on the remaining evidence not affected by the 
irregularity, the court found proof beyond reasonable doubt that the 
appellant committed the offence. However, if the irregularity was of 
such a nature that the remaining evidence could not properly be taken 
354See chapter six supra under 6. 5. 3, text at note 14 7 for a discussion 
of this doctrine. Cf also supra under 8.5.4, text at note 250. 
355 1991 { 2) SACR 601 {A). 
356At 608f. 
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into consideration, the conviction had to be set aside on account of 
the irregularity. 
In S v So/0357 the court held that the provisions of the interim 
Constitution, more specifically sections 25(3) and 33( 1) changed the 
position.358 Section 25(3) guaranteed an accused a right to a fair 
trial, whereas section 33( 1) set out the circumstances in which the 
state's infringement on fundamental human rights may be justified. 
The court stated that an appeal against a conviction ought to succeed 
if the accused's right to a fair trial in terms of section 25(3) has been 
infringed, unless the court finds that such right has been limited by 
law of general application as intended by the provisions of the 
limitation clause (section 33( 1 )). In Solo, the court of appeal set aside 
a conviction of an attempt to cause an explosion and a sentence of 9 
years imprisonment on the basis that the presiding magistrate had not 
exercised his discretion to refuse a postponement of the case to 
enable the accused to secure the services of a legal representative, in 
a regular and judicial manner. However, the court emphasised that its 
finding could not be regarded as an acquittal of the crime charged; 
the court's finding was not based on the evidence advanced at the 
trial, but merely on the irregularity. 359 However, the court was not 
prepared to order a new trial in this particular case. Because the court 
emphasised that its finding did not amount to an acquittal 
( "onskuldigbevinding"), 360 it may be inferred that the court left open 
357 1995 ( 1) SACR 499 (E). 
-
358Act 200 of 1993. These provisions are presently contained in 
sections 35(3) and 36 respectively of the final Constitution (Act 108 
of 1996). See chapter ten infra under 10.5. and 10. 7 for the 
provisions of these sections. 
359At 509h. 
360See id. 
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the door for the prosecution to initiate proceedings de nova. 
As far as an appeal against sentence is concerned, the general 
principle applies that a court of appeal may only interfere if the trial 
court did not exercise its discretion in a judicial or reasonable 
manner. 361 These principles also apply where the court of appeal 
increases the sentence, irrespective of whether the state or the 
accused appealed. 362 
The Appellate Division interpreted the provisions of section 324 
(dealing with the institution of de nova proceedings) in the landmark 
decision of S v Moodie. 363 The facts of the case were as follows. 
Moodie was convicted of the murder of his wife and sentenced to 
death. He appealed by means of special entry on the record on the 
basis that the proceedings in connection with the trial were irregular 
in that the deputy sheriff in charge of the jury had been present in the 
jury room during the whole of their deliberations. The appeal was 
upheld by the Appellate Division on the basis that the irregularity 
complained of consisted of such a gross departure from the 
established rules of procedure that it constituted per se a failure of 
justice and that it was therefore unnecessary for the court to deal with 
the merits of the case. In other words, the court held that the trial 
361 See S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A). 
362See S v Anderson 1964 (3) SA 494 (A) in which the court 
emphasised (at 495g) that a court of appeal will not alter a 
determination arrived at by the exercise of a discretionary power 
merely because it would have exercised that discretion differently, but 
only if the trial court acted unreasonably or improperly. See also S v 
Du Tait 1979 (3) SA 846 (A), a case where the court of appeal 
increased the sentence where the accused had lodged an appeal. In 
that case, Rumpff CJ emphasised (at 855h) that a court will not lightly 
take the step of increasing a sentence. 
363 1961 (4) SA 752 (A). 
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was a nullity and on that account it did not consider the merits at all. 
The conviction and sentence were accordingly set aside and the 
accused freed. Moodie was subsequently arraigned before the 
Transvaal Provincial Division on the same charge as that on which his 
conviction and sentence had been set aside. He pleaded that he had 
previously been acquitted of the charge. His plea was upheld, and, at 
the request of the prosecution, the court reserved a question of law 
for the decision of the Appellate Division as to whether the trial judge 
was correct in upholding the plea. 364 
On appeal counsel for the state argued that just as an acquittal by 
a trial court set aside on appeal by reason of an irregularity or defect 
in the procedure does not qualify as an acquittal which brings into 
effect protection against double jeopardy, so too a conviction which 
is similarly set aside on appeal is not an acquittal which bars a further 
trial. 366 In other words, the state argued that a conviction and 
sentence set aside on a basis other than the factual merits of the case 
is not tantamount to an acquittal. 366 
Counsel for the accused on the other hand raised the argument that 
the principle applicable at common law is not that a person should not 
be tried twice or punished twice for the same act or omission, but that 
he should not be "put in jeopardy" twice for the same offence. 367 
Counsel for the accused pointed out the lack of unanimity in previous 
decisions with regard to the meaning of the expression "acquittal on 
364See S v Moodie 1961 (4) SA 752 (A). 
366 At 591 d. The state relied inter alia on R v Twalatunga (discussed 
in chapter three supra under 3.6.2). 
366At 591h. 
367 At 592, relying inter alia upon R v Manasewitz discussed in chapter 
four supra under 4.6.3. 
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the merits". They referred to the test proposed by Ridley J in the 
Engish case of Haynes, 368 namely "a verdict by the jury", or the 
test proposed by Gardiner JP in Bekker, 369 namely whether the case 
can be regarded as a /is terminata. Counsel for the accused raised the 
argument that because the jury in the court a quo in Moodie "gave a 
verdict which it intended to be a final decision, "370 the accused 
could not be tried de nova, except in the circumstances set out in the 
relevant legislation.371 In their view, section 370 had to be 
interpreted on the basis that it amounted to a mere confirmation of the 
common law; the words "any other technical irregularity or defect" as 
set out in section 370(c) had therefore to be interpreted ejusdem 
generis so that they were interpreted to have the same meaning as the 
words contained in subsections (a) and (b) (conviction on a defective 
indictment or conviction without the court having the necessary 
jurisdiction). 372 In other words, where the defect rendered the trial 
a nullity because (a) the court had no jurisdiction or (b) the indictment 
was invalid or defective. 
The Appellate Division rejected the arguments raised by the defence. 
It held that in terms of the common law principle of res judicata, the 
plea of autrefois acquit cannot succeed unless it is based on a final 
judgment on the merits. 373 The court relied on R v Bekker74 in 
368See chapter three supra under 3.2.2 for a discussion of this case. 
369See chapter three supra under 3.6.2 for a discussion of the Bekker 
case. 
370At 592h. 
371 Section 370 of Act 56 of 1955 (presently section 324 of Act 51 of 
1977). 
372At 594F. 
373At 595F. 
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which the Cape Provincial Division had previously referred to general 
statements which had been made by Voet in his treatment of the plea 
of res judicata. 375 In the court's view there had not been, as 
suggested by counsel for the defence, a /is terminata when he was 
convicted; his conviction had been set aside on appeal on the basis 
that the judgment convicting the accused was invalid by reason of an 
irregularity in the procedure. 376 The court stated that in effect the 
court in the first appeal held that no verdict by the jury, in those 
circumstances, could have been valid; accordingly (in the court's view 
in the second appeal) "the accused never was in jeopardy of being 
legally convicted at his trial" .377 
The court then considered whether its judgment (in the second 
appeal) could be regarded as an acquittal on the merits. Building on 
the premise than an acquittal on the merits was required in terms of 
the common law, the court observed that the factor which is common 
to sections 370(a) and (b) is that the ground on which the court of 
appeal sets aside the conviction is an irregularity or defect "which 
precludes a legally valid consideration upon the merits". 378 In the 
374See supra chapter three under 3.6.2, text at note 270 for a 
discussion of the Bekker case. 
375See Voet 44.2.1 - 44.2.3 set out in chapter two supra under 2.2, 
text at notes 13 and 14 and the text of Carpzovius referred to in 
Kaplan's case at 595G-H (discussed in chapter three under 3.6.2, text 
at note 281). The court also relied on Wessels CJ's opinion in 
Manasewitz (discussed in chapter four under 4.6.3, text at note 437) 
and concluded that whatever the position might have been in English 
law, a successful reliance on the exceptio rei judicatae in Roman-
Dutch law required an acquittal on the merits (at 596E). 
376At 596F. 
377 At 596G. 
378At 597F. 
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court's view, that factor must therefore also be found in section 
370(c). The court acc·ordingly laid down the principle that379 
[aJn irregularity in the procedure which justifies the 
setting aside of a conviction by the Court of Appeal is 
technical if it precludes a valid consideration of the 
merits: in other words, if it makes it impossible for the 
court to give a valid consideration on the merits. 
The Moodie principle was subsequently applied in State v Naidoo. 380 
Naidoo was convicted by a jury of the murder of a girl with whom he 
was on intimate terms. He was sentenced to death but his conviction 
and sentence was set aside on appeal on the ground that an 
irregularity had occurred in that certain evidence, calculated to 
influence the jury, was inadmissible. The inadmissibility was based on 
the fact that an Indian interpreter had not been sworn. On appeal the 
court examined the facts, including the valid evidence in respect of 
which there had been no irregularity. In other words, in considering 
the merits of the conviction, the court did not also take into account 
the inadmissible evidence given at the first trial. 381 The court 
concluded that it could not be said that the jury would inevitably have 
convicted on the remaining valid evidence. The conviction and 
sentence were accordingly set aside. However, Naidoo was 
subsequently reindicted on the same charge of murder. He pleaded 
autrefois acquit, which plea was upheld by the trial court. The matter 
came before the Supreme Court by reservation of a question of law 
posed by the prosecution, namely whether the trial court was correct 
379At 597G. 
3801962 (2) SA 625 (A). 
381 Contra the approach adopted in the American Supreme Court 
decision of Lockhart v Nelson discussed supra under 8.5.2, text at 
note 236. 
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in upholding the plea. The Appellate Division answered the question 
in the affirmative. By applying the Moodie principle, the court 
concluded that Naidoo was entitled to rely on the plea of former 
jeopardy. Naidoo could therefore not be tried again for the same 
offence. The court explained why Moodie could be retried but not 
Naidoo, in the following terms382 
In each case there was an irregularity in the first trial. 
But irregularities vary in nature and degree. Broadly 
speaking they fall into two categories. There are 
irregularities (fortunately rare) which are of so gross a 
nature as per se to vitiate the trial. In such a case the 
Court of Appeal sets aside the conviction without 
reference to the merits. There remains thus neither a 
conviction nor an acquittal on the merits and the accused 
can be re-tried in terms of sec. 370(c) of the Criminal 
Code. That was the position in Moodie's case, in which 
the irregularity of the deputy sheriff remaining closeted 
with the jury throughout their two hour deliberation was 
regarded as so gross as to vitiate the whole trial. 
On the other hand there are irregularities of a lesser 
nature (and happily even these are not frequent) in which 
the Court of Appeal is able to separate the bad from the 
good, and to consider the merits of the case, including 
any findings as to the credibility of witnesses. If in the 
result it comes to the conclusion that a reasonable trial 
Court, properly directing itself, would inevitably have 
convicted, it dismisses the appeal and the conviction 
stands as one on the merits. But if, on the merits, it 
cannot come to that conclusion, it sets aside the 
conviction, and this amounts to an acquittal on the 
merits. In such a case sec. 370(c) of the Code does not 
permit of a re-trial. That was the position in Naidoo's 
case, in which the failure to swear an interpreter at one 
stage, resulted in certain evidence being regarded as 
inadmissible. 
The effect of the application of the Moodie principle in Naidoo was 
badly received in certain juristic circles. Professor Kahn criticised the 
382At 353G-H. 
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decision on the ground that it is difficult to understand how a case can 
be re-decided on the merits when vital portions of the record are 
eliminated. 383 His main criticism was directed against the unjust 
effect of the rule. In this respect Kahn observed that384 
[i]f the irregularity is a thumping big one (how ironic that 
counsel for Moodie in the appeal argued it was such a 
one!) it is tough luck on the accused - he can be retried; 
if it is just a teeny weeny irregularity, again tough luck -
it is disregarded under section 369( 1 )385 as no failure 
of justice resulted, and the conviction is sustained; but 
if it is just the correct sort of error, the convicted man is 
acquitted and can be tried no more. 
Kahn pleaded for the permissibility of retrials whenever a conviction 
has been quashed for irregularity. 386 In passing it may be mentioned 
that in view of the subsequent enactment of section 322(3), a 
situation like the one which presented itself in Naidoo cannot arise 
again. 387 
A subsequent decision which deserves to be discussed388 in detail 
383See Kahn E "Criminal Appeals or once again 'Erewhon revisited'" 
South African Law Journal 1963 439, 445. 
384At 441. 
385The proviso to the present section 322( 1 ) . 
386 At 444. He added that a comparative study may be useful in 
developing new principles in this particular field of law. 
387See supra under 8.6.2.2, text at note 331 for the provisions of 
section 322(3). 
388The Appellate Division applied the "Moodie principle" in two 
subsequent decisions, S v Nzuza 1963 (3) SA 631 (A) and S v Louw 
( 1965) (4) SA 120 (E). In Nzuza the accused was convicted of murder 
on admissions given at preparatory examinations. The court held that 
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is that of S v Mkhize, 389 handed down by the Appellate Division in 
1988. In this case the Appellate Division elucidated the principle 
introduced in Moodie and applied in Naidoo. The facts were the 
following. M and three others were tried and convicted in the 
Transvaal Provincial Division of various offences. They were 
represented by a person with an LLB degree. However, their legal 
representative had not been admitted to practise as an advocate. He 
misrepresented himself as an advocate by falsely taking the identity of 
another person who had in actual fact been admitted to practice as an 
advocate. When the full facts became known, the appellants applied 
for a special entry alleging that the proceedings in the trial court and 
their subsequent convictions had been vitiated by this irregularity. 
The Appellate Division stated that it is a well·established principle 
that an irregularity in the conduct of a trial may be of such an order as 
to amount per se to a failure of justice which vitiates the trial. 390 
The court referred to such an irregularity as a "fatal irregularity" .391 
The court explained that, in terms of its decision in Naidoo, less 
serious and less fundamental irregularities do not necessarily have the 
effect of vitiating a trial. In these cases, the court of appeal must 
examine and assess the evidence and decide for itself whether, on the 
it amounted to an irregularity so gross as to be per se a failure of 
justice which rendered the trial a nullity and allowed the state to 
reindict the accused. In Lauw, a plea of autrefois acquit was rejected 
on the basis that denial to give counsel for the defence an opportunity 
to state its case amounted to a miscarriage of justice of such a gross 
nature that it could be said that the accused had not had a trial in 
which he lawfully could have been convicted (at 1 21). 
3891988 (2) SA 868 (A). 
390At 871G. 
391/d. 
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evidence and the findings of credibility unaffected by the irregularity 
or defect, there is proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. If proof of 
guilt is found, the appeal is dismissed. If not, the appellant is 
acquitted and may not be tried again in a new trial. However, the 
court explained that if the irregularity amounted to a fatal one which 
vitiated the trial, "[n]o further enquiry into the merits is called 
for". 392 The conviction may accordingly be set aside and a new trial 
ordered. 
An important aspect of the judgment in Mkhize is that the 
Appellate Division laid down certain criteria which a court of appeal 
must apply in order to determine whether an irregularity which tainted 
the proceedings (in the trial court) amounted to a fatal irregularity 
which rendered the trial a nullity. The court stated393 
[T]he inquiry in each case is whether it [the irregularity] 
is of so fundamental and serious a nature that the proper 
administration of justice and the dictates of public policy 
require it to be regarded as fatal to the proceedings in 
which it occurred. 
On the facts before it the court concluded that in terms of the 
abovementioned criteria, practising as an advocate without being duly 
admitted amounted to a fatal irregularity which rendered the trial a 
nullity. 394 New proceedings against the accused for the same 
offence would accordingly have been in order. 
392At 872A. 
393Per Kumbleben AJA at 872G. (My emphasis). 
394At 875G. 
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8.6.2.3 New trials on appellate reversal of convictions handed down 
in lower courts 
Parties dissatisfied with the outcome of a criminal trial in a lower 
court may bring the matter before the provincial or local divisions of 
the Supreme Court either by way of review or by way of an appeal. 
An appeal is brought where the accused challenges the legal or factual 
correctness of his conviction or sentence. However, where his 
complaint is based on the methods of a trial concerning an irregularity 
involved in arriving at the conviction, the complaint is brought by way 
or review. Therefore, a review is not specifically directed at the 
finding of the court but at the method which the court employed to 
make its finding. In an appeal the appellant is confined to the record, 
but in review proceedings the aggrieved party may also rely on 
irregularities which do not appear from the record. 395 
Section 309 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that any person 
convicted of an offence by any lower court, may appeal against such 
a conviction and against any resultant sentence or order to the 
provincial or local division having jurisdiction. As indicated in chapter 
six, the prosecution may also request the magistrate to reserve a 
question of law for decision by a court of appeal; in other words, the 
prosecution may also appeal on a point of law against an acquittal 
handed down in a lower court. 396 The Attorney-General may 
furthermore appeal against sentence imposed on a person who has 
been convicted in a lower court, provided that leave to appeal has 
been granted by a judge in chambers. 397 
395See in general Du Toit Service 14 1994 30-1 and Hiemstra 1993 ed 
761. 
396Section 31 0. 
397Section 31 OA. 
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In disposing of an appeal against a conviction, the court may398 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
(vi) 
confirm, alter or quash the conviction, and in the event 
of the conviction being quashed where the accused was 
convicted on one of two or more alternative charges, 
convict the accused on the other alternatives charge or 
one or other of the alternative charges399 
confirm, reduce, alter or set aside the sentence or any 
order of the magistrate's court400 
set aside or correct the proceedings of the magistrate's 
court401 
generally give such judgment or impose such sentence or 
make such order as the magistrate's court ought to have 
given, imposed or made on any matter which was before 
it at the trial of the case in question402 or 
remit the case to the magistrate's court with instructions 
to deal with any matter in such manner as the provincial 
or local division may think fit403 and 
make any such order in regard to the suspension of the 
execution of any sentence against the person convicted 
or the admission of such person to bail, or, generally, in 
regard to any matter or thing connected with such 
person or the proceedings in regard to such person as to 
the court seems likely to promote the ends of 
justice.404 
398See section 309(3) read with section 304. 
399Section 304(2)(c)(i). 
400Section 304(2)(c)(ii). 
401 Section 304(2)(c)(iii). 
402Section 304(2)(c)(iv). 
403Section 304( 2)( c )( v). 
404Section 304(2)(c)(vi). 
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Furthermore it is specifically provided that unless the appeal is based 
solely on a question of law, a court of appeal, in addition to the 
abovementioned powers, has the power to increase any sentence 
imposed on the appellant or to impose any other form of sentence in 
lieu of or in addition to such sentence.405 Similar to the position 
regarding appeals from superior courts, the proviso is also added that 
no conviction or sentence shall be reversed or altered by reason of any 
irregularity or defect in the record or the proceedings, unless it appears 
to the court of appeal that a failure of justice has in fact resulted from 
such irregularity or defect. 406 
It is also provided for in the Supreme Court Act407 that the 
Appellate Division or a provincial division or a local division which has 
appeal jurisdiction may receive further evidence or remit the case to 
the court whose judgment is the subject of the appeal for a further 
hearing, with the relevant instructions regarding the taking of further 
evidence or otherwise as seems necessary to the division concerned. 
If the appeal is dismissed, the accused may with leave of the court 
against whose decision he wishes to appeal or with special leave of 
the Appellate Divison appeal further to the latter division.408 The 
Appellate Division may reinstate the conviction, sentence or order of 
the lower court which is being appealed from, in its original or in a 
modified form or give such a decision or take such an action as the 
provincial or local divison ought to have taken. 409 It is further 
405Section 309(3). 
407Section 22 of Act 59 of 1959. Cf to the same effect section 
304(2)(b). 
408See section 21 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. 
409Section 311 ( 1 ) . 
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provided that if an appeal brought by the Attorney-General to the 
Appellate Division or to a local or provincial division (in terms of 
section 310) is dismissed, the court may order that the state pay the 
costs of the accused.410 
Where the prosecutor appeals against a decision in favour of the 
accused on any question of law, the following rules pertain.411 If 
the appeal is allowed, the court of appeal may itself impose the 
sentence or make the order which the lower court ought to have 
given. However, the court of appeal may also remit the matter to the 
lower court concerned and instruct that court as to what should be 
done. If the court of appeal does not choose one of these options, the 
case is returned to the court against whose decision on a question of 
law a successful appeal was made. The court re-opens the case and 
deals with it in the light of the question of law as set out on appeal. 
In reconsidering its decision in the light of the court of appeal's 
exposition of the legal position, the court a quo is limited to the 
record. Further evidence may be heard only if it has been specially 
authorised by the court of appeal.412 Conversely, if a question of 
law is decided in favour of the accused, he state may appeal further 
to the Appellate Division. 
The issue whether the prosecution may take a matter on review to 
the detriment of the accused has already been considered in detail in 
chapter six.413 This chapter focuses instead on the powers of an 
410Section 311 (2). 
411 See sections 310(4) and (5). See chapter six supra under 6.6.2.2 
for a discussion of the right of the prosecution to appeal on a point of 
law. 
412See Du Toit Service 11 1993 30-42C. 
413See chapter six supra under 6.6.2.6. 
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appellate tribunal in disposing of a matter taken upon review in favour 
of the accused. These powers are the same as those of a superior 
court in disposing of an appeal by the accused against his conviction 
and/or sentence, and need not be repeated. 414 
Finally it is provided for in the Criminal Procedure Act that when a 
conviction is set aside on appeal or review, the circumstances in 
which de nova proceedings may be instituted are the same as those 
provided for in instances of appeals from superior courts to the 
Appellate Division.415 In other words, the defence of autrefois 
acquit will not be of any avail to an accused whose conviction or 
sentence is set aside on appeal on the ground of a technical 
irregularity in the proceedings. It follows that the principles laid down 
in Moodie are also applicable to convictions and sentences of lower 
courts set aside by courts of appeals. 
The interpretation by our courts of these various provisions is 
considered in the following paragraphs. This discussion is confined 
to interpretations which involve double jeopardy issues. 
Similar to the position where an accused appeals against a 
conviction handed down in a superior court as a court of first instance, 
a court disposing of an appeal against a conviction from a lower court 
has the power to substitute the conviction of a court a quo for a 
conviction of a more serious offence of which the appellant (in the 
414See supra, text at notes 399-404 for the provisions of section 
304(2)(c). 
415See section 313 which provides that the provisions of section 324 
shall mutatis mutandis apply with reference to any conviction and 
sentence of a lower court which is set aside on appeal or review on 
any ground referred to in that section. 
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court of appeal's view) should have been convicted in the first 
place.416 In such cases, the court of appeal may also impose a more 
severe sentence417 or remit the matter to the trial court for the 
imposition of an appropriate sentence.418 Moreover, it was held in 
S v t=419 that a court of appeal may also interfere with a sentence 
(which includes the power to impose a more severe sentence) in cases 
where only the conviction was appealed against. In S v Magabe420 
the court held that a court of appeal may also add to the conviction by 
the trial court an additional conviction on another offence. However 
,it does not include the power to alter a conviction of murder with 
extenuating circumstances to one of murder. 421 
The principles which our courts apply in determining whether a 
sentence ought to be increased on appeal have already been discussed 
in the context of appeals from superior courts. 422 Suffice it to add 
the following: In S v Sonday423 the constitutionality of the 
statutory provision which empowers a court of appeal to increase a 
416See S v E supra 9770-E and S v Du Tait 1966(4) SA 627 (A) 634A-
B. 
4175 v E 9760-E. 
418R v V supra 324A. See the provisions of section 309(3) discussed 
supra, text at note 405. 
419 1983 ( 1) SA 747 (0) 753G-H. 
420 1990 (2) SACR 234 (W). 
421 See S v Mako 1984 (3) SA 677 (A) 680H and R v Taylor 1949 (4) 
SA 702 (A) 717. 
422See supra under 8.6.2.2. 
423 1994 (2) SACR 810 (C). 
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sentence at its own initiative and without request to do so by the 
state424 was challenged on the basis that it violates the accused's 
right to a fair trial (section 25(3) of the interim Constitution),425 and, 
more particularly, the right to have recourse by way of appeal to a 
higher court and the right to adduce and challenge evidence (sections 
25(3)(b) and (d) respectively). 426 
The court rejected this argument. It stated that "the concept of a 
fair trial, including a fair appeal, embraces fairness, not only to the 
accused or the appellant ... but also, in a criminal case, to society as 
a whole .... ".427 In the court's view, the whole object of the 
statutoty power of the court of appeal to increase a sentence on 
appeal is to empower the court to rectify miscarriages of justice in the 
form of sentences which are manifestly much too light. 428 The court 
concluded that the contention that the exercise of such a power could 
derogate from the fairness of the accused's trial had to be rejected and 
enjoyed no prospect of being accepted by a reasonable court. The 
court based its conclusion on the following argument429 
By noting this appeal the applicants have reopened the /is 
between themselves on the one hand and society on the 
other which closed when they were sentenced by the 
trial court. That reopened /is is now before us on appeal. 
424This is provided for in section 309(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
See supra, text at note 405 for the provisions of this section. 
425 Act 200 of 1994. The right to a fair trial is now provided for in 
section 35(3) of Act 108 of 1996. 
426These provisions are presently contained in section 35(3) (o) and (i) 
of Act 108 of 1996. 
427At 820e. 
428At 821h. 
429At 821f-g. 
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Within certain circumscribed limits an appeal is a 
rehearing of the case. The applicants, having chosen to 
reopen the /is, cannot be heard to complain, in my view, 
in the event of this court finding itself obliged to correct 
an obvious miscarriage of justice, albeit to their 
detriment, in the performance of its duty to see to it that 
the interests of society are properly and fairly protected 
by its decisions. 
Therefore, although the rule against double jeopardy did not feature in 
this case, the court clearly came out in support of what is known in 
American law of double jeopardy jurisprudence as a waiver 
theory.430 
A court of appeal, in setting aside a conviction, also has the power 
to remit the case back to the magistrate.431 In S v Somciza432 
the court held that it was undesirable that an accused who has been 
found guilty by a particular magistrate and whose conviction and 
sentence have been set aside should be retried, or that his trial should 
continue before the same magistrate who has already made findings 
in which he has accepted the evidence tendered by the 
prosecution. 433 The court argued that434 
[h]owever dispassionately the magistrate might feel he 
would be able, because of his judicial training, to weigh 
up the evidence afresh once he has heard the appellant's 
430See supra under 8.5.2, text at note 176 for a criticism of the 
"waiver theory" by Mr Justice Holmes in his minority opinion in the 
the American Supreme Court decision of Kepner. 
431 See section 304(2)(c)(v). 
432 1990( 1 ) SA 361 (A). 
433At 365i. 
434At 365j-366a. 
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evidence, the appellant is, understandably, unlikely to 
feel complacent about his prospects of receiving a fair 
trial before that magistrate. 
However, the court found it unnecessary to decide the point raised by 
the appellants that sections 313 read with section 324 in fact 
precludes a remittal to the same magistrate. The court also added that 
where the appeal is allowed on the basis of an irregularity, the court 
should merely set aside the conviction and sentence and leave it to the 
Attorney-General to act in terms of section 324 (in other words to 
institute proceedings de nova) if he so desires.435 
As indicated above, the Criminal Procedure Act as well as the 
Supreme court Act provide that a court of appeal may hear further 
evidence, or, remit a case to a magistrate's court to hear further 
evidence.436 Where the state wants to lead further evidence, it was 
recommended in S v Smit437 that it must place a proper application 
before the court, which contains the evidence that the state would 
adduce. Moreover, the appellant ought to be informed of the 
application so that he might be present and may lead evidence in 
rebuttal. 
In R v Siwi438 the court of appeal on automatic review set aside 
convictions of a number of counts of stock theft on the ground that 
there was insufficient evidence aliunde on all of the counts except one 
435At 365H-366G. 
-
436Sections 304(b) and section 22 of the Supreme Court Act (see 
supra, text at note 407). sections 22 and 304(b). The Appellate 
Division may also hear further evidence (see section 316). However, 
this does not occur in practice. (See Hiemstra 841 .) 
437 1966(1) SA 638 (0) 641C-F. 
438 1951 (3) SA 703 (0). 
: -::1~ -.... 
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to prove the offences. The state made the submission that the matter 
ought to be remitted to the magistrate to give the crown a further 
opportunity of leading evidence to prove the commission of the 
offences of the counts on which the convictions were set aside, more 
especially so because the accused had pleaded guilty to all the counts. 
It was submitted that the court had these powers in terms of section 
98(2) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944 which provided that 
the court of appeal may "hear any evidence or ... remit the case to the 
magistrate's court with instructions to deal with any such matters in 
such manner as the court of appeal may think fit ... " . 439 
The court refused to remit the matter for further evidence on the 
basis that a survey of previous decisions in point revealed a strong 
reluctance on the part of courts to remit cases for further hearing 
"where the Crown has failed to prove an essential element of the 
crime". 440 In the court's view, the power to remit a case for 
evidence to supplement a deficiency in the crown's case should be 
sparingly exercised in review or appeal.441 The court stated that a 
court "as a rule", ought not to remit a case for further evidence if the 
crown had omitted to prove an essential element of the offence. 442 
However, the court added that it might do so if a reasonable 
explanation was given to the court as to why such evidence was not 
led at the trial and the interests of justice demanded such a 
course. 443 The court expressed its willingness to hear evidence or 
439This is currently provided for in section 304 (2)(c)(iv). 
440At 710F. 
441 At 713H. 
443At 714A. 
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remit a case (a) if "owing to an oversight" the crown failed to lead 
evidence; (b) where the omitted facts could be proved without delay 
and (c) were undisputable, for example, failure to prove the locus 
delicti. 444 In the case at hand, the court held that it could not remit 
the case because the crown could have led the evidence at the trial 
and could offer no reasonable explanation why the evidence had not 
been led. 
These principles were subsequently confirmed by the Transvaal 
Provincial Division in R v Letuli. 445 In that case the court made the 
following important statement446 
The public prosecutor is dominus litis: if he fails to 
adduce the necessary evidence there is no apparent 
reason why the accused, who is entitled to his acquittal, 
should by a remittal be deprived of such right as he 
possesses to raise on some later occasion a plea of 
autrefois acquit in respect of this charge. 
The court added that even in the exceptional cases namely, (a) where 
the evidence was of such a nature that it would prove the case 
without delay and without real dispute and (b) where it had not been 
omitted deliberately but by oversight or through some 
misunderstanding and (c) where a satisfactory explanation is furnished 
as to why it had not been adduced in the first trial, the superior court's 
discretion to allow the crown this priviledge should be sparingly 
used.447 In S v Mokgeled1448 the Appellate Divison held that while 
444At 714A. 
445 1953 (4) SA 241 (T). 
446At 246C. 
447 At 246G-H and 251 A-B. 
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it, like any provincial division, has the undoubted power to remit a 
case to the trial court for further evidence to remedy a deficiency in 
the state's case, that power would be sparingly exercised.449 The 
court laid down as a general principle that remittal for hearing of 
further evidence should normally not be ordered where an appeal 
succeeds because of insufficiency of evidence against the 
appellant. 450 
Finally, in S v Roux451 the court questioned whether "the true 
interests of justice requires that a case which has been completed 
should be reopened for the purpose of enabling further evidence to be 
led". 452 The court added that453 
[t]he interests of justice and the public interest require 
that those who are guilty of an offence ought to be 
convicted. It is also in the interest of justice however, 
that finality should be reached in criminal cases, which 
should not be allowed to "drag on indefinitely" .454 
Where evidence which ought to have been led at the trial 
was not led, a request to allow the case to be reopened 
will therefore not be readily acceded to on appeal. 
448 1968 (4) SA 335 (A). 
449At 339. 
450/d. 
451 1974 (2) SA 452 (N). 
452At 454H-455A. 
453At 455A. 
454Referring to the words of De Wet CJ in R v Mkize ( 2) 1940 AD 211, 
212. 
599 
8.6.2.4 Summary 
The following principles apply with regard to the setting aside by the 
Appellate Division of convictions and acquittals handed down in 
superior courts. 
* If the accused appeals against his conviction, a court of appeal may 
set aside the conviction and substitute it for a conviction of a more 
serious offence. This position has recently been criticised by the 
Appellate Division on the ground that it encroaches on the 
sacrosanctity of an acquittal. In doing this, the Appellate Division 
endorsed the implied acquittal doctrine. 
* In considering whether a conviction should be set aside on the 
ground of an irregularity or defect in the procedure, it is at present (in 
terms of the provisions of the Constitution), appropriate to consider 
whether the accused's right to a fair trial has been violated. If the 
answer to this question is in the affirmative, it must furthermore be 
established whether the infringement can be be justified in terms of 
the limitation clause. 
* In Moodie the Appellate Division invoked the nullity theory 
(previously applied in English law) to effect new trials on appellate 
reversal of convictions. The principle advanced in Moodie and applied 
in Naidoo, namely that the person who has been convicted may be 
tried again in a new trial if his conviction is set aside on appeal on the 
basis that the irregularity which tainted the proceedings was of so 
gross a nature that it precluded the court of appeal from considering 
the merits of the case, has further been elucidated in Mkhize. The 
Appellate Division explained in Mkhize that no further enquiry into the 
merits is even called for if the irregularity which occurred at the trial 
can be described as a fatal irregularity. A fatal irregularity is 
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determined by enquiring whether the irregularity is of so fundamental 
and serious a nature that the proper administration of justice and the 
dictates of public policy require it to be regarded as fatal to the 
proceedings in which it occurred. If the irregularity is regarded (in 
4.. 
terms of these criteria) as fatal, the trial and subsequent conviction is 
regarded as a nullity. Therefore, the state may once again prosecute 
the accused for the same offence in a new trial; the accused has 
never been in jeopardy of a conviction at the first trial. 
* The Moodie principle still forms part of South African law. Unlike 
the position in English law, no reforms have been introduced in this 
particular area of criminal procedure in South African law.455 
Furthermore, as will become apparent in the conclusions to this thesis 
in chapter ten, it is an open question whether application of the 
Moodie principle can withstand constitutional scrutiny in all cases. 
The following principles apply with regard to the setting aside by 
courts of appeal of convictions and acquittals handed down in lower 
courts. 
* If the accused appeals against his conviction, a court of appeal may 
substitute the conviction for a conviction of a more serious offence. 
The same applies with regard to appeals by the accused against 
sentence. A court of appeal may impose a more severe sentence even 
if the prosecutor did not request the court to increase the sentence. 
The constitutionality of this practice has recently been challenged on 
the basis (inter alia) of the accused's constitutional right to a fair trial. 
The submission that this practice infringes on fundamental human 
rights was rejected by a division of the Supreme Court on the basis 
that there is no reasonable prospect that it will be accepted by the 
455Cf the position currently in English law set out supra under 8.2. 
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Constitutional Court. The particular division justified its standpoint, 
inter alia, by advancing a waiver theory. As indicated in American 
constitutional double jeopardy jurisprudence, a waiver theory cannot 
be advanced as a rationale to explain why an accused who succeeds 
in having his conviction set aside on appeal, may be tried again in new 
proceedings; not only does the theory rely on a fiction, but it also 
assumes that by exercising the fundamental constitutional right to 
appeal, the accused is simultaneously denied the right to claim 
enforcement of other fundamental human rights such as the 
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. 
* In general, courts of appeal are reluctant to remit a case back to 
the magistrate for hearing of further evidence to supplement a 
deficiency in the state's case. The basic concern is that an accused 
ought not be deprived of his rights against double jeopardy. In other 
words, remittal for further hearing will, as a rule, not be ordered where 
the appeal succeeds because of insufficiency of evidence against the 
appellant. 
PART FIVE 
A CONSIDERATION OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY PRINCIPLES IN A 
CONTINENTAL SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER NINE 
GERMAN LAW 
9. 1 General introduction 
Section 103 (Ill) of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz, 
sometimes translated as Basic Law) provides 1 
Niemand dart wegen derselben Tat auf Grund der allgemeinen 
Strafgesetze mehrmals bestraft werden. (No person may in 
terms of the general provisions of criminal law be punished 
more than once for the same conduct). 2 
On a literal interpretation, the provision only contains a guarantee 
against double punishment. However, the Constitutional Court of 
Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht) interpreted this provision 
broadly: it held that the provision not only affords the accused 
protection against double punishment, but also against multiple 
prosecutions. 3 The right has furthermore been interpreted as 
affording the accused protection against a successive prosecution for 
1 Grundgesetz fiir die Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and v 23. 5. 1 949 
(BGB1.,1 ). 
2My translation. 
3 BVerfGE 12 62, 66. 
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the same criminal conduct after a conviction as well as after an 
acquittal. 4 
An accused may only rely on the provision if previously acquitted or 
convicted by a court of law of an act or omission punishable in terms 
of criminal law. 5 Soon after the enactment of the German 
Constitution, the Bundesverfassungsgericht held that the protection 
afforded by the section is the same as that provided for in the ordinary 
law. In other words, constitutional protection against double jeopardy 
is the same as provided for in criminal law and the law of criminal 
procedure as interpreted by the ordinary courts. 6 However, in 1981 
the Court held that this rule is not absolute: if the Constitutional Court 
is faced with new issues not previously resolved in terms of the 
ordinary law, or with controversial issues, it may lay down new 
4/d. Contra the narrow interpretation of the similarly worded double 
jeopardy provision of the Indian Constitution set out in chapter three 
under 3.4.1 above. 
5See Sachs M Grundgesetz Kommentar 1996 1610. A conviction or 
acquittal in other proceedings, for example disciplinary proceedings, 
falls outside the ambit of this provision. The Constitutional court also 
interpreted section 103 (Ill) on the basis that it applies only to 
decisions handed down by German courts of law, and not to decisions 
of foreign courts. (See BVerfGE 12 62, 66). However, this does 
not apply in respect of decisions of the International Court of Human 
Rights (a supranational court). The decisions of that court attains 
Rechtskraft in German law. (See BGH 24 54, 57). 
6See BVErfGE 3 248, 252. The court held that the history of the 
establishment of the fundamental right did not indicate that it ought to 
be interpreted on a basis different from that provided for in the 
ordinary law of the land. This interpretation, known as the subjektiv-
historische interpretation, is severely criticised in legal literature. See 
for example Maunz T & Durig G et al Grundgesetz Kommentar Band 
1 V 1994 103 (Ill) 5-6 hereinafter referred to as Maunz/Durig. 
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principles in this particular field of law. 7 
In German law, the ne bis in idem rule is referred to as the 
Rechtskraftlehre (the doctrine of res judicata). 8 In legal literature, a 
78VerfGE 56 22, 34. See Maunz/Durig 103·om 6-7for·a detailed 
discussion of this case. 
8See in general Spinellis DD Die Materielle Rechtskraft des Strafurteils 
(Inaugural disseration zur Erlangung der Doktorwurde) 1962 3-7; 
Rheingans H Die Ausbildung der strafprozessualen Rechtskraftlehre 
von der Aufkliirung bis zur Reichsstrafprozessordnung v 1877 1937 
3-33; Wolter E Der Umfang der Rechtskraft im Strafprozess 
(Inaugural dissertation zur Erlangung der juristische Doktorwurde) 
1938, 11 for the historical development of the Rechtskraftlehre in 
Germany. Based initially on the principle of res judicata as expounded 
in Roman and Canon law, the principle was subjected to several 
exceptions during the Middle Ages. During this period, the inquisitorial 
process came to be applied in criminal trials. Since the most 
important value in terms of this process was the establishment of the 
truth, it had the following implications for the principle of Rechtskraft: 
if the accused failed to prove his innocence beyond any doubt, the 
court would release him in terms of a procedure known as absolutia 
ab instantia. A release in terms of this procedure did not amount to 
an acquittal: new proceedings for the same crime could be undertaken 
if new evidence became available. (See Wolter 11, Rheingans 15-23 
and Spinellis 5). However, the Rechtskraftlehre gained momentum 
during the period of the Enlightment. The ideas of freedom of the 
individual and certainty of the individual against arbitrary action by the 
state came to be recognised in the law of criminal procedure, 
particularly in the field of Rechtskraft. The predominant value of the 
inquisitorial process, namely that the truth must be established at all 
costs, was substituted for the value of legal certainty which eventually 
led to finality accorded to an acquittal. (See Rheingans 34). The ne 
bis in idem rule acquired formal recognition in a constitution of 1791 , 
but was applied inconsistently during the 1900s: the rule applied only 
to acquittals; convictions could be challenged, apparently, ad 
infinitum. (See Spinellis 6). It was only after 1848 that the principle 
was formally recognised as being available to decisions in favour of 
the accused as well as decision prejudicial to the accused. In 1877, 
the principle was recognised in the Strafprozessordnungsgesetz. 
Following on the violation of the principle during the period of the 
Third Reich, the rule eventually in 1949 attained the status of a 
fundamental human right in terms of the German Constitution. 
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distinction is drawn between formelle (formal) Rechtskraft and 
materielle (substantive) Rechtskraft:9 Formelle Rechtskraft means 
that the decision can no longer be challenged in the same proceedings. 
This means that all possible remedies (such as appeals or applications 
for reviews) have been exhausted or that the time within which these 
remedies could have been utilised has lapsed. The effect of the 
formelle Rechtskraft is that the court's decision may be implemented 
(it accordingly has Vollstreckungswirkung). Materielle Rechtskraft 
means that the matter is now res judicata; it can no longer be the 
subject of adjudication in another proceeding. Of importance is that 
formelle Rechtskraft is a prerequisite for materielle Rechtskraft. The 
result of this approach is that the appeal to a higher tribunal by the 
prosecutor is not regarded as a violation of the rule against double 
jeopardy; materielle rechtskraft only attaches at a stage after all legal 
remedies have been exhausted. 10 • Terminology used in German law 
to describe the concept of res judicata (materielle Rechtskraft), are the 
following: Strafklageverbrauch (consumption of the criminal charge) 
and Sperrwirkung (blockage effect). Moreover, when the criminal 
charge is consumed (verbraucht), it results in a Verfahrenshindernis 
(obstruction to further proceedings). 
German legal commentators have identified several policies that 
underlie the rule or principle of Rechtskraft. The basic principle 
advanced is that the rule seeks to achieve the objectives of legal 
certainty as well as justice for the individual. 11 It is suggested that 
9See in general Roxin C Strafverfahrensrecht 1991 22 Auflage 337-
338. 
10See also infra under 9. 2, text at note 20 for a discussion of this 
particular aspect of German criminal procedure. 
11Henkel H Strafverfahrensrecht Ein Lehrbuch 1968, 2 (neuebearbeite) 
Auflage 384 points out that in the field of Rechtskraft, the value of 
individual justice is sacrificed to the social value of legal certainty. 
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the rule seeks to achieve the following specific purposes 12 
(a) A protection function (Schutzfunktion) 
The rule protects the accused against arbitrary exercise of state power 
and has the effect of ensuring individual legal certainty. Inasmuch as 
the accused may appeal to the Constitutional Court on-the basis of 
violation of this right, this particular function achieves its objective. 
(b) A sanction function (Sanktionfunktion) 
This is a particularly important function of the rule against double 
jeopardy in German law. It presupposes that the prosecutor conducts 
an exhaustive investigation of all the facts pertaining to a criminal 
matter before preferring charges. The rule fulfils this function by 
prohibiting the prosecutor from bringing charges in a successive 
prosecution for offences arising from the same transaction which 
previously have been adjudicated on. 13 The same applies to the 
court; the presiding judge has the right and the duty to investigate all 
the facts pertaining to the matter as well as to evaluate the facts from 
all legal perspectives. 14 If he fails to perform his duty in these 
respects (his so-called Kognitionspflicht), a second proceeding may be 
This is so, because in terms of the Rechtskraft doctrine, incorrect 
decisions (unfavourable to the accused) also acquire finality; to 
maintain order and peace in the legal community, it is necessary that 
correct as well as incorrect decisions acquire finality. 
12See Trepper T Zur Rechtskraft strafprozessualer Besch/ilsse 
(dissertation) 1995 18-22. 
13See infra under 9. 4 for a discussion of the definitional issue of "same 
offence" in German law. 
14See infra under 9.4.2 for a discussion of the courts duties in this 
respect. 
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prohibited, not only for offences considered and adjudicated on in the 
first proceeding, but also for other offences. The Rechtskraft therefore 
performs a preventative function; it attaches a sanction to failure by 
the organs of state to perform their duties, namely denial of a second 
opportunity to prosecute the accused. 
The general approach is that only a decision or adjudication on the 
factual merits of the matter (which can no longer be challenged) 
acquires materielle Rechtskraft. This is known as a Sachurteil (a 
decision on the factual merits of the case) as opposed to a 
Prozessurteil (a decision on procedural grounds). The latter does not 
attain materielle Rechtskraft because it does not relate to the factual 
guilt or innocence of the accused. 15 The ambit of the previous 
subject of adjudication is determined by reference to what is 
understood as the concept strafprozessuale Tat. This concept is a 
very wide one and can be translated as "the criminal act, conduct, or 
transaction in the criminal procedural sense of the word". The ambit 
of the strafprozessuale Tat is probably one of the most complex 
issues in German criminal procedure. Before considering this concept, 
it is essential first to explain certain distinctive features of German 
criminal procedure. Thereafter the issue of attachment of jeopardy 
will be considered, which will be followed by a discussion of the 
concept strafprozessuale Tat and the principle known as the Verbot 
der Reformatio in Peius. 
9.2 DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE GERMAN LAW OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 
German criminal procedure differs from the procedure applied in 
Anglo American countries inasmuch as the former is based on an 
15See Fezer G Strafprozessrecht 1995 zweite Auflage 239. 
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inquisitorial model and the latter on an adversarial model. The 
intention of this thesis is not to elaborate on the differences and 
similarities between the two models. 16 However, it will focus on 
certain premises which differ in the two models which may explain the 
evolution of different rules of double jeopardy in the two systems. 
The basic goal of the German criminal proceeding is the same as that 
in the countries which adopt an adversarial system: the determination 
of the objective truth on the basis of and within the framework of the 
procedural forms which the law prescribes. 17 However, the 
techniques of finding this objective truth differ in these respective 
legal systems. Also, the mechanics used to establish equality of trial 
position between the prosecutor and the defence are not the same. 18 
The principal difference between German and Anglo-American 
systems of criminal procedure is that the former does not have a trial 
16See Herrmann J "Models for the reform of the criminal trial in the 
People's Republic of China - comparative remarks from a German 
perspective" Festschrift fur Koichi Miyazawa 1995 611, 612-613 
(hereinafter referred to as Herrmann Festschrift) for a synopsis of the 
main characteristics of the two models, and a detailed discussion 
( 61 6-631) of the different types of inquisitorial and adversarial trials. 
17See Jescheck H "Principles of German criminal procedure in 
comparison with American law" Virginia Law Review Vol 56 1970 
239, 240. The author observes that it is often assumed that the 
Anglo-American trial with its adversarial nature is merely "a sporting 
match between the attorneys involved without any goal of 
ascertaining the truth" (at 240). The German trial on the other hand, 
is viewed as a means of convicting the accused at all costs. In the 
author's view, these assumptions over-emphasise certain features of 
the different trial procedures. He observes that "the object of both 
trials is the same search for the truth within the permissible legal 
framework" (Id). See also Herrmann Festschrift 621-622. 
18See Jescheck 241 . 
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by jury. 19 This difference should be considered in conjunction with 
another distinctive feature of German criminal procedure: the right of 
the German prosecutor to appeal against an acquittal on a point of law 
as well as on the factual merits of a case. 20 As indicated above, 
it is suggested in legal literature that the only reason why prosecution 
appeals are prohibited in Anglo-American countries is that the jury 
nullification rule excludes a determination of the grounds on which an 
acquittal is based.21 In other words, the prosecution is prohibited 
from appealing an acquittal, not because of double jeopardy principles, 
but for the simple reason that the jury nullification rule makes it 
impossible to identify grounds on which the decision can be 
challenged. In countries without jury systems such as Germany and 
South Africa, this problem does not exist; the judge must set out the 
reasons or grounds on which his judgment is based. This is arguably 
the reason why the German prosecutor may appeal against an 
19The trial by jury was abolished in Germany in 1924 and replaced by 
a Schwurgericht in which three professional judges together with six 
lay judges decide the question of guilt and penalty together. These lay 
judges have the same rights as the professional justices; they may 
even outvote the professional judges and grant an acquittal. However, 
this hardly occurs in practice. The lay judges usually preside by the 
legal evaluation of the professional judges. With the exception of the 
single judge Amtsgericht (lower court of general jurisdiction in 
Germany), all the other criminal courts are collegial (composed of 
professional judges and lay judges (Laien). See in general Jescheck 
243. 
20See infra note 7 4 for a discussion of the forms of appeal namely, 
Berufung and Revision. The German prosecutor may appeal on the 
factual merits of a case (Berufung) or take a matter on review 
(Revision). See para 296 I StPO Klein~necht T and Meyer K 
Strafprozessordnung 39 ed 1989 1054. l;ither of these remedies may 
also be employed by the prosecutor to afi>peal against sentence. The 
Revision is an appeal on a point of law j or an appeal on procedural 
grounds. See in general Roxin 347-385~ 
21 See chapter six supra under 6.5.7 for la discussion of the views of 
the American commentator Westen and Drubel. 
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acquittal on legal as well as factual grounds. Consequently, there is 
no reason why the South African prosecutor should not also be 
allowed to appeal against an acquittal, not only on legal grounds, but 
also on the factual merits of a case. 
However, this argument loses ground if one considers the other 
important distinctive feature of German criminal procedure, namely 
that the prosecutor may also take a matter on appeal or review in 
favour of the accused after a conviction. 22 This particular rule flows 
from the inherent nature of the inquisitorial process; the prosecutor 
and accused are theoretically not opposing parties, but are both 
committed to finding the truth. 23 This perhaps explains why the 
institution of the prosecution appeal (the right of the prosecutor to 
appeal) has never been challenged in German courts or even been 
considered in legal literature as involving double jeopardy violations. 
In German law, the appeal is (apparently) viewed simply as a mere 
continuation of the same proceedings. This assumption is 
strengthened by the distinction drawn in German law between formelle 
and materielle Rechtskraft. 
A further distinctive feature of the German system of criminal 
procedure is that the prosecutor theoretically has very little discretion 
(if any) whether to charge a suspect with a crime. Instead, the 
German prosecutor is bound in theory by the Legalitiitsprinzip 
22See para 292 II StPO set out in Kleinknecht and Meyer 1054. The 
German prosecutor may appeal or take a matter on review if he is 
convinced that the accused ought to have been acquitted, or that a 
procedural error tainted the proceedings which prejudiced the accused. 
The prosecutor may even take the appeal (in favour of th& accused) 
against the wishes of the accused (See Kleinknecht and Meyer 1056). 
23See also infra under 9.3.1 for a discussion of the prosecutor's duties 
during the investigating stage of the trial. 
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(principle of legality) under which he is required to bring an action in 
all non-petty cases in which he is able to prove his case in court. 24 
This particular feature of criminal procedure also has certain 
implications with regard to the right of the prosecutor to withdraw 
charges. The extent to which the German prosecutor is allowed to 
withdraw charges is discussed in detail in the paragraphs dealing with 
the "attachment of jeopardy" issue.25 
Probably the most important difference between the two systems 
lies in the manner of adducing evidence. As will become clear from 
the discussion of German rules of double jeopardy, this difference also 
has an impact on those rules. 26 In Anglo-American systems, proof 
is received by direct examination and cross-examination. In Germany, 
the so-called lnstruktionsmaxime applies. This means that it is the 
responsibility of the judge to take testimony and to discover the true 
facts. 27 The judge bears the responsibility of interrogating the 
accused and witnesses. Moreover, the completeness and correctness 
of the proof also rests on his shoulders. 28 The judge must be 
thoroughly familiar with the charges (contents of the file) to carry out 
his examination and to discharge his duty to clarify the facts. This is 
referred to as his so-calledAufkliirungspflicht (duty to clarify the facts, 
or duty to ensure that all the relevant facts of a case are duly 
24See Jescheck 245 and Herrmann J "The rule of compulsory 
prosecution and the scope of prosecutorial discretion in Germany" 
University of Chigago Law Review Vol 41 1974 468. 
25See infra under 9.3. 
26See infra under 9 .4. 
27See Eser A "Beweisermittlung und Beweiswurdigung in 
vergleichender Perspektive" Festschrift fiir Koichi Miyazawa 1995 
561, 565-566. 
28See Jeschek 249. 
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presented).29 A necessary consequence of this rule is that his 
adjudication can only be based on what was established in the open 
and main trial (Hauptverhandlung) and not what occurred in the 
investigative stages of trial (Ermittlungsverfahren). 30 This also 
ensures that the judge cannot make a prejudicial decision on the basis 
of evidence obtained in earlier, preliminary, investigative stages of 
trial. 31 
The German judge is also . obliged to consider the facts as 
established and clarified by him in the main trial from all legal 
perspectives. This means that, in making his judgment, he has to 
take into consideration all the relevant offences which the accused 
may possibly have committed - not only those set out in the charge 
sheet. 32 In other words, the court is not bound by the prosecution's 
legal evaluation of the facts; the judge may arrive at different 
conclusions to those of the prosecutor in the charge sheet and is only 
bound by the factual basis of the criminal conduct set out in the 
charge sheet (the so-called Tat). 33 The court therefore has a 
291n terms of para 244 II StPO this is a fundamental principle of 
German criminal procedure: the court must determine the truth by 
considering all facts and testimony which is necessary for reaching a 
decision. See Beulke W Strafprozessrecht 1994 170. Herrmann 
Festschrift points out (at 618) that, unlike the position in French law 
where there is only a moral duty on the judge to try to discover the 
truth, there is a legal duty on the German judge to try to discover the 
truth. 
30See Eser 566. See also infra under 9.3 for a discussion of these 
different stages of proceedings in German criminal procedure. 
31 See Eser 566. 
32These duties are implicit in a number of provisions of the Code. 
These are discussed in detail infra under 9.4.2. 
33See infra under 9.4 for a detailed discussion of these principles of 
German criminal procedure. 
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umfassende Kognitionspflicht, in other words, a comprehensive duty 
to consider all the facts related to the criminal conduct set out in the 
charge sheet. Moreover, the court must consider these facts from all 
legal perspectives. 34 
The scope of the Sperrwirkung in German criminal procedure is 
closely related to or dependent on the expansive Kognitionspflicht of 
the judge, namely his duty to consider the conduct charged from all 
factual and legal perspectives. As will become clear from a discussion 
of the principles, it is precisely these wide duties and powers of the 
court which resulted in expanded protection against successive 
prosecutions for the same criminal transaction in German law. 
9.3 The attachment of jeopardy 
In order to understand at which stage jeopardy attaches in German 
law, it is necessary firstly to give a broad outline of the different 
stages of criminal proceedings in German' law, as well as the different 
kinds of discontinuances of proceedings which may occur during these 
stages. 
9.3. 1 Discontinuance of proceedings! by the prosecutor during 
investigative phase 
The first stage of German criminal proceedings is known as the 
investigative stage (Ermittlungsverfahren). During this stage, the 
office of the prosecutor investigates whether a crime has been 
committed. However, his duty is not !simply to gather one-sided 
evidence against the suspect, but to in'Vestigate all the facts, also 
34See BGH StV 1987 52, 53. 
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those favourable to the accused. 35 After a full investigation of the 
alleged offence, the prosecutor has to decide whether there is enough 
evidence against the suspect to bring a charge against him. If the 
prosecutor decides to bring a charge, it is then lodged with the court 
with jurisdiction to hear the matter. 36 
The Ermittlungsverfahren comes to an end by preferring a charge 
against the accused, or by discontinuing the proceedings against the 
accused. As a general rule, this is done by the prosecutor without 
participation of the court. 37 During the Ermittlungsverfahren the 
prosecutor is dominus litis. Discontinuance of proceedings during this 
stage may be based on the following grounds 
(a) procedural grounds, for example that the crime has prescribed 
(b) substantive legal grounds, for example that the act is not 
punishable or 
(c) on factual grounds, for instance that X did not in actual fact 
commit the crime 
(d) the principle of expediency. 38 
Only the last-mentioned of these grounds needs to be explained. As 
indicated above, the basic premise in German law is that the 
prosecutor has no (or very little) discretionary powers whether to 
institute criminal proceedings. In fact, he is under an obligation to 
35See para 1 60 II StPO Kleinknecht and Meyer 646. 
36Par 1 70 1 StPO Kleinknecht and Meyer 706. 
37The only exception is where the discontinuance is in terms of the 
principle of expediency. See infra, text at notes 45 and 46. 
38Discontinuances of proceedings described in (a)-(c) are provided for 
in para 170 II 1 StPO (Kleinknecht and Meyer 706-707), and in (d) in 
terms of paras 153 and 153A StPO (Kleinknecht and Meyer 595-615). 
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prosecute when he is presented with evidence of criminal conduct. 
This is a fundamental principle in German criminal procedure, known 
as the Legalitatsprinzip. 39 However, there are certain exceptions to 
this rule. In the field of petty offences ( Vergehen), the prosecutor may 
in certain defined circumstances (set out in the Code), exercise a 
discretion whether to continue or to discontinue proceedings. 40 
These powers are justified in terms of the principle of expediency 
(Opportunitatsprinzip). They are as follows 
(d) (i) where the guilt of the accused can be regarded as trivial or 
insignificant and there is no public interest warranting a 
prosecution. 41 
Where proceedings are discontinued in the circumstances set out in (a) 
to (d)(i) above, new proceedings may nevertheless be instituted 
against the accused for the same conduct even if no new facts or 
evidence comes to light. 42 The fact that the prosecutor's decision 
does not invoke materielle Rechtskraft is not criticised in legal 
literature. It is, inter alia, explained on the basis that the 
Legalitatsprinzip requires that the prosecutor investigates a matter 
afresh if there are sufficient grounds to suspect that a person has 
39See section 152 II StPO Kleinknecht and Meyer 590. 
40German law distinguishes between Vergehen (petty offences) and 
Verbrechen (serious offences). Verbrechen are offences punishable 
by more than one year of imprisonment. 
41 Par 153 I StPO Kleinknecht and Meyer 595. This, however, may 
only be done with the consent of the qourt competent to open the 
main proceedings except if the alleged crime was only against property 
and the damage was insignificant and th• punishment prescribed low. 
Therefore, in the last-mentioned circumstances, the prosecutor may 
drop the case without consent of the court. 
42See Beu Ike 133-140. This is the position even if the court consented 
to the discontinuance. 
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committed a crime. 43 It is also argued that Rechtskraft is related 
only to judgments of the court which can be described as final 
decisions on the factual merits of the case. The preliminary decision 
of the prosecutor not to prefer a charge does not comply with these 
requirements. 44 
The Code furthermore provides for discontinuance of proceedings on 
grounds of expediency during this phase (the investigative phase) by 
the prosecutor on a conditional basis. This is provided for in the 
following circumstances 
(d) (ii) When a person is regarded as having had minor guilt, and 
the offence is simply a Vergehen, the prosecutor may 
drop the case on condition that the accused pay an 
amount of money to a charitable organisation, the victim 
or the state. 45 
A discontinuance of proceedings on this basis requires consent of the 
court (competent to open the main proceedings) as well as the 
consent of the accused.46 The double jeopardy implications are the 
following. If the suspect does not comply with the conditions, the 
proceedings may be continued. If however, the conditions are 
complied with, the termination acquires limited Rechtskraft. The 
transgression may not again be prosecuted as a Vergehen, but may be 
prosecuted as a Verbrechen if it appears at a later stage that the case 
can be viewed from a different legal perspective, indicating that a 
43See Radtke H Zur Systematik des Strafklageverbrauchs 
verfahrenserledigender Entscheidungen im Strafprozess 1994 153. 
44See Radtke 159. 
45Para 153a StPO Kleinknecht and Meyer 603. 
46See Beulke 142. 
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more serious offence has been committed which deserves a more 
severe punishment. 47 The fact that this particular form of 
discontinuance of proceedings obtains only limited Rechtskraft is 
explained as follows. The act (or conduct) has already been 
consumed (verbraucht) as a Vergehen. It therefore cannot be 
prosecuted once again as a Vergehen, but it may subsequently be 
prosecuted as a Verbrechen. 48 
German criminal procedure also provides for another summary 
procedure which imposes sanctions without trial. This is known as 
the Penal Order or Strafbefehl procedure.49 The penal order can be 
described as an offer to the accused to accept a sentence and thereby 
admit his or her guilt. To this extent, the penal order can be compared 
to the guilty plea in Anglo-American procedure.50 Instead of filing 
a formal charge, the prosecutor may in the case of less serious 
offences ( Vergehen), draft a penal order specifying the act, the 
criminal law applicable, the evidence available and the proposed 
sentence, together with a statement that the penal order will be 
executed unless the accused objects within a week after delivery. The 
order is presented to a judge for review and approval. The judge may 
then sign the order, or direct a public trial. If the judge signs it (which 
happens in most cases), it becomes effective as a final judgment one 
week after delivery to the accused. However, if the accused objects, 
he files a notice with the court and he is then entitled to an ordinary 
trial. In terms of the relevant provision in the Code, the issuance of 
a penal order which is not contested obtains the status of a final 
47Para 153a I 4 StPO. See Kleinknecht and Meyer 603 and 612. 
48See Radtke 158. 
49See paras 407-412 StPO (Kleinknecht and Meyer 1340-1360). 
50See Herrmann Festschrift 632. 
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decision.51 However, against the literal meaning of the provision in 
the Code, the courts have attached only limited Rechtskraft to the 
Strafbefehl: they held that new proceedings nevertheless may be 
instituted if it appears at a later stage that the case can be viewed 
from a different legal perspective, indicating that a more serious 
offence has been committed which deserves more severe 
punishment.52 However, the legislature then added a provision to the 
Code which stipulates that on issuance of a penal order, new 
proceedings may only be instituted against the accused when new 
facts and evidence come to light which, if evaluated on their own or 
in conjunction with the previous evidence, amount to a Verbrechen. 53 
To summarise. As a rule, discontinuance of proceedings by the 
prosecutor during the investigative stage of trial does not bring into 
effect protection against double jeopardy. However, there are two 
exceptions to this rule. The first is that a discontinuance of criminal 
proceedings for a less serious offence (Vergehen) on a conditional 
basis (with the consent of the accused and the court), in terms of the 
principle of expediency, obtains limited finality. This means that the 
accused may not again be prosecuted for the less serious offence, but 
may nevertheless be prosecuted once again for a more serious offence 
(Verbrechen) arising from the same facts if it appears at a later stage 
that the case can be viewed from a different legal perspective, 
51 Para 410 Ill StPO provides: "Soweit gegen einen Strafbefehl nicht 
rechtzeitig Einspruch erhoben warden ist, steht er einem 
rechtskriiftigen Urteil gleich". See Kleinknecht and Meyer 1353. (A 
penal order against which an objection has not been timely raised 
obtains the effect of a final judgment). Translation by Niebler H in 
American series of foreign penal codes - The German Code of Criminal 
Procedure Vol 10 1965. 
52See BGH 28 69. 
53See para 373a (Kleinknecht and Meyer 1257) and Roxin 432. 
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indicating that a more serious offence has been committed which 
deserves a more severe punishment. The second exception is that 
discontinuance of proceedings for a less serious offence in terms of a 
summary conviction procedure known as the penal order procedure 
(which order is issued by the court with the consent of the accused), 
obtains also limited finality. Since such an order resembles a final 
adjudication on the merits, a higher degree of finality is attached to a 
discontinuance on this basis than which is attached in terms of a 
discontinkuance on the basis of the principle of expediency; new 
proceedings may only be instituted against the accused when new 
facts and evidence come to light which demonstrate that the accused 
committed a more serious offence. 
9.3.2 Discontinuance of proceedings by the court during the 
intermediary stage of proceedings (Zwischenverfahren) 
If the prosecutor prefers a charge, the court then carries the 
responsibility for the matter and becomes dominus litis. An important 
implication of this is that the court, if it decides to proceed with the 
matter, is not bound by the charges set out in the charge sheet. 54 
Another important aspect relating to the preferring of a charge, is that 
the prosecutor is not allowed, from this stage onwards, to discontinue 
proceedings or withdraw the charges on his own initiative or with 
consent of the court. 
The prosecutor brings a charge when a conviction is probable, in 
other words, if the person is sufficiently suspect. 55 The most 
important details set out in the charge are the following: the name of 
54Par 155 II Kleinknecht and Meyer 638. 
55Para 170 I. See Roxin 258. The concept "hinreichend verdiichtig" 
(sufficiently suspect) is used in this context. 
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the accused and a description of the facts, namely the acts or 
omissions which the accused allegedly performed (the so-called Tat). 
This is known as the Prozessgegenstand (the subject of adjudication 
as set out in the charge). 56 Further particulars set out in the charge 
are the definitions of relevant offences and the prescribed punishment 
for these offences in terms of the German Penal Code. However, the 
fact that the charge is handed in at the court does not mean that the 
trial is initiated and that the accused is requested to plead. First of all, 
the court must determine in intermediate proceedings 
(Zwischenverfahren) whether the trial should take place by opening the 
proceedings or admitting the charge. 
During the Zwischenverfahren, the charge is read to the accused 
and he is then granted an opportunity to advance reasons as to why 
the main proceedings should not be opened.57 After the accused has 
stated his case, the court must decide whether there are sufficient 
grounds on which to open the main proceedings. If the court decides 
that a conviction is probable, the main proceedings are opened by 
means of an Eroffnungsbeschluss (a decision to open proceedings). 
The Eroffnungsbeschluss contains certain detail, for example in which 
court the main proceedings should take place etcetera. Of importance 
is that the Eroffnungsbeschluss may also deviate from the charge 
sheet; it may, for instance be viewed from a different factual or legal 
perspective than that set out in the charge itself.58 The only 
limitation is that the Eroffnungsbeschluss must refer to the same Tat 
(acts or conduct) described in the charge. If it covers other acts or 
56Roxin 1 23-1 24. 
57See Beulke 148. 
58Para 207 II Kleinknecht and Meyer 740. 
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conduct, a new charge must be lodged. 59 
However, the court may also decide not to open the proceedings. 
This may be done on the following grounds60 
(a) where a verdict of not guilty can be expected on factual or legal 
grounds· 
{b) where the act is not a crime or 
{c) where there is a Verfahrenshindernis, for example prescription. 
The prosecution may appeal against the decision of the court not to 
open the proceedings. However, the decision obtains finality if it can 
no longer be challenged in the same proceedings. The finality is 
nevertheless limited; new proceedings may be instituted if new facts 
or new evidence come to light. 61 
The fact that the Nichteroffnungsbeschluss on these grounds 
acquires limited finality, has been criticised on the basis that it 
resembles a final decision on the factual merits of the case; the 
Nichter6ffnungsbeschluss on the abovementioned grounds relies on a 
conclusion that there is no probability that the accused may be 
convicted. 62 
The alternative point of view advanced in legal literature is that the 
decision not to open the main proceedings involves a lesser degree of 
investigation into the guilt or innocence of the accused than the 
59See para 207 Ill Kleinknecht and Meyer 740. 
60Para 204 1 Kleinknecht and Meyer 733. 
61 Para 211 Kleinknecht and Meyer 750. See also BGHSt 18, 225. 
62See Radtke 218. 
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Sachurteil (decision on the factual merits of a case at the end of 
trial). 63 A subsequent adjudication based on new testimony and 
facts is therefore justifiable. 
The court, at this stage, may also prefer on principles of expediency, 
not to open the main proceedings. 64 These principles are the same 
as those on which the prosecutor may discontinue proceedings in the 
Ermittlungsverfahren. 65 A discontinuance by the court on the basis 
that the accused's guilt is trivial or insignificant and that there is no 
public interest to prosecute may only occur with the consent of the 
accused and the prosecutor. A discontinuance on this basis by the 
court during the Zwischenverfahren acquires limited Rechtskraft, the 
ambit of which is controversial in the case law. 66 In earlier legal 
literature the fact that a discontinuance of proceedings on this basis 
during the intermediary stage of trial acquires only limited Rechtskraft 
was severely criticised. The general view was that, inasmuch as it 
involves an adjudication by the court to the extent of guilt with which 
63See Radtke 225-226. The commentator points out that it is required 
of the court to set out the grounds on which the decision is based; a 
requirement which makes it possible to determine the ambit of the 
materielle Rechtskraft in the particular case. 
64Par 153 II StPO Kleinknecht and Meyer 595. 
65These are (a) that the guilt of the accused for a less serious offence 
is trivial and insignificant and that there is no public interest to 
prosecute and (b) that the guilt of the accused for a less serious 
offence is minor and that proceedings are discontinued with the 
consent of the accused on a conditional basis, namely that the 
accused compensates the state or the victim or a charitable 
organisation. 
66See Beulke 140-141 . This commentator expresses the point of view 
that new proceedings ought to be allowed if it appears that the 
accused committed a Verbrechen. 
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the accused performed the act, it also amounts to a Sachurteil. 61 
An alternative point of view recently raised is that the grounds on 
which a court may decide not to open proceedings (in terms of the 
principle of expediency) cannot be regarded as being equivalent to a 
decision on the factual merits of the case. It is suggested, for 
instance, that a discontinuance on this basis amounts amounts simply 
to a hypothetical adjudication of guilt. 68 Therefore, it cannot exclude 
a subsequent adjudication based on new facts and evidence which 
demonstrate the presence of a higher degree of guilt, and the 
possibility that a Verbrechen has been committed. 69 The limitation 
placed on the Rechtskraft is also explained on the basis that, at this 
particular stage of criminal proceedings, the court's Kognitionspf/icht 
is not as comprehensive as required for a Sachurteil. Since the 
Rechtskraft is arguably dependent on the ambit of the 
Kognitionspflicht, only limited Rechtskratt70 is accorded to 
discontinuances of proceedings on these grounds. 
As indicated above, a discontinuance of proceedings by the court 
during the Zwischenverfahren may also occur (in terms of the 
67 See Radtke 1 74-1 75. (See supra under 9. 3. 1 , text at notes 4 1 and 
45 for the grounds on which proceedings may be discontinued in 
terms of the prinicple of expediency). 
68See Trapper 102. 
69Cf Radtke 196. However, it is not altogether clear from the case law 
or the Code of Criminal procedure whether new proceedings may be 
instituted only for Verbrechen, or in all cases where there is new 
evidence available. 
70See Radtke 1 87-1 9 7 and 21 3-214. 
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principle of expediency) on a conditional basis. 71 The prosecutor has 
to give his consent and the decision cannot be challenged. If the 
conditions are fulfilled, new proceedings may not be instituted - at 
least not for Vergehen. 72 
To summarise. If the prosecutor prefers a charge, the court becomes 
dominus litis. From this moment onwards the prosecutor is not 
permitted to discontinue criminal proceedings on his own initiative 
(even with the consent of the court). The prosecutor brings a charge 
if a conviction is probable. Then the court must decide whether a trial 
should take place by opening the main proceedings. The decision of 
the court not to open the proceedings (the Nichteroffnungsbeschluss) 
obtains only limited finality; new proceedings may be instituted if new 
facts or evidence come to light. In legal literature this position is 
criticised on the basis that the decision not to open the main 
proceedings relies on a conclusion that there is no probablility that the 
accused may be convicted; in other words, a decision which 
resembles a final adjudication on the factual merits of a case. An 
alternative point of view is that the decision not to open the main 
proceedings involves a lesser degree of investigation into the guilt or 
innocence of the accused than that which precedes the Sachurteil. 
Consequently, a subsequent adjudication based on new facts and 
evidence may be justified. 
During this stage of proceedings the court may also discontinue 
proceedings for less serious offences on the basis of the principle of 
expediency, namely on the grounds that (a) the guilt of the accused 
71 Para 153a II. See Kleinknecht and Meyer 602. These are the same 
as provided for during the Ermittlungsverfahren. See supra under 
9.3.1, text at note 45. 
72See Beulke 142. Apparently, new proceedings may be instituted for 
Verbrechen. 
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can be regarded as trivial or insignificant and that there is no public 
interest to prosecute and (b) the case is dropped on a conditional basis 
(by issuance of a penal order) because the accused only had minor 
guilt. A discontinuance of proceedings on any these grounds also 
obtains limited finality, the ambit of which is controversial in the case 
law. In legal literature, the fact that a discontinuance in terms of the 
principle of expendiency during the intermediary stage of trial obtains 
limited Rechtskraff, is justified inter alia on the ground that it only 
involves a hypothetical adjudication of guilt. However, a more 
substantial argument is that the limitation placed on the Rechtskraff 
can be explained as follows. The court's Kognitionspflicht (at this 
stage of proceedings) is not as comprehensive as that which is 
required for a final decision on the factual merits (Sachurteil) at the 
end of the trial. Since the ambit of the courts' Kognitionspflicht 
relates to the ambit of the Rechtskraff, a lesser degree of finality is 
accorded to a discontinuance on any of these grounds during this 
preliminary stage of criminal proceedings than that which is accorded 
to a Sachurteil at the conclusion of the main trial. 
9.3.3 Discontinuance of proceedings after the opening of the main 
trial 
The trial or main proceedings (Hauptverhand/ung) begins with the 
opening of proceedings by the court. After the opening of the main 
proceedings, the case can no longer be withdrawn - by either the 
court or the prosecutor. If the court decides after opening the main 
proceedings that there is no probability of conviction, the proceedings 
continue and the accused is acquitted by a judgment on the factual 
merits (Sachurtei/J. 73 
73See Fezer 113. 
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If the decision can no longer be challenged by appeal or review, 
further proceedings are barred. In other words, materielle Rechtskraft 
then comes into operation.74 
9.3.4 Discontinuance of proceedings on the basis of violation of 
fundamental rights 
The law in this particular field has not as yet been fully settled in 
Germany. However, discontinuance or stay of proceedings by the 
court on this basis has been considered in the following instances 
(i) the right to a speedy trial 
(ii) entrapment 
(iii) kidnapping against the principles of International law and 
(iv) violation of the accused's rights during the investigative stages 
of trial. 
74There are several remedies by which a decision may be challenged. 
The first one is the appeal (Berufung). This leads to a trial de nova. 
The court of appeal may investigate the whole case afresh and also 
receive new evidence. The court either dismisses the appeal or allows 
the appeal by making its own decision on the merits. Both the 
defendant and the prosecutor may appeal. The prosecutor may appeal 
against an acquittal on the factual merits of a case as well as against 
sentence imposed on the person who has been convicted. As 
indicated above, the prosecutor may even appeal on behalf of the 
accused if he is of the opinion that the accused was unfairly convicted 
and/or sentenced. The Berufung is available to the accused and the 
prosecution to challenge the decisions of lower courts of general 
jurisdiction. The Revision is a remedy which can be described as an 
appeal on a point of law and an appeal on procedural aspects for 
instance, whether the court applied the law correctly to the facts or 
whether there was any procedural irregularity (a violation of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure). If the review is well-founded, the decision is 
reversed and the matter referred back to the lower court for a new 
trial. The appeal or revision on initiative of the prosecutor to the 
prejudice of the accused is not regarded as a violation of the rule 
against double jeopardy. The remedy of Revision is available to the 
accused and the prosecution to challenge the decisions of lower as 
well as superior courts. See in general Roxin 347-392. 
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The right to a speedy trial has only been considered by the 
Bundesgerichtshof as a factor to be taken into account for the 
imposition of a lesser punishment. However, in recent times lower 
courts as well as the Bundesgerichtshofhave recognised the possiblity 
that a violation of this right may lead to a permanent stay of 
proceedings.75 In cases of entrapment (Lockspitzel), the possiblity 
has also been recognised by the Bundesgerichtshof that it may in 
certain circumstances lead to a Verfahrenshindernis. However, since 
1 984 the Strafsenat of the Bundesgerichtshof held that it may only be 
taken into consideration as a factor for the imposition of lesser a 
punishment. 76 The law however, is still in a stage of development 
in this particular field. In the remaining instances, the courts' right to 
stay proceedings has been denied in the case of (iii) 77 and has not 
yet been fully resolved in the case of (iv). 78 
9.4 THE DEFINITIONAL ISSUE OF DIESELBE TAT (THE "SAME 
OFFENCE") 
9.4.1 General 
The Grundgesetz does not give a definition of the concept dieselbe 
Tat. As has been mentioned, the meaning of the concept is therefore 
75 See Roxin Die Rechtsfolgen schwerwiegender 
Rechtsstaatsverstosse in der Strafrechtspflege 1987 (neuebearbeite 
Auflage 1995) 84-91, hereinafter referred to as Roxin Imme. 
76BGHSt 32 345. See Roxin Imme 25-31. 
77See Roxin Imme IV citing BVerf G NstZ 86 178; 86 468. 
78Two lower courts recognised a Verfahrenshindernis in these 
situations, but the courts of Revision (reviewing courts) had a different 
point of view. See Roxin Imme IV. 
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also to be found in the ordinary law. 79 A distinction is drawn in 
German law between the concept Tat in the substantive law sense of 
the word (materielle Tatbegriffl on the one hand, and Tat in the 
procedural law sense of the word (prozessuale Tatbegriffl on the other 
hand. The concept Tat in the substantive law sense of the word 
relates to single trial multiple punishment issues. In other words, in 
substantive law, the concept Tat determines which punishment ought 
to be imposed on the person who has been convicted. 
In most cases, the criteria applied in substantive law to determine 
whether there is a single unit of conduct (Tateinheit) or multiplicity of 
conduct ( Tatmehrheit), is also implemented by the courts to determine 
whether a subsequent prosecution for the same Tat is prohibited. It 
follows that in most cases where there is Tateinheit in the substantive 
sense of the word, there will also be Tateinheit in the procedural sense 
of the word. 80 It is therefore essential to discuss the criteria 
advanced in substantive law to determine the concept materielle Tat. 
This is known as the Konkurrenzlehre (doctrine of concurrency). 
However, the courts have also given a broader meaning to the concept 
strafprozessuale Tat than to the concept Tat in the substantive law. 
This will become clear from the discussion of the concept 
strafprozessuale Tat in German law. 
To summarise. In German law, the basic premise is that the same 
criteria apply to determine the permissibility of multiple punishment in 
a single trial on the one hand, and successive prosecutions for the 
same offence on the other hand. However, a successive prosecution 
79See Maunz\Durig 103 Ill 13. 
800f importance is to always keep in mind that materielle Rechtskraft 
comes into operation in respect of the Tat in the procedural sense of 
the word. 
629 
may also be prohibited in circumstances where multiple punishment (in 
a single trial) may be allowed. In other words, in certain cases where 
there is Tatmehrheit in substantive law, the courts nevertheless held 
that the offences charged in successive prosecutions are in a relation 
of Tateinheit to each other. This means that broader protection is 
afforded the accused in the context of successive prosecutions than 
in the single trial multiple punishment context. 
The following discussion will focus on the concept strafprozessuale 
Tat as explained in terms of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
Thereafter, the criteria advanced in the substantive law to determine 
the multiple punishment issue will be discussed (the so-called 
Konkurrenzlehre). Finally, the ambit of the concept strafprozessuale 
Tat as explained by the courts will be considered. 
9.4.2 The concept Tat in terms of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
The concept strafprozessuale Tat becomes relevant in the following 
procedural contexts 81 
(a) While the Tat is adjudicated on, it may not at the same time be 
adjudicated on by another court. This is referred to as 
Rechtshangigkeit (the principle of /is pendens). 
(b) It defines the subject on which the court may give a decision. 
This means that the court, in delivering judgment, is bound to 
the Tat with which the accused is charged. The Tat with which 
the accused is charged is known as the subject of the 
adjudication (Gegenstand der Urteilsfindung). 
(c) The ambit of the materielle Rechtskraft is dependent on the 
concept strafprozessuale Tat. 
81 See Fezer 243 and Beulke 212. 
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The concept strafprozessuale Tat is the same in all three these 
contexts. 
The concept Tat is described in the Code as the subject matter of 
adjudication against the accused. 82 This is called the 
Prozessgegenstand. Unlike the position in Anglo-American countries, 
the Prozessgegestand is not limited to the crimes set out in the charge 
sheet. It pertains to a much wider field. The subject matter of 
adjudication in German law pertains to the conduct of the accused 
described in the charge sheet as revealed as a result of the trial. 83 
It follows that the court, in delivering its judgment (Urteilsfindung), is 
neither bound to the charge sheet nor to the description of the criminal 
conduct in its opening decision (Eroffnungsbeschluss). 84 For 
example: A throws a stone at B, a police officer. He is charged with 
the crime of resisting a police officer. However, depending upon the 
facts as revealed in the trial (Hauptverhandlung), he may also be 
convicted of assault without this being alleged in the charge sheet. 
There is a duty on the court to consider (in its judgment), all factual 
issues which came to light as a result of the trial. The court also has 
a duty to consider the facts (as they appear to be as a result of the 
82Para 264 I StPO. See Kleinknecht and Meyer 972. 
83See para 2641: Gegenstand der Urteilsfindung istdie in der Anklage 
bezeichnete Tat wie sie sich nach der Ergebnis der Verhandlung 
darstellt". (Kleinknecht and Meyer 972). (The subject matter of the 
judgment is the act specified in the charge as revealed as a result of 
the trial - translation by Niebler). 
84See para 264 II: "Das Gericht ist an die Beurteilung der Tat, die dem 
Beschluss iiber die Eroffnung des Hauptverfahrens zugrunde liegt, 
nicht gebunden". (Kleinknecht and Meyer 972). (The court is not 
bound by the classification of the act on which the order opening the 
main proceeding is based - translation by Niebler.) 
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trial) from all legal perspectives. This means that the court must take 
into consideration all the crimes of which the accused may be 
convicted on the basis of the facts as determined during the trial. 85 
The only limitation placed on the court is that it may not adjudicate 
on a completely different Tat from that described in the charge sheet 
and the openinig decision.86 Therefore, there is a comprehensive 
duty on the court finally to dispose of the totality of the criminal 
conduct which the accused allegedly committed, in one single trial. 
The duty of the court to establish all the true facts and relevant legal 
perspectives is called the Kognitionspflicht. 87 As indicated above, it 
is suggested that the ambit of the court's Kognitionspflicht is closely 
related to the ambit of the materielle Rechtskraft. In fact, certain 
writers suggest that it should be the only criterion in determining 
whether a successive prosecution ought to be prohibited. 88 The 
scope of the court's Kognitionspflicht is discussed in detail in the 
paragraphs which follow. However, before considering this particular 
issue, it is necessary first of all to consider which criteria are applied 
in the substantive law to determine the permissiblity of multiple 
punishment. 
85See BGHStV 1987 52, 53. See also Fezer 243. 
86See para 155 I: "Die Untersuchung und Entscheidung erstreckt sich 
nur auf die in der Klage bezeichnete Tat und auf die durch die Klage 
beschuldigten Person en ". 11. "lnnerhalb dieser Grenzen sind die 
Gerichte zu einer selbstandigen Tiitigkeit berechtigt und verpflichtet; 
insbesondere sind sie bei Anwenduing des Strafgesetzes an die 
gestellte Antrage nicht gebunden". (The investigation and _decision 
extend only to the act designated in the charge and to the persons 
accused in the charge. Within these limits the courts are authorised 
and obliged to act independently; in particular in applying the criminal 
law, they are not bound by the charges made - translation by Niebler). 
87See Fezer 243. 
88This is the view of Fezer (244). 
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9.4.3 The doctrine of concurrency 
As indicated above, the doctrine of concurrency was developed in 
German law in order to regulate the multiple convictions problem 
encountered in a single trial. The basic premise in terms of this 
doctrine is the following 
One Tat = one punishment. 
More than one Tat = multiple punishment combined in a 
sensible manner. 
According to this basic premise an accused, by performing one single 
act (Handlung), can comply with the elements (Tatbestiinde) of more 
than one crime. This is known as Tateinheit (unity of conduct) and 
referred to in German law as ldealkonkurrenz. However, there is also 
the possibility that by committing several acts the accused complies 
with the elements of several crimes. This is known as Tatmehrheit 
(multiplicity of conduct) and referred to as Rea/konkurrenz. 
Basically, Tateinheit pressuposes that only a single punishment may 
be imposed.89 This is the case even if several legal interests are 
infringed. However, in determining what punishment ought to be 
imposed, the most important legal interest which has been infringed 
is taken into consideration. With this evaluation the punishment is 
imposed which relates to the gravest Unrechtsgehalt (the gravest 
degree of injustice) of the conduct. This is known as the 
Absorptionprinzip: the most severe punishment absorbs the lighter 
punishments. 90 Tatmehrheit on the other hand, presupposes multiple 
89Para 52 I StGB (Strafgesetzbuch). See Baumann J et al Strafrecht 
Allgemeiner Tei/ Lehrbuch 10 (neuebearbeite) Auflage 1995, 732. 
90/d. 
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punishment. The principle applicable is known as the 
Asperationprinzip (principle of asperity). This means that the 
punishment imposed for offences which are in a relationship of 
Tatmehrheit forms one aggregate sentence, based on the severest 
penalty for the individual sentence. 91 
However, for the purpose of this thesis it is important to establish 
in which circumstances it can be said that there is Tateinheit or 
Tatmehrheit. As indicated above, in cases where Tateinheit exists in 
substantive law, there will also be a single strafprozessuale Tat. 
9.4.3.1 The concept Tateinheit (unity of conduct) 
The doctrine of concurrency advances several criteria to establish 
Tateinheit. These are the following 
(i) The act in the natural sense of the word. (Handlung im 
naturlichen Sinn). This is the most simple form of an act: a 
single physical act (one body movement). For example: X 
slaps Y once in the face. If there is one act in the usual sense 
of the word, there will also be only one Strafprozessuale Tat. 
(ii) Natural unity of conduct (naturliche Handlungseinheit). This is 
a dogmatic construction of an act. This form of Tateinheit 
consists of at least two physical acts in the usual sense of the 
word. However, in terms of certain criteria, they are regarded 
as a unit of conduct. These criteria are the following 
(a) connection in terms of time and place and 
91 See paras 53-55 StGB & Baumann 733-734. This is known as 
Gesamtstrafe. The Gesamtstrafe is determined by considering the 
most severe sentence, aggregate to the other sentences. The 
Gesamtstrafe must be more severe than the most severe punishment 
for one of the offences, but not more severe than the total of all the 
punishments prescribed for each sentence. 
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similarity in the execution of the acts92 
(b) a similar intention; in other words, there ought to 
be uniformity in the decision (einheitlicher 
Handlungswille) so that it may be said that it could 
be regarded as one project. 
A simple example of natilrliche Handlungseinheit is the 
following. X slaps Y across the face, and with- a second slap 
breaks Y's glasses. The crimes of assault and malicious injury 
to property then are in a relationship of Tateinheit. 93 It is also 
irrelevant whether the rights of different victims are violated.94 
For example: X, acting in a continuous state of rage, breaks 
down a door of a hotel and injures several people inside. The 
crimes of malicious injury to property and multiple assaults on 
several victims are in a relationship of Tateinheit. 95 
The Bundesgerichtshof explained the concept naturliche 
Handlungseinheit as follows96 
Eine natilrliche Handlungseinheit ist gegeben wenn der 
Handelnde den auf die Erzielung eines Erfolges in der 
Aussenwelt gerichteten einheitlichen Willen durch eine 
Mehrheit gleichgearteter Akte betatigt und diese 
einzelnen Betatigunsakte aufgrund ihres raumlichen und 
zeitlichen Zuzammenhanges objektiv erkennbar derart 
zusammengehoren, dass sie nach der Auffassung des 
Lebens eine Handlung bi/den. (A natural unit of conduct 
exists where a person commits several similar acts in the 
same space and during the same time and with a similar 
intention, and each of the single acts performed can in 
92See Baumann 726. 
93See Bauman 727. 
94/d. The only exception is where highly personal rights of the 
individual are violated. 
95Example taken from Jakobs G Strafrecht Allgemeiner Tei/ - Die 
Grundlagen und die Zurechnungs/ehre Lehrbuch 2 (neuebearbeite 
Auflage) 1993 890. 
96BGHSt 10 230, 231. 
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terms of the ordinary course of events be viewed 
objectively as a unit of conduct). 97 
Where there is a normal unit of conduct (natOrliche 
Handlungseinheit) in the substantive law, there will also be a 
strafprozessuale Tat. 
(iii) Legal unit of conduct (rechtliche Handlungseinheit) 
Legal unit of conduct exists where particular acts can be 
viewed as inherently independent of each other. However, in 
terms of certain criminal law perspectives, they are regarded as 
one unit of conduct. 98 The following are forms of a legal unit 
of conduct 
(a) Multiple act Tatbestande 
This is where the Tatbestand of a crime itself joins 
multiple acts into a legal unit. For example, the crime of 
robbery entails that the accused has to perform several 
acts in the ordinary sense of the word: an act of 
violence and the appropriation of an object. In this case 
there is Tateinheit in substantive law, as well as one 
strafprozessuale Tat. If a person is only charged with the 
appropriation, it is expected of the judge to fulfil his 
Kognitionspflicht by also viewing the appropriation from 
the perspective of the unlawful compulsion (Notigung) as 
a method of effecting the appropriation. The 
appropriation and the compulsion cannot be divided; the 
degree of injustice and blameworthiness for both these 
manifestations of criminal conduct ought to be 
determined in one trial. 99 
(b) Continuing crimes (Dauerdeliktstatbestande) 
In these cases, the realising of the Tatbestand occurs 
over a period of time, for example the kidnapping of a 
97Freely translated. 
98See Baumann 727. 
99See Fezer 245. 
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person; the crime continues until the victim is set free. 
Single acts performed to fulfil the Tatbestand of the 
continuous crime build a unit of conduct 
(Handlungseinheit), and one strafprozessuale Tat. 100 
The following are examples of ldealkonkurrenz 
* 
* 
If, from a factual or legal perspective, certain conduct is 
required for the realisation of a Tatbestand, there will be 
Handlungseinheit (a unit of conduct) where at least a part 
of this conduct is identical to that required to comply 
with another Tatbestand or Tatbestiinde. 101 In other 
words, if there is overlapping of conduct in the process 
of committing more than one crime, there will be 
Tateinheit. This is known in German law as Teilidentitiit. 
This means that there is only partial identity in conduct. 
A simple example is the following. X drives a car without 
a licence. He stops, breaks into a house and steals 
jewellery. Then he drives back to his house. This is 
ldealkonkurrenz on the basis of overlapping conduct. In 
order to comply with the Tatbestand of theft, X must 
remove the property. While taking away the property, he 
also commits the crime of driving without a licence. 102 
Where there is Teilidentitiit in the substantive law, there 
will also be one strafprozessuale Tat. 
Where each of several crimes is in a relationship of 
Handlungseinheit with a particular crime, there should 
also be Handlungseinheit between each of these several 
crimes. This is called Verklammerung (joining 
together). 103 An example is the following. A person 
drives under the influence of liquor. On his way, he 
picks up a woman and takes her to a lonely place where 
100See Baumann 728. 
101 See Jakobs 909-910. 
102See Fezer 246. This commentator explains Teilidentitiit as follows: 
An act in the ordinary sense of the word (natDrliche Handlung) 
complies at the same time with the preconditions of two Tatbestiinde, 
but one of these Tatbestande or each of them still requires further acts 
or a continuing act to be fully complied with. 
103See Jakobs 912. 
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he rapes her. The crimes of rape and drunken driving are 
not in a relationship of Tateinheit with each other. 
However, they are joined in Tateinheit by a third crime, 
namely kidnapping a woman against her will with 
unlawful performance of sexual acts with the 
woman. 104 Where there is Verklammerung, there will 
also be one strafprozessuale Tat. 
9.4.3.2 The broader interpretation of the conceptstrafprozessuale Tat 
by the courts 
German courts have adopted a comprehensive "same transaction" 
approach to determine whether a successive prosecution for the 
"same offence" (dieselbe Tat) ought to be barred. The 
Bundesgerichtshof explained the courts' approach in the following 
terms105 
Nach der stiindigen Rechtsprechung des Reichsgerichts und des 
Bundesgerichtshofs ist unter Tat im Sinne des [Absatzl 264Stp0 
der vom Eroffnungsbeschluss betroffene geschichtliche 
Vorgang einschliesslich al/er damit zusammenhangenden und 
darauf beziiglichen Vorkommnisse und tatsiichlichen Umstiinde, 
die nach der Auffassung des Lebens eine natiirliche Einheit 
bi/den, zu verstehen. (In terms of the approach of the 
Reichtsgericht and the Bundesgericht, the Tat in the sense of 
para 264StPO is understood as the subject of adjudication as 
described in the opening decision, including all other related 
events and factual circumstances which, according to normal 
human experience or the ordinary understanding of things, form 
a natural unity). 106 
104This is a substantive offence in German law (para 237 StGB). See 
Dreher E & Trondle H Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze Band 10 
1991 45 Auflage 1255). The example is taken from Kuhl K Strafrecht 
Allgemeiner Tei/ 1994 1 Auflage 727-728. 
105BGHSt 13 320, 321. See also BGHSt 23 141, 145 & 35 80, 81-
82. The same concept of the straprozessuale Tat was adopted by the 
Constitutional Court. See BVerfG 56 22, 28. 
106Freely translated. 
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At first glance it may seem as if these criteria are the same or very 
similar to those advanced in substantive law to determine naturliche 
Handlungseinheit for the purpose of establishing concurrency in one 
trial. This is indeed the basic approach. In most cases where, in 
terms of substantive law, there is Tatmehrheit (multiplicity of 
conduct), there will also be a single strafprozessuale Tat. 101 
However, the courts have also held that where there is Tatmehrheit 
in substantive law (Realkonkurrenz), there may nevertheless be only 
one strafprozessua/e Tat. In other words, a successive prosecution for 
an act may be prohibited even if multiple punishment are allowed in 
a single trial. The Bundesgerichtshof held that this would be the case 
if separate acts (in terms of substantive law) are so closely connected 
that a separate evaluation and adjudication of each of these acts could 
be regarded as an unnatural splitting up of a unit of conduct. 108 
The classic example given in the textbooks of a situation where 
there is Tatmehrheit in terms of substantive law but only one 
strafprozessuale Tat, is the following. The crimes of drunken driving 
and causing an accident on the one hand, and subsequent departure 
from the scene of the crime ("hit and run") on the other hand, stands 
in Realkonkurrenz with one another. 109 However, the 
Bundesgerichtshof held (applying the above criteria), that there is 
nevertheless Tatidentitiit (identity of acts) between these offences to 
107See Radtke 99. 
108(Zwischen den einzelnen Verhaltensweisen des Taters muss ein 
innere Verknupfung bestehen, dergestalt, dass ihre getrennte 
Aburteilung in verschiedenen erstinstanzlichen Verfahren a/s 
unnaturliche Aufspaltung eines einheitlichen Lebensvorganges 
empfunden wurde}. See Beulke 213, citing BGHSt 13 21, 26. See 
also BGHSt 35 14, 17 to the same effect. 
109The Bundesgerichtshof held that the offences of Unfallflucht (para 
142 StGB) and Gefahrdung des Strassenverkehrs (para 315c) are not 
in a relationship of Tateinheit with one another. (See BGHSt 21 203). 
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the extent that they can be regarded as a single strafprozessuale 
Tat.110 
This approach may be reconciled with the court's Kognitionspflicht: 
the court is obliged to consider the facts as they appear in the 
Hauptverhandlung from all legal perspectives. However, the issue is 
whether the Strafklageverbrauch may cover an even wider field than 
could be expected objectively of the presiding judge to investigate and 
determine. In other words, is the Kognitionspflicht of the judge an 
abstract-hypothetical concept, or a concept with concrete boundaries? 
In the past, the courts have followed an abstract-hypothetical 
approach. This means that in order to determine the scope of the 
Strafklageverbrauch it is not important in which sense the court was 
de facto able to adjudicate on the act in its totality, but only if it was 
de jure in a position to do so. 111 
Several legal commentators criticise this approach. It is suggested, 
inter alia, that the Rechtskraft should be limited to the matter which 
could in actual fact be established or determined by the court 
exercising due diligence. 112 Another suggestion is that the identiy 
110See BGHSt 23 14 1, 146-14 7. Beu Ike 214 points out that the result 
of this approach is that if a person is simply charged of drunken and 
dangerous driving, he may also be convicted in the Hauptverhandlung 
of the crime of "hit and run" if the facts revealed during the main trial 
demonstrate that he also committed the offence of "hit and run". 
111See Radtke 107. (FOr den Umfang des Strafklageverbrauchs kommt 
es nicht darauf an, inwieweit das Gericht die angeklagte Tat 
tatsachlich in ihren gesamten Umfang aburteilen konnte, sondern nur 
darauf, ob es rechtlich dazu in der Lage war). The author points out 
that this approach was established by the previous Reichtsgericht 
(RGSt 9 344, 347) and followed in decisions of that court and the 
subsequentBundesgerichL 
112See Henkel H 388-389. (Nicht nur das, was diese hypotetisch 
abzuurteilen in der Lage war, sondern was es bei sorgfaltiger ErfO/lung 
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of acts ought to be determined on the basis of the identity of the legal 
interests violated. 113 Some legal commentators express the view 
that the principles of concurrency should be applied consistently in 
determining whether there is one strafprozessuale Tat. In other 
words, in all cases where there is Tatmehrheit in terms of the 
substantive law, a subsequent prosecution should be allowed. 114 
A further criterion advanced in order to determine identity of 
offences in the context of successive prosecutions is the following. 
There should only be Tatidentitiit if the second proceeding relates to 
factual events which could have been charged in the alternative to the 
crimes charged in the first proceeding. 115 The rationale underlying 
this theory is the avoidance of inconsistent judgments. 
Peters raises the following argument. 116 The identity of the act 
in the context of Rechtskraft should be determined by considering not 
only the relationship of the individual acts, but also the aim (or target) 
of each act (Richtung des Tiitigkeitsaktes). In other words, it must be 
determined if the previous subject of adjudication had the same 
der Wahrheitserforschungspflicht abzuurteile hatte, bestimmt den 
Umfang der Sperrwirkung de ne bis in idem). 
113See Bertel C Die ldentitiit der Tat 1970. However, he also requires 
that there ought to be similarity in the injury caused (before a second 
prosecution is prohibited). In his view, the legal interest violated and 
the gravity of the injurious act should be considered together (at 140). 
114See Herzberg RF "Ne bis in idem - Zur Sperrwirkung des 
rechtskraftigen Strafurteils" Juristische Schulung 1972 113. 
115See Schoneborn C "Alternativitat der Handlungsvorgange als 
Kriterium des strafprozessualen Tatbegriffs" Monatschrift fur 
deutsches Rechts 1974 529, 531. 
116See Peters K Strafprozess: Ein Lehrbuch 2 Auflage 1985 508-509. 
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"direction" or aim as the subsequent subject of adjudication. For 
example, the crimes of theft and robbery have the same aim 
( Tatrichtung). These offences can therefore not be charged in 
successive prosecutions. However, a person previously convicted of 
poaching of animals may in a subsequent trial be charged of murder 
of a person even if the murder occurred during the same time as the 
offence of poaching; the "direction" or aim of each of these acts 
differs. In terms of this criterion, a person previously convicted of 
receiving stolen property may also again be charged of robbery of the 
same objects. The "direction" or aim of each act is different. 117 
In recent times German courts have handed down a few decisions 
which deviate from a strict abstract-hypothetical approach. In 1980, 
the Bundesgerichtshof allowed a subsequent prosecution for capital 
crimes committed by the accused in his capacity as a member of a 
criminal organisation after a previous conviction of a crime which 
prohibits membership of the same organisation. 118 The court based 
its conclusion on the fact that the subsequent proceedings had not in 
fact been part of the subject matter of adjudication in the previous trial 
and also that a more severe punishment is prescribed for the acts 
charged in the second proceedings. 119 
The court also allowed a subsequent prosecution for negligent 
assault with a weapon after a previous conviction for unlawful 
possession of that particular weapon. 120 The court took into 
117This criterion has recently been applied by German courts. See infra 
text at note 127. 
118See BGH 29 288, 289. 
119At 296-297. 
120see BGHSt 36 151, 153. 
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consideraton the following criteria: the objectives of the respective 
acts (Tatobjekt), the time during which they were performed, and the 
place where they were performed. 121 
Legal commentators have suggested that these decisions rely in 
particular on the following criteria 122 
(i) the "direction" or aim of the act (Tatrichtung) 123 
(ii) the gravity of the legal interest infringed (Unrechtsdimension). 
These criteria were also applied in two other important decisions of 
the Bundesgerichtshof during 1987. The issue in the first of these 
cases was whether a previous (incorrect) conviction of receiving stolen 
property would prevent a subsequent prosecution for robbery. 124 
The court answered this question in the negative. It argued that the 
crimes had not been committed during the same time of in the same 
space, and also that the different legal interests violated had not 
indicated a unit of conduct. 125 In the second decision the 
Bundesgerichtshof also denied the existence of one strafprozessuale 
Tat in circumstances where the accused was charged with theft of 
jewellery after a previous conviction of being an accessory after the 
121At 154-155. 
122See Beulke 215 & Schh:ichter E "Von der Unabhangigkeitsthese zur 
materiell-rechtlich begrenzter Tatidentitat beim Dauerdelikt Juristen 
Zeitung 1991 1057, 1060-1061. 
123 As explained supra, text at note 11 7. 
124BGHSt 35, 60. 
125At 64. 
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fact in respect of the same jewels. 126 The second prosecution was 
permitted on the basis that that different legal interests were violated 
and that the target or aim of the act (Angriffsrichtung) differed and 
also that it occurred at different times in different places. 127 
The fact that the court employed normative criteria instead of the 
wider factual approach in all of these cases, may be viewed as an 
indication of a swing towards a more conservative approach in this 
particular field of double jeopardy jurisprudence. 128 However, the 
Bundesgerichtshof has not as yet explicitly rejected the wider de facto 
approach. 129 It may therefore be concluded that German courts 
apply a wide "same transaction" approach to determine identity of 
offences, but allow exceptions in individual cases, namely where the 
interests of justice require that the accused be prosecuted once again. 
126BGHSt 35, 80. The decision therefore amounted to a rejection of 
the theory of alternativity as proposed by Schoneborn. See supra text 
at note 11 5 for a discussion of this theory. 
127At 82. 
128See however Radtke (at 102) who expresses the point of view that 
the number of decisions in which the court relied on these criteria are 
too few to conclude that the traditional comprehensive Tatbegriff has 
given way to a more limited Tatbegriff. 
129 An issue which would subject the ambit or the strafprozessuale Tat 
to closer scrutiny is the "subsequent death" situation. This particular 
issue has not as yet been considered by the courts. A plausible 
explanation may be that the prosecution has refrained from instituting 
new proceedings in these particular cases because it is generally 
recognised that the materielle Rechtskraft also covers a consequence 
which arises only after adjudication of the act (Tat) which brought 
about the consequence. 
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9.5 PROHIBITION ON IMPOSITION OF A MORE SEVERE SENTENCE 
ON APPEAL AND RETRIAL (VERBOT DER REFORMATIO IN 
PE/US) 
As indicated above, German law allows the accused as well as the 
prosecution to appeal against acquittals, convictions and sentences 
handed down by lower courts. 130 The courts of appeal have wide 
powers to dispose of each of these matters. 131 However, there are 
certain limitations placed on a court of appeal in respect of sentences. 
These limitations are set out in certain provisions of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure. The relevant rules are the following 
(i) if the accused or his counsel appeals against a conviction 
and/or sentence, or the prosecutor appeals in favour of the 
accused against a conviction and/or sentence, the judgment of 
the trial court may not, with regard to the nature and degree of 
punishment, be changed to the prejudice of the accused132 
(ii) however, if the prosecutor appeals to the prejudice of the 
accused against an acquittal or sentence, the decision may be 
changed either to the prejudice of the accused or in his 
favour. 133 
The prohibition is only applied to punishment and not to a change 
in the decision itself. 134 It also applies on retrial after appellate 
130See supra note 7 4. 
131 See supra note 74 for a discussion of these powers. 
132Paras 331 I; 358 II 1 StPO (See Kleinknecht and Meyer 1127 & 
1217). 
133Para 301 StPO (Kleinknecht and Meyer 1061). 
134This means that a person charged and convicted of theft, may 
nevertheless be convicted (on appeal) of robbery. 
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reversal of a conviction. The rule is known as the 
Verschlechterungsverbot. This means that there is a prohibition on 
placing a person in a worse position that he has previously been. 
However, it only applies if the accused appealed, or the prosecutor 
appealed in favour of the accused. If the prosecutor appealed to the 
prejudice of the accused (against his acquittal and/or sentence), a 
more severe sentence may be imposed. 
Of importance is that the Verschlechterungsverbot is based on the 
consideration that the accused ought not to be inhibited from using his 
legal remedies, for instance the institution of appeal. 135 
9.6 RE-OPENING TO DISADVANTAGE OF FINALLY ACQUITTED 
ACCUSED 
The German Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a case may 
be re-opened to the disadvantage of a finally acquitted accused in the 
following circumstances 136 
* 
* 
* 
if a document presented to his advantage during the main 
trial as genuine was false or falsified 
if the witness or expert, while giving testimony or 
rendering an opinion to the advantage of the accused has 
made himself guilty of an intentional or negligent 
violation of the duties imposed by the oath or of 
intentionally giving false unsworn testimony 
if a judge, juror or lay judge who participated in passing 
the judgment has made himself guilty of a violation of 
his official duties with respect to the matter (if public 
punishment to be imposed by way of a judicial criminal 
proceeding is provided for such violation) and/or 
135See BGHSt 11319,323. 
136Para 362 Kleinknecht and Meyer 1232. 
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* if a credible confession of the punishable act is made by 
the acquitted person in court or outside of court. 
9.7 SUMMARY 
* On a literal interpretation, the double jeopardy provision of the 
German Constitution- only offers- the accused -protection. against 
multiple punishment. This is similar to the double jeopardy provision 
of the Indian Constitution. However, the Supreme Court of India 
preferred to give effect to the literal meaning of the words used in the 
constitutional guarantee, while the Constitutional Court of Germany 
(the Bundesverfassungsgericht) opted for a broad interpretation of the 
guarantee. The court ruled that the provision protects the accused 
against multiple punishment as well as against multiple trials. 
Moreover, the court held that an accused may rely on the guarantee 
irrespective of whether he has previously been acquitted or convicted 
for the same criminal conduct (dieselbe Tat). 
* In one of the first double jeopardy cases the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht held that protection afforded in terms of the 
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy is the same as that 
provided for in the ordinary law. However, the court added in a later 
decision that it may lay down new principles in this field of law if it is 
faced with new issues not previously resolved in terms of the ordinary 
law, or if it is faced with controversial issues of double jeopardy. 
* Legal commentators have identified several policy considerations 
which underlie the guarantee against double jeopardy. It is pointed out, 
inter alia, that the rule strives to achieve the objectives of legal 
certainty as well as justice for the individual. Also, it protects the 
accused against arbitrary exercise of state power and ensures that 
organs of state perform their duties in a diligent manner. If the organs 
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of state (the prosecutor and the court) do not perform their duties in 
a diligent manner, namely by investigating all the facts from all 
relevant legal perspectives, they are denied a second opportunity to 
prosecute the accused. 
* In German law of criminal procedure, the doctrine of res judicata is 
referred to as the Rechtskraftlehre. Unlike the position in Anglo-
American systems, a distinction is drawn in German law between 
formelle Rechtskraft and materielle Rechtskraft. Formelle Rechtskraft 
means that a decision can no longer be challenged in the same 
proceedings. This means that all possible remedies (such as appeal 
and review) have been exhausted, or that the time within which these 
remedies could have been utilised, has lapsed. Materielle Rechtskraft 
on the other hand, means that a decision has obtained the status of 
finality: it can no longer be the subject of adjudication in another 
proceeding. Of importance is that a decision only becomes final 
(obtains materielle Rechtskraft) at a stage after all legal remedies 
available to the accused or the prosecution have been utilised. In 
other words, formelle Rechtskraft is a prerequisite for materielle 
Rechtskraft. 
* Apart from the requirement of formelle Rechtskraft, it is also 
necessary that a termination of proceedings against the accused 
amounts to an adjudication on the factual merits of the case. This is 
called a Sachurteil (a decision on the merits) as opposed to a 
Prozessurteil (a decision based on procedural grounds). Therefore, a 
decision cannot attain the status of finality (acquire materielle 
Rechtskraft) unless it can be viewed as a final decision on the factual 
merits of the case. In this respect, the German approach is similar to 
that followed in most Anglo-American systems of criminal procedure. 
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* As in Anglo-American systems of criminal procedure, a Sachurteil 
usually takes place at the conclusion of the main proceedings (the 
Hauptverhandlung). However, German law also recognises that a 
discharge may occur at an earlier stage of criminal proceedings, 
namely during either the investigative stage (the Ermittlungsverfahren) 
or during the intermediary stage of proceedings (the 
Zwischenverfahren) which, although it does not follow on a full trial 
on the merits, resembles a decision on the merits. Therefore, in terms 
of Anglo-American legal terminology, it may be said that jeopardy, in 
German criminal law, may also "attach" at a stage before the final 
conclusion of the trial. 
* Nevertheless, German courts have been reluctant to afford 
absolute finality to discontinuances during these preliminary stages of 
trial, even if they resemble an adjudication on the factual merits of the 
case. In fact, the courts only afford limited finality to such 
discontinuances. However, this does not mean that all types of 
discontinuances during these stages of criminal proceedings obtain the 
same degree of finality. In fact, the courts have accorded different 
degrees of finality to different types of discontinuances of proceedings 
during these stages of criminal proceedings. 
The basic approach is that the accused discharged during these 
preliminary stages of criminal proceedings for a minor or less serious 
offence, may be prosecuted once again if the prosecutor discovers at 
a later stage that he in fact committed a more serious offence. 
However, in some instances new proceedings may only be instituted 
if new facts or evidence come to light which demonstrate that a more 
serious crime has been committed which deserves a more severe 
punishment. In other instances, new proceedings may be instituted 
if it appears (at a later stage) that the case can be viewed from a 
different legal perspective, indicating that a more serious offence has 
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been committed which deserves a more severe punishment. In the 
latter cases, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove the 
discovery of new facts or evidence. 
In legal literature, various rationales have been advanced to explain 
the phenomenon that limited finality is accorded to particular 
discontinuances of proceedings during the preliminary stages of trial. 
It is, for instance, suggested that the degree of investigation into the 
guilt or innocence of the accused required for a particular decision to 
either continue with a case or to discharge the accused, relates to the 
degree of finality accorded to the subject-matter on which the 
discontinuance is based. This argument is further supported by the 
notion that the court's Kognitionspflicht is not as comprehensive 
during the preliminary stages of criminal proceedings as during the 
main trial (Hauptverhandlung). Since the ambit of the Rechtskra'ft 
is related to the ambit of the Kognitionspflicht, only limited finality is 
accorded to decisions to discontinue during the preliminary stages of 
criminal proceedings. 
* Discontinuance of proceedings on the basis of violation of human 
rights has not as yet occurred in German law. In recent times, lower 
courts as well as the Bundesgerichtshofhave nevertheless recognised 
that proceedings may, in deserving circumstances, be discontinued 
permanently on the basis of violation of human rights such as denial 
of a speedy trial or entrapment. However, the law in this particular 
field is still in a developing stage. 
* In German law, the prosecution appeal against an acquittal on a 
point of law or on the factual merits of the case is not regarded as a 
violation of the rule against double jeopardy. In fact, it is not even 
considered in legal literature as involving double jeopardy principles. 
The reasons are the following. Finality only attaches to a decision if 
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all legal remedies have been exhausted in the same proceedings. 
Therefore, the appeal is viewed merely as a continuation of the same 
proceedings. In terms of German law of criminal procedure, the state 
may appeal against a decision favourable to the accused handed down 
in a lower court on the factual merits as well as on a point of law. 
However, the state may also appeal against a decision which is 
prejudicial to the accused on all the abovementioned grounds. This 
phenomenon, which is unknown in Anglo-American systems of 
criminal procedure, is a result of the inquisitorial nature of the German 
criminal trial; the defence and the prosecution are not opposing 
parties, but are both committed to finding the truth. Therefore, as 
submitted in the text, any assumption that the German prosecutor is 
allowed to appeal against an acquittal on the factual merits of a case 
solely because the jury system does not apply in the German system 
of criminal procedure, has no valid basis. 
* In German law, the Anglo-American concept of "same offence" is 
referred to as the strafprozessuale Tat. The concept strafprozessuale 
Tat defines the subject matter on which the court may give a decision, 
and determine the ambit of the materielle Rechtskraft. Unlike the 
position in Anglo-American systems of criminal justice, the subject 
matter of adjudication against the accused is not limited to the crimes 
set out in the charge. It covers a much wider field, namely the 
conduct of the accused as is revealed as a result of the trial. 
The comprehensive subject matter on which the court may, and also 
is obliged to adjudicate, flows from the inquisitorial nature of the 
criminal trial: the court has a duty (a so-called Kognitionspflicht) to 
establish the truth by examining all the relevant facts, and to view 
these facts from all possible legal perspectives. This means that the 
court must take into consideration all the crimes of which the accused 
may be convicted on the basis of the facts determined during the trial. 
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The underlying idea is that the court has a comprehensive duty finally 
to dispose of the totality of the criminal conduct which the accused 
committed in one single trial. Of importance is that the ambit of the 
Kognitionspflicht is closely related to the ambit of the Rechtskraft; 
This means that the question of whether a successive trial is 
permissible, is determined (inter alia) by investigating whether the 
court could have considered the subject matter in the first trial from 
the legal perspectives raised in the second trial. 
* In German law, a comprehensive two-tiered investigation is 
undertaken in order to determining whether a successive prosecution 
for the same subject matter (dieselbe Tat) is permissible. First of all, 
the criteria which are applied to determine the permissibility of the 
imposition of multiple punishment in a single trial are applied also to 
determine whether a successive prosecution is for dieselbe Tat. 
These criteria were developed in terms of the doctrine of concurrency 
which focuses on the issues of whether there is, in a specific case, a 
unit of conduct ( Tateinheit, also referred to as ldealkonkurrenz) or 
multiplicity of conduct (Tatmehrheit, also referred to as 
Realkonkurrenz). The basic premise is that where Tateinheit exists in 
the substantive law, there will also be only one strafprozessuale Tat. 
In other words, where imposition of multiple punishment is prohibited 
in a single trial, a successive prosecution will also not be permissible. 
* In terms of the doctrine of concurrency, Tateinheit is determined in 
the first place, by focusing purely on the facts. This involves an 
investigation as to whether the performance of more than one physical 
act occurred during the same time, in the same space, with a similar 
intention and whether each of the single acts performed can be 
viewed (in the ordinary understanding of things) as a unit of conduct. 
However, Tateinheit may also be determined by focusing on the legal 
composition of offences. The approach adopted in German criminal 
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law to determine "legal identity" as opposed to "factual identity" is 
different to that followed in Anglo-American systems (which focus 
mainly on the issue whether crimes qualify as lesser or greater 
included offences of each other). In German law, the relevant inquiry 
is whether the court fulfilled is duties (Kognitionspflicht), by 
considering the acts of which the accused is charged from all relevant 
legal perspectives. (For instance, if a person is charged with the act 
of appropriation of property belonging to another person, the court is 
obliged to consider the act from the perspectives of (at least) theft and 
robbery). 
* The investigation as to whether a subsequent trial relates to 
dieselbe Tat, does not only involve application of the criteria developed 
in terms of the doctrine of concurrency. The protection afforded 
against successive prosecutions for the same "subject-matter" is much 
more expansive than the protection afforded against multiple 
punishment in a single trial. This means that a subsequent prosecution 
may be barred even if multiple punishment would have been allowed 
in a single trial. The Bundesgerichtshof explained that this is the case 
if separate acts fin terms of substantive law) are so closely connected 
that a separate evaluation and adjudication of each of these acts can 
be regarded as an unnatural splitting of a unit of conduct. 
* In previous decisions, the Bundesgerichtshof has held that in 
determining the ambit of the Rechtskraft, the court should not merely 
investigate whether the court of first instance was de facto able to 
adjudicate on the act in its totality, but also if it was de jure in a 
position to do so. In practice, this means that finality also attaches 
to subject-matter which was impossible to consider in the first trial, for 
instance the "subsequent death" cases. This position has been 
severely criticised by legal commentators on the basis that the ambit 
of Rechtskraft should always relate to the matter which could in 
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actual fact have been established or determined by the court 
exercising due diligence. 
* In recent cases, the Bundesgerichtshof has not followed a strict 
abstract-hypothetical approach in order to determine the permissiblity 
of successive trials for the same subject-matter. In some cases, the 
court has in fact abandoned a wide "same transaction" approach in 
favour of a more conservative approach which focuses mainly on the 
issue whether there is similarity in the aim of the act (Tatrichtung) and 
equivalence in the seriousness of the legal interest infringed 
(Unrechtsdimension) as well as similarity in time, space and intention. 
On the facts present in most of these particular cases, a strong case 
could be made out that the public's interest in bringing offenders to 
justice justified a second trial. Since the court has not as yet 
categorically rejected a wider abstract-hypothetical approach, it may 
therefore be concluded that German courts apply a wide "same 
transaction" aproach to determine identity of offences, but make 
exceptions in individual cases where the interests of justice demand 
that a person be prosecuted once again. 
* German law of criminal procedure provides that if the accused 
appeals, or the state appeals against a decision prejudicial to the 
accused, the nature and degree of punishment imposed on the 
accused may not be changed to the detriment of the accused. The 
rule only applies to punishment and not to the finding of the court. 
Therefore, if the accused appeals or the state appeals in favour of the 
accused, the court of appeal may find him guilty of a more serious 
offence than that of which he has originally been convicted. However, 
the court may not impose a more severe sentence than that which had 
been imposed by the trial court. The rule also applies on retrial after 
appellate reversal of a conviction, and is referred to in German law as 
the Verschlechterungsverbot. The rule is based on a consideration of 
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reasonableness, namely that an accused ought not be be inhibited 
from using his legal remedies. 
* Finally, subject-matter which acquires materielle Rechtskraft, may 
only be re-opened on the grounds of fraud or collusion by the accused, 
witnesses or the court (in the case of collusion), or if the acquitted 
person made a credible confession afterwards (in or outside court). 
PART SIX 
CONCLUSIONS 
CHAPTER TEN 
PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
GUARANTEE AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
10. 1 GENERAL 
The recent introduction in South Africa of a supreme constitution 1 
with an entrenched bill of rights can be viewed as the most important 
and far-reaching event in South Afican legal history since 1910. The 
adoption by the previous parliament of a constitution containing a 
higher set of values which direct all state action, 2 not only resulted in 
the democratisation of the political institutions of this country but also 
"turned the entire legal system of South Africa on its head" .3 
This chapter focuses on the impact that the entrenchment of the 
common law rule against double jeopardy in the Constitution may have 
on existing legislation and common law rules which involve double 
jeopardy issues. However, before considering in any detail whether 
recognition in the South African Constitution of the common law rule 
against double jeopardy as a fundamental human right has brought 
about any changes in this particular area of law, it is essential first to 
1Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 
1996). 
21nterim Constitution of South Africa (Act 200 of 1993). 
3See Malan K Fundamental Rights: Themes and Trends 1996 V. 
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give a brief background to the adoption of the final Constitution in 
1996.4 This will be followed by a consideration of the guidelines laid 
down by the Constitutional Court for the interpretation of the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. Application by the 
Constitutional Court of these principles in actual cases will 
subsequently be considered. In final analysis, this thesis will consider 
the constitutionality of existing common law rules and statutory 
provisions which involve double jeopardy issues. 
10.2 BACKGROUND TO ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION - THE 
ROLE OF THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION5 
The establishment in South Africa of a new legal order was initiated 
with the adoption of an interim Constitution in 1993.6 The adoption 
of the interim Constitution by the previous parliament resulted from 
political negotiations in which all South African political actors, 
including previously banned political parties and movements and 
previously imprisoned leaders of various parties and movements, 
participated. The first democratic elections were conducted in terms 
of the provisions of the interim Constitution and it was required of the 
new Parliament to adopt a final constitution. This is why the 1993 
Constitution was referred to as an interim Constitution. Despite being 
a transitional Constitution, it was nevertheless binding, supreme and 
fully justiciable. 
The adoption of the interim Constitution could be described as a 
4Act 108of1996. 
5This synopsis draws largely on Erasmus G and Van Riet C Human 
Rights practice - a joint project between lawyers for human rights and 
practical legal training 1997 7. 
6Act 200 of 1993. 
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stepping stone in negotiating a final Constitution for South Africa. 7 
The parliament elected in 1994 served as a Constitutional Assembly 
in order to achieve this objective. In drawing up a final Constitution, 
the Constitutional Assembly was bound by 34 Constitutional Principles 
which were adopted at multi-party negotiations by various parties and 
interest groups entrusted with the task of creating a new legal order 
in South Africa. In order to ensure compliance with these 34 
Constitutional Principles, the text of the final Constitution had to be 
certified by the Constitutional Court before it could come into effect. 8 
In October 1996 the final Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) was certified 
by the Constitutional Court in the decision of Ex parte Chairperson of 
the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa 1996. 9 
. For the purpose of this study, the most important chapter in the 
Constitution is chapter two which contains the Bill of Rights. Apart 
from entrenching specific fundamental rights (inter alia the rights of 
detained and accused persons), this chapter contains various 
provisions which lay down principles which a court or other competent 
forum must follow in interpreting the Bill of Rights. The rights set out 
in the Bill of Rights are subject to certain limitations. Specific 
provision is made in chapter two for the limitation of rights in certain 
71n Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re 
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 29, the court observed that the interim 
Constitution was intended to provide "a historic bridge between the 
past of a deeply divided society . . . and a future founded on the 
recognition of human rights". (The court cited the words used in the 
opening paragraph of the postscript to the interim Constitution). 
8The Constitutional Court was created in terms of the interim 
Constitution (Act 200 of 1993). 
9Supra. 
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defined circumstances. 10 
At the time of writing this thesis, the provisions of the final 
Constitution (which came into effect at the beginning of 1997) have 
not as yet been interpreted by the Constitutional Court. However, 
there is a vast body of guidelines laid down in decisions by the 
Constitutional Court (as well as other divisions of the Supreme Court) 
which are the result of the interpretation of certain provisions of the 
interim Constitution. These guidelines are considered in the following 
paragraphs to the extent which they can still be regarded as valid in 
terms of the provisions of the final Constitution. 
10.3 INTERPRETATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
The Constitution, and more specifically the Bill of Rights, contains 
certain legal values which, inter alia, direct state action. This means 
that state power is made subject to certain higher constitutional values 
and should be exercised in accordance with these values. 11 The fact 
that the South African Constitution is based on the recognition of 
certain higher values has important implications for the interpretation 
of the Constitution. The first section 12 of the Constitution sets out 
the core values on which the new legal order is based. It provides as 
10The requirements for a limitation of a fundamental right are set out 
in section 36( 1) and 36{2) of the 1996 Constitution. 
11 Section 2 of the Constitution provides that it is the supreme law of 
the Republic; that obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled and that 
law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid. 
12Section 1 of Act 108 of 1996. 
follows13 
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The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, 
democratic state founded on the following values: 
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and 
the advancement of human rights and freedoms. 
(b) Non-racialism and non-sexism. 
(c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law. 
(d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters 
roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of 
democratic government, to ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness. 
Whereas this provision sets the tone for future interpretation of all the 
provisions of the Constitution, section 39 (the last provision in chapter 
three of the Constitution) deals specifically with the interpretation of 
the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Section 39 provides 
( 1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum -
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom; 
(b) must consider international law; and 
(c) may consider foreign law. 
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the 
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum 
must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights. 
(3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other 
rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common 
law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that tney are 
consistent with the Bill. 
13The preamble to the 1996 Constitution confirms these values. It 
states inter alia, that the Constitution is adopted to "establish a 
society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental 
human rights ... ". 
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Section 39 was inserted in the Constitution to "liberate judges from 
the shackles of positivism and formalism" .14 The drafters of the Bill 
of Rights deemed it important that it should be clear from the 
provisions of the Constitution itself that a positivistic approach to 
interpretation which focuses essentially on the intention of the 
legislature can no longer be tolerated in a value-based legal order. It 
was emphasised that with the adoption of the- Constitution; "a value-
orientated interpretation has become a respectable and constitutionally 
endorsed process" .15 Section 39 was therefore inserted in the Bill 
of Rights with the intention of instructing the courts to adopt a 
purposive approach instead of a positivistic approach which places all 
the emphasis on the intention of the legislature. A purposive 
interpretation is aimed at identifying and protecting the core values 
which underlie a fundamental right in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom. In other words, "the 
meaning of the [provisions of] the Constitution is not to be found in a 
simple decoding of the written text, [but] is to be determined with 
reference to its underlying values and commitments" .16 
14See Overview of method of work prepared by Technical Committee 
of Theme Committee four obtained from Internet at 
http://www.constitution.org.za (hereinafter referred to as Report -
Theme Committee four). According to this overview, members of 
the Technical Committee entrusted with the task of drafting the Bill of 
Rights expressed the opinions that judges had pretended in the past 
that their function had merely been to declare the law instead of make 
the law. The point of view was expressed inter alia, that judges 
discouraged open discussion of the judicial role in the interpretation of 
statutes on the basis that interpretation in a Westminster system with 
parliamentary sovereignty is a purely mechanical exercise to determine 
the intention of the legislature. In this process, judges arguably had 
furthered the aims of apartheid. 
15See Report- Theme Committee four. 
16See Chaskalson Met al Constitutional law of South Africa 1996 11-
16. See also Botha H "The values and principles underlying the 1993 
Constitution" South African Public law vol 9 no 2 1994 233, referred 
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In interpreting the provisions of the Bill of Rights, South African 
courts have easily made the transition from a positivistic style of 
interpretation to a broader value-orientated approach. In one of the 
first decisions dealing with the interpretation of the interim 
Constitution, a division of the Supreme Court held that the search for 
the intention of the legislature was no longer a cardinal principle of 
interpretation "for the simple reason that the Constitution is sovereign 
and not the legislature" .17 The judgment in Quozeleni v Minister of 
Law and Order18 also set the tone for future interpretation of the 
Constitution. Froneman J stated that because the Constitution is the 
supreme law against which all law is to be tested, "it must be 
examined with a view to extracting from it those principles or values 
against which such law ... can be measured" .19 He added that the 
Constitution must be interpreted so as "to give clear expression to the 
values it seeks to nurture for a future South Africa". 20 
to as Botha Values ("[t]he new Constitution is the supreme law of the 
land: the testing power of the court is no longer limited to procedural 
matters, but extends to the question whether legislation is consistent 
with the substantive norms and values embodied in the Constitution. 
A positivistic approach has, therefore, become wholly inappropriate."); 
Davis D "Democracy - its influence upon the process of constitutional 
interpretation" South African Journal on Human Rights Vol 10 no 1 
1994 103, 104 (" [t]he Constitution ... makes a decisive break with the 
Westminster tradition ... ") and Kruger J "Is interpretation a question 
of common sense? Some reflections on value judgments and section 
35" Comparative International Law Journal of Southern Africa Vol 
XX.VIII 1, 1995 7 (" [i]n a constitutional state courts give meaning to 
the system of values and norms called into being by the bill of 
rights ... "). 
17See Matiso v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison 1994 (4) 
BCLR 592 (SE) 597F. 
181994 ( 1) BCLR 75 (E). 
19At 80. 
201d. 
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However, the locus classicus on interpretation of the South African 
Constitution is undoubtedly the very first decision handed down by the 
Constitutional Court namely, S v Zuma. 21 In Zuma the 
Constitutional Court approved of the Canadian approach to 
interpretation set out in the case of R v Big M Drug Mart L td22 where 
Dickson J (later Chief Justice of Canada) said the following with 
reference to the Canadian Charter of Rights23 
The meaning of right or freedom guaranteed by the 
Charter was to be ascertained by an analysis of the 
purpose of such a guarantee; it was to be understood, 
in other words, in the light of the interests it was meant 
to protect. In my view this analysis is to be undertaken, 
and the purpose of the right or freedom in question is to 
be sought by reference to the character and larger 
objects of the Charter itself, to the language chosen to 
articulate the specific right or freedom, to the historical 
origins of the concept enshrined, and where applicable, 
to the meaning and purpose of the other specific rights 
and freedoms with which it is associated within the text 
of the charter. The interpretation should be . . . a 
generous rather than legalistic one, aimed at fulfilling the 
purpose of a guarantee and securing for individuals the 
full benefit of the Charter's protection. 
Kentridge J who delivered the judgment in Zuma, pointed out that in 
the Drug Mart case it was emphasised also that cognizance must be 
taken of the legal history, traditions and usages of the country 
concerned if the purposes of its constitution were to be fully 
21 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (SA). 
22(1985) 18 DLR (4th) 321 (SCC). 
23At 395-396, cited in Zuma at para 15. 
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understood. 24 However, he warned that25 
constitutional rights conferred without express limitation 
should not be cut down by reading implicit restrictions 
into them, so as to bring them into line with the 
common law. 26 
In Zuma Mr Justice Kentridge expressed himself in favour of "a 
generous interpretation ... suitable to give individuals the full measure 
of the fundamental rights and freedoms referred to". 27 However, he 
cautioned that this does not mean that the language which is used in 
the Constitution must be neglected. The court emphasised that in 
interpreting a provision of the Constitution, the· language used in the 
provision must still be respected; ignorance of the language used in 
the Constitution in favour of a general resort to "values" would, in the 
court's view, "result . . . not in interpretation but divination". 28 
Nevertheless, adopting a liberal approach in interpreting the provisions 
25/d. Mr Justice Kentridge referred to his own dissenting opinion in 
Attorney-Genera/ v Moagi 1982 (2) Botswana LR 124, 184. 
26ln Shabala/a v Attorney-General of Transvaal 1995 ( 12) BCLR 1593 
(CC) para 26 the Constitutional Court once again emphasised that "the 
Constitution is not simply some kind of statutory codification of an 
acceptable or legitimate past. It retains from the past only what is 
defensible and represents a radical and decisive break from that part 
of the past which is unacceptable . . . The relevant provisions of the 
Constitution must therefore be interpreted so as to give effect to the 
purposes sought to be advanced by their enactment". (Cf also S v 
Williams 1995 (7) BCLR 861 (CC) para 51 to the same effect). 
27 At para 14. The court cited the words of Lord Wilberforce of the 
Privy Council in the case of Minister of Home Affairs (Bermuda} v 
Fisher (1980) AC 319 (PC) 328-329. 
28At para 18. 
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of the Constitution, the court concluded that29 
a constitution "embodying fundamental rights should as 
far as its language permits be given a broad 
construction". 
In S v Makwanyane30 the Constitutional Court refei:redwith approval 
to the generous and purposive approach adopted in the interpretation 
of fundamental human rights (entrenched in the Bill of Rights) by Mr 
Justice Kentridge in Zuma. 31 However, the court also laid down 
other guidelines for interpretation. In his judgment, Chaskalson P 
added that provisions of the Bill of Rights should not be considered in 
isolation, but in its context, "which includes the history and 
background to the adoption of the Constitution, other provisions of the 
Constitution itself and, in particular, the provisions of Chapter Three 
of which it is part. "32 Favouring an interpretation which secures for 
"individuals the full measure" 33 of its protection, Chaskalson Padded 
that background material, for instance the reports of the Technical 
Committees involved in the drafting of the Constitution, may be used 
as an aid to constitutional interpretation where it is clear, is not in 
dispute and is relevant to showing why particular provisions were or 
29/d. Mr Justice Kentridge cited his own words in S v Moagi supra 
184. 
30Supra. 
31 At para 9. 
32At para 10. 
33/d. The court cited the words used by Lord Wilberforce in the Fisher 
case (at 128-1 29) which were also referred to by Mr Justice Kentridge 
in Zuma. 
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were not included in the Constitution.34 
Furthermore, Chaskalson P observed that in interpreting the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights, comparative "bill of rights" 
jurisprudence will be of importance, particularly in the early stages of 
transition when there is no developed South African jurisprudence 
from which to draw. 35 However, he cautioned that although the Bill 
permits recognition of foreign law, it will not necessarily otter a safe 
guide to the interpretation of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. 36 
In Makwanyane the court made extensive use of contextual 
interpretation. In dealing with the question of whether the imposition 
of the death sentence could be regarded as constitutional, the court 
treated the right to life, the right to equality and the right to dignity as 
together giving meaning to the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and 
degrading punishment in section 11 (2) of the interim Constitution.37 
34At paras 17-19, 12-14. Chaskalson et al submit (at 11-18 - 11-19) 
that by holding that the reports of the technical committees on the 
drafts may be consulted, the court had not resorted to an "intention 
of the legislature" approach. Instead they suggest that the "recourse 
to historical background is part of the process of purposive 
interpretation". This means that these reports may be consulted to 
determine the values which underlie the provisions of the Constitution. 
35At para 37. 
361d. Chalskalson P emphasised that there is no injunction to consider 
foreign law. See also the judgment of Mokgoro J, at para 304 to the 
same effect. 
37This approach was also followed in Ferreira v Levin /f/O and 
Vryenhoek v Powell NO 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC). In Levin, the majority 
of the Constitutional Court rejected a broad interpretation of the right 
to freedom of the person (section 11 ( 1) of the interim Constitution); 
in other words, the court rejected an interpretation which offers 
protection beyond that of the physical integrity of a person. This was 
done on the basis that the provision must be interpreted concomitantly 
with other provisions which have in common the protection of physical 
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In a subsequent case, Mhlungu v the State, 38 a majority of the 
Constitutional court held (per Mahomed J) that where the literal 
meaning of a provision of the Constitution gives rise to arbitrariness 
and perpetuation of injustice, an alternative approach which avoids 
such consequences must be sought. 39 The majority judgment in 
Mhlungu suggests that if an interpretation more consonant with the 
values of the Constitution can "reasonably" be accommodated within 
the text, such an interpretation should be preferred to a literal 
interpretation. 40 
The minority (per Kentridge J) expressed the opinion that where 
the language used in the Constitution is clear, a court has to give 
effect to it.41 However, this does not imply that the minority 
opinion favoured a narrow interpretation of the language used in the 
Constitution; it suggests merely that the language used in a provision 
"is not infinitely malleable, but defines the limits of a generous 
liberty. These are the prohibitions of "detention without trial", 
"torture" and "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment". 
381995 (7) BCLR 793 (CC). 
39See para 1 5 and paras 8 - 9. 
40/d. 
41 At para 78. Mr Justice Kentridge referred to Zuma where it was 
emphasised that respect has to be paid to the language used in the 
Constitution. In Mhlungu he concluded (at para 84) that "there are 
some provisions, even in a Constitution, where the language used, 
read in its context, is too clear to be capable of sensible qualification. 
It is the duty of all courts ... to promote the values which underlie a 
democratic society ... In the long run, I respectfully suggest, these 
values are not promoted by doing violence to the language of the 
Constitution in order to remedy what may seem to be hard cases" . 
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interpretation" . 42 
The guidelines laid down by the Constitutional Court in the cases 
discussed above may be summarised as follows 
(a) In interpreting any of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, the 
courts should follow a value-orientated approach. This means 
that the courts must identify and protect the values which 
underlie the particular fundamental right relied upon 
(Makwanyane and Zuma). 
(b) In identifying the values underlying a fundamental human right, 
a court should adopt a generous approach which gives to 
individuals the "full measure of the fundamental rights and 
freedoms referred to" (Zuma and Makwanyane). Restrictions 
ought not to be read into provisions in order to bring them into 
line with the common law (Zuma). 
(c) In interpreting a provision of the Bill of Rights, it should not be 
considered in isolation; it must be considered in its context, 
which includes the history and background to the adoption of 
the Constitution and in particular the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights of which it is part (Makwanyane). 
(d) A court may also have regard to the identification and 
protection of values underlying fundamental human rights in 
42See Chaskalson et al 11-29. These legal commentators explain (at 
11-30) the difference between the majority and the minority opinions 
in Mhlungu on the following basis: the minority regarded clarity of 
language as conclusive of the meaning of the provision, whereas the 
majority regarded language as "the outer perimeter within which the 
expression of constitutional values is ultimately confined". 
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comparable foreign law, and must have regard to the protection 
of these values in international law. However, in considering 
foreign case law, a court should exercise caution not to import 
principles which cannot be applied in the South African legal 
context (Makwanyane). 
(e) In determining the values which underlie· a constitutional 
provision, the court cannot ignore or neglect the language of 
the Constitution (Zuma). However, a broad interpretation of the 
language used in a constitutional provision is preferred to a 
narrow interpretation (Zuma). Moreover, if a literal 
interpretation would give rise to arbitrariness and injustice, an 
interpretation which is consonant with the values which 
underlie the Constitution should be preferred if such an 
interpretation can reasonably be accommodated within the text 
(Mhlungu). 
For the purpose of future interpretation of the provisions of the Bill 
of Rights in the final Constitution, 43 it is also important to discuss 
briefly the judgment of the Constitutional Court in the Certification 
case.44 This case was not concerned with interpretation of the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights as such, but focused solely on the 
question of whether the text adopted in the final Constitution complied 
with the Constitutional Principles set out in the interim 
Constitution.45 However, the court made certain statements in the 
43Chapter three of Act 108 of 1996. 
44See supra, text at note 9. 
45Section 71 of the interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993) required 
that the new constitutional text approved of by the Constitutional 
Assembly be certified by the Constitutional Court as being compliant 
with the Constitutional Principles set out in Schedule 4 of the interim 
Constitution. 
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Certification case which may be of value to courts in interpreting 
provisions of the Bill of Rights in future. 
Firstly, the court expressed itself in favour of a purposive and 
teleological approach in interpreting the Constitutional Principles. 46 
The court stated that it follows logically from this approach that the 
Constitutional Assembly need not to have repeated the same 
constitutional protections in the new text as those contained in the 
interim Constitution; the only question would be whether "the 
discipline enjoined by the Constitutional Principles is respected". 47 
In interpreting Constitutional Principle II, namely that "[e]veryone shall 
enjoy all universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and civil 
liberties ... ", the court had to consider certain objections to the new 
text. Objections raised inter alia, were that certain provisions 
contained in chapter two (the Bill of Rights in the final Constitution) 
should fail certification because the scope of the new text of these 
provisions either falls short of, or goes further than the corresponding 
provisions in the interim Constitution.48 The Constitutional Court 
rejected this argument, reasoning as follows49 
To the extent that the IC [interim Constitution] afforded 
rights which went beyond the "universally accepted" 
norm, the Constitutional Assembly was entitled to 
formulate rights more generously than would be required 
by the "universally accepted" norm, or even to establish 
new rights. It should be emphasised that the Bill of 
Rights drafted by the Constitutional Assembly is as 
extensive as any to be found in any national constitution. 
46 At paras 32-39. 
47 At para 40. 
48My emphasis. 
49At para 52. (My emphasis). 
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The significance of this statement is that in interpreting the scope of 
a fundamental human right, the courts will be allowed to construe the 
right as giving broader protection to the individual than afforded in 
terms of the same fundamental human right in international law, or in 
the law of foreign jurisdictions. 
10.4 STRUCTURE OF INTERPRETATION: A TWO-STAGE ANALYSIS 
It is universally recognised that no rights are absolute. In some 
constitutions, for instance the German and Canadian constitutions, 
specific provision is made in the constitutions for the limitation of 
rights. These provisions are better known as "limitation clauses". 50 
These so-called "limitation clauses" lay down definite norms and 
criteria in terms of which an infringement of a fundamental right may 
be allowed. Other constitutions, for instance the Constitution of the 
United States of America, do not contain limitation clauses. This does 
not mean that rights cannot be limited in these jurisdictions. In legal 
systems with constitutions without express limitation clauses, the 
courts "have been obliged to find limits to constitutional rights through 
the narrow interpretation of the rights themselves". 51 In other 
words, where a Bill or Rights has no general limitation clause, 
limitations must be read into the definition of the right. 52 
50De Ville J "Interpretation of the general limitation clause in the 
chapter on fundamental Rights" South African Public law vol 9 no 2 
1994 287, 289 explains that limitation cla&,ses "give expression to the 
simple truth that fundamental rights and freedoms are not absolute, 
but need to be restricted in certain instances to safeguard other 
important societal interests". 
51 Per Chaskalson P in Makwanyane para 102, describing the 
methodology followed by the Supreme Court of the United States of 
America in the limitation of rights. 
52See Chaskalson et al 11-31 . 
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The drafters of the South African Constitution considered it 
appropriate to follow the Canadian example. The South African 
Constitution contains a general limitation clause which contains certain 
criteria in terms of which the permissibility of a limitation of a 
fundamental right must be determined.53 
It is obvious that the permissibility of a limitation of a fundamental 
human right can only be determined after it has been determined that 
a right has in fact prima facie been infringed. In other words, the 
presence of a limitation clause in a constitution means that 
constitutional analysis proceeds in two stages.54 First, it must be 
considered whether there has been an infringement of a 
constitutionally guaranteed right. If so, it must be considered in a 
second stage of analysis, whether the infringement could be regarded 
as permissible in terms of the norms and criteria laid down in the 
limitation clause. 
The distinction between these two stages of analysis is important 
for a number of reasons. These are the following 
* Because the first enquiry deals with the question of whether the 
law or act under scrutiny infringes at all on the right relied on, 
it involves a determination of the ambit or scope of the right 
itself. This stage of analysis demands an identification of the 
values which underlie the right and the interests which it seeks 
53The Canadian Constitution contains a similar general limitation 
clause, whereas the German Constitution contains only specific 
limitation clauses attached to most of the fundamental rights. See 
Erasmus and Van Riet 82. 
541n Makwanyane (para 100) the Constitutional Court endorsed the 
two-stage analysis. 
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* 
* 
* 
* 
to protect. 55 In other words, the ambit of the right is 
determined by adopting a purposive approach. 
The onus is on the petitioner to show that the infringement 
occurred in the first stage of analysis.56 The burden has to be 
discharged on a balance of probabilities.57 
If the court is persuaded that the values advanced by the 
petitioner underlie and serve to protect the right in question, the 
petitioner must further convince the court that the law or act 
interferes with these values or interests and therefore infringes 
his or her fundamental human right. 
If the petitioner succeeds in demonstrating that a right has been 
infringed by the law or conduct in question, the onus then shifts 
to the respondent (for instance the state or the party relying on 
the legislation) to show, in the first place, that the infringement 
is justifiable; in other words, that it complies with the 
requirements laid down in the limitation clause. 58 
The standard to be met by the party who would justify a 
limitation is proof on a preponderance of probability. 59 
55Cfthe Drug Mart case (at 359-360) approved of in Zuma (para 15). 
56See Quozeleni v Minister of Law and Order 870. 
58See Makwanyane para 102. 
59See Kha/a v Minister of Safety and Security 1994 (4) SA 218 (W) 
228F. In Makwanyane it was held (at para 146) that a "clear and 
convincing" case was required to justify the death sentence as a 
penalty for murder. Henderson A "Who, how and how much? The 
onus, manner and sufficiency of proof in a dispute involving 
. fundamental rights" De Rebus 1 995 64 1 , 645 submits that 
Makwanyane lends support for the general notion of "a very high 
degree of probability". 
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Erasmus and Van Riet point out that there is a vital difference 
between questions of interpretation (the first stage of enquiry) and 
limitation (the second stage of enquiry). 60 They explain that 
[t]he question of limitation of rights is much more factual 
than the question of interpretation and needs to be 
resolved with appropriate evidence. A court cannot 
determine in the abstract whether the limitation of a right 
or freedom is "reasonable" or "justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom". This determination requires evidence, such as 
sociological or statistical data, on the impact of the 
legislative restriction on society. In this regard rule 34 of 
the Constitutional Court's 1994 rules made provision for 
the introduction of factual material which is relevant to 
the determination of the issues before the Court provided 
that the facts are common cause or otherwise 
incontrovertible; or are of an official, scientific, technical 
or statistical nature and capable of easy verification. 
In Zuma and Makwanyane the Constitutional Court suggested that 
the first stage of enquiry (the interpretation stage) requires a generous 
interpretation. 61 As will become clear from the following paragraphs, 
the court has also adopted this approach in subsequent cases. 
However, before considering these cases in any detail, it is necessary 
first of all to consider the requirements laid down in the Constitution 
for the limitation of fundamental human rights. 
10.5 CRITERIA FOR LIMITATION OF RIGHTS 
The limitation clause of the South African Constitution is contained in 
chapter two, (the Bill of Rights) section 36. It provides as follows 
60At 83. 
61 See Makwanyane para 100 (discussed supra under 10.3) and Zuma 
para 21 (discussed supra under 10.3). 
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( 1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in 
terms of law of general application to the extent that the 
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, 
including -
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; · 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; 
and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Except as provided for in subsection ( 1) or any other 
provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
Before discussing in any detail the requirement set out above, it is 
necessary to refer briefly to the background to the adoption of this 
clause in the final Constitution. As will become clear from the 
discussion that follows, section 36 is in fact based on an analysis in 
Makwanyane's case62 of the limitation clause contained in the interim 
Constitution. 63 However, the previous limitation clause was in 
certain respects different from the present one. Although it laid down 
the requirement that a limitation be reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on equality and freedom, 64 it 
also required that the limitation "shall not negate the essential content 
of the right in question". 65 Moreover, the previous limitation clause 
subjected certain specific rights (including the rights of accused 
persons) to a higher level of scrutiny than other rights. It required that 
62At para 104 (discussed infra, text at note 94). 
63Section 33 of Act 100 of 1993. 
64Section 33( 1 )(a). 
65Section 33( 1 )(b). 
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limitation of the latter rights must also be "necessary" .66 
The requirement that the limitation should not negate the "essential 
content" of the right was omitted in the final Constitution. 67 The 
members of the Technical Committee involved with the drafting of the 
final Bill of Rights also decided to do away with the bifurcated 
approach adopted in the interim Constitution by subjecting certain 
rights to more severe scrutiny than others. 68 The committee 
members explained that the word "necessary" obliges the state to 
show that the restriction is of paramount concern to the government; 
is not designed to impair the right more than is strictly proportionate 
to the objective pursued; and presupposes that there is no alternative 
to the means chosen. 69 In the view of the members of the 
committee, it would be better to extend the necessary requirement to 
66Section 33( 1 )(b) (aa) and (bb). 
67The drafters of the final Constitution felt that in practice this point 
will seldomly be reached as limitations essentially do not aim to 
destroy the essential content of the right; in most cases arguably, 
courts will limit themselves to the balancing of state and individual 
interests in order to ensure that the limitation imposed is proportionate 
to the objective pursued. The fact that this requirement was doubtful 
in content (even in German law - from which it was originally taken) 
also convinced the drafters (the members of Technical Committee 
four) that it would be better to exclude it from the final Constitution. 
See in general Report - Theme Committee Four. 
68See id. 
69/d. The construction of the "necessary" requirement by the members 
of the committee is based upon the construction of the same 
requirement in the Canadian Charter of Rights in the Canadian 
Supreme Court decision of R v Oakes 1986 26 DLR (4th) 200 (SCC). 
See also Woolman S "Riding the push me pull you: constructing a 
atest that reconciles the conflicting interests which animate the 
limitation clause" South African Journal on Human Rights Vol 10 no 
1 1994 60, 88 who suggests that in terms of Oakes the "necessary" 
requirement "force[s] the government to search for the least restrictive 
means of achieving its objects". 
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cover all rights because this would allow the courts to adopt a more 
flexible approach by applying a stricter test of scrutiny for rights of 
special importance. 70 The Committee therefore suggested that it 
should be provided for in the limitation clause of the final Constitution 
that a limitation be both "reasonable" and "necessary" and that the 
courts should be allowed to decide on the application of 
"reasonableness" and "necessity" in individual-cases. 71 
As is apparent from the wording of section 36, the word 
"necessary" was nevertheless not expressly included in the final 
Constitution. However, it is submitted that scrutiny on the basis of 
whether an infringement of a fundamental right is "necessary" was not 
altogether abandoned in the new limitation clause. In section 36(e) it 
is provided that a court, in considering whether a limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable, is obliged to take into consideration inter 
alia whether there is a "less restrictive means to achieve the purpose". 
It is submitted that the obligation to consider whether there are 
alternative means available to achieve the purpose which the state 
seeks to achieve by the limitation in question, involves a consideration 
of the "necessity" of the limitation, albeit as a component of the 
inquiry as to whether the limitation is "reasonable and justifiable" in 
terms of section 36( 1). 
This assumption is strengthened by the analysis of the limitation 
clause contained in the interim Constitution by Chaskalson P in 
70/d. The members of the Committee took notice of the approach 
followed in American constitutionat jurisprudence, namely by applying 
variable levels of scrutiny (at the court's discretion) depending on the 
importance of the particular right in question. 
71/d. 
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Makwanyane. The court analysed the provision as follows72 
The limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that 
is reasonable and necessary in a democratic society 
involves the weighing up of competing values, and 
ultimately an assessment based on proportionality. This 
is implicit in the provisions of section 33( 1) IC [interim 
Constitution]. The fact that different rights have 
different implications for-democracy-, -and in the case of 
our Constitution, for "an open and democratic society 
based on freedom and equality", means that there is no 
absolute standard which can be laid down for 
determining reasonableness and necessity. Principles can 
be established, but the application of those principles to 
particular circumstances can only be done on a case by 
case basis. This is inherent in the requirement of 
proportionality, which calls for the balancing of different 
interests. In the balancing process, the relevant 
considerations will include the nature of the right that is 
limited, and its importance to an open and d~mocratic 
society based on freedom and equality; the purpose for 
which the right is limited and the importance of that 
purpose to such a society; the extent of the limitation, 
its efficacy, and particularly where the limitation has to 
be necessary, whether the desired ends could reasonably 
be achieved through other means less damaging to the 
right in question. 
It is clear that the new text of the limitation clause is in fact based 
on the analysis by Chaskalson Pin Makwanyane of the "reasonable 
and necessary" requirements in the previous limitation clause.73 In 
fact, the commentators Erasmus and Van Riet suggest that "there is 
no reason why [the passage in Makwanyane] should not apply with 
equal force to the interpretation of s36 of the 1996 Constitution". 74 
72At para 104 (my emphasis). 
73Section 33 of the Interim Constitution. 
74At 86. See supra, text beneath note 61 for the provisions of the 
new limitation clause (section 36 of Act 108 of 1996). 
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The authors conclude that because the new text corresponds so 
closely with the Makwanyane analysis, it is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that it was adopted to confirm the court's approach in 
Makwanyane.75 This author fully agrees with their argument: the 
guidelines for interpretation laid down in Makwanyane and applied 
subsequently in all cases dealing with the interpretation of provisions 
of the interim Constitution, apply equally to interpretation of the 
limitation clause in the 1996 Constitution. The requirements laid down 
in the new limitation clause (as interpreted in Makwanyane and 
applied in subsequent cases) are discussed in detail below. 
10.5.1 Law of general application 
In terms of section 36( 1) the rights in the Bill of Rights may be 
limited only in terms of law of general application. Both statutory rules 
(parliamentary legislation and laws of the new provincial legislatures) 
and rules of common law may limit fundamental rights. 76 In 
Shabala/av Attorney General of TransvaaP7 the Constitutional Court 
held that law of general application within the meaning of the 
limitation clause includes rules of common law. 78 
In S v Makwanyane it was argued that section 277 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, 79 which provides that a person may be sentenced to 
death, could not constitute a law of "general application" because it 
76This is clear also from the Afrikaans text: "algemeen geldende reg". 
77Supra. 
78At para 23. 
79Act 51 of 1977. 
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did not apply uniformly to the whole of South Africa.80 The court 
rejected this argument on the basis that disparities between the legal 
orders in different parts of the country could not for that reason alone 
be said to render the laws such that they would not be of general 
application. 81 
Legal commentators point out the the requirement "law of general 
application" has little relevance to the question whether laws are 
applicable only to one area or to one class of persons. Instead, it is 
suggested that the requirement "prevents laws which permit of 
arbitrary application from qualifying as a limitation of a fundamental 
right in terms of s 36" .82 In order to understand what is meant by 
"laws which permit of arbitrary application" it is necessary to refer to 
the Constitutional Court's interpretation of the concept "equality". 
The equality clause which provides inter alia, that83 
[e]veryone is equal before the law and has the right to 
equal protection and benefit of the law 
has been interpreted by the Constitutional Court to mean that 
differentiation does not amount per se to unequal treatment in the 
constitutional sense. The court expressed the view that the section 
rather prevents the state from drawing arbitrary or irrational 
distinctions between people, whether it be in conferring benefits or in 
80This argument was based on the fact that the death sentence had 
been abolished by military decree in the Ciskei bantustan in 1990. 
81 At para 32. The court pointed out that the interim Constitution itself 
(section 229) allows different legal orders to exist side by side until a 
process of rationalisation has been completed. 
82See Erasmus and Van Riet 84. 
83Section 8( 1) of the interim Constitution (section 9( 1) of the 1996 
Constitution). 
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applying sanctions. 84 In Makwanyane Ackerman J explained the 
concept "arbitrary" as follows85 
Arbitary action or decision-making, is incapable of 
providing a rational explanation as to why similarly placed 
persons are treated in a substantially different way. 
Without such a rational justifiable mechanism, unequal 
treatment must follow. - . 
It is submitted that laws which permit of arbitrary application in the 
sense explained above, may be construed as infringing on the 
provisions of the equality clause. Conversely, the limitation clause86 
precludes their justification. 87 
10.5.2. Reasonableness and justifiability in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom 
In the first decisions in which divisions of the Supreme Court 
interpreted the limitation clause, 88 they were guided by Canadian law 
in giving content to the concepts "reasonable" and "justifiable." 89 
In particular, South African courts have applied the criteria laid down 
84See the judgment of Ackerman J in Makwanyane (para 156). Cf also 
S v Ntuli 1996 (1) BCLR 141 (CC) paras 18-20; S v Rens 1996 (2) 
BCLR 155 (CC) para 29 and AK Entertainment CC v Minister of Safety 
and Security 1995 ( 1) SA 783 (E) at 7920. 
85At para 156. 
86Section 36 of the 1 996 Constitution. 
87See Erasmus and Van Riet 84. 
88Section 33 of the interim Constitution. 
89See Park-Ross v The Director, Office for Serious Economic Offences 
1995 (2) SA 148 (C) 167ff; Jeeva v Receiver of Revenue, Port 
Elizabeth 1995 (2) SA 433 (SE) 454-455A and Kha/a v Minister of 
Safety and Security supra 236-237. 
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in the decision of the Supreme· Court of Canada in R v Oakes. 90 
In Oakes the Supreme court of Canada held that the reasonableness 
and justifiability of a limitation on a fundamental human right is 
determined by considering whether the objective of government action 
is suffficiently important to override a constitutionally protected right 
or freedom. 91 The court held that this objective of governmental 
action will, at minimum, be regarded as of sufficient importance if it 
relates to matters which are "pressing and substantial" in a free and 
democratic society.92 Once this requirement is complied with, the 
court must also consider in a second stage of analysis whether the 
means chosen to achieve the objective are reasonable and 
demonstrably justified. This involves a proportionality test which 
entails a further three stage enquiry, 93 namely 
(a) Is the government infringement of the right rationally 
connected to its objective and not arbitrary, unfair or 
based on irrational considerations. In other words, it 
must be determinined whether it is carefully designed to 
achieve its objective. 
(b) Even if rationally connected to the objective in the first 
sense, it is also required that the government 
infringement should impair as little as possible the right 
or freedom. 
90Supra. 
91 At 227. 
921d. 
93At 227-228. 
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(c) Finally, there must be a proportionality between the 
effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting 
the constitutional right or freedom, and the objective 
which has been identified as of sufficient importance. 
The court pointed out that even if an objective is of 
sufficient importance, and the first two elements of the 
proportionality test are satisfied, it is still possible that 
because of the severity of the deleterious effects of a 
measure on individuals or groups, the measure will not be 
justified by the purposes it is intended to serve. 
In Makwanyane Chaskalson P, in laying down the factors relevant 
to an inquiry concerning the reasonableness and justifiability of a 
limitation, followed the Canadian approach set out above. The court 
stated that the limitation of constitutional rights in a democratic 
society "involves the weighing up of competing values, and ultimately 
an assessment based on proportionality". 94 The court added that in 
the balancing process, the relevant considerations will include95 
(a) the nature of the right that is limited 
(b) its importance in an open and democratic society based 
on freedom and equality 
(c) the purpose for which the right is limited and the 
importance of that purpose to such a society 
(d) the extent of the limitation 
(e) its efficacy, and particularly where the limitation has to 
be necessary 
(f) whether the desired ends could reasonably be achieved 
through other means less damaging to the right in 
question. 
It is submitted that (a) and (b) relate to the first stage of enquiry as 
94At para 104. 
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laid down in Oakes, whereas (c)-(f) incorporate a proportionality test 
which relates to the question of whether the means chosen to achieve 
the objective are reasonably and demonstrably justifiable. The 
Constitutional Court, nevertheless, also stated in Makwanyane that it 
could see no apparent reason "to attempt to fit our analysis [of the 
limitation clause] into the Canadian pattern" or for that matter to fit it 
into the pattern of limitation analysis followed by any of the other 
foreign courts. 96 In other words, although the court relied on 
Canadian limitation jurisprudence in identifying the relevant factors 
which ought to be considered in determining the reasonableness and 
justifiability of a limitation, it did not limit the enquiry to these factors. 
The court in actual fact chose a more flexible approach, by adding the 
following statement97 
The fact that different rights have different implications 
for democracy, and in the case of our Constitution, for 
"an open and democratic society based on freedom and 
equality" means that there is no absolute standard which 
can be laid down for determining reasonableness and 
necessity. Principles can be established, but the 
application of these principles to particular circumstances 
can only be done on a case by case basis. This is 
inherent in the requirement of proportionality, which calls 
for the balancing of different interests. 
The approach of Chaskalson P in Makwanyana may be summarised 
as follows. The limitation test depends on the circumstances. This 
means that the criteria for reasonableness and justifiability will not 
always and in each case be the same. However, there are certain 
96 At para 110. In Zuma Kentridge J followed the same approach. He 
stated that although the Canadian criteria may be of assistance to our 
courts in cases where a delicate balancing of individual rights against 
societal interest is required, there is no reason "in this case [Zuma's 
case] ... to attempt to fit our analysis into the Canadian pattern". (At 
para 35.) 
97 At para 104. 
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important criteria which ought to be taken into consideration in 
determining the reasonableness and justifiability of a limitation. On the 
one hand, these criteria focus on the purpose of the limitation, and on 
the other hand involve a proportionality test. The proportionality test 
requires of a court to make an assessment of the importance of the 
purpose of the limitation, the gravity and extent of the infringement 
caused by the limitation as well as the efficacy of the limitation. The 
efficacy of the limitation involves the question of whether there is a 
rational connection between the limitation and the objective it seeks 
to achieve. In determining the reasonableness and justifiability of a 
limitation, a court should also consider whether the objective can 
reasonably be achieved by other less restrictive means. 
10.6 INTERPRETATION AND LIMITATION IN ACTUAL CASES 
In Makwanyane it was argued that imposition of the death sentence 
for murder was cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment which was 
also inconsistent with the right to life entrenched in the Constitution. 
The arguments advanced were that the death sentence could not be 
rectified in the case of an error and that its application was arbitrary. 
The Attorney-General contended that the death sentence is a 
necessary and acceptable form of punishment which is not cruel, 
inhuman or degrading in terms of the relevant provision in the 
Constitution.98 The Attorney-General observed that the death 
sentence was recognised as a legitimate punishment in many parts of 
the world because it serves as a deterrent to violent crime; the death 
sentence of necessity has a greater deterrent value than life 
imprisonment because it ensures that the worst murderers would not 
be able to endanger the lives of others. 99 It was also contended that 
98Section 11 (2) of the Interim Constitution. 
99At para 27. 
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its retention was required in the light of the high level of violent crime 
in South Africa. Moreover, it was submitted that public opinion 
supports the retention of the death sentence. 
By adopting a purposive, generous and contextual approach, 100 
Chaskalson P interpreted the provision which prohibits cruel, inhuman 
and degrading punishment101 · not in isolation, but also in the light of 
other provisions of the Bill of Rights, in particular the right to equality 
and the right to life. 102 By focusing on the values which underlie 
these rights, the court reached the conclusion that imposition of the 
death penalty for murder amounts to an infringement of the right 
against cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. The court then 
considered whether the imposition of the death penalty could 
nevertheless be justified in terms of the limitation clause. 
Chaskalson P first considered the justifiability of the infringing 
legislation in terms of the criteria laid down in Oakes: whether the 
limitation was rationally connected to its objective; impaired the right 
as little as possible and whether there was proportionality between the 
effects of the measure and the objective which it sought to 
achieve. 103 He concluded that although there was a rational 
connection between capital punishment and the purpose for which it 
was prescribed, the elements of arbitrariness, unfairness and 
irrationality in the imposition of the punishment were factors that had 
100See supra under 10.3 for a discussiion of these different 
approaches employed by the Constitutional Court in interpreting 
provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
101 section 11 ( 1) of the interim Constitution. 
102At para 10. 
103See supra for a discussion of these criteria. 
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to be taken into account. 104 In other words, the court found that 
because the imposition of the punishment was inherently unfair, 
irrational and arbitrary, it could not be said that there was a rational 
connection between the limitation and the objective it sought to 
achieve. The court then stated that the fact that a severe punishment 
in the form of life imprisonment was available as an alternative 
sentence is relevant to the second question, namely whether the death 
sentence impaired the right as "little as possible". According to 
Chaska Ison P, the pertinent question was whether the possibility of 
being sentenced to death rather than being sentenced to life 
imprisonment had a marginally greater deterrent effect. 
However, as indicated above, the court did not consider itself bound 
to the Canadian test. The court (per Chaskalson P) formulated its own 
more flexible test, incorporating the criteria laid down in Oakes. 
Applying the more flexible approach Chaskalson concluded that105 
[i]n the balancing process the principal factors that have 
to be weighed are on the one hand the destruction of life 
and dignity that is a consequence of the implementation 
of the death sentence, the elements of arbitrariness and 
the posssibility of error in the enforcement of capital 
punishment and, the existence of a severe alternative 
punishment (life imprisonment) and, on the other, the 
claim that the death sentence is a greater deterrent to 
murder, and will more effectively prevent its commission, 
than would a sentence of life imprisonment, and that 
there is a public demand for retributive justice to be 
imposed on murderers, which only the death sentence 
can meet . . . It has not been shown that the death 
sentence would be materially more effective to deter or 
prevent murder than the alternative sentence of life 
imprisonment would be. Taking these factors into 
account, as well as the elements of arbitrariness and the 
104At para 106. 
106Paras 145-146. 
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possibility of error in enforcing the death penalty, the 
clear and convincing case that is required to justify the 
death sentence as a penalty for murder, has not been 
made out. The requirements of section 33( 1) [the 
limitation clause] have accordingly not been satisfied ... n. 
106 
Of importance is that the court also rejected the contention 
advanced by the state that the death sentence should be retained 
because public opinion favoured it. Chaskalson P emphasised that 
public opinion in itself is no substitute for the duty vested in the courts 
to interpret the Constitution and to uphold its provisions without fear 
and favour. The court observed that107 
[i]f public opinion were to be decisive there would be no 
need for constitutional adjudication. The protection of 
rights could then be left to parliament which . . . is 
answerable to the public for the way its mandate is 
exercised ... ". 108 
In S v Williams 109 the Constitutional Court was asked to consider 
the constitutionality of legislation which provides for corporal 
106Cf also the conclusion of Didcott J at paras 183-184. Kriegler J 
held that the legislation was not saved by the limitation clause 
because it did not pass the test of reasonableness because no 
empirical study had demonstrated that capital punishment had a 
greater deterrent value than a lengthy sentence of imprisonment. He 
concluded that it could not be reasonable "to sanction judicial killing 
without knowing whether it had any marginal deterrent value". (At 
para 213.) See also the judgment of O'Regan J at paras 339-342. 
107 At para 88. 
108 At para 89 the court added that it "cannot allow itself to be diverted 
from its duty to act as an independent arbiter of the Constitution by 
making choices on the basis that they will find favour with the public". 
1091995 (7) BCLR 861 (CC). 
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punishment of juveniles 110 in terms of the "cruel and unusual 
punishment" provision in the Constitution, 111 the equality 
clause, 112 the right to dignity113 and the provision which 
protected the rights of children. 114 Making extensive use of 
comparable foreign constitutional jurisprudence, Langa J adopted a 
purposive approach, emphasising the values which underlie all of these 
rights. 115 However, he pointed out that in seeking the purpose of 
a particular right, it is important to place it in the context of South 
African society. 116 He concluded that the imposition of corporal 
punishment on juvenile offenders was prims facie unconstitutional 
because the establishment of the new constitutional order amounted 
to a rejection of violence. 117 The fact that South African courts 
have in the past criticised the permissibility of the infliction of corporal 
punishment also contributed to the court's conclusion that it should be 
regarded as unconstitutional. 118 
The court then proceeded to the second stage of analysis, namely 
whether the infringement could be regarded as justifiable in terms of 
the limitation clause. The court indicated that the enquiry involves a 
"testing [of] the measures adopted against the objective sought to be 
110Section 294 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 19 77. 
111 Section 11 of the interim Constitution. 
112Section 8 of the interim Constitution. 
113Section 10 of the interim Constitution. 
114Section 30 of the interim Constitution. 
115See paras 23-49. 
116At para 51. 
117At para 52. 
118At para 53. 
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achieved" .119 The court observed that the test relied on 
proportionality: a process of weighing up the individuals' rights 
against the objective which the state seeks to achieve. This 
evaluation has to take place "against the backdrop of the values of 
South African society as articulated in the Constitution and in other 
legislation, in the decisions of our courts and generally against our 
own experiences as a people". 120 
It was argued on behalf of the state that sentencing alternatives for 
juveniles were limited and that South Africa did not have a sufficiently 
well-established physical and human resource base which was capable 
of supporting the imposition of alternative punishments. 121 In other 
words, it was argued that because society has not yet established 
other mechanisms to deal with juveniles who find themselves in 
conflict with the law, it is justifiable that juveniles be subjected to 
corporal punishment. The court commented that this is just another 
way of saying that the price to be paid for the state of unreadiness of 
society to deal with juvenile offenders is to subject juveniles to 
punishment that is cruel, inhuman or degrading. 122 The court 
rejected this submission of the state as being pragmatic rather than 
principled, and stated that it is "diametrically opposed to the values 
that fuel our progress towards being a more humane and caring 
119 At para 58. 
120At para 59. 
121At para 63. 
122/d. The court pointed out (at para 74 note 88) that there are 
several more humane sentencing options available in current legislation 
(for example correctional supervision in terms of section 276A of the 
Criminal Procedure Act). In the court's view, the state should regard 
it as a challenge to create the necessary infrastructures to deal with 
juvenile offenders in terms of these more humane sentencing. options. 
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society". 123 
The state also emphasised the deterrent nature of juvenile whipping. 
The court accepted deterrence as a legitimate objective which may be 
pursued by the state in crime-ridden society, but added that the means 
employed to effect deterrence must be "reasonable and demonstrably 
justifiable". 124 The court found that no evidence which proved that 
juvenile whipping was a more effective deterrent than other available 
forms of punishment had been submitted. In the light of all the 
circumstances, the court concluded that the legislation which provided 
for corporal punishment could not be saved by the limitation clause 
because it was neither reasonable, nor justifiable and also not 
necessary. 
In Brink v Kitshoff125 a provision in the Insurance Act126 was 
struck down by the Constitutional Court on the basis that it violated 
the right to equality. 127 Broadly speaking, the relevant section 
provided that if a husband cedes a life policy to his wife, and upon his 
death his estate is sequestrated as insolvent, the proceeds of the 
policy return to his insolvent estate. The court held that the provision 
infringed on the right of married women against discrimination: no 
similar provision had been made in respect of married male 
beneficiaries or anyone else for that matter. 128 Consequently, the 
court concluded that the provision discriminated on the basis of sex 
123At para 63. 
124At para 80. 
1251996 (6) BCLR 752 (CC). 
126Section 44(1) and (2) of Act 27 of 1943. 
127Section 8 of the Interim Constitution. 
128See para 43. 
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and marital status. The court then considered whether the provision 
could nevertheless be regarded as justifiable in terms of the provisions 
of the limitation clause. 
In her judgment, O'Regan J stated that the limitation clause involves 
a proportionality exercise in which the purpose and effects of the 
infringing provisions are weighed against the nature and extent of the 
infringement caused. 129 The respondents argued that the purpose 
of the provision was to protect the interests of creditors of an 
insolvent estate. Recognising that it was a valuable and important 
purpose, the court nevertheless ruled that in order to achieve the 
purpose, it was unnecessary to draw a distinction between married 
women and married men. Therefore, the court concluded that it could 
not be said that the provision was reasonable or justifiable. 130 In the 
court's view, a gender neutral provision would have served the 
interests of the creditors much better. As indicated above, this 
consideration, namely whether there is a rational connection between 
the limitation and the objective sought to be achieved, is also 
recognised in section 36(3) (the limitation clause in the 1996 
Constitution). 131 
The rationality of the relation between the limitation and its purpose 
has also been an important factor in determining reasonableness and 
justifiability in cases where the onus is reversed. In S v Zuma, 132 
129At para 46. 
130At para 50. 
131 1t is submitted that the "rational connection" enquiry is made when 
a court considers "the relation between the limitation and its purpose" 
as required in terms of section 36(d). See supra, text beneath note 61 
for the wording of this provision. 
132Supra. 
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S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso, 133 S v Mbatha; S v Prinsloo, 134 S v 
Julies 135 and Scagell v Attorney-General of the Western Cape 136 
statutory presumptions which shifted the onus from the state to the 
accused were struck down by the Constitutional Court. In all of these 
cases, the state's attempts to justify the encroachment on the right of 
an accused person to be presumed innocent until proven guilty137 
failed. 
In Bhulwana the challenged legislation provided that where an 
accused was found in possession of a quality of dagga in excess of 
115 gram, it would be presumed "until the contrary is proved" that he 
or she was dealing in dagga. 138 The court found that the provision 
infringed the right of the accused to be presumed innocent, 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 139 The court argued that this 
presumption required of the prosecution to prove all the elements of 
the offence; a presumption which relieved the prosecution of part of 
that burden could result in the conviction of an accused person despite 
the existence of a reasonable doubt of his guilt. 140 Therefore, it 
created a risk that an innocent person may be found guilty. 
133 1995 (12) BCLR 1579 (CC). 
1341996 (3) BCLR 293 (CC). 
1351996 (7) BCLR 899 (CC). 
1361996 ( 11) BCLR 1446 (CC). 
137Section 25(3)(c) of the interim Constitution. This right is currently 
recognised in section 35(3) of the 1996 Constitution. 
138Section 21 ( 1 )(a)(i) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 
1992. 
139Section 25(3)(c) of the interim Constitution. 
140At para 15. 
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The court then considered whether the provision could nevertheless 
be justified in terms of the limitation clause. The state argued that the 
purpose of the presumption was to assist in controlling illegal drug 
trade because it would ensure the imposition of heavier sentences on 
drug offenders. 141 Recognising that effective prohibition of abuse 
of illegal drugs is "a pressing social purpose", the court nonetheless 
expressed doubt as to whether this purpose was in fact furthered by 
the presumption. 142 O'Regan J argued that although the sentencing 
discretion granted to a court is greater for dealing than for possesion, 
the maximum penalty for possession only is also extremely severe. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that sentences in excess of the maximum 
penalty for possession will ever be imposed in cases where the 
presumption will be a material factor in finding guilt. 143 The court 
indicated that where a large quantity of dagga was found in the 
accused's possession, an inference of dealing might in any event be 
justified without any reliance on the presumption. 144 If, however, 
any doubt remained as to whether the accused was dealing, he was 
entitled to the benefit of the doubt. The court concluded on this basis 
that the provision could not be justified in terms of the limitation 
clause. 
In Mbatha the Constitutional Court was faced with the issue 
whether a presumption in the Arms and Ammunition Act was valid. 
The legislation provided that persons who found themselves in the 
immediate vicinity of an unlicenced weapon were presumed 
possessors of that weapon for the purpose of proving the offence of 
141 At para 20. 
142/d. 
143At para 21. 
144/d. 
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possessing an illegal firearm, unless they could establish the 
contrary. 145 The state argued that the objective of the presumption 
was to assist in combating the escalating levels of crime as part of the 
state's duty to protect society. 146 The state submitted that without 
such a presumption it would be practically impossible to prove the 
mental and physical elements of possession. 
The court recognised that combating crimes of violence, particularly 
those involving firearms, is a real and pressing social concern. 147 
However, the court observed that the issue before it was whether the 
means to be used to obviate these concerns were in accordance with 
the provisions of the Constitution. 148 The court pointed out that it 
had to consider the importance of the right in an open and democratic 
society and the extent to which that right has been limited. 149 
After consideration of the state's arguments, the court recognised 
that it might be difficult to show that a particular person (against 
whom the presumption operated) was in fact guilty of the crime of 
possession. The court conceded that if that person was in fact guilty, 
the absence of the presumption might enable him to escape 
conviction. However, the court explained that150 
this is inevitably a consequence of the presumption of 
145Section 40( 1) read with sections 32( 1 )(a) and 32( 1 )(e) of the Arms 
and Ammunition Act 75 of 1969. 
146At paras 16 and 17. 
147 At para 18. 
149 At para 18. 
150At para 20. 
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innocence; this must be weighed against the danger that 
innocent people may be convicted if the presumption 
were to apply. In that process the rights of innocent 
persons must be given precedence. After all, the 
consequences of a wrong conviction are not trivial. 
The court found that the the provision was problematic in that it 
contained no inherent mechanism which excluded those who were 
innocent from its reach. The court explained its concern by giving the 
following example: if a single firearm were to be found on a crowded 
bus, each and every person would be presumed guilty unless he or she 
could establish their innocence. 151 In view of this consideration, the 
court concluded that the provision was neither reasonable nor 
justifiable. The court also added that it had not been demonstrated 
that the objective of the provision could not reasonably be achieved 
by other means less damaging to constitutionally entrenched 
rights. 152 The provision was consequently unconstitutional. 
In a recent civil case, D v K, 153 the fact that a less intrusive 
measure was available to achieve a legitimate objective was an 
important factor taken into account by the court in determining 
justification of a limitation of a fundamental human right, namely the 
right to privacy. The facts were that the applicant applied for an order 
of court compelling the respondent to subject himself to a blood test 
for the purpose of determining whether or not he could be excluded as 
the possible father of a minor child. The court found that the taking 
of blood samples from a person amounts to a violation of that person's 
151 At para 22. 
152At para 26. 
1531997 (2) BCLR 209 (N). 
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privacy. 154 However, it had to be determined also whether the 
intrusion might, in terms of the limitation provisions of the 
Constitution, be justifiable. 155 The court concluded that compulsion 
to undergo a blood test to establish paternity could not be regarded as 
reasonable or justifiable because there were less intrusive methods 
available to achieve the desired results. 156 These less intrusive 
measures were identified as following from certain presumptions in the 
Children's Status Act157 which become operative once the court 
found as a proven fact that sexual intercourse had taken place 
between the mother and the person alleged to be the father at the 
time that the child was conceived. 158 
From the discussion of the above cases it is clear that the 
Constitutional Court as well as other courts have assessed the 
reasonableness and justifiability of a limitation by following the 
guidelines laid down by Chaskalson Pin Makwanyane's case. It is 
also clear that the emphasis placed on each of the specific guidelines 
set out in Makwanyane (and recognised in the new limitation clause) 
differ from case to case. In other words, it is apparent that the 
factors regarded as of utmost relevance in determining whether a 
limitation is reasonable and justifiable depend on the unique facts 
present in each case. 
In the paragraphs below an interpretation of the constitutional 
guarantee against double jeopardy is proposed in view of the principles 
154Section 13 of the Interim Constituiton. 
155At 221A. 
156At 221A-B. 
157 Act 82 of 1987. 
158At 2180-F. 
I 
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laid down in the cases discussed above. In order to determine the 
ambit of the rule, it is necessary to identify the values which underlie 
the rule. Thereafter, it will be considered whether present legislation 
and common law rules which involve double jeopardy issues can 
withstand constitutional scrutiny. The final proposals will draw largely 
from the principles laid down in foreign case law (considered on a 
comparative basis in this thesis) inasmuch as these principles can be 
reconciled with the guidelines laid down for interpretation of provisions 
of the Constitution by the Constitutional Court. 
10.7 PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
PROVISION 
10. 7. 1 The values which underlie the constitutional guarantee against 
double jeopardy 
The historical and comparative study undertaken in this thesis has 
demonstrated that the constitutional guarantee against double 
jeopardy protects the accused's interest in finality. The underlying 
idea is that the accused should be protected against harassment by 
the state; he should be protected against repeated attempts by the 
prosecution to get a conviction for what is basically the same criminal 
conduct. The most important effect of the rule is that it places 
certain restraints on the prosecutor's powers to institute criminal 
proceedings. It follows that the broader purpose of the rule is to 
prevent abuse by the state of the criminal process. 
The values which underlie the rule were identified by the United 
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States Supreme Court which stated that159 
The State with all its resources and power should not be 
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an 
individual for an alleged offense (sic), thereby [1] 
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal 
and [2] compelling him to live in a continuing state of 
anxiety and insecurity, as well as [3] enhancing the 
possibility that even though innocent he may be found 
guilty. 
It has been suggested that the first value, that of protecting the 
accused from "embarrassment and expense" is not such an important 
consideration. 160 The argument advanced is that it is just as 
embarrassing and financially burdensome to endure repeated 
preliminary and bail hearings as it is to endure repeated trials. 
However, it is universally accepted that jeopardy only attaches at the 
commencement of the trial. 161 This thesis argues that although this 
first-mentioned value may be of lesser importance than the other 
values under consideration, it cannot be regarded as immaterial. The 
comparative study has demonstrated that in many jurisdictions even 
repetitive pre-trial proceedings have been viewed as a violation of the 
rule against double jeopardy. 162 In the English legal system, for 
159See Green v US 187-188 discussed in chapter six supra under 
6.5.3, text at note 147. 
160See the dissenting judgment of Justice Powell in Crist v Bretz at 
437. (This case is discussed in chapter three supra under 3.5.2, text 
at note 154). Cf also the views of Westen and Drubel General Theory 
87-88. 
161Westen and Drubel General Theory 87-88. 
162See the position in English law discussed in chapter three supra 
under 3.2.2, text at note 55; Indian law, discussed in chapter three 
supra, under 3.4.2, text at notes 133 and 134 and South African law 
discussed in chapter three supra under 3.6.2, text at note 294. 
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instance, courts have prohibited repeated preliminary hearings on the 
basis that they have become vexatious or amounted to an abuse of 
process by the prosecuting authorities; the abuse, inter alia lying in 
the undue embarrassment and expense caused to the defendant. 163 
The second value, namely that the accused ought not to live in "a 
continued state of anxiety and insecurity", is substantially more 
significant from the perspective of the double jeopardy implications of 
repetitive trials. In fact, the identification of this value in American 
constitutional jurisprudence has undoubtedly had an impact on the 
rules of attachment developed in that legal system. It was pointed out 
in chapter three that the United States Supreme Court held in Crist v 
Bretz that the accused's interest in finality becomes particulary acute 
with the commencement of trial for the very reason that it is at this 
stage in the proceedings that the accused becomes vulnerable to a 
possible conviction; "stress and possible harassment of the defendant 
is from then on sustained" .164 
The value that the accused ought not to be subjected indefinitely to 
anxiety and insecurity can also be viewed as part of his greater 
interest in finality. It is submitted that the accused's right to finality 
is served by having his trial completed by the first tribunal he 
encounters which is vested with jurisdiction to make an adjudication 
of his culpability for the crime(s) charged. The American 
commentators Westen and Drubel however, point out that the 
accused's right to finality does not guarantee that the proceedings will 
end with the first tribunal; "it merely gives him an opportunity to have 
163See the discussion of R v Horsman Justices, Ex parte Reeves and 
Brooks v Director of Public Prosecutions in chapter three supra under 
3.2.2, text at notes 55 and 59. 
164Per Justice Blackmun at 38. See the discussion of the Crist case in 
chapter three supra under 3.5.2, text at note 154. 
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the proceedings ended by means of a verdict of not guilty. If the 
defendant is convicted and his conviction reversed on appeal, the 
state may be able to insist on putting him to trial a second time" .165 
This brings us to the final value recognised in Green: the state 
ought not be be allowed repeated attempts to convict an accused for 
the same offence because it may "enhance the possibility that even 
though innocent he may be found guilty" .166 It has been suggested 
that this value "lies at the core of the problem ... " .167 The 
importance of the value (in the context of protection against double 
jeopardy) is described as follows 168 
In many cases an innocent person will not have the 
stamina or resources effectively to fight a second charge. 
And, knowing that a second proceedings is possible an 
innocent person may plead guilty at the first trial. But 
even if the accused vigorously fights the second charge 
he may be at a greater disadvantage than he was at the 
first trial because he will normally have disclosed his 
complete defence at the former trial. Moreover, he may 
have entered the witness box himself. The prosecutor 
can study the transcript and may thereby find apparent 
defects and inconsistencies in the defence evidence to 
use at the second trial. 
The risk that an innocent person may be convicted is undeniably a 
consideration of utmost importance in determining the permissibility of 
successive prosecutions. In fact, this consideration is the core value 
which sustains the majority of the rights of arrested, detained and 
165Westen and Drubel General Theory at 90 note 57. 
166At 188 of the Green case. 
167Friedland 4. 
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accused persons. It is submitted that this value sustains at least the 
following rights: 169 the right to remain silent; 170 not to be 
compelled to make confessions or admissions which could be used in 
evidence against the person; 171 to consult with a legal 
practitioner; 172 to have a fair trial which includes the right to be 
informed of the charge with sufficient detail; 173 to be present when 
being tried; 174 to be presented by a legal practioner; 175 to be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty and to remain silent and not to 
testify during the proceedings; 176 to adduce and challenge 
evidence; 177 to appeal or take the matter on review to a higher 
court. 178 
However, there are rights of accused and detained persons which 
serve other values. A value of particular importance is that the 
individual ought to be treated with dignity and respect. Constitutional 
rights of accused and detained persons which protect these values, for 
instance, are the right to conditions of detention which are consistent 
169For an in-depth discussion of the values which underlie a system of 
due process of law, see Joubert JJ "Die legaliteitsbeginsel in the 
strafprosesreg" LLD Dissertation 1995 80 et seq (hereinafter referred 
to as Joubert Dissertation). 
170Section 35( 1 )(a) and (b) of the 1996 Constitution. 
171 Section 35( 1 )(c). 
172Section 35(2)(b). 
173Section 35(3)(a). 
174Section 35(3)(e). 
175Section 35(3)(g). 
176Section 35(3)(h). 
177Section 35(3)(i). 
178Section 35(3)(0). 
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with human dignity, 179 to communicate with next of kin and a 
medical practioner 180 and to have the trial begun and concluded 
without unreasonable delay. 181 An American commentator also 
considers the right to protection against double jeopardy as essentially 
an affirmation of the value that individuals ought to be treated with 
dignity and respect. 182 
However, it must be emphasised that rights of arrested, detained 
and accused persons entrenched in the Bill of Rights in the South 
African Constitution not only serve the values identified above, but 
also serve to uphold the integrity of the legal system. This is achieved 
by employing the criminal process itself to impose sanctions for 
violations of fundamental human rights. In other words, the criminal 
process is also employed to correct its own abuses. 
That the drafters of the final Constitution of South Africa had in 
mind the creation of a new order which not only concerns itself with 
the maximisation of the reliability of fact finding processes and the 
protection of the individual's dignity, but also one which compels 
respect for the integrity of the criminal justice system, is apparent 
from the inclusion in the final Bill of Rights of section 35(5). This 
sections provides that 
179Section 35(2)(e). 
180Section 35(2)(f). 
181 Section 35(3)(d). 
182See Kadish SH "Methodology and criteria in due process 
adjudication - a survey and criticism" The Yale Law Journal Vol 66 
1957 319, 347. The classification by Kadish of the values which 
underlie particular constitutional rights are discussed in detail by 
Joubert Dissertation 81-83. 
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[e]vidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in 
the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the admission of 
that evidence would render the trial unfair or otherwise 
be detrimental ta the administration of justice. 
By recognising that violation of certain rights (far instance, the right 
of an arrested person not ta be coerced ta make any confession or 
admission which may be used in evidence against him) 183 may be 
vindicated through the criminal process itself, (namely by excluding 
such evidence), the drafters of the South African Constitution have 
demonstrated that full effect should be given ta the ideas of 
protection of fundamental rights of individuals and limitation of state 
power. 184 
To return ta the values which underlie the double jeopardy provision 
in the Constitution. It is submitted that the guarantee serves bath the 
following basic values which underlie constitutional rights of detained 
and accused person: (a) the minimisation of the possibility that an 
innocent person be convicted and (b) the value that the individual 
aught to be treated with dignity and respect. However, there is an 
important difference between the guarantee against double jeopardy 
and mast of the other constitutional rights of accused persons. The 
guarantee against double jeopardy determines the number of times 
that a person may be tried and not merely the way in which he may 
183Sectian 35( 1 )(c). 
184Packer explains (at 165) that by employing the criminal process 
itself ta impose sanctions far the violation of fundamental human 
rights, a legal system gives effect ta values "which can be expressed 
in . . . the concept of the primacy of the individual and the 
complementary concept of limitation of official power". 
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sanctioned in a constitutional state.190 
It remains to be considered whether the other two requirements, 
namely that the accused be convicted or acquitted on a valid 
indictment and on the merits can withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
The constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy stipulates that 
"every accused person has a right to a fair trial which includes the 
right not be tried for an offence in respect of an act or omission for 
which that person has previously been acquitted or convicted" .191 
The interpretation of the provision will proceed first by determining 
the literal meaning of the words used in the provision. The word 
which is relevant to the issue of attachment of jeopardy is n acquittal". 
According to the Oxford Dictionary the word "acquittal" means or 
denotes "the deliverance from a charge by a verdict" .192 Adopting 
a broad interpretation of the language used in the Constitution which 
190An example which may be advanced is the so-called "people's 
courts" employed during the late 1980's and early 1990's by political 
activists to "try" suspected criminals or people not sympathetic to 
their cause. As indicated in the introduction (chapter 1 ), this thesis 
does not consider the double jeopardy implications of successive trials 
by tribunals with concurrent jurisdiction. (It is not considered for 
instance, whether a person may be charged and either convicted or 
acquitted first by a prison disciplinary body or a military court, and 
thereafter for essentially the same conduct by a court of law). The 
conclusion reached-above namely, that "jurisdiction" is an essential 
requirement in a constitutional state before effect may be given to 
determinations of liability for conduct, does not imply that only courts 
of law qualify as tribunals with jurisdiction to adjudicate upon criminal 
conduct. It is merely required that the tribunal be vested by law with 
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the guilt or innocence of the accused 
person for the conduct charged. 
191 Section 35(3}(m). 
192The Concise Oxford Dictionary 1963 5th ed 13. 
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secures for the individual "the full measure" of its protection, 193 it 
is submitted that the word "acquittal" denotes a discharge of the 
accused by the trial court at a stage after plea; in other words, 
"acquittal" means a discharge194 of the accused by the first 
factfinder that he encounters, who is vested with the required 
jurisdiction to make an adjudication of the guilt or innocence of the 
accused for the crime(s) charged. 
The literal interpretation suggested above also complements a 
purposive interpretation which focuses on the values which underlie 
the rule and the purposes which the rule seeks to achieve. It is clear 
that a second trial after the accused has been discharged in the first 
trial at a stage after the trial has commenced will cause expense, 
insecurity and anxiety to the accused. However, the most important 
consideration is that it creates the risk that an innocent person may be 
convicted. By getting a second opportunity to prosecute the accused 
and have him convicted, the state obtains an unfair advantage. A new 
trial gives the state an opportunity to correct the mistakes that it made 
in the first trial and to refine the presentation of its case. Moreover, 
the trial, when it was terminated in favour of the accused, may already 
have reached a stage at which the prosecution had had ample 
opportunity to identify the weaknesses in the case for the defence. 
Finally, the accused may have run out of resources. This puts the 
prosecution in a much better position at the second trial. As indicated 
in the historical and comparative study undertaken in this thesis, this 
is exactly the kind of abuse of the criminal process which the rule 
against double jeopardy circumvents. 
193Per Mr Justice Kentridge in Zuma para 10, citing from the Bermuda 
Fisher case (see supra under 10.3, text at note 27). 
194The word "discharge" is also described as meaning an "acquittal" 
in terms of the Oxford Dictionary (at 3471 ). 
708 
The double jeopardy provision protects the accused's interest in 
finality. The interest in finality as indicated above 195 encompasses 
the right (or rather the opportunity) 196 of the accused to have his 
trial completed by the first tribunal he encounters, provided the 
tribunal is duly empowered by law to make an adjudication of the guilt 
or innocence of the accused for the offence(s) charged. If the first 
trier of fact concludes the trial on the basis that, as a matter of fact, 
the accused cannot be convicted of the offence and must be 
acquitted, the accused cannot be tried again for the same offence. 
This is the traditional approach followed in South African law. 
However, it is submitted that the values which underlie the 
constitutional provision against double jeopardy require that even if the 
accused is discharged (at a stage after plea) on any other basis, for 
instance that the court could not proceed to find that he is guilty as a 
result of an error such as a defective indictment which could not be 
amended because this would have prejudiced the accused in his 
defence, he may not be tried again for the same offence in a new trial. 
Apart from achieving the important values set out above, this 
approach pre-eminently protects the integrity of the legal system: the 
organs of state ought not to benefit from their own incompetence. 
In other words, the practical effect of this approach is that it forces 
the prosecution to prepare adequately before its brings its case against 
an alleged offender. 
As indicated in the comparative study, a similar approach has 
recently been adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada. 197 The 
195See supra under 10. 7.1, text at note 165. 
196See id for the views of the American commentators Westen and 
Drub el 
197See chapter three supra under 3.3.2 for the discussion of the 
decisions of Riddle and Moore, text at notes 72 and 91 . 
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court rejected the idea that a trial must have been concluded on the 
merits before the accused may rely on the plea of former acquittal. 
Instead, the court suggested that the idea of a "trial on the merits" 
means only that the previous dismissal must have been made by a 
court of competent jurisdiction whose proceedings were free from 
jurisdictional error and which rendered judgment on the charge. 198 
It must be pointed out, however, that the Supreme Court of Canada 
did not give full effect to the "one trial" principle; it left open the door 
for a second prosecution by expanding the concept "jurisdiction" and 
employing the "in jeopardy" analysis. In Moore 199 for instance, the 
court held that an accused discharged on the basis of a defective 
indictment may not be tried again in a new trial if the indictment could 
have been amended at the first trial. The court argued that if the 
indictment could have been amended it means that the accused was 
"in jeopardy" of a conviction. If, conversely, the indictment could not 
have been amended because it would have caused prejudice to the 
accused, the court argued that "the dismissal would be tantamount to 
an acquittal" which would bar a second trial. 200 However, the court 
retained the principle advanced in common law that if the charge was 
a "nullity," in other words, so defective that no person could have 
been convicted on it, the accused was never in jeopardy and could 
therefore be charged again in a new trial. 201 The court explained 
198See Riddle discussed in chapter three supra under 3.3.2, text at 
note 83. 
199See chapter three supra under 3.3.2, text at note 91 for a detailed 
discussion of this case. 
200At 312. See chapter three supra under 3.3.2, text at note 97. 
201/d. As pointed out in chapter three supra under 3.6.2 (text at note 
290)it is highly unlikely that a discharge on this basis can still occur 
in South African law. This is so because South African courts have 
extensive powers to allow amendments of charge sheets. Moreover, 
defective charge sheets may be cured by evidence presented at the 
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that the justification for allowing a second trial in the case where the 
first indictment was a "nullity" was that the court then had no 
"jurisdiction n to try the matter. 202 
This thesis argues that broader protection should be afforded to the 
accused in terms of the double jeopardy provision in the South African 
Constitution than in Canada. It is submitted that the values which 
underlie the rule against double jeopardy do not allow that the 
permissibility of a second trial be made dependent on the question of 
whether a person was "in jeopardy" of a conviction at the first trial. 
The "in jeopardy" analysis was employed in the common law not so 
much as a means to protect the accused against repetitive 
prosecutions, but rather to effect new trials if the prosecution made 
errors in the presentation of its case in the first trial (for instance, by 
drawing up a defective indictment which excluded a conviction of the 
accused). Because the courts had no power to allow amendments of 
indictments, new trials were effected by declaring the first trial a 
"nullity". Since the first trial, as a result of the error, was regarded as 
a "nullity", it was argued that the accused could be tried again. The 
reason advanced was that he was never "in jeopardy" of a conviction 
at the first trial. 203 
The rejection by the Supreme Court of Canada of the "trial on the 
merits" requirement can be regarded an important breakthrough in the 
law of double jeopardy. However, by retaining the "nullity theory" and 
expanding the concept "jurisdiction", the court has not succeeded in 
giving full effect to the values which underlie the rule against double 
trial. 
202At 311. See chapter three supra under 3.3.2, text at note 97. 
203See the discussion of the common law cases of Drury and Green in 
chapter two supra, text at notes 68 and 71 • 
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jeopardy. In practice, employment of the "nullity theory" and the 
concept "absence of jurisdiction" may still have the effect that the 
prosecution can benefit from an error made in the preparation of its 
case, by getting a second opportunity to convict the accused. 
Rather than relying on the technicalities outlined above, this thesis 
argues that the permissibility of a second trial for the same offence 
after a discharge of the accused should be determined by focusing 
purely on achievement of the values underlying the double jeopardy 
provision in the Constitution. It is submitted that in order to achieve 
these values, the accused should be deemed to be "in jeopardy" of 
a conviction at the stage when the trial commences, in other words, 
at the pleading stage. The reason is that a second trial defeats the 
accused's right to finality (his right to have his trial completed by the 
first tribunal which has jurisdiction to try him on the issue of guilt or 
innocence of the offence(s) charged). Moreover, in order to achieve 
the values which the rule seeks to protect, a narrow meaning should 
be given to the concept "jurisdiction", rather than the expanded "term 
of art" meaning mentioned above. This thesis submits that the 
question should merely be whether the tribunal was empowered in 
terms of law to try the accused on the issue of guilt or innocence for 
the offence(s) charged. 
It now remains to be considered in a second stage of analysis 
whether a second prosecution may nevertheless be justified in terms 
of the provisions of the limitation clause. As pointed out in 
Makwanyane, 204 justification for limitation of a fundamental right is 
determined by balancing the interests of the accused against that of 
the state. This involves a proportionality enquiry: the court must 
weigh opposing interests against one another, placing the purpose, 
204 At para 104. 
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effects and importance of the limitation on the one side of the scales 
and the gravity and extent of the infringement of the fundamental right 
caused by the limitation on the other side. 206 
To determine whether a second prosecution may follow on a 
discharge of the accused at a stage after jeopardy had attached, the 
interest of the public in having the prosecution present all the evidence 
it has available in an error-free trial must be weighed against the 
interest of the accused in having his trial concluded by the first 
tribunal with required jurisdiction. It is submitted that in serving the 
valid interest of society without making too great an inroad into the 
fundamental right of the accused in finality, the state should get a 
reasonable and fair opportunity to present its best case to the court. 
This thesis submits that the state is denied a reasonable opportunity 
to present its best case if the court acted with mala tides in 
discharging the accused or if the accused obtained an acquittal as a 
result of behaviour which may be viewed as mala fide. An example 
would be where the court acquitted the accused as a result of fraud 
or collusion. It is furthermore submitted that even in the absence of 
proof of mala tides, there may be deserving cases in which the 
accused's interest in finality is outweighed by the state's interest in 
bringing offenders to justice. This thesis argues that the state is also 
denied a reasonable opportunity to present its case if the court acted 
in breach of the rules of natural justice. For instance, a second trial 
will also be justified if the court unreasonably refused to hear the 
prosecution's case. Finally, it is submitted that a second trial will also 
be justified if the trial was terminated prematurely by an extrinsic 
factor, for example illness or other inability of the presiding officer to 
continue with the case. 
205See Makwanayane discussed supra under 10.5.2, text at note 95. 
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However, it is submitted that the state is not denied a reasonable 
opportunity to state its case if it is barred from charging the accused 
once again in a second trial because it made mistakes in its 
preparation of the first prosecution. Moreover, it is submitted that the 
state is not denied a reasonable opportunity to state its case if a 
premature discharge of the accused can be ascribed to a so-called 
jurisdictional error made by the court. As pointed out by Mr Justice 
Brennan in a dissenting opinion in the United States Supreme Court 
case of Scott, "the government's means of protecting its vital interest 
in convicting the guilty is its participation as an adversary at the 
criminal trial where it has every opportunity to dissuade the trial t:ourt 
from committing erroneous rulings favorable to the accused". 206 A 
second trial would, in these circumstances, not be reasonable or 
justifiable; the guarantee against double jeopardy does not allow 
organs of the state to benefit from its own mistakes at the cost of the 
accused. 
10. 7. 3 The constitutional permissibility of a successive prosecution 
for a "different" offence 
This analysis focuses on the issues considered in chapter four, namely 
whether the rule against double jeopardy prohibits a successive 
prosecution for an offence which is not identical to the offence 
charged in the previous trial, but nevertheless arose from the same 
facts. 
The guarantee against double jeopardy in the South African 
Constitution provides that "[e]very accused person has a right to a fair 
trial, which includes the right not to be tried for an offence in respect 
of an act or omission of which he or she has previously been acquitted 
206At 84. See chapter six supra under 6.5.5, note 188. 
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or convicted". 207 It is submitted that the literal meaning of these 
words is that a person may not be tried for an offence if in order to 
prove some or all of the elements of the offence, the state has to rely 
on conduct for which the accused has previously been acquitted or 
convicted. 
This construction of the literal meaning of the provision can be 
explained as follows. The words "acquitted or convicted" refer to the 
words n act or omission n in isolation, and not to the words "offence in 
respect of an act or omission". 208 If the drafters of the provision 
intended that the words "acquitted or convicted" refer to the word 
"offence", it would have been senseless to include the words "act or 
omission"; the minimum requirement for the performance of all 
offences is either an act or an omission. Therefore, it is submitted 
that the only reasonable explanation for the inclusion of the words 
"act or omission" in the provision is that the provision was intended 
to protect the accused, not only against a successive prosecution for 
the same offence (in the sense of an identical offence or a lesser or 
greater included offence as recognised in the common law), 209 but 
also against reprosecution for the same conduct; in other words, 
conduct ("an act or omission") for which the accused has previously 
been acquitted or convicted. As indicated in chapter four, a "same 
conduct" standard offers expanded protection. 
207Section 35(3)(m) of the 1996 Constitution. 
208Cf also the Afrikaans text of the provision set out in chapter one 
under 1.1 note six. 
209 As indicated in the comparative overview of the definitional issue of 
"same offence" (chapter four), protection against successive 
prosecution for lesser and greater included offences has been effected 
in the common law by means of application of the "same evidence" 
(Vandercomb) test and the "in peril" test. See chapter four supra 
under 4.6.1 - 4.6.4 for a discussion of the application of these tests 
in South African law. 
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against successive prosecutions; it prevents reprosecution for conduct 
of which the accused had previously been acquitted or convicted.210 
It is clear from the discussion of contemporary South African law in 
chapter four that the literal meaning attributed to the double jeopardy 
provision in the Constitution by this writer (namely as introducing a 
same conduct standard), cannot be viewed as a radical break with the 
past. Broader protection against multiple prosecutions has been 
recognised by South African courts since the 1960's. First in the case 
of Davidson and then in Ndou, the courts (in determining the 
permissibility of a successive prosecution), applied a standard which 
involves the question whether prosecution for an offence amounts to 
reconsideration of liability for conduct of which the accused has 
previously been acquitted or convicted. 211 
It must, however, be considered also whether the literal 
interpretation of the constitutional guarantee proposed above can be 
reconciled with a purposive interpretation which focuses on the values 
which underlie the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. 
The relevant question is whether the prohibition on reprosecution for 
for conduct of which the accused has already been acquitted or 
convicted sufficiently serves the accused's right in finality. In other 
words, does it protect the accused against embarrassment, anxiety, 
expense, insecurity and the risk of being convicted despite being 
innocent? 
210See chapter four supra under 4.5.6 for a discussion of the American 
case of Grady. 
211 See chapter four supra under 4.6.5 and 4.6.6 for a discussion of 
these cases. 
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law. 221 A same transaction test has also recently been approved 
of in a decision of a provincial division of the Supreme Court in South 
Africa (S v Khoza) 222 as an effective measure to protect the accused 
against state abuse of the criminal process. 223 
It is submitted that determination of the ambit of the concept "same 
criminal episode" or "same transaction" in an individual case would 
not present major difficulties for the courts. In developing a body of 
jurisprudence in this particular field, our courts may draw extensively 
on the treatment of this issue in English and German law. However, 
in developing criteria to determine the boundaries of the concept 
"same transaction", the courts must not lose . sight of certain 
differences between substantive German criminal law and law of 
criminal procedure on the one hand, and South African criminal law 
and law of criminal procedure on the other. 224 
This thesis submits that in determining the boundaries of the 
concept "same transaction", the broader enquiry ought to be whether 
separate crimes (in terms of substantive law) are so closely connected 
221 See chapter nine supra under 9.4.3.2. 
222See chapter four supra under 4.6.8 for a discussion of the decision 
in Khoza. 
223See chapter four supra under 4.6.8 for a detailed discussion of the 
decision in Khoza. The court expressed itself against the practice of 
proceeding on charges arising from the same criminal episode or 
transaction in a piecemeal fashion. The court recognised that it has 
inherent discretionary powers to stay criminal proceedings on the basis 
that a second prosecution would amount to abuse of the criminal 
process by the state. 
224The application in practice of the German criterion known as 
Verklammerung is dependent on the definitions of substantive offences 
in that jurisdiction. It can therefore not be applied on a similar basis 
in South African law. See chapter nine supra under 9.4.3. 1, text at 
note 103. 
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that a separate evaluation and adjudication of each of these crimes 
may be regarded as an unnatural splitting up of a unit of conduct. 225 
Closer scrutiny may involve an investigation of whether 
(a) there is a connection between the offences in 
terms of criteria such as time and place of 
execution and similarity (albeit not identity) in the 
acts. of execution 
(b) there is similarity of intention in the sense that the 
crimes can be regarded as one project, or are part 
of a common scheme or plan 
(c) the crime(s) charged successively could have been 
charged in the alternative to crime(s) charged in 
the first trial. 
It is however, an open question whether the Constitutional Court 
will go as far as interpreting the constitutional provision in the sense 
that it prohibits successive prosecutions for crimes arising from the 
same transaction or facts. Even a broad interpretation of the words 
used in the constitutional guarantee in my view, cannot be construed 
as prohibiting successive prosecutions for all crimes arising from the 
same facts. However, if the more flexible approach introduced in 
Mhlungu is followed, namely that an interpretation consonant with the 
values underlying the constitutional guarantee should be preferred to 
a literal interpretation if such a literal interpretation would perpetuate 
arbitrariness and injustice (provided the broader interpretation can 
reasonably be accommodated within the text) 226, the Constitutional 
Court may very well go so far as interpreting the provision in 
accordance with the proposals in this thesis. Moreover, the court may 
225As indicated in chapter nine supra under 9.4.3.1 and 9.4.3.2 this is 
the basic approach followed in German law. 
226See supra under 10.3, text at note 38 for a discussion of the 
approach followed in Mhlungu. 
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adopt a same transaction test on the basis of the accused's broader 
right to a fair trial. 
If the Constitutional Court nevertheless decides that neither the 
accused's broader right to a fair trial nor the double jeopardy provision 
in the Constitution can be interpreted as meaning that successive 
prosecutions for crimes arising from the same facts or transaction are 
prohibited, it becomes essential to consider also whether the provision 
incorporates the rule of issue estoppal. 227 
In the discussion of South African law in chapter four, it was 
indicated that the Appellate Division rejected the idea (in O'Neill) that 
the broader concept of res judicata also covers cases of estoppal in 
respect of particular facts which led to the verdict. 228 As indicated 
in that discussion, the court in O'Neill relied (for this particular 
conclusion) on its previous decision of Manasewitz. However, as 
indicated in chapter four, the decision in Manasewitz, in this respect, 
can only be regarded as authority for the proposition that issue 
estoppal may not be raised by the prosecution to the prejudice of an 
accused who pleads autrefois acquit. 229 In other words, it was 
demonstrated in chapter four that the rejection in O'Neill of the idea 
that issue estoppal may be raised in favour of the accused, cannot be 
justified in terms of the decision in Manasewitz. It was also pointed 
out that a division of the Supreme Court in fact recognised the 
application of the rule of issue estoppal in our law in Vermeulen's 
2271t is submitted that recognition of the doctrine of issue estoppal (as 
a separate rule) will become largely immaterial if the double jeopardy 
provision in the Constitution is interpreted as offering the accused 
protection against successive prosecutions for offences arising from 
the same facts or transaction. 
228See chapter four supra under 4. 6. 9. 
229See chapter four supra under 4.6.9, text at note 566. 
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case, albeit under the guise of action estoppal. 230 
This thesis argues that the broader concept of res judicata introduced 
in Manasewitz laid the foundation for the recognition of issue estoppal 
in our law. Moreover, it is argued that recognition of the accused's 
common law right to protection against double jeopardy as a 
fundamental right in the Constitution now obliges the courts ·to give 
effect to the principle of issue estoppal. It is submitted that a literal 
as well as a purposive interpretation of the constitutional guarantee 
against double jeopardy requires that the state be prohibited from 
relitigating issues previously decided in favour of the accused. This 
submission is based on the accused's broader interest in finality: an 
issue determined in favour of an accused by a tribunal vested with the 
power to make an adjudication of the accused's guilt or innocence for 
criminal conduct, cannot be re-opened in a second trial. The 
underlying idea is that the prosecution should not be allowed to build 
a case around proof of conduct for which a person has already been 
acquitted. 
The rule of issue estoppel is applied in Indian, Canadian and 
American federal law. The reason why it has been rejected in English 
law is because it is extremely difficult in that system of law to identify 
and isolate issues determined by the jury in favour of the accused. 
This is so because the jury need not give reasons for its 
decisions. 231 Courts in South Africa do not have to deal with this 
problem. Furthermore, it is submitted that the principle of issue 
estoppal follows from a literal as well as a purposive interpretation of 
230See chapter four supra under 4.6.9, text at note 581 for a detailed 
discussion of Vermeulen's case. 
231 See chapter four supra under 4. 2. 3 for a discussion of the case of 
Humphrys. 
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the constitutional guarantee: the words "acquitted" of an "act or 
omission" are broad enough to include also a finding of fact in favour 
of the accused (for example, that the accused was not present at the 
scene of the crime). In view of all these considerations, it is proposed 
that the constitutional provision be interpreted as incorporating the rule 
of issue estoppal. Consonant with the purposes underlying the 
constitutional provision, issue estoppal should be applied only in 
favour of the accused and not be available to the state. 232 
Moreover, it is proposed that similar to the position in Canadian and 
Indian law, application of the rule be confined to situations where the 
parties in the second trial are the same as in the first trial. 233 
It remains to be considered in a second stage of analysis whether 
justification for a successive prosecution for crimes arising from the 
same criminal transaction (or facts) may be found to exist in terms of 
the provisions of the limitation clause. The comparative study 
undertaken in this thesis has led this writer to the conclusion that 
successive prosecutions for crimes arising from the same facts may 
well be reasonable and justifiable in the following circumstances 
(a) Where the accused through collusion with a public 
official obtained a conviction on a lesser charge to 
escape prosecution on a greate.r charge. 
(b) Where the crime charged in the second trial has 
not yet been completed at the time of the first trial 
(the "subsequent death" or "intervening death" 
exception). 
232As indicated in chapter four under 4.3.5, (text at note 156) 
recognition of issue estoppal in favour of the crown amounts to a 
violaton of the fundamental right of the accused to be presumed 
innocent until proven guilty by the state. 
233See chapter four supra under 4.3.5 and 4.4.4. 
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(c) Where the crime charged in the second trial has 
not been discovered by the prosecution at the time 
of the first trial, despite the exercise of reasonable 
diligence by the prosecutor's office. 
(d) Where joinder of offences in one charge, in one 
single trial, would have been prejudicial to the 
prosecutor or prejudicial to the accused. 
(e) Where the accused is responsible for the 
separation of trials. 
(f) Where the offence(s) charged in the second trial 
are based on the same conduct of which the 
accused has previously been held to be in 
contempt of court. 234 
(g) Where an issue decided in favour of the accused 
may again be re-opened in a second trial if it was 
obtained as a result of fraud, for instance perjury. 
It is submitted, furthermore, that in determining 
justification for violation of the rule of issue 
estoppal in subsequent perjury charge type cases, 
our courts may draw extensively from rules 
developed in Canadian law. 235 Consonant with 
the values which underlie the rule against double 
jeopardy, the Canadian Supreme Court held in 
Grdic236 that the crown may only re-open an 
issue if to prove the allegation (of fraud), 
additional evidence is rendered; in other words, 
evidence not put to the trier of fact in the previous 
proceedings. Moreover, Grdic exemplifies that 
even if this additional evidence was available at 
the first trial to the crown (using reasonable 
diligence), but the crown failed to render it, the 
234lt is submitted that in previous conviction for contempt cases, the 
state's interest in enforcing court orders (namely, to ensure that 
violation of its orders do not go unpunished) outweighs the accused's 
interest in finality. Cf the approach adopted in English law discussed 
in chapter three supra under 3.3.2, text at note 21. 
235See chapter four supra under 4.3.5 for a discussion of the relevant 
principles borne out in Canadian case law. 
236See chapter four supra under 4.3.5, text at notes 151-153 for a 
discussion of the approach adopted in Grdic. 
724 
crown may not rely on it in a subsequent trial to 
prove perjury. 
By way of excursus, it must be conceded that apart from the 
instances set out above, there may be other cases in which the state 
may make out a convincing case that limitation of the rule (namely 
that all charges arising from the same transanction should be joined in 
one charge) may be justified. This involves legislation which creates 
various related offences (not necessarily lesser or greater included 
offences) with the specific object of combating continuous organised 
criminal activity (for example drug trafficking). The state may then 
argue that in order to combat continuous, organised- criminal activity, 
it should be empowered to charge the accused in successive 
prosecutions for different substantive offences (in terms of the 
traditional "same evidence" and "in peril" tests), committed in different 
places and at different times, despite the fact that these offences form 
part of essentially the same project or scheme or plan. The 
Constitutional Court (if it interprets the double jeopardy provision as 
introducing a broad same transaction approach), will then have to 
weigh this interest of the state against the accused's interest in 
finality. Due to constraints of length, this thesis cannot explore this 
problematic area. It is simply submitted that the determination of 
justification for successive prosecutions of offenders involved in 
organised, continuous criminal activity, will require closer scrutiny of 
the considerations set out in the limitaton clause than undertaken in 
the instances set out in (a) - (g) above. 237 
Finally, it is suggested that the common law should be reformed 
2371t will have to be considered, for instance, whether there is not a 
less restrictive measure to combat continuous, organised criminal 
activity. 
725 
in order to bring it into line with the values which underlie 
constitutional protection against double jeopardy. It is recommended 
that the reform be achieved by inserting a compulsory joinder rule in 
the Criminal Procedure Act. This thesis proposes that the provisions 
essentially be based on the recommendations recently made in this 
regard by the Law Reform Commission of Canada. With minor 
amendments (introduced by this writer), the rule proposed by the Law 
Reform Commission of Canada reads as follows238 
1. ( 1) 
(2) 
Unless otherwise ordered by the court in the interests of 
justice - such as preventing prejudice - or unless the 
accused acquiesces in a separate trial, an accused should 
not be subject to separate trials for multiple crimes 
charged or for crimes not charged but known at the time 
of the commencement of the first trial that 
(a) arise from the same transaction or facts (being 
closely connected in time, place and occassion) or 
(b) are part of a common scheme or plan. 
In assessing whether it is in the interests of justice to 
have separate trials, a court should be permitted to 
consider, among other factors 
(a) the number of charges being prosecuted 
(b) whether the effect of the multiple charges would 
be to raise inconsistent defences 
(c) whether evidence introduced to suppport one 
charge would prejudice the adjudication on the 
other charge(s) 
(e) the timing of the application of severance. 
As indicated above, the joinder rule proposed above makes 
provision that a court may order separate trials "in the interests of 
238See at 50 et seq of Working Paper 63. 
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justice". The concept "interests of justice" is clarified by insertion of 
the words "such as preventing prejudice" and further elucidated by a 
list of factors which may be taken into account in determining whether 
separation will be "in the interests of justice". It is submitted that a 
provision to this effect will give guidelines to prosecutors in drawing 
up charges, and also to courts in determining whether the interests 
of justice require that separate trials be held for crimes arising from the 
same transaction or facts. 
1O.7 .4 The constitutionality of a prosecution appeal on a point of law 
only 
As indicated in chapter six, the present Criminal Procedure Act239 
allows the state to appeal against acquittals handed down in lower as 
well as superior courts, albeit on a point of law only. Consideration of 
the constitutionality of these provisions240 will involve a literal as 
well as a purposive interpretation of the constitutional guarantee 
against double jeopardy. The constitutional guarantee provides that 
"every accused person has the right to a fair trial which includes the 
right not to be tried for an offence in respect of an act or omission for 
which that person has previously been either acquitted or 
convicted". 241 The question posed here is whether it can be said 
that a person is "tried" again for the same unlawful conduct of which 
he or she has previously been acquitted if a court of appeal 
reconsiders the merits of his acquittal on the record of the 
proceedings, and solely on the basis of whether the trial court made 
an error of law in acquitting the accused. 
239Act 51 of 1977. 
240Sections 310 and 319 of the Act. 
241 Section 35 (3)(m) of the 1996 Constitution. 
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The Oxford Dictionary defines the word "try" as to "subject (person) 
to trial (for murder etc.)". 242 The word "trial" on the other hand is 
defined as a "judicial examination and determination of issues between 
parties by judge ... ". 243 It is submitted that a broad interpretation 
of these words includes a reconsideraton of legal issues only by a 
court of appeal on the record or proceedings which took place in the 
first trial. 244 Moreover, this interpretation is supported by the fact 
that the drafters of the provision did not add the proviso that the 
person relying on the provision should have been "finally" acquitted or 
convicted. As indicated in chapter three, this is provided for in the 
double jeopardy provision of the Canadian Charter of Rights. 245 As 
indicated in chapter six, the Supreme Court of Canada regarded the 
inclusion of the word "finally" in the double jeopardy provision in the 
Canadian Charter of Rights as in indication that the drafters intended 
that the practice be retained that the crown may appeal against an 
acquittal on a point of law. 246 
It is submitted that a purposive interpretation leads to the same 
conclusion as the suggested literal interpretation: an appeal by the 
prosecution against an acquittal, albeit on a point of law only, violates 
the accused's right to finality, namely his right to have his trial 
242At 1398. 
243At 1387. 
244See Zuma (discussed supra under 10.3, text at notes 27 - 29) 
where the Constitutional Court expressed itself in favour of a broad 
interpretation of the words used in a constitutional guarantee in the Bill 
of Rights. 
245See chapter three supra under 3.3.1, text at note 61 for the 
wording of this provision. 
246See chapter six supra under 6.3.2, text at note 69 for a discussion 
of the Morgentaler case. 
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completed by the first tribunal he encounters vested with jurisdiction 
to make an adjudication of his guilt or innocence of the crime(s) 
charged. 
However, it may be argued on behalf of the state that an appeal by 
the prosecution on a point of law alone poses no risk whatsoever that 
an innocent person may be convicted. In support of this contention 
it may be said that only new trials (following on previous acquittals or 
convictions) create this danger. In a new trial, as opposed to an 
appeal on the record on a point of law only, the prosecution may bring 
additional evidence and improve on the presentation of its case by 
anticipating the evidence already offered by the accused at the first 
trial. In other words, it may be argued that it is only in a new trial that 
the state obtains an undue advantage over the accused which 
enhances the risk that although being innocent, the accused may 
nevertheless be convicted. This is true, but, as the comparative and 
historical study has demonstrated, there are also other values at stake 
which are not necessarily of less importance than the value that the 
risk should be minimised that an innocent person be convicted. -
Apart from the fact that a second trial (albeit an appeal) creates 
embarrassment, anxiety, insecurity and expense, an appeal by the 
prosecution also undermines the value or idea that the state, being 
more powerful than the individual, ought not to benefit from its own 
mistakes. In other words, an important objective of the constitutional 
guarantee against double jeopardy is that the individual ought not to 
pay the price for incompetence of organs of the state. This- means 
that if the prosecution or the adjudicator (the court) made mistakes 
which lead to the acquittal of the accused, the accused ought not (as 
a rule) to be subjected to further proceedings in order to correct those 
mistakes. That this is an important value which underlies 
constitutional protection against double jeopardy can also be inferred 
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from the treatment of state appeals against acquittals in other 
jurisdictions. 
In chapter six it was pointed out that the prohibition on state 
appeals against acquittals in American federal jurisprudence cannot be 
ascribed solely to the fact that employment of juries as factfinders in 
that jurisdiction makes appellate review of acquittals 
inappropriate. 247 Instead, the fact that the state is also prohibited 
from appealing on a point of law against an acquittal handed down by 
a judge sitting as sole adjudicator of the facts in a so-called bench 
trial, has demonstrated that the "one trial" principle has been the 
decisive consideration in determining the constitutional permissiblity 
of prosecution appeals. 248 Although English legal commentators 
have not considered the rationale which underlies the prohibition on 
state appeals against acquittals handed down in superior courts on a 
point of law only, it can also not merely be assumed that the only 
reason why the state is prohibited from appealing on a point of law in 
that jurisdiction is the fact that superior courts employ juries as 
factfinders. 249 
A discussion of German law on the other hand, has demonstrated 
that the fundamentally different inquisitorial trial procedures followed 
in that jurisdiction (which, for instance allow the prosecution to appeal 
247See chapter six supra under 6.5. 7. As indicated, the theory that the 
prohibition on state appeals against acquittals can be ascribed only to 
the fact that it is impossible to identify on what basis the jury 
acquitted the accused (because a jury need not give reasons for its 
finding and may acquit against the evidence), has been proved to be 
an over-simplification of the rationale underlying the prohibition in 
American constitutional double jeopardy jurisprudence. 
248See id, and in particular the submissions of Thomas Elegant theory 
(under 6.5. 7, text at notes 250 - 251). 
249Cf the comments in chapter six supra under 6.2.2, text at note 24. 
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on a point of law as well as on the facts on behalf of the state as well 
as on behalf of the person who has been convicted), invalidates any 
argument to the effect that, because the state may appeal against an 
acquittal in that jurisdiction, it should likewise be recognised as 
constitutional in the South African legal system.25° Finally, the 
comparative study has shown that an appeal on a point of law as well 
as on the facts is allowed in India for the simple reason that their 
constitutional provision against double jeopardy protects the accused 
only against a second trial after he has been convicted and punished. 
To return to South African law. The rule that the state may appeal 
against an acquittal on a point of law has never been part of our 
common law; it was only introduced by the legislature in the 1940' s. 
In the cases of V and Magmoed the Appellate Division pointed out 
that legislation which provides for state appeals against acquittals 
amounts to a violation of the common law rule that sanctity should be 
accorded to acquittals. 251 In Magmoed the court gave a narrow 
interpretation to the concept "question of law"; it observed that to 
hold otherwise "would be opening the door to appeals by the 
prosecution against acquittals contrary to the traditional policy and 
practice of our law". 252 In view of all these considerations, it is 
submitted that the statutory provisions which provide for an appeal on 
a point of law against an acquittal amount to an infringement of the 
250See chapter nine supra under 9. 2, text at note 22. 
251 See the discussion in chapter six of the Magmoed case under 
6.6.2.3, text at note 324. As indicated, the court in Magmoed 
pointed out that the traditional policy and practice in our law has 
always been that an acquittal by a competent court should be 
regarded as final and conclusive. See also to the same effect the 
Appellate Division case of V discussed in chapter eight supra under 
8.6.2.2, text at note 349. 
252At 101 h. See chapter six supra under 6.6.2.3, text at note 324. 
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accused's fundamental right against double jeopardy. 
It remains to be considered whether the legislation which provides 
for state appeals on a point of law against acquittals handed down by 
lower as well as superior courts may nevertheless be viewed as 
reasonable and justifiable in terms of the provisions of the limitation 
clause. The state may for instance raise the argument that it has a 
valid interest in appealing against an acquittal on a point of law 
because such an appeal serves the general interest of the public that 
offenders should be convicted and punished. Moreover, it may be 
argued that a state appeal on a point of law serves the interests of the 
public in the proper administration of justice and legal certainty. These 
interests (arguably) cannot be served effectively if the courts make 
errors of law which the system does not allow to be corrected. 
It is submitted that the interest of the public that offenders should 
be convicted and punished is not sufficient to be weighed against the 
accused's interest in finality. This argument (namely that offenders 
should be convicted and punished), may also be raised to justify 
appeals by the state on the facts as well as a new trials after accused 
have been acquitted on the factual merits. However, it is submitted 
that the other interests of the public set out above, namely the 
interests in the proper administration of justice and legal certainty, is 
of sufficient importance to be weighed against the accused's interest 
in finality. These interests relate to matters which are pressing and 
substantial in a free and democratic society. 
However, it will also have to be considered whether the means 
chosen to achieve the objective can be regarded as reasonable and 
justifiable. It is submitted that the limitation (state appeal against an 
acquittal) is in fact rationally connected to its objective; it is not 
arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. Moreover, the 
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limitation is not of such a nature and extent that it can be said that it 
will have such a deleterious effect on the individual that it cannot be 
justified by the purposes it is intended to serve; the appeal is limited 
to the record and to a point of law only. Moreover, our courts have 
opted for a narrow interpretation of the concept "question of 
law" .253 This may be construed as an indication that the legislation 
infringes as little as possible on the accused's right to finality. 
However, it is submitted that it will be less easy for the state to 
demonstrate that the objectives of the limitation cannot be achieved 
by less restrictive measures. 
The moot appeal as provided for in English law254 in actual fact 
presents a model of a less restrictive measure to achieve the 
objectives set out above; it may serve the purpose of stating the 
correct legal principles for future reference in order to prevent 
perpetuation of application by the courts of incorrect principles. In 
fact, the moot appeal is a means whereby these objectives can be 
achieved without in any way infringing on the accused's right to be 
protected against double jeopardy. 
However, it may also be argued that if only a moot appeal is allowed 
(instead of an appeal which, if successful, results in the setting aside 
of the acquittal afforded the accused in the trial court), it may lead to 
inequality of treatment of accused persons: some may be convicted 
and punished for crimes while others may go free merely because the 
court misinterpreted the law. It is submitted that in order to 
253See the discussion of the Magmoed case in chapter six under 
6.6.2.3, text at note 308. 
254See chapter six supra under 6.2.3 for a discussion of the moot 
appeal procedure provided for in English law. 
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substantiate this argument, the state will have to show that the 
inequality which flows from the absence of an appeal on a point of law 
(which affects the acquittal afforded the accused) can be viewed as 
arbitrary and irrational distinctions drawn between people. 255 It is 
submitted that it would be difficult to show that the inequality which 
flows from the absence of legislation which provides for such an 
appeal by the prosecution is arbitrary and irrational if it can be ascribed 
to an attempt to protect the accused's fundamental right to be 
protected against double jeopardy; the objective of protecting the 
accused against double jeopardy offers a "rational explanation" of why 
similarly placed people (accused) are treated differently. 256 
The state may, however, be in a much stronger position to make out 
a case that a prosecution appeal on a point of law which affects the 
acquittal afforded the accused should be retained (at least in respect 
of acquittals handed down in lower courts) if it can show that the 
administration of justice in these courts have reached such a low level 
that it would bring the law into disrepute and undermine the proper 
administration of justice if the state is not allowed one reasonable 
opportunity to bring offenders to justice. 
As pointed out in the comparative study in chapter six, an appeal 
on a point of law is allowed (presumably on the latter basis) against 
decisions handed down in lower courts in the English legal 
system. 257 However, as indicated in chapter six, the administration 
255As indicated supra under 10.5.1 (text at note 84), inequality of 
treatment is determined in our law by focusing on whether 
discrimination between people is arbitrary and irrational. 
256See the opinion of Ackerman J in Makwanyana's case para 156, 
discussed supra under 10. 5. 1 , text at notes 84 and 85. 
257See chapter six supra under 6.2.2. 
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of justice in the lower courts in this jurisdiction is essentially 
administered by lay people.258 This is not the position in the 
present South African legal system. Therefore, for the present, it is 
submitted that the state would not succeed with this argument; the 
administration of justice by the lower courts in South Africa has not 
reached such a low standard that an appeal by the state can be 
viewed as an essential means to maintain respect for the 
administration of justice. In view of the above considerations, it is 
concluded that the legislation which currently provides for a state 
appeal against an acquittal handed down in a lower as well as a 
superior court cannot survive constitutional scrutiny. 
10. 7. 5 Review of an acquittal 
This thesis has argued consistently that the accused's interest in 
finality requires that he be subjected only to one trial before a finder 
of fact vested with jurisdiction to decide upon his or her guilt or 
innocence of the crime(s) charged. It has been emphasised in this 
chapter that a trial de nova after the accused has previously been 
discharged by a competent court at a stage after he or she has 
pleaded, undermines the values which underlie the constitutional 
guarantee against double jeopardy. 259 New trials not only cause 
anxiety, expense and insecurity, but (unlike state appeals on a point 
of law only) also create the risk that an innocent person may be 
convicted. 
It follows that a review of an acquittal amounts - to an 
infringement of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy; 
the setting aside by a court of appeal of an acquittal on the basis of 
258Under 6.2.2, note 23. 
259See supra under 10. 7 .2. 
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a defect or an irregularity in the proceedings opens the door for the 
prosecution to institute de novo proceedings against the accused. 
New trials (as indicated above), defeat the objectives of the 
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. 
As indicated in chapter six, English and Canadian courts allow 
reviews of acquittals by invoking the so-called "nullity" theory and the 
concept of "absence of jurisdiction". 260 Indian and German courts 
also allow reviews of acquittals which may lead to new trials. 
However, a comparison of the latter two systems to the South African 
system in this particular regard is not appropriate; a "continuous 
jeopardy" approach is followed in these jurisdictions. In American 
federal law on the other hand, new trials may follow upon declaration 
of a mistrial, unless the motion for a mistrial can can be viewed as 
prosecutorial overreach or an attempt to manipulate the trial. 261 
In South Africa, review by a higher court of proceedings in lower 
courts has traditionally been regarded as a remedy available to the 
convicted person only. However, as pointed out in chapter six, the 
Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court held in the 1980' s 
that it may rely on its inherent powers to also set aside an acquittal 
260 Although the traditional policy has always been that an acquittal 
may not be challenged by the state, the House of Lords recently held 
that a person must be lawfully acquitted before he or she may invoke 
the plea of former jeopardy. See chapter six supra under 6.2.5, text 
at note 50 for a discussion of the Harrington case. As also indicated 
in chapter six, Canadian courts have allowed reviews of acquittals on 
the basis that the trial court made a jurisdictional error (for example by 
failing to take into account all factors in deciding to order a a stay of 
proceedings on constitutional grounds). See the case of Thompson 
discussed in chapter six at supra under 6.3.5, text at note 98. See 
however the arguments against this approach raised under 10.7.2 
above. 
261 See chapter three supra. under 3.5.2.1. 
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handed down by a magistrate in a lower court. 262 This approach 
was disapproved of in two subsequent cases handed down by the 
Eastern Cape Provincial Division of the Supreme Court. It was 
indicated in chapter six that in Makopu the Eastern Cape Division of 
the Supreme Court argued that "even if the court had the inherent 
power to make this sort of order [the setting aside of an acquittal] it 
should not do so". 263 The court based its conclusion on "policy 
considerations which require certainty and finality in criminal cases 
" 264 In a subsequent case, Ntswayi, the court expressed the 
view that the interests of justice are not served if the state is given an 
opportunity (in a second trial) to correct mistakes which it had made 
at the first trial. 265 
This thesis agrees with the approach followed in the Makopu and 
Ntswayi cases. Review of an acquittal infringes the traditional policy 
of our law that the acquitted person ought not to pay the price for 
judicial incompetence by being subjected to a second trial. It must, 
however, also be considered whether there are circumstances in 
which review of an acquittal may nevertheless be viewed as 
reasonable and justifiable in terms of the provisions of the limitation 
clause. As indicated above, 266 this thesis submits that an accused 
who has been "acquitted" by a tribunal which had no jurisdiction to try 
his case in the first place, cannot rely on the constitutional provision 
262See chapter six above under 6.6.2.6, text at note 353 for a 
discussion of the Lubisi case. 
263 At 5 78b of the judgment discussed in chapter six supra under 
6.6.2.6, text at note 358. 
264At 578b-c. 
265At 401g and 402b. See chapter six supra under 6.6.2.6, text at 
note 360 for a a discussion of this case. 
266See the discussion under 10. 7.2. 
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against double jeopardy. However, it is submitted that no justification 
exists (in terms of the provisions of the limitation clause), to extend 
the ambit of the traditional concept of "jurisdiction" to situations 
where the presiding officer, in acquitting the accused, made a so-
called jurisdictional error in his assessment of the evidence, 267 or 
performed any other irregularity which can be construed as an action 
"without jurisdiction" in the expanded sense of the word (as 
suggested by Canadian courts). 
As indicated above, this thesis argues that a second trial (including 
a review of an acquittal) may only be justified if the state was denied 
a fair and reasonable opportunity to present its case before the first 
trier of fact. 268 Consistent with this approach, it is submitted that 
review of an acquittal will only be justified in terms of the provisions 
of the limitation clause in the following circumstances 
(a) where an acquittal was obtained as a result of corruption, bias 
or mala tides on the part of the judicial officer presiding at the 
first trial, irrespective of whether the mala tides was induced by 
the accused 
(b) where it was obtained as a result of mala tides by the accused 
or 
(c) where the court acted in breach of the rules of natural justice 
by, for example, unreasonably denying the state an opportunity 
to present its case. 
267See the approach in Canadian law discussed in chapter six supra 
under 6.3.5. 
268See the submissions under 10. 7 .2. 
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10. 7. 6 The constitutionality of a state appeal against sentence 
The present Criminal Procedure Act makes provision that the state 
may appeal to a higher court against sentence imposed on the person 
convicted in a lower as well as a superior court. 269 The 
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy provides that 
everyone has a right to a fair trial which includes the right not to be 
tried for an offence "in respect of an act or omission for which he or 
she has previously been acquitted or convicted" .270 At first glance, 
the words used in the constitutional provision does not seem to bar a 
reconsideration or re-adjudication of the appropriateness of a sentence 
imposed on the convicted person. In fact, even a broad interpretation 
of the words does not lead to the conclusion that a sentence imposed 
by a trial court may not be challenged by the prosecution; the words 
"acquitted or convicted" refer to an 11 act or omission 11 (conduct) and 
not to a sentence. Moreover, in all the legal systems under 
consideration in this comparative study a state appeal against 
sentence imposed on the convicted accused is allowed. 271 
A purposive approach, on the other hand, may lead to a different 
conclusion. It is submitted that the accused's interest in finality, 
namely that his trial be completed by the first tribunal with jurisdiction 
he encounters, also encompasses the right not to be subjected to a 
reconsideration by a court of appeal of the appropriateness of a 
sentence imposed by the trial court. This thesis argues that a state-
269See sections 31 QA and 3168 of Act 51 of 19 77 discussed in 
chapter six supra under 6.6.2.5. 
270Section 35(3)(m) of the 1996 Constitution. 
271 See chapter six supra for the position in English, Canadian Indian 
and American law. See also chapter nine for the position in German 
law. 
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initiated review of a sentence by a higher court can be viewed as an 
infringement on the accused's right to be protected against double 
jeopardy for the following reasons. In considering an appropriate 
sentence, a judge performs an exercise which is similar to an 
adjudication of the guilt or innocence of an accused for certain 
unlawful conduct. In meting out a sentence, a judge makes a factual 
determination of the "guilt or innocence" of an accused in respect of 
a particular sentence. This means that failure to impose a more severe 
sentence, like failure to find guilty of a higher degree of liability, 
amounts to an "acquittal" of that more severe sentence. In other 
words, it is submitted that when a particular punishment is selected 
from a range of prescribed punishments (irrespective of the ambit of 
the range), the sentencing judge impliedly "acquits" the accused of 
any greater punishment that he could have imposed on the 
accused.272 In terms of the constitutional provision, an "acquittal" 
272See the decision of the American Supreme Court in Bullington 
discussed in chapter six supra under 6.5.6, text at note 218. As 
indicated in chapter six, the United States Supreme Court first held in 
DiFrancesco that a prosecution appeal against sentence does not 
amount to a violation of the constitutional provision against double 
jeopardy. However, it was pointed out that the court made an 
exception to this rule in Bullington. The court held that an appeal by 
the prosecution against sentence will in fact be prohibited (in terms of 
the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy) if the sentencing 
proceeding followed by the trial court resembled a trial on the issue of 
guilt or innocence. The court argued inter alia, that because the trial 
court (in Bullington) did not have unbounded discretion to select a 
punishment from a variety of authorised sentences (as in DiFrancesco), 
but could only choose between twQ possible sentences (the death 
sentence or life imprisonment), it must of necessity have "acquitted" 
the accused of the sentence of death when imposing a sentence of life 
imprisonment. This thesis argues, on the contrary, that the question 
whether the state may appeal against sentence cannot be made 
dependent on the ambit of the discretion of the sentencing judge. 
Instead, it is suggested that even if the sentencing judge had a wide 
discretion (in the sense that he could choose between a variety of 
sentences), the double jeopardy provision in the Constitution should 
be interpreted in the sense that the state is prohibited from challenging 
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of criminal conduct ("an act or omission") offers the accused 
protection against double jeopardy. By analogy it may be argued that 
an "acquittal" (albeit an implied acquittal) of a more severe sentence 
also offers the accused protection against reconsideration of the 
appropriateness of that particular sentence. 
It is submitted that, in order to give full effect to the values which 
underlie the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, the 
interpretation proposed above is preferred to a strictly literal 
interpretation. This may be achieved by invoking the more flexible 
criteria introduced in Mhlungu or by relying on the broader right of the 
accused to a fair trial. The prohibition of an appeal against sentence 
serves the important interests of the accused not to be subjected to 
embarrassment, anxiety, insecurity and expense. Moreover, it 
excludes the risk that a person, "innocent" of a particular sentence, 
may nevertheless be "found guilty" of that particular sentence.273 
Finally, it also gives effect to the idea which underlies the guarantee 
that the accused ought not to pay the price for errors made by organs 
of the state. 
The historical overview in chapter six has indicated that an appeal by 
the prosecution against sentence was a recognised practice at the 
the appropriateness of the sentence. (Cf the arguments raised by 
American legal commentators in chapter six under 6.5.6, text at notes 
230 - 233). 
273Although, in theory, the powers of review of a court of appeal are 
narrowly defined (see chapter six supra under 6.6.2.6, text at note 
342) the possibility exists that in practice, a reviewing court may 
impose a sentence which is perhaps too severe. This may occur 
because a court reviewing a sentence is usually limited to the record 
of proceedings and therefore in a much weaker position than the trial 
judge who sees and hears the witnesses and the accused. 
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beginning of the nineteenth century. 274 However, it was not 
provided for in legislation (consolidating rules of criminal procedure) 
introduced in 191 7. 275 As indicated in chapter six, it was only re-
introduced in South African law in 1990. 276 As indicated above, 
this thesis argues that legislation which provides for state appeals 
against sentences amounts to a violation of the constitutional 
provision against double jeopardy. 
However, it must also be determined in a second stage of analysis 
whether the relevant legislation may nevertheless be justifiable in 
terms of the provisions of the limitation clause. In defence of the 
current legislation, the state may raise the argument for instance, that 
imposition of a too lenient sentence for a crime may cause a public 
outcry and consequently bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute. Furthermore, it may be argued that an appeal by the state 
against sentence, as currently provided for in legislation, ensures that 
uniformity is accomplished in the meting out of sentences for the same 
or similar offences. In other words, the institution of a prosecution 
appeal against sentence enables superior courts to lay down 
guidelines which have to be followed by judges and magistrates in 
sentencing offenders. 
It is submitted that the first argument raised above cannot on its 
own justify limitation of the accused's right to be protected against 
274See chapter six supra under 6. 6. 1 . 
275 Act 31 of 191 7. 
276Provision was made by means of Act 107 of 1990 for a state 
appeal against a sentence imposed by a lower as well as a superior 
court. As indicated in chapter six under 6.6.2.5, this step was taken 
probably as a result of strong reaction in the press (at the time) against 
lenient sentences imposed by white magistrates on white accused 
convicted of assault and culpabile homicide in respect of black victims. 
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double jeopardy. The argument may likewise be raised in favour of 
state appeals against acquittals on the merits and new trials after 
acquittals on the merits; the public may also be outraged because, in 
their view, a "guilty" person is acquitted. However, the second 
argument, that the prosecution appeal against sentence performs the 
important function of rationalising sentencing decisions, presents a 
substantial and pressing interest of the state which ought to be 
balanced against the accused's interest in finality. Consideration of 
the relevant legislation also reveals that it is carefully designed to 
infringe as little as possible on the accused's right to be protected 
against double jeopardy. It is provided, for instance, that on 
application for leave to appeal or an appeal in terms of the Act (by the 
prosecution against sentence) the judge or the court may order the 
state to pay the accused concerned the whole or any part of the costs 
to which he might have been put in opposing the application or 
appeal. 277 Moreover, as pointed out in chapter six, it has been 
emphasised in the case law that this right ought to be exercised 
sparingly and confined to instances where, in the opinion of the 
prosecution, it is so inappropriate that the trial court did not exercise 
its discretion reasonably or judicially. 278 As indicated in chapter six, 
the court (in Maraga) warned that the prosecution appeal against 
sentence is a drastic measure and that the courts should prevent "as 
far as is absolutely possible, an accused person from going 
unnecessarily through the ordeal of an appeal against his sentence by 
the state" . 279 
277Sections 310A(6) and 3168(3). See chapter six supra under 
6.6.2.5. 
278See chapter six supra under 6.6.2.5, text at note 342 for the 
principles laid down in the case of Maraga. 
279 At 609d of the judgment, discussed in chapter six supra under 
6.6.2.5, text at note 343. 
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The crucial issue, however, is whether there is a less restrictive 
means available than the prosecution appeal against sentence which 
may be employed by the state in order to achieve the objective of 
uniformity in the imposition of sentences for the same or similar 
offences. This thesis argues that there is at least one less restrictive 
measure available to achieve this objective: the legislature may 
incorporate a body of sentencing guidelines in the Criminal Procedure 
Act. Suggestions to this effect has already been made by various 
legal commentators. 280 The value of a body of sentencing 
guidelines lies in the fact that it lays down recommended sentences 
(within strict parameters) for particular crimes, which crimes are 
categorised in conjunction with other factors such as age, previous 
criminal history etcetera. 
The decision of the Constitutional Court in Williams has taught that 
the fact that society has not yet established mechanisms to deal with 
certain problems does not justify infringement of fundamental rights 
of the individual. 281 Likewise it may be argued that the absence of 
other mechanisms in our system of criminal justice to rationalise 
sentencing decisions cannot justify the infringement of the double 
jeopardy provision. The new constitutional order requires of the state 
280See in general Van Rooyen JH "The odd couple: more on Holder 
1979 (2) SA 70 (A) South African Journal for Criminal law and 
Criminology 1979 88; Van Rooyen JH "Thunder and lightning: has 
the Scheepers case on sentencing been struck down?" South African 
Journal for Criminal law and Criminology 1979 48. Van Rooyen JH 
"The decision to imprison - the courts' need for guidance" South 
African Journal for Criminal law and Criminology 1980 228; Van 
Rooyen JH "Doelgerigte straftoemeting: 'n regsvergelykende 
ondersoek na wyses om straftoemetingsdiskresie te reguleer" Tydskrif 
vir Hedendaagse Romeins-hollandse reg Vol Ill 1992 386 and Vol IV 
575; Terblanche SS "Die boete as strafvorm LLD dissertation 1990 
chapter three and further passim and Van der Merwe DP Sentencing 
1996 Annexure A "Minnesota Sentencing guidelines". 
281 See supra under 10.6, text at note 121. 
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to develop mechanisms which may improve the standard of 
administration of justice. 282 It is submitted that there is no reason 
why mechanisms such as sentencing guidelines cannot be as effective 
as a prosecution appeal against sentence in order to achieve the valid 
interest of the state in rationalising sentencing decisions. 
10. 7. 7 The constitutionality of certain rules dealing with the powers 
of courts of appeal 
In these paragraphs, the constitutionality of the following rules of 
criminal procedure are considered 
(a) the rule that a court of appeal may find an accused guilty of a 
more serious offence than the one against which he appealed 
and 
(b) the rule that a court of appeal may impose a more severe 
sentence in disposing of an appeal by the accused against his 
conviction and/or sentence. 
As indicated in chapter eight283 the Criminal Procedure Act 
provides that a court of appeal may, in setting aside a conviction, " ... 
give such judgment as ought to have been given at the trial or impose 
such sentence as ought to have been imposed at the trial". 284 The 
Appellate Division held that this provision empowers a court of appeal 
to set aside a conviction and substitute it for a conviction for a more 
282Cf Williams discussed supra under 10.6, text at note 109. 
283See supra under 8.6.2.2, text at note 327. 
284Section 322( 1 )(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, which 
sets out the powers of a court of appeal in disposing of an appeal 
against a conviction handed down in a superior court. A similar 
provision exists in respect of appeals against convictions handed down 
in lower courts (section 304(2)(c)(iv)). 
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serious offence, provided that the accused was originally charged with 
the more serious offence.285 However, as indicated in chapter eight, 
the Appellate Division recently criticised this rule (in Morgan) on the 
ground that it amounts to an encroachment by the legislature on the 
fundamental common law principle that an acquittal is sacrosanct and 
may therefore not be challenged by the prosecution or altered by a 
court of appeal to a conviction. 286 Moreover, the court (per 
Corbett CJ) expressed itself in favour of what is referred to in 
American double jeopardy jurisprudence as an "implied acquittal" 
doctrine:287 a conviction of a lesser offence should be regarded as 
an implied acquittal of the greater offence. 
The comparative study has demonstrated that in the majority of 
legal systems considered on a comparative basis in this thesis, 
substitution of a conviction for a conviction of a more serious offence 
is not allowed. It is not allowed in English, Canadian, Indian and 
American federal law. Moreover, it has even been prohibited in Indian 
law, where a "continuing jeopardy" theory is approved of in the 
context of appeals. The basic premise in all these systems is that a 
conviction of a lesser offence should be regarded as an acquittal of a 
greater offence. 
It is submitted that the "implied acquittal" argument may also be 
raised to challenge the constitutionality of the practice that a court of 
appeal may impose a more severe sentence on the accused who 
285See the decisions of Makwanazi and E discussed in chapter eight 
supra under 8.6.2.2, text at notes 335 and 336. 
286At 161 b. See chapter eight supra under 8.6.2.2, text at note 339 
for a discussion of the court's decision in Morgan. 
287See chapter eight supra under 8.5.4, text at note 250 for a 
discussion of the doctrine as introduced in Green. 
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appeals against his conviction and/or sentence. As indicated above, 
the Constitutional Court has given a broad interpretation (which 
focuses on the values which underlie the relevant guarantee) to other 
fundamental rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 288 This thesis 
has argued that a state appeal against an acquittal infringes upon the 
fundamental right of the accused against double jeopardy because it 
amounts to a redetermination of the "guilt or innocence" of the 
accused of a particular sentence. 289 The same argument may be 
raised in the context discussed in these paragraphs: imposition of a 
more severe sentence on appeal initiated by the accused infringes 
upon his right in finality because it amounts to a redetermination of his 
"guilt or innocence" for a sentence of which he has previously been 
acquitted. As indicated above, this interpretation (which serves the 
values which underlie the constitutional guarantee against double 
jeopardy), can be reconciled with a literal interpretation in terms of the 
criteria laid down in Mhlungu, or may be accomodated under the 
general right of the accused to a fair trial. 290 This interpretation is 
also in line with the approach adopted in a number of the legal 
systems under consideration in this comparative study: imposition of 
a more severe sentence on appeal instituted by the accused is 
prohibited in the German, Indian and English systems of criminal 
procedure. 291 
In South Africa, a division of the Supreme Court recently held (in the 
case of Sonday) that a statutory provision (section 309(3) of the 
288See supra under 10.6. 
289See supra under 10. 7.6, text at note 272. 
290See under 10.7.6, text at note 273. 
291 See chapter eight supra under 8.2.2, 8.4.2 and chapter nine under 
9.5. 
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Criminal Procedure Act) which empowers the court of appeal to 
increase a sentence at its own initiative cannot be challenged on 
constitutional grounds. 292 The court argued inter alia that by 
appealing, the applicants had re-opened the /is between themselves 
and the state and could therefore not "be heard to complain" .293 In 
other words, the court advanced a "waiver" theory to support its 
argument that the rule did not violate the accused's fundamental right 
to a fair trial. 294 This thesis argues that the court in Sonday failed 
to appreciate that exercise of a fundamental right, for instance, the 
right of appeal to a higher court, cannot be construed as a "waiver" 
of another fundamental right, for instance, the right to be protected 
against double jeopardy. Moreover, it it is an open question whether 
the right to appeal or to review to a higher court can be exercised by 
an accused to its full measure if it can only be exercised under the 
danger that by appealing he may receive an even more severe 
sentence than was originally imposed. 295 
In final analysis it is submitted that these practices can also not be 
viewed as "reasonable and justifiable" in terms of the provisions of the 
292See chapter eight supra under 8.6.2.3, text at note 423 for a 
discussion of the decision in Sonday. As indicated in that discussion, 
the constitutionality of the provision was challenged not in terms of 
the double jeopardy guarantee but on the basis that it violates the 
accused's right to a fair trial in general, and, more particularly, the 
rights to have recourse by way of appeal to a higher court and to 
adduce and challenge evidence. 
293At 821 f-g. See chapter eight supra under 8.6.2.3, text at note 429. 
294See chapter eight supra under 8.5.2, text at note 176 for a 
discussion of the fallacies of a "waiver theory" as an argument to 
justify infringement of the rule against double jeopardy. 
295This is the main reason why the practice is prohibited in Germany. 
See chapter nine supra under 9.5. 
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limitation clause. 296 This thesis argues that the rules which allow 
that an accused who appeals against his conviction and/or sentence 
may be convicted of a more serious offence and receive a more severe 
sentence, fails to meet the requirements or reasonableness and 
justifiability set out in the limitation clause. It is submitted that the 
state's interest in bringing offenders to justice cannot outweigh the 
accused's interest in finality in circumstances where the state has 
already had a complete opportunity to state its case before a trier of 
fact which concluded the trial by making a finding on the factual 
merits of the case, namely by convicting the accused of a particular 
crime or crimes, and imposing a particular sentence. Moreover, it is 
submitted that rules which have the effect of inhibiting the accused in 
the exercise of his fundamental rights (entrenched in the Constitution) 
can hardly be viewed as being reasonable and justifiable in terms of 
the limitation provision in the Constitution. 
10. 7 .8 The constitutionality of new trials on appellate reversal of 
convictions 
This thesis has argued consistently that a literal as well as a purposive 
interpretation of the constitutional provision against double jeopardy 
means that the state is prohibited from instituting criminal proceedings 
against a person who has previously been discharged by a tribunal 
vested with jurisdiction to try him or her on the issue of guilt or 
innocence for the crimes charged. It was emphasised that this 
interpretation serves the values which underlie the constitutional 
provision. These values (which need not be repeated here) require 
that the accused ought not to pay the price if an organ of state made 
an error which precluded an adjudication on the merits of the case. 
Consistent with this approach, it is argued here that a retrial on 
296Section 36 of the 1996 Constitution. 
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appellate reversal of a conviction can also be viewed as an 
infringement of the fundamental right of the accused to be protected 
against double jeopardy. However, the difficult issue that presents 
itself in this context is whether a new trial on appellate reversal of a 
conviction may nevertheless be justified in terms of the provisions of 
the limitation clause. 
As pointed out in chapter eight, current legislation provides that a 
court of appeal may if it confirms the appeal order a new trial in the 
following circumstances 
(a) where the court which convicted the accused was not 
competent to do so or 
(b) where the indictment on which the accused was convicted was 
invalid or defective in any respect or 
(c) where there has been any other technical irregularity or defect 
in the procedure. 
It must accordingly be considered whether these provisions can be 
regarded as reasonable and justifiable limitations of the accused's 
fundamental right against double jeopardy. It has already been argued 
that a legal system operating in a constitutional state cannot give 
effect to a finding by a tribunal not vested by law to make a 
determination of the guilt or innocence of a person for criminal 
conduct. In the context discussed here, it means that a person may 
be tried again if his conviction was set aside on the basis that the 
court lacked the necessary jurisdiction to try him or her in the first 
place. Therefore, it only remains to consider the reasonableness and 
justifiability of the provisions set out in (b) and (c) above. The basic 
idea that underlies both the exceptions set out in (b) and (c) is that 
the state may institute new proceedings against the accused if his 
conviction was set aside by a court of appeal on a basis other than the 
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factual merits of the case. 
This thesis has argued consistently that the values which underlie the 
constitutional provision against double jeopardy require that, as a rule, 
the accused should be subjected only to one trial before a finder of 
fact vested with the power to make an adjudication of his guilt or 
innocence for the crime(s) charged. In other words, it has been 
argued that a "trial on the merits" is not necessarily a prerequisite for 
protection against a second prosecution for the same criminal conduct. 
This thesis argued that if the state had a reasonable opportunity to 
present its case and there was no mala fides on the part of the 
accused or the court, a second trial would not be justified merely 
because the trial was not concluded on the factual merits of the case. 
The question that presents itself in this discussion is whether the 
traditional rule, namely that a second trial will only be barred if the 
accused was acquitted on the factual merits of the case, can survive 
constitutional scrutiny if the acquittal (or discharge) was obtained as 
a result of an appeal by the accused against his conviction. In other 
words, is it reasonable and justifiable that where the accused appeals 
against his conviction and the conviction is set aside on a basis other 
than the factual merits of the case, the state may get another 
opportunity to convict by instituting new proceedings against him? 
The comparative study has demonstrated that the modern trend in 
Anglo-American systems of criminal justice is to allow more readily 
new trials on appellate reversal of convictions. This is the position in 
English, Canadian and American law. A comparison of Indian and 
German law, however, is not apposite in this context because both 
these systems follow a "continous jeopardy" approach. In other 
words, these systems do not regard appeals and new trials as a 
violation of the rule against double jeopardy. In the English, Canadian 
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and the American systems the basic approach is that new trials are 
allowed if a conviction is reversed by a court of appeal on the basis of 
trial error (a technical irregularity) as opposed to insufficiency of 
evidence. In other words, a new trial is allowed if the error or 
irregularity was of such a nature that it precluded the court of appeal 
from making a finding on the factual merits of the case (a finding that 
there was insufficient evidence to convict the accused). As indicated 
in chapter eight, this is also the approach followed in South African 
law. 
As is clear from the comparative study undertaken in this thesis, 
justification for new trials on appellate reversal of convictions cannot 
be found in abstract theories of doubl~ jeopardy. The advancement of 
theories such as a "waiver" theory or a "continuous jeopardy" theory 
has been answered by valid counter-arguments. 297 However, 
valuable contributions have been made by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in an attempt to identify the rationale which underlies 
the exception that a new trial may be allowed if the court.of appeal 
discharged the accused on a basis other than the factual merits of the 
case. The court explained in Tateo that justification for new trials on 
appellate reversal of convictions can be explained as follows298 
Corresponding to the right of an accused to be given a 
fair trial is the societal interest in punishing one whose 
guilt is clear after he has obtained such a trial. It would 
297See chapter eight supra under 8.5.2, text at note 176 for the 
criticism of Mr Justice Holmes of the "waiver" theory in Kepner. The 
"continuous jeopardy" theory, on the other hand, inevitably leads to 
the conclusion that the state may also appeal against an acquittal. It 
would therefore be hypocritical to apply the "continuous jeopardy" 
theory only in cases where the accused appealed against his 
conviction. 
298At 466. (My emphasis). See the discussion of Tateo in chapter 
eight under 8.5.2, text at note 180. 
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be a high price indeed for society to pay were every 
accused granted immunity from punishment because of 
a defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the 
proceedings leading to the conviction. From the 
standpoint of a defendant, it is at least doubtful that 
appellate courts would be as zealous as they now are in 
protecting against the effects of improprieties at the trial 
or pretrial stage if they knew that reversal of a conviction 
would put the accused irrevocably beyond the reach of 
further prosecution. In reality, therefore, the practice of 
retrials serves defendants' rights as well as society's 
interests. 
This writer fully agrees with the above argument. It is submitted 
that, in terms of the provisions of the limitation clause of the South 
African Constitution, it is reasonable and justifiable to allow new trials 
in circumstances where the court of appeal was prevented from 
considering the merits of a case as a result of an irregularity or defect 
in the proceedings. It is reasonable and justifiable because the 
purpose of the limitation is not only to protect the state's interest in 
bringing offenders to justice, but also to protect the accused's 
interests as identified by the United States Supreme Court in Tateo. 
Moreover, there is a rational connection between the limitation and its 
purpose, and there is not a less restrictive means to achieve the 
purpose. 
However, it is submitted that in order to limit as little as possible the 
accused's right to be protected against double jeopardy, the state 
should be prohibited from bringing additional evidence at the second 
trial. As indicated in chapter eight, our courts have been relu<!_tant to 
remit cases for further evidence. 299 This thesis argues that the 
bringing of additional evidence at a second trial is unconstitutional and 
cannot be justified in terms of the provisions of the limitation clause. 
299See chapter eight supra under 8.6.2.3, text at note 446. 
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It is submitted that the prohibition on additional evidence will serve to 
prevent that the state gets an unfair advantage over the accused at 
the second trial and will minimise the possibility that an innocent 
person may be convicted. 
Consistent with the approach adopted above, it is furthermore 
submitted that the accused may not be convicted (on retrial) of a more 
serious offence than that of which he was previously convicted, and 
that a more severe punishment may not be imposed on him than 
originally imposed (at the first trial). 300 
However, this thesis argues that there is one instance where a new 
trial on appellate reversal of a conviction (on the basis of trial error) 
would not be reasonable and justifiable in terms of the limitation 
clause. This instance is where the irregularity that occurred at the trial 
can be viewed as a serious violation of a fundamental human right 
entrenched in the Constitution. It is submitted that retrial in such 
cases can never be regarded as justifiable or reasonable because it 
would undermine compliance by organs of state with the values on 
which the state is based. 
An English legal commentator recently criticised the reluctance of the 
English Court of Appeal to use its newly acquired powers, (namely to 
order retrials "if the interests of justice so requires") 301 to allow more 
appeals and prohibit retrials in cases of serious violations of due 
process values. 302 The commentator observed that allowing a retrial 
in such instances would mean that "an important opportunity for 
300See the submissions under 10. 7. 5 above. 
301 See chapter 8 supra under 8.2.2, text at note 11 for the relevant 
provision. 
302See Sanders A Criminal Justice 1994 444. 
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affirming fundamental due process values would be lost". 303 He also 
questioned304 
[whether] ... the police, the prosecution or the trial judge 
[would] remain faithful to the dictates of due process if 
the worse that can happen in the event of infidelity is 
that the initial adversarial fight is declared void and a 
rematch ordered ... 
The Supreme Court of Canada has recognised in Conway that a court 
may exercise its discretion to stay proceedings on the ground that 
unfair or oppressive treatment of an accused disentitles the crown to 
carry on with the prosecution. 305 The court explained that3°6 
304At 445. 
[t]he prosecution is set aside, not on the merits, ... but 
because it is tainted to such a degree that to allow it to 
proceed would tarnish the integrity of the court. The 
doctrine [of abuse of process] is one of the safeguards to 
ensure "that the repression of crime through the 
conviction of the guilty is done in a way which reflects 
our fundamental values as a a society". It acknowledges 
that courts must have the respect and support of the 
community in order that the administration of criminal 
justice may properly fulfil its function. Consequently, 
where the affront to fair play and decency is 
disproportionate to the societal interest in the effective 
prosecution of criminal cases, then the administration of 
justice is best served by staying the proceedings. 307 
305See the discussion of the decision in Conway in chapter three supra 
under 3.3.2, text at note 115. 
306 At 301-302, citing Lamer J in Rothman v The Queen ( 1981) 59 
CCC(2d)30, 69(SCC). 
307My emphasis. 
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South Africa has an unfortunate history of violation of fundamental 
human rights. The Constitution was adopted to create a Rechtsstaat, 
a !>tate under the rule of law, a state in which legality is respected. By 
recognising that new trials may be barred if a conviction is set aside 
on appeal as a result of an irregularity which amounts to a serious 
violation of human rights, the double jeopardy provision may serve the 
important purpose of compelling respect for the values on which our 
new order is based. 
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